Murphy v Electoral Commissioner

The High Court of Australia considered a constitutional challenge brought by two plaintiffs against the Electoral Commissioner concerning provisions of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Cth). The dispute centred on sections of the Act that prevented claims for enrolment, transfer of enrolment, or amendment of electoral rolls from being considered during a specific "suspension period," which ran from 8 pm on the day the rolls closed until the close of polling for an election. The plaintiffs argued that these provisions placed an unconstitutional burden on the mandate that Parliament be "directly chosen by the people," as enshrined in sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution.

The Court was required to determine whether the impugned provisions of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* (Cth) were invalid by reason of contravening sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution. This involved assessing whether the suspension period imposed an impermissible burden on the constitutional requirement for Parliament to be directly chosen by the people, and if so, whether any such burden was justified by a substantial reason. The Court also had to consider the standing of the plaintiffs to bring the proceedings and the consequential relief and costs.

The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs' case fundamentally misunderstood the nature of the constitutional mandate. Unlike cases where legislation actively reduced the scope of popular choice, this case concerned provisions that represented long-standing time limits for the finalisation of electoral rolls, which were essential for the orderly and efficient conduct of elections. The Court found that the suspension period was a design feature of the Act, serving legitimate purposes by defining the class of eligible participants in the electoral process and thereby advancing the efficient conduct of elections. The plaintiffs' attempt to rely on precedents like *Roach v Electoral Commissioner* and *Rowe v Electoral Commissioner* was found to be inapposite, as those cases dealt with laws that actively disqualified individuals from voting, whereas the impugned provisions did not disqualify anyone but rather regulated the timing of enrolment processes. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were essentially complaining that the legislature had not gone far enough in providing opportunities for enrolment, rather than that existing opportunities had been curtailed.

The Court answered the stated questions as follows: the second plaintiff had standing; sections 94A(4), 95(4), 96(4), 102(4), 103A(5), 103B(5), and 118(5) of the Act were not contrary to sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution and were therefore valid; and no relief should be granted. The first plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the special case.