COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL)
CITATION: Mulholland v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 2
PARTIES: MULHOLLAND, Samuel William Murray v STATE OF TASMANIA
FILE NO: 1230/2016 DELIVERED ON: 14 March 2017 DELIVERED AT: Hobart HEARING DATE: 8 March 2017 JUDGMENT OF: Tennent, Pearce and Brett JJ
CATCHWORDS:
Criminal Law – Appeal and new trial – Appeal against sentence – Grounds for interference – Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate – Offender asserts manifest excessiveness – Rape – Sentence of imprisonment for 3½ years not manifestly excessive.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3521]
Criminal Law – Sentence – Relevant factors – Nature and circumstances of offender – Mental disorder - Relevance to sentence not demonstrated.
Criminal Law – Sentence – Relevant factors – Nature and circumstances of offender – Other matters – Consequences of conviction – Relevance of registration under Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005 as extra curial punishment.
Counsel: Appellant: G Barns Respondent: J Hartnett Solicitors: Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment Number: [2017] TASCCA 2 Number of paragraphs: 34
Serial No 2/2017
File No 1230/2016
SAMUEL WILLIAM MURRAY MULHOLLAND v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
TENNENT J PEARCE J BRETT J 14 March 2017
Order of the Court (8 March 2017)
Appeal dismissed.
Serial No 2/2017
File No 1230/2016
SAMUEL WILLIAM MURRAY MULHOLLAND v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
TENNENT J 14 March 2017
On 8 March 2017, following the hearing of this appeal, I joined in the making of an order dismissing it. I have now had the benefit of reading reasons prepared by Pearce J as to why he joined in the making of the order of dismissal. I agree with those reasons.
File No 1230/2016
SAMUEL WILLIAM MURRAY MULHOLLAND v STATE OF TASMANIA
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
PEARCE J 14 March 2017
The appellant, Samuel Mulholland, was found guilty by a jury of rape. He was sentenced by Porter J to imprisonment for 3½ years from 18 March 2016 with eligibility for parole after having served half the sentence. His Honour ordered that the appellant's name be placed on the register under the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005 (the Act) and that he comply with the requirements under that Act for a period of three years following release. This appeal challenges the sentence on the sole ground that it is manifestly excessive.
On 8 March 2017, after…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Mulholland v Tasmania [2017] TASCCA 2
Case
[2017] TASCCA 2
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania heard an appeal by the offender, Mulholland, against a sentence of imprisonment for three and a half years imposed upon him following a conviction for rape.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, thereby providing grounds for interference on appeal.
The Court considered the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the sentencing principles applicable to such matters. Applying these considerations, the Court concluded that the sentence of three and a half years imprisonment was not demonstrably outside the range of appropriate sentences for the offence of rape in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the sentence was not found to be manifestly excessive.