Ms Carradene Leanne Boyer v Richard George Hogan Pty Ltd/Trustee for the Jack Chevarna and Mishalle Family Trust T/A Hogan Civil Contracting
[2022] FWC 2211
•24 OCTOBER 2022
| [2022] FWC 2211 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Ms Carradene Leanne Boyer
v
Richard George Hogan Pty Ltd/Trustee for The Jack Chevarna and Mishalle Family Trust T/A Hogan Civil Contracting
(U2022/2660)
| DEPUTY PRESIDENT BINET | PERTH, 24 OCTOBER 2022 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy
On 2 March 2022, Ms Carradene Boyer (Ms Boyer) filed an application (Application) pursuant to section 394 of Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FW Act) with the Fair Work Commission (FWC) alleging she was unfairly dismissed by Richard George Hogan Pty Ltd/Trustee for The Jack Chevarna and Mishalle Family Trust T/A Hogan Civil Contracting (Hogan Contracting).
On 23 March 2022 the FWC sent a copy of the Application to Hogan Contracting’s business email address. The attached correspondence instructed Hogan Contracting to file a Form F3 - Employer’s Response to unfair dismissal application (Form F3) within seven days.
On the same day a Notice of Listing was sent to Hogan Contracting’s business email address advising that the Application had been listed for a staff conciliation by telephone on 3 May 2022.
On 28 April 2022, a FWC Staff Conciliator left a voicemail for the Managing Director of Hogan Contracting, Mr Richard Hogan (Mr Hogan), requesting that he provide contact details for the 3 May 2022 conciliation. On the same date, an email was sent to Mr Hogan confirming the request that he provide his phone number for the staff conciliation and advising that the Form F3 was overdue.
On 2 May 2022, the FWC Staff Conciliator left a further voicemail for Mr Hogan requesting an urgent call back regarding the overdue Form F3 and his contact details for the staff conciliation.
On the same date the FWC Staff Conciliator called the business telephone number listed on the website of Hogan Contracting, to confirm that Mr Hogan’s email address was correct and requesting that he call back urgently. The person who answered the phone provided an alternative email address for Mr Hogan. The Staff Conciliator then sent an email to that address confirming the telephone call and requesting that Mr Hogan call the FWC urgently.
On the afternoon of 2 May 2022, a different member of FWC staff spoke to Hogan Contracting’s bookkeeper on the telephone who advised there had been a death in Mr Hogan’s family.
On 3 May 2022 Mr Hogan did not attend the telephone conciliation or return four voice messages left between 9:15am and 9:45am. A member of Hogan Contracting staff called the FWC Registry and confirmed that Mr Hogan would not attend conciliation and she had not been able to contact him that day.
On 3 May 2022, Hogan Contracting were informed that if no response was received within two working days, the Application would be referred directly to a Member for the Application to be determined. Hogan Contracting did not respond within this time period.
The Application was subsequently allocated to my Chambers for determination.
On 17 May 2022, my Chambers sent an email to Hogan Contracting directing Hogan Contracting to file the Form F3 by 4pm 20 May 2022. In the same correspondence Hogan Contracting were informed that an in-person conciliation conference had been listed for 12pm 17 June 2022. A further email attaching a Notice of Listing was sent via email on the same date.
On 23 May 2022, my Chambers emailed Hogan Contracting advising that in the absence of Hogan Contracting filing a Form F3 by 4pm the following day the conciliation would be vacated and directions issued for the filing of materials for the determination of the Application.
On 25 May 2022 my Chambers emailed the parties advising that in the absence of a response from Hogan Contracting, the conciliation conference listing had been vacated and that directions would shortly be issued. In the same correspondence Hogan Contracting were informed that if Hogan Contracting failed to file materials in compliance with the directions the Application would be decided solely on the basis of materials filed by Ms Boyer.
On 1 June 2022 directions were issued to parties (Directions):
a.by email to [email protected],
b.via the Hogan Civil Contracting’s website enquiry form;
c.by registered post to Hogan Civil Contracting’s business address – 133 Mandurah Terrace, Mandurah WA 6210 (Mandurah Address); and
d.by registered post to the address identified in Ms Boyer’s Form F2 for Hogan Civil Contracting - 31 Pateman Place, South Yunderup WA 6280 (South Yunderup Address).
On the same date my Associate called the business telephone number of Hogan Contracting to alert the business to the arrival of the Directions.
The Directions required Hogan Contracting to file and serve its submissions, evidence and Form F3 response by Thursday 9 June 2022.
Hogan Contracting failed to file any materials by this date or by the date of this decision.
On 28 June 2022 Hogan Contracting were informed via email, and registered post to Hogan Civil Contracting’s Mandurah Address and South Yunderup Address that the Application would be decided solely on the materials provided by Ms Boyer.
On 7 July 2022 and 14 July 2022 Ms Boyer filed materials in support of her Application. Copies of these materials were forwarded by via email, and registered Post to Hogan Civil Contracting’s Mandurah Address and South Yunderup Address.
On 3 August 2022 my Associate left a voicemail for Mr Hogan explaining that a decision would be made solely on materials provided by Ms Boyer if he did not respond in writing to Chambers.
On 23 August 2022, my Chambers wrote to the Parties and advised them that I had reserved my Decision in this matter.
On 16 September 2022 Mr Hogan made contact with my Chambers via a telephone and confirmed that his email address and South Yunderup address were correct. He was advised that he could seek leave to file his materials late.
On 19 September 2022 Chambers sent a text message to Mr Hogan which stated:
“Dear Mr Hogan,
Re: U2022/2660 – Boyer v Hogan Civil Contracting
Chambers spoke to you at 4.20pm Friday 16 September 2022 in relation to the above matter which is currently before Deputy President Binet at the Fair Work Commission. The Deputy President informs you that she has reserved her decision in this matter. If you wish to make submissions to file materials late, you can email [email protected] by 4pm (AWST) Wednesday 21 September 2022. In the absence of receiving any submissions by the due date, a Decision will be issued based on the materials before the Deputy President filed by the Applicant.
Associate to Deputy President Binet at the Fair Work Commission”
As at the date of this decision Hogan Contracting have not filed a Form F3 or any other materials in response to the Application. The Application has therefore been determined solely on the basis of the materials filed by Ms Boyer.
Evidence
Ms Boyer filed the following materials in support of the Application:
a.Her signed witness statement dated 4 July 2022.
b.Her Form F2 – Unfair Dismissal Application dated 2 March 2022.
c.Her last pay slip with Hogan Contracting.
d.Her Employment Agreement dated 21 August 2020.
e.An email to Mr Hogan on 1 March 2022 asking him to confirm her employment status.
f.A witness statement of Ms Nicola Carr (Ms Carr) a bookkeeper who provided book keeping services to Hogan Contracting and who was present on the last day Ms Boyer worked.
g.Payslips for week ending 23 June 2022 and 7 July 2022 for her new employment.
h.Submissions with respect to the merits of the Application.
Background
Hogan Contracting is an earthworks contractor.
Ms Boyer commenced working with Hogan Contracting on 17 August 2020 as an Operations Director pursuant to an Offer of Employment dated 21 August 2020.[1] Her total renumeration package was $100,000 per year plus superannuation.[2]
Ms Boyer was employed on a full time basis to help run the business reporting directly to Mr Hogan. Her duties included recruitment, mobilisation and business development.[3]
As Hogan Contracting did not have office space Ms Boyer would primarily work from her home in Scarborough. Ms Boyer would travel to the Mandarah and South Yunderup region to meet up with Mr Hogan once a week.[4]
Ms Boyer says that her role was demanding. For example, she says she worked for a period of 10 weeks without a break for 10-14 hours a day in order to support a new project the business had secured.[5]
On Friday 11 February 2022 Ms Boyer was working at Mr Hogan’s home when Mr Hogan requested that she help to set up his new phone and put a logo on his LinkedIn page. Ms Boyer says that she told Mr Hogan that the logo didn’t have the correct pixels and she was unable to resize it as it was blurry. According to Ms Boyer, Mr Hogan retorted that his ex-girlfriend had been able to set up his previous logo. Ms Boyer says that she suggested that Mr Hogan could seek his ex-girlfriend’s assistance with his new logo. [6]
Ms Boyer claims that Mr Hogan stood up and started yelling at Ms Boyer and said that Ms Boyer should not mention his ex-girlfriend’s name. Ms Boyer says that Mr Hogan threw his phone on the ground multiple times until it was smashed. [7]
Ms Boyer told Mr Hogan that he should not speak to her in that manner and that she was sick of him yelling at her. Ms Boyer packed up her belongings and left Mr Hogan’s home. Ms Boyer alleges that Mr Hogan had inappropriately raised his voice at her multiple times in the past.[8]
Ms Carr who is an external book keeper for Hogan Civil Contracting was present at the time of the incident. Ms Boyer says that Ms Carr subsequently contacted Ms Boyer the same day to check if Ms Boyer was ok. [9]
The following day Ms Boyer logged into her computer to do some work from her home and says that all of her passwords had been cancelled and she was unable to log into her laptop.[10]
On Monday morning Ms Boyer says that she received a call from Ms Carr. According to Ms Boyer she was advised by Ms Carr that Mr Hogan had instructed Ms Carr to ascertain out how much it would cost to ‘pay out’ Ms Boyer. Ms Boyer says that Ms Carr told her that when she informed Mr Hogan of the sum owed to Ms Boyer he stated that he would not pay Ms Boyer anything.
In her witness statement, Ms Carr states that:[11]
“I had already paid Carradene (Ms Boyer) for the week ending 11 February 2022. The following week Richard (Mr Hogan) instructed me to pay Ms Boyer a mix of annual and personal leave as she had gone to see family in Sydney”.
Ms Boyer received a payslip for the pay period of 14 February 2022 until 20 February 2022 recording that she had been paid accrued leave of 24 hours of annual leave and 16 hours of person/carers leave.[12]
Ms Carr says that she advised Mr Hogan that Ms Boyer had additional accrued annual leave owing to her. Ms Carr says that Mr Hogan instructed her not pay Ms Boyer anything further because Ms Boyer had walked out of her job without resigning or giving notice.
Ms Boyer says that a few day after her conversation with Ms Carr someone attended her home and collected the business laptop from her.[13]
Ms Boyer emailed Mr Hogan on 1 March 2022 asking him to provide an update on the status of her employment. She days she did not receive any response.[14]
Ms Boyer filed the Application on 2 March 2022.
Ms Boyer commenced a new job in Karratha on 4 April 2022. Her annual salary in her new role is $100,000.[15]
Ms Boyer seeks an order for payment of compensation.
Is Ms Boyer protected from unfair dismissal?
An order for reinstatement or compensation may only be issued if Ms Boyer was unfairly dismissed and Ms Boyer was protected from unfair dismissal at the time of her dismissal.
Section 382 of the FW Act provides that a person is protected from unfair dismissal if, at the time of being dismissed:
a.the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and
b.one or more of the following apply:
i.a modern award covers the person;
ii.an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;
iii.the sum of the person’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (FW Regulations), is less than the high income threshold.
The high income threshold for a dismissal taking effect on or before 30 June 2022 was $158,500.
For the purposes of Part 3-2 of the FW Act an employer means a national system employer and an employee means an employee of a national system employer. There is no dispute that Hogan Contracting is a national system employer[16] Ms Boyer is therefore a national system employee.
If the employer is not a small business, the ‘minimum employment period’ is six months ending at the earlier of the following times:[17]
a.the time when the person is given notice of the dismissal; or
b.immediately before the dismissal.
There is no dispute, and I am satisfied based on the evidence of Ms Boyer, that Hogan Contracting is not a small business employer for the purposes of section 383 of the FW Act.[18]
Ms Boyer commenced employment with Hogan Civil Contracting on 17 August 2022.[19] Ms Boyer was dismissed on 11 February 2022.[20]
I am therefore satisfied that, at the time of dismissal, Ms Boyer was an employee who had completed a period of employment of at least the minimum employment period.
It was not in dispute and I find that, at the time of dismissal, the sum of Ms Boyer’s annual rate of earnings (being $100,000) together with such other amounts worked out in accordance with Regulation 3.05 of the FW Regulations was less than the high income threshold.
Consequently, I am satisfied that Ms Boyer was protected from unfair dismissal.
Was Ms Boyer unfairly dismissed?
Section 385 of the FW Act provides that a person has been unfairly dismissed if the FWC is satisfied that:
a.the person has been dismissed;
b.the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable;
c.the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (SBFD Code); and
d.the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy.
Was Ms Boyer dismissed?
Section 386(1) of the FW Act provides that a person has been dismissed if the person’s employment was terminated at the employer’s initiative or the person resigned from their employment but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by their employer.
Section 386(2) of the FW Act sets out circumstances where an employee has not been dismissed, none of which are presently relevant.
Ms Boyer says that in the days following the discussion on 11 February 2022:
a.Her password access on her laptop was cancelled.
b.The company belongings in her possession were collected from her home.
c.Mr Hogan did not respond to her email requesting that he confirm her employment status.
While Ms Carr says that that Mr Hogan told her that Ms Boyer resigned this is inconsistent with Ms Boyer’s evidence that she contacted Mr Hogan seeking to confirm her employment status.
I find, based on the evidence before me, that Ms Boyer’s employment with Hogan Contracting was terminated at the initiative of Hogan Contracting.[21]
I am therefore satisfied that Ms Boyer has been dismissed within the meaning of section 385 of the FW Act.
Was Ms Boyer’s dismissal a case of genuine redundancy?
Pursuant to section 389 of the FW Act, a person’s dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy if:
a.the employer no longer required the person’s job to be performed by anyone because of changes in the operational requirements of the employer’s enterprise; and
b.the employer has complied with any obligation in a modern award or enterprise agreement that applied to the employment to consult about the redundancy.
It was not in dispute, and I find, that Ms Boyer’s dismissal was not due to Hogan Contracting no longer requiring her job to be performed by anyone because of changes in Hogan Contracting’s operational requirements.[22]
I am therefore satisfied that the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy.
Was Ms Boyer’s dismissal consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code?
Section 388 of the FW Act provides that a person’s dismissal is consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal (SBFD) Code if:
a.immediately before the time of the dismissal or at the time the person was given notice of the dismissal (whichever happened first), the person’s employer was a small business employer; and
b.the employer complied with the SBFD Code in relation to the dismissal.
It was not in dispute, and based on the evidence of Ms Boyer I find, that Hogan Contracting was not a small business employer within the meaning of section 23 of the FW Act at the relevant time, having in excess of fourteen (14) employees.[23]
As Hogan Contracting is not a small business employer within the meaning of the FW Act, I am satisfied that the SBFD Code does not apply to Ms Boyer’s dismissal.
Was the Application made within the period required?
Pursuant to section 396 of the FW Act, the FWC is obliged to decide whether an application was made within the period required in subsection 394(2) of the FW Act before considering the merits of an application.
Section 394(2) of the FW Act requires that the Application is to be made within twenty-one (21) days after the dismissal took effect.
It is not disputed, and I find, that Ms Boyer was dismissed from her employment on 11 February 2022 and made the Application on 2 March 2022. I am therefore satisfied that the Application was made within the period required in subsection 394(2) of the FW Act.
Was the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable?
The ambit of the conduct which may fall within the phrase ‘harsh, unjust or unreasonable’ was explained in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd by McHugh and Gummow JJ as follows:
“…. It may be that the termination is harsh but not unjust or unreasonable, unjust but not harsh or unreasonable, or unreasonable but not harsh or unjust. In many cases the concepts will overlap. Thus, the one termination of employment may be unjust because the employee was not guilty of the misconduct on which the employer acted, may be unreasonable because it was decided upon inferences which could not reasonably have been drawn from the material before the employer, and may be harsh in its consequences for the personal and economic situation of the employee or because it is disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct in respect of which the employer acted.”[24]
Section 387 of the FW Act provides that, in considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:
a.whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees);
b.whether the person was notified of that reason;
c.whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person;
d.any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal;
e.if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person – whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal;
f.the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal;
g.the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
h.any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.
Each of these criteria must be considered to the extent they are relevant to the factual circumstances of the Application.[25]
Was there a valid reason for the dismissal related to Ms Boyer’s capacity or conduct?
In order to be a valid reason, the reason for the dismissal should be “sound, defensible or well founded”[26] and should not be “capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced.”[27] It is not the role of the FWC to stand in the shoes of the employer and determine what the FWC would do if it was in the position of the employer.[28]
The employer carries the onus of establishing a valid reason.[29]
Hogan Contracting have provided no evidence that it had a valid reason for terminating Ms Boyer’s employment. Ms Boyer’s evidence is that she had performed her duties well and have never been notified of any performance deficiencies.
Based on the evidence before me I find that there was no valid reason for Ms Boyer’s dismissal related to Ms Boyer’s capacity or conduct.
Was Ms Boyer notified of the valid reason?
Notification of a valid reason for termination must be given to an employee protected from unfair dismissal before the decision is made to terminate their employment,[30] and in explicit,[31] plain and clear terms.[32]
There is no evidence that Ms Boyer was notified of the reasons for her dismissal.
Was Ms Boyer given an opportunity to respond to any valid reason related to his capacity or conduct?
An employee protected from unfair dismissal should be provided with an opportunity to respond to any reason for their dismissal relating to their conduct or capacity. An opportunity to respond is to be provided before a decision is taken to terminate the employee’s employment.[33]
The opportunity to respond does not require formality and this factor is to be applied in a common sense way to ensure the employee is treated fairly.[34] Where the employee is aware of the precise nature of the employer’s concern about his or her conduct or performance and has a full opportunity to respond to this concern, this is enough to satisfy the requirements.[35]
There is no evidence that Ms Boyer was given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for her dismissal prior to the decision to dismiss being made.
Did Hogan Contracting unreasonably refuse to allow Ms Boyer to have a support person present to assist at discussions relating to the dismissal?
Where an employee protected from unfair dismissal has requested a support person be present to assist in discussions relating to the dismissal, an employer should not unreasonably refuse that person being present.
There is no positive obligation on an employer to offer an employee the opportunity to have a support person:
“This factor will only be a relevant consideration when an employee asks to have a support person present in a discussion relating to dismissal and the employer unreasonably refuses. It does not impose a positive obligation on employers to offer an employee the opportunity to have a support person present when they are considering dismissing them.” [36]
As I have found that no discussions were held by Hogan Contracting with Ms Boyer wish respect to her proposed dismissal I have therefore treated this factor as neutral in this Application.
Was Ms Boyer warned about unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal?
As there is no evidence that Ms Boyer’s dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance, I have treated this factor as neutral in this Application.
To what degree would the size of Hogan Contracting’s enterprise and the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal?
While not a small business for the purposes of the FW Act it would appear that Hogan Contracting lacked internal, or access to external, human resource expertise.
What other matters are relevant?
Section 387(h) of the FW Act requires the FWC to take into account any other matters that the FWC considers relevant to determining whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
Neither party have identified any relevant matters not otherwise dealt with elsewhere in this decision.
Conclusion
I have made findings in relation to each matter specified in section 387 of the FW Act as relevant.
I have considered and given due weight to each factor as a fundamental element in determining whether the termination was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. [37]
Having considered each of the matters specified in section 387 of the FW Act, I am satisfied that the dismissal of Ms Boyer was harsh, unjust and unreasonable.
Being satisfied that the dismissal was harsh, unjust and unreasonable, I am satisfied that Ms Boyer was unfairly dismissed within the meaning of section 385 of the FW Act.
Remedy
Section 390 of the FW Act provides that an order for a remedy for unfair dismissal can only be made in the following circumstances:
“390 When the Commission may order remedy for unfair dismissal
(1)Subject to subsection (3), the Commission may order a person’s reinstatement, or the payment of compensation to a person, if:
(a) the Commission is satisfied that the person was protected from unfair dismissal (see Division 2) at the time of being dismissed; and
(b) the person has been unfairly dismissed (see Division 3).
(2) The Commission may make the order only if the person has made an application under section 394.
(3) The Commission must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:
(a) the Commission is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and
(b) the Commission considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.”
I am satisfied that Ms Boyer:
a.made an application for an order granting a remedy under section 394;
b.was a person protected from unfair dismissal; and
c.as unfairly dismissed within the meaning of section 385 of the FW Act,
Ms Boyer seeks an order for compensation. Regardless of the remedy sought by Ms Boyer section 390(3) of the FW Act, prohibits the making of an order for the payment of compensation unless reinstatement is inappropriate and payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
Ms Boyer since her dismissal has found employment elsewhere. Given the evidence of Ms Carr I am believe it unlikely that the necessary trust and confidence could be restored between Ms Boyer and Mr Hogan to make her reinstatement tenable and I therefore consider reinstatement inappropriate.
Having found that reinstatement is inappropriate, it does not automatically follow that a payment for compensation is appropriate. As noted by the Full Bench in Nguyen v Vietnamese Community in Australia t/a Vietnamese Community Ethnic School South Australia Chapter: [38]
“The question whether to order a remedy in a case where a dismissal has been found to be unfair remains a discretionary one…”
Where an applicant has suffered financial loss as a result of the dismissal, this may be a relevant consideration in the exercise of this discretion.[39]
Ms Boyer did not receive wages between 11 February 2022 and 4 April 2022. The payment received for the pay period from 14 February 2022 to 20 February 2022 was for her accrued leave entitlements. There is no evidence that she intended to take leave during this period.
In all the circumstances, I consider that an order for payment of compensation is appropriate because of the financial loss she has suffered.
Applying the Sprigg Formula[40] and ensuring that the amount of compensation is appropriate having regard to all the circumstances of the case I am satisfied that it is appropriate to award Ms Boyer compensation of 7 weeks pay less taxation as required by law plus superannuation.
An Order[41] to this effect will be issued with this Decision.
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
[1] Digital Court Book, 2, 13 (‘DCB’).
[2] Ibid 14.
[3] Ibid 2, 16.
[4] Ibid 2.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid 2, 23.
[7] Ibid 2.
[8] Ibid 2.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid 23.
[12] Ibid 3.
[13] Ibid 26.
[14] Ibid 3, 22.
[15] Ibid 3, 24.
[16] Ibid 26.
[17] Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 383.
[18] DCB (n 1) 26.
[19] Ibid 26.
[20] Ibid 26.
[21] Ibid 26.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] (1995) 185 CLR 410, 465 (McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[25] Sayer v Melsteel Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 7498, 4 [14]; Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd PR915674 (AIRCFB), (Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002), [69].
[26] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371, 373.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Walton v Mermaid Dry Cleaners Pty Ltd(1996) 142 ALR 681, 685.
[29] Culpeper v Intercontinental Ship Management Pty Ltd (2004) 134 IR 243.
[30] Crozier v Palazzo Corporation Pty Ltd (2000) 98 IR 137, 151 [73] .
[31] Previsic v Australian Quarantine Inspection Services Print Q3730 (AIRC, Holmes C, 6 October 1998).
[32] Ibid.
[33] Crozier (n 160), 151 [75].
[34] Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology v Asher (2010) 194 IR 1, 14 – 15 [26] quoting Gibson v Bosmac Pty Ltd (1995) 60 IR 1, 7 (Wilcox CJ).
[35] Gibson v Bosmac Pty Ltd (1995) 60 IR 1, 7 (Wilcox CJ).
[36] Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth), [1542].
[37] ALH Group Pty Ltd t/a The Royal Exchange Hotel v Mulhall (2002) 117 IR 357, [51]. See also Smith v Moore Paragon Australia Ltd PR915674 (AIRCFB, Ross VP, Lacy SDP, Simmonds C, 21 March 2002), [92]; Edwards v Justice Giudice [1999] FCA 1836, [6]–[7].
[38] Nguyen v Vietnamese Community in Australia t/a Vietnamese Community Ethnic School South Australia Chapter[2014] FWCFB 7198, [9].
[39] Vennix v Mayfield Childcare Ltd [2020] FWCFB 550, [20]; Jeffrey v IBM Australia Ltd [2015] FWCFB 4171, [5]-[7].
[40] (1998) 88 IR 21.
[41] PR747104.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
<PR744978>
0
13
0