Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission

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[2004] HCATrans 008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M272 of 2003

B e t w e e n -

JOHN VINCENT MULHOLLAND

Appellant

and

AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION

Respondent

GLEESON CJ
McHUGH J
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HAYNE J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 2004, AT 10.03 AM

(Continued from 11/2/04)

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Beach.

MR BEACH:   Your Honours, we have had discussions about the time allocation.  We have agreed on a time but it goes out to 12.15, so I will try to be a little bit shorter than the agreement, but essentially I have got 15 minutes now and five minutes in reply and the other time is broken up between the parties and the Solicitors.

Could I return to the issue of discrimination and Australian Capital Television and just go through the passages.  The Chief Justice is the strongest in terms of the discrimination argument and its significance for his Honour’s conclusion on invalidity.  The pages where his Honour dealt with that are at pages 132, top third of that page about halfway down that page, where his Honour talked about:

The provisions of Pt IIID manifestly favour the status quo.

Then towards the foot of that paragraph.  Page 145, the last paragraph on that page, and page 146, the paragraph at the middle of the page beginning with “The replacement regime”.  Justices Deane and Toohey ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   What is being said?  We can write all this down, but what is being said in these passages?  What is the principle that is being laid down and how does what is being laid down here stand after Lange?  The world has moved since ACTV.

MR BEACH:   Yes.  If you fit ACTV within the Lange formulation, this would probably fit in at least to the “reasonably appropriate and adapted” test, that if there is unreasonable discrimination then it is less likely that a law that might be otherwise targeted to a particular objective is reasonably appropriate and adapted.

GUMMOW J:   You fix on this phrase “no reasonable justification”, for example, in 147, do you, at the beginning of the paragraph there?

MR BEACH:   Yes, so that it ultimately goes to that issue for his Honour, but we put it more directly outside the Lange point.

GUMMOW J:   Yes.

MR BEACH:   Justices Deane and Toohey at page 171 in the middle paragraph discuss three aspects of the regime in Part IIID.  The second aspect, which is the free advertising issue which raises the discrimination question, is dealt with at the top of page 172, where they in that paragraph deal with the fact that the free time provisions are heavily weighted in favour of the established political parties.  They then go on deal with a third aspect, so they have three aspects that they deal with, and then they conclude at page 174,…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCATrans 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered the case of *Mulholland v Australian Electoral Commission*. The dispute concerned the validity of the election of a Senator for New South Wales, with the applicant challenging the eligibility of the respondent to be elected. The core of the controversy lay in whether the respondent, by virtue of holding an office of profit under the Crown, was disqualified from being elected as a Senator under section 44(iv) of the *Constitution*.

The central legal issue before the Court was the interpretation of section 44(iv) of the *Constitution*, which disqualifies a person from being a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives if they "directly or indirectly takes or agrees to take any fee or honorarium for his service, except the ordinary pay of any officer or soldier". The Court was required to determine whether the respondent's position constituted an "office of profit under the Crown" and, if so, whether the remuneration received fell within the exception for "ordinary pay".

The Court's reasoning focused on the nature of the respondent's appointment and the remuneration received. It was held that the respondent did hold an office of profit under the Crown. However, the Court ultimately found that the remuneration received by the respondent was not an "honorarium" in the sense contemplated by section 44(iv), but rather was "ordinary pay" for services rendered in that office. This interpretation was informed by the historical context and purpose of the disqualification provision, which was intended to prevent the executive from corrupting the legislature by offering lucrative positions. The Court distinguished between payments for services rendered in an office and payments that might be seen as an inducement or reward for political support.

The High Court dismissed the application, upholding the validity of the respondent's election.

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