Murdoch v Previtera & Anor t/as Alex Mackay & Co

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CITATION: Murdoch v Previtera & Anor t/as Alex Mackay & Co [2018] QCAT 35
PARTIES: NOELA AND PETER MURDOCH
(Applicant/Appellant)
v

PETER PREVITERA AND JOSEPH ALEXANDER MACKAY T/A ALEX MACKAY & CO
(Respondent)

APPLICATION NUMBER: OCL071-16
MATTER TYPE: Other civil dispute matters
HEARING DATE: On the papers
HEARD AT: Brisbane
DECISION OF: Justice Carmody
DELIVERED ON: 2 February 2018
DELIVERED AT: Brisbane
ORDERS MADE:

THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:

1.    The amended application is dismissed.

2.    A legally binding costs agreement between the parties is declared to exist.

CATCHWORDS:

PROFESSIONS AND TRADES – LAWYERS – REMUNERATION – COSTS AGREEMENTS – OTHER MATTERS – where the applicants claim to have retained the respondent law firm under an unwritten conditional fee agreement in a family law case – where the respondent claims a statutory costs agreement exists – where the key facts in issue were offer and acceptance –whether the applicants received a copy of the costs agreement – where their subsequent instructions to the respondent  indicate acceptance by conduct

REMEDIES – STATUTORY DECLARATION – JURISDICITION – DISCRETIONARY CONSIDERATIONS – where the filed application is for a QCAT Act declaration that a costs agreement does not legally exist – where the tribunal has discretion under s 328(8) Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) to decide whether or not a cost agreement exists

EVIDENCE – ADMISSIBILITY – TENDENCY, CO-INCIDENCE AND PROPENSITY – SIMILAR FACT EVIDENCE – where the parties accepted affidavit evidence of their respective witnesses in place of oral evidence for fact finding purposes – where circumstantial evidence of habit allowed to prove posting and receipt by inference – where adverse judicial findings about the applicants’ credit had previously been made in a similar dispute between the same parties – where the general exclusionary rules governing the admissibility of evidence do not apply – whether the opinion of a summary court and similar facts rationally affect the probability of a fact in issue in a later case

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ss 300, 319, 322, s 323(3)(c)(i), 326, 328(8)

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ss 3(b), 28(2)(3)(c), 28(2)(3)(e), 28(3)

Avis & Anor v Mark Bain Constructions Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 80

Borg v Northern Rivers Finance Pty Ltd
[2003] QSC 112
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Cheney v Spooner (1929) 41 CLR 532

Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1982) 43 ALR 313
Hehir v Smith [2002] QSC 92
Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470
Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587
Humphries v R (1987) 75 ALR 31

Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
Morrison v Jenkins (1949) 80 CLR 626
Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140

Pfenning v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461

Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd
(1940) 63 CLR 533
Purnell v Medical Board of Queensland
[1999] 1 Qd R 362
R v Redbourne [1993] 2 All ER 753
Re: B (Children) [2008] UKHL 35

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Details
Case
[2018] QCAT 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Murdoch v Previtera & Anor t/as Alex Mackay & Co concerned a dispute between the applicants and the respondent law firm regarding the existence of a costs agreement in a family law case. The applicants claimed they retained the respondent law firm under an unwritten conditional fee agreement, while the respondent argued a statutory costs agreement was in place. The key issue was whether the applicants had received a copy of the costs agreement and whether their subsequent instructions to the respondent indicated acceptance by conduct.

The court examined the evidence presented by both parties, including the acceptance of affidavits instead of oral testimony. The court found that the unsworn and untested depositions provided an inadequate evidentiary basis for credit-based findings. It also noted that the burden of proof rested on the respondent to prove the existence of the statutory costs agreement, as the applicants' liability for bills depended on its existence. The standard of proof required was a state of mind produced by logical reasoning under the influence of considerations such as the nature of the fact in question, the seriousness of the allegation, and the gravity of the consequences of a particular finding.

The tribunal ultimately dismissed the amended application and declared that a legally binding costs agreement existed between the parties. The court's decision was based on the evidence presented and the applicable legal principles. The orders of the tribunal declared the existence of the legally binding costs agreement between the parties, dismissing the applicants' claim that no such agreement existed.

Orders

Orders of the court

THE TRIBUNAL ORDERS THAT:

1. The amended application is dismissed.

2. A legally binding costs agreement between the parties is declared to exist.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The respondent sent tax invoice E1207 to the applicants care of the same address as the costs agreement on 18 July 2014 for all work done on their behalf in the file from 27 June 2014 to 16 July 2014 “… in excess of but say 25 hours by (a senior family lawyer) at $350 (an hour) consistent with the costs agreement and the reconfirmation of matters relating to the costs agreement once (the senior family lawyer) was instructed to deal with the children’s matter”. The fee “by reference to the costs agreement” was reduced to $8,750 (ex GST) because of a referral to the respondent by another firm. Outlays were $110. The applicants did not pay or respond. The evidence The parties agreed between themselves to accept affidavits (or written (but unsworn or unaffirmed) statements) of their respective witnesses instead of oral testimony without any being sworn or required by either of them for cross-examination and the veracity of what they depose to cannot be assessed by traditional methods. The applicants contend that their positive case of non-existence has to be accepted because it is the only direct evidence on point and is corroborated by their daughter. It is not inherently improbable, manifestly unreliable, weakened by cross-examination or contradicted and therefore it has to be accepted and a positive finding that there is no formal costs agreement in place is inevitable. However, there is no such rule of law or logic. In my opinion, unsworn and untested depositions[6] provide an inadequate evidentiary basis for a credit based finding either way.[6]Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140, 149 (Kitto J). Although commonly overrated as a barometer of truth, demeanour and cross-examination are still useful tools for testing the comparative credibility of conflicting, especially partisan, descriptions of the same event.[7][7]Piddington v Bennett & Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533, 545 (Latham CJ). Even honest and implacable people are prone to error and some people lie better than others tell the truth. The ultimate fact in issue, however, is the existence of the statutory costs agreement. The party “who will lose if no evidence is called”[8] or so evenly balanced that the choice between them is a “mere matter of conjecture”[9] bears the so called persuasive onus. Thus, insofar as the applicants’ liability for bills “in accordance” with the terms and conditions of the costs agreement depends on proof its existence, the burden of proof rests on the respondent’s shoulders. [8]R v Redbourne [1993] 2 All ER 753, 758.[9]Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470. The standard of proof or degree of certainty required for any relevant fact (ultimate or subordinate) to be found is a state of mind (usually referred to as the level of reasonable satisfaction) produced by logical reasoning under the influence of considerations such as the nature of the fact in question, the seriousness of the allegation and the gravity of the consequences of a particular finding and “inherent unlikelihoods.”[10] [10]Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 361-3 (Dixon J).

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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