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Munsie v Dowling

Munsie v Dowling

Case [2014] NSWSC 598 16 May 2014

Defamation

Injunction

Interlocutory Orders

Media & Entertainment Law

Tort Law

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Supreme Court

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Munsie v Dowling [2014] NSWSC 598
Hearing dates: 8 May 2014
Decision date: 16 May 2014
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Hall J
Decision:
(1) The defendant be restrained, until further order, from publishing:
(a) The Article and the Twitter Publication respectively identified in Exhibits JMM-1 and JMM-6 to the affidavit of Justine Melissa Munsie sworn 14 April 2014);
(b) The alleged imputations set out in the Statement of Claim filed herein on 15 April 2014;
(c) Any matter of and concerning the plaintiffs to the same effect as the Article, the Twitter Publication referred to in order 1(a) or the alleged imputations referred to in Order 1(b).
(2) The question of costs of the Notice of Motion is reserved.

Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - interlocutory relief - injunction - previous application for injunctive relief no bar to subsequent application on different ground - relevant principles in granting interlocutory injunctive relief in defamation proceeding - defendant restrained until further order from publishing the Article and Twitter publication - defendant restrained until further order from publishing the imputations set out in the statement of claim - defendant restrained until further order from publishing any matter of and concerning the plaintiffs to the same effect as the Article, the Twitter publication or the imputations - costs reserved
Legislation Cited: Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010
Cases Cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618
Church of Scientology of California Inc. v Readers Digest Services Pty Ltd (1980) 1 NSWLR 344
Jakudo Pty Ltd v South Australian Telecasters Limited (1997) 69 SASR 440
Munsie v Dowling [2014] NSWSC 548
Tate v Duncan-Strelec [2013] NSWSC 1446
Y and Z v W [2007] NSWCA 329; (2007) 70 NSWLR 377
Category: Interlocutory applications
Parties: Justine Munsie (First Plaintiff)
Kerry Stokes (Second Plaintiff)
Shane Dowling (Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
ATS Dawson (Plaintiffs)
In person (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Addisons (Plaintiffs)
In Person (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2014/114469

Judgment

Background

On 15 April 2014 proceedings were commenced by Statement of Claim filed in this Court by the first and second plaintiffs against the defendant in respect of an article published in or about February 2014, a copy of which is Confidential Exhibit JMM-1 to Ms Munsie's affidavit sworn 14 April 2014 to which I will refer below.

In paragraph [5] of the Statement of Claim the plaintiffs allege that the relevant article in its natural and ordinary meaning carried defamatory imputations in respect each of the plaintiffs. Paragraph [5] particularises in respect of each plaintiff the imputations relied upon.

On 6 May 2014, the plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion, also dated 6 May 2014, in which the following orders were sought:

"5. The defendant be restrained, until further order, from publishing:

a. The Article and the Twitter Publication (as defined in the affidavit of Justine Melissa Munsie sworn 14 April 2014);

b. The imputations set out in the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Munsie v Dowling

Details

AGLC: Munsie v Dowling [2014] NSWSC 598
Case: [2014] NSWSC 598
Decision Date: 16 May 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Munsie v Dowling was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiff sought injunctive relief against the defendant for defamation. The plaintiff, Munsie, alleged that the defendant, Dowling, had published defamatory material about them in an article and on Twitter. The court was required to decide whether to grant an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant from further disseminating the alleged defamatory content. The legal issues involved determining the appropriate criteria for granting such relief, including the balance of convenience and the need to protect the plaintiff's reputation.

The court considered the principles applicable to interlocutory injunctions in defamation cases, emphasising the importance of protecting the plaintiff's reputation while ensuring that the defendant's right to freedom of expression is not unjustly curtailed. The court found that the previous application for injunctive relief did not preclude a subsequent application on a different ground. It assessed the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff's reputation if the injunction was not granted and concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff. The court also noted that the publication of the defamatory material was likely to continue unless restrained.

As a result, the court granted the injunction, restraining the defendant from publishing the article and the Twitter publication, as well as any other matter concerning the plaintiff that conveyed the same defamatory imputations. The court reserved the issue of costs for a later determination. This decision underscores the court's commitment to protecting the plaintiff's reputation in defamation cases while carefully weighing the competing interests involved.

Orders