FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Muriniti v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 33
File numbers: NSD 1777 of 2019
NSD 1893 of 2019Judgment of: MOSHINSKY J Date of judgment: 30 January 2023 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – applications to set aside bankruptcy notices – where the applicants were legal practitioners and held professional indemnity insurance with the respondent (the Insurer) at the relevant time – where personal costs orders were made against the applicants by the Land and Environment Court – where the Insurer granted indemnity to the applicants in respect of the personal costs orders –where there was subsequent litigation between the Insurer and the applicants in the Supreme Court of NSW – where the Insurer was successful in that litigation and the applicants were ordered to pay indemnity costs of $294,912 – where the applicants failed to pay the judgment debt and the Insurer caused bankruptcy notices to be issued against the applicants based on the judgment debt and interest ($324,327) – where the applicants applied to this Court to set aside the bankruptcy notices on the basis of a counterclaim – where the applicants sought leave to “go behind” the judgments of the Supreme Court – whether the bankruptcy notices should be set aside – applications dismissed Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 30, 40, 52 Cases cited: Ebert v Union Trustee Co of Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 346
Gomez v State Bank of New South Wales Ltd [2002] FCAFC 101
Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd v Muriniti [2017] NSWSC 1557
Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd v Muriniti (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 558
Muriniti v King [2019] NSWCA 232
Muriniti v Lawcover Insurance Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWCA 311
Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton (2017) 261 CLR 132
Re Brink; Ex parte Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd (1980) 30 ALR 433
Re Capsanis; Capsanis v Owners – Strata Plan 11727 [2000] FCA 1262
Re Glew; Glew v Harrowell of Hunt & Hunt Lawyers (2003) 198 ALR 331
Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198
Sayer-Jones v Juju Bean Investments Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 177
Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212
Young v King (No 4) [2012] NSWLEC 236
Young v King (No 6) [2015] NSWLEC 111
Young v King (No 8) [2015] NSWLEC 187
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency Number of paragraphs: 89 Date of hearing: 9, 10 and 12 August 2022 Date of last submissions: 19 August 2022 Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr RD Newell of LC Muriniti & Associates Counsel for the Respondent: Mr AR Zahra SC with Mr J Anderson Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
NSD 1777 of 2019 BETWEEN: LEONARDO CARLO MURINITI
Applicant
AND: LAWCOVER INSURANCE PTY LTD…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 33
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the applicants had a valid counterclaim against the Insurer that could be considered under section 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act, which allows for the setting aside of bankruptcy notices if the debtor has a counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand equal to or exceeding the judgment debt. The applicants argued that the Insurer acted in bad faith, leading to the Supreme Court Costs Orders, and they sought to rely on additional matters not previously considered in the Supreme Court proceedings. The Court also had to decide whether the applicants were entitled to "go behind" the Supreme Court judgments to address these new claims.
The Court concluded that while the principle of going behind a judgment applied in the context of setting aside bankruptcy notices, the applicants' claim of bad faith did not sufficiently justify setting aside the bankruptcy notices. The Court found that the applicants had not presented a compelling case for a counterclaim that equaled or exceeded the judgment debt. Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded that the alleged bad faith of the Insurer warranted disregarding the Supreme Court judgments. As a result, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notices was dismissed, and the applicants were ordered to pay the Insurer's costs of the proceeding. The Court also provided a mechanism for either party to seek a variation of the costs order by submitting written arguments within a specified timeframe.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant have leave to rely on the additional matters set out in the interlocutory application dated 8 July 2022 filed by the applicant in proceeding NSD1777/2019.
2. The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice be dismissed.
3. Subject to paragraph 4, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding.
4. If either party seeks a variation of the costs order in paragraph 3, the party may file and serve within seven days a written submission (of no more than three pages) in support of a different costs order. In that event, the other party may within a further seven days file a responding submission (of no more than three pages), and the issue of costs will be determined on the papers.
[Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.]
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although the present case involves applications to set aside bankruptcy notices, rather than the hearing of a creditor’s petition, the Insurer accepted that the principles regarding going behind a judgment are applicable in the present context, noting that this has been accepted in a decision of a single Judge of this Court: see Sayer-Jones v Juju Bean Investments Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 177. In these circumstances, I will proceed on the assumption that the principles are applicable in the present context.Consideration The applicants contend that the bankruptcy notices should be set aside because they have a counterclaim for damages against the Insurer within the meaning of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act. The applicants contend, in brief summary, that the Insurer acted in bad faith in the lead-up to Judgment 11 and in the period following Judgment 11 (in particular, in considering whether or not to appeal from the judgment) giving rise to a claim for damages against the Insurer. The applicants contend that the damages equal the amount of the Supreme Court Costs Orders. As part of their case, the applicants seek leave to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments on the bases or grounds set out in the Statement of Grounds. Relatedly, the applicants seek leave to rely on certain additional matters, as set out in the Interlocutory Application. As noted above, the hearing was conducted on the basis that I was dealing with both: (a) the question whether leave to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments should be granted; and (b) the substance of the matter should leave be granted. In support of the application to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments, Mr Newell submitted that “Mr Muriniti and Mr Newell acknowledge that they did not present their case properly before Sackar J” and that “critical matters were not ventilated” (T107). Mr Newell submitted that this was a sufficient basis to go behind the Supreme Court Judgments. I have some doubt as to whether this provides a sufficient basis to go behind the judgments in the circumstances of the present case. However, having regard to the nature of the applicants’ allegations (being allegations of bad faith against the Insurer), and in circumstances where the substance of the matters was fully argued in the proceedings before me, I consider it appropriate to deal with the matters raised by the applicants on their merits. I will therefore go behind the Supreme Court Judgments, and I will grant leave to the applicants to rely on the additional matters set out in the Interlocutory Application. As indicated above, one of the key arguments advanced by the applicants on the present applications is that Judgment 11 proceeds on an incorrect premise, namely that Judgment 6 had considered and resolved a conspiracy claim, that is, a claim by Mrs Young that the Kings, the relevant Council, certain legal representatives and certain experts had engaged in a conspiracy against her. The applicants submit that, in fact, Judgment 6 did not consider and resolve any such claim.