Muriniti v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Muriniti v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 33

File numbers: NSD 1777 of 2019
NSD 1893 of 2019
Judgment of: MOSHINSKY J
Date of judgment: 30 January 2023
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – applications to set aside bankruptcy notices – where the applicants were legal practitioners and held professional indemnity insurance with the respondent (the Insurer) at the relevant time – where personal costs orders were made against the applicants by the Land and Environment Court – where the Insurer granted indemnity to the applicants in respect of the personal costs orders –where there was subsequent litigation between the Insurer and the applicants in the Supreme Court of NSW – where the Insurer was successful in that litigation and the applicants were ordered to pay indemnity costs of $294,912 – where the applicants failed to pay the judgment debt and the Insurer caused bankruptcy notices to be issued against the applicants based on the judgment debt and interest ($324,327) – where the applicants applied to this Court to set aside the bankruptcy notices on the basis of a counterclaim – where the applicants sought leave to “go behind” the judgments of the Supreme Court – whether the bankruptcy notices should be set aside – applications dismissed
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30, 40, 52
Cases cited:

Ebert v Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346

Gomez v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [2002] FCAFC 101

Gould v Day [1999] FCA 1650

Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd v Muriniti [2017] NSWSC 1557

Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd v Muriniti (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 558

Muriniti v King [2019] NSWCA 232

Muriniti v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 311

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132

Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 433

Re Capsanis; Capsanis v Owners – Strata Plan 11727 [2000] FCA 1262

Re Glew; Glew v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers (2003) 198 ALR 331

Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198

Sayer-Jones v Juju Bean Investments Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 177

Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212

Young v King [2013] NSWCA 364

Young v King [2016] NSWCA 282

Young v King (No 4) [2012] NSWLEC 236

Young v King (No 6) [2015] NSWLEC 111

Young v King (No 8) [2015] NSWLEC 187

Young v King (No 9) [2016] NSWLEC 4

Young v King (No 11) [2017] NSWLEC 34

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 89
Date of hearing: 9, 10 and 12 August 2022
Date of last submissions: 19 August 2022
Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr RD Newell of LC Muriniti & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr AR Zahra SC with Mr J Anderson
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

NSD 1777 of 2019
BETWEEN:

LEONARDO CARLO MURINITI

Applicant

AND:

LAWCOVER INSURANCE PTY LTD…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Muriniti and Newell, sought to set aside bankruptcy notices issued by Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd, which had been based on a judgment debt owed by them. The dispute arose from a series of legal proceedings involving professional indemnity insurance, personal costs orders, and subsequent litigation between the applicants and the Insurer. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the bankruptcy notices should be set aside, particularly considering the applicants' claim of bad faith on the part of the Insurer and their request to "go behind" previous Supreme Court judgments.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicants had a valid counterclaim against the Insurer that could be considered under section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, which allows for the setting aside of bankruptcy notices if the debtor has a counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand equal to or exceeding the judgment debt. The applicants argued that the Insurer acted in bad faith, leading to the Supreme Court Costs Orders, and they sought to rely on additional matters not previously considered in the Supreme Court proceedings. The Court also had to decide whether the applicants were entitled to "go behind" the Supreme Court judgments to address these new claims.

The Court concluded that while the principle of going behind a judgment applied in the context of setting aside bankruptcy notices, the applicants' claim of bad faith did not sufficiently justify setting aside the bankruptcy notices. The Court found that the applicants had not presented a compelling case for a counterclaim that equaled or exceeded the judgment debt. Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded that the alleged bad faith of the Insurer warranted disregarding the Supreme Court judgments. As a result, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notices was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the Insurer's costs of the proceeding. The Court also provided a mechanism for either party to seek a variation of the costs order by submitting written arguments within a specified timeframe.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant have leave to rely on the additional matters set out in the interlocutory application dated 8 July 2022 filed by the applicant in proceeding NSD1777/2019.

2. The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice be dismissed.

3. Subject to paragraph 4, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.

4. If either party seeks a variation of the costs order in paragraph 3, the party may file and serve within seven days a written submission (of no more than three pages) in support of a different costs order. In that event, the other party may within a further seven days file a responding submission (of no more than three pages), and the issue of costs will be determined on the papers.

[Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.]

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 40 relevantly provides:(1)A debtor commits an act of bankruptcy in each of the following cases:…(g)if a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order, being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed, has served on the debtor in Australia or, by leave of the Court, elsewhere, a bankruptcy notice under this Act and the debtor does not:(i)where the notice was served in Australia—within the time fixed for compliance with the notice; or(ii)where the notice was served elsewhere—within the time specified by the order giving leave to effect the service;comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the Court that he or she has a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand equal to or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt or sum payable under the final order, as the case may be, being a counter-claim, set-off or cross demand that he or she could not have set up in the action or proceeding in which the judgment or order was obtained;(Emphasis added.)The hearing and the evidence The hearing of the two proceedings took place in person in Court (as distinct from by video-conference, as was sometimes the case during 2022, due to the COVID-19 pandemic) over three hearing days. The applicants were jointly represented by Mr Newell (as advocate) and LC Muriniti & Associates (as solicitors) (with Mr Muriniti instructing). The material before the Court includes a statement of agreed facts and issues (SOAF) and an agreed chronology, both dated 13 March 2020. The applicants rely on the following documentary evidence:(a)affidavits of Mrs Young dated 4 September 2003, 15 December 2003, 23 May 2011, 12 April 2012, 1 March 2016 and 29 March 2018;(b)affidavits of Mr Muriniti dated 29 October 2019 (Muriniti 2019 Affidavit) and 26 July 2022;(c)affidavits of Mr Newell dated 12 November 2019, 20 March 2020 (5 pages in length, and without any annexures), 20 March 2020 (2 pages in length, plus 302 pages of annexures), 6 April 2020, 7 July 2022, 8 July 2022;(d)an affidavit of John Thomas Davies dated 28 July 2022;(e)a bundle of documents (listed in a schedule headed “Schedule of documents in respect of leave sought” dated 8 July 2022);(f)a Warringah Council memorandum addressed to Katrina Brown dated 9 November 2001;(g)a letter from Terence Stern to LC Muriniti & Associates dated 17 November 2008. The applicants subpoenaed Mrs Young to give oral evidence. Shortly before Mrs Young was due to commence her oral evidence, she provided to the Court (and the Court provided to the parties) an unsworn affidavit dated 8 August 2022 that she had prepared on her own, without legal assistance. The applicants did not rely on that affidavit or ask Mrs Young any questions about it during her evidence-in-chief. However, during cross-examination, senior counsel for the Insurer took Mrs Young to the unsworn affidavit and she adopted it. Senior counsel for the Insurer then tendered that affidavit. In the circumstances, I gave Mr Newell leave to ask questions in the nature of cross-examination during re-examination.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Although the present case involves applications to set aside bankruptcy notices, rather than the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Insurer accepted that the principles regarding going behind a judgment are applicable in the present context, noting that this has been accepted in a decision of a single Judge of this Court: see Sayer-Jones v Juju Bean Investments Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 177. In these circumstances, I will proceed on the assumption that the principles are applicable in the present context.Consideration The applicants contend that the bankruptcy notices should be set aside because they have a counterclaim for damages against the Insurer within the meaning of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. The applicants contend, in brief summary, that the Insurer acted in bad faith in the lead-up to Judgment 11 and in the period following Judgment 11 (in particular, in considering whether or not to appeal from the judgment) giving rise to a claim for damages against the Insurer. The applicants contend that the damages equal the amount of the Supreme Court Costs Orders. As part of their case, the applicants seek leave to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments on the bases or grounds set out in the Statement of Grounds. Relatedly, the applicants seek leave to rely on certain additional matters, as set out in the Interlocutory Application. As noted above, the hearing was conducted on the basis that I was dealing with both: (a) the question whether leave to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments should be granted; and (b) the substance of the matter should leave be granted. In support of the application to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments, Mr Newell submitted that “Mr Muriniti and Mr Newell acknowledge that they did not present their case properly before Sackar J” and that “critical matters were not ventilated” (T107). Mr Newell submitted that this was a sufficient basis to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments. I have some doubt as to whether this provides a sufficient basis to go behind the judgments in the circumstances of the present case. However, having regard to the nature of the applicants’ allegations (being allegations of bad faith against the Insurer), and in circumstances where the substance of the matters was fully argued in the proceedings before me, I consider it appropriate to deal with the matters raised by the applicants on their merits. I will therefore go behind the Supreme Court Judgments, and I will grant leave to the applicants to rely on the additional matters set out in the Interlocutory Application. As indicated above, one of the key arguments advanced by the applicants on the present applications is that Judgment 11 proceeds on an incorrect premise, namely that Judgment 6 had considered and resolved a conspiracy claim, that is, a claim by Mrs Young that the Kings, the relevant Council, certain legal representatives and certain experts had engaged in a conspiracy against her. The applicants submit that, in fact, Judgment 6 did not consider and resolve any such claim.