Mr Sivananthan Sagadevan v FedEx Express Australia Pty Ltd
[2025] FWC 1618
•23 JUNE 2025
| [2025] FWC 1618 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
| DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy
Mr Sivananthan Sagadevan
v
FedEx Express Australia Pty Ltd
(U2025/3741)
| COMMISSIONER REDFORD | MELBOURNE, 23 JUNE 2025 |
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – application dismissed
On 5 May 2025 Mr Sivananthan Sagadevan (Mr Sagadevan) filed an application pursuant to s 394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) seeking a remedy in relation to unfair dismissal with respect to his former employer, FedEx Express Australia Pty Ltd (FedEx).
The application was the subject of a hearing conducted in the Commission at Melbourne on 12 June 2025. Mr Sagadevan was assisted at the hearing by an interpreter, and by his support person, Ms Turga Chandran, who advocated on his behalf. Ms Catherine Tirado appeared for FedEx.
Prior to the hearing, the parties filed and served Outlines of Argument, Statements of Evidence and other documentary material. Evidence was given for FedEx by Mr Brent Francis, who had worked with Mr Sagadevan and is an Operations Manager for FedEx. Evidence was also given by Ms Yakshini Subramaniam, a FedEx employee and Mr Sagadevan’s former partner. Each of these persons gave evidence at the hearing and was subjected to cross examination.
In Reply Submissions, Mr Sagadevan submitted that Ms Subramaniam had not given direct evidence in the matter, and thus the Respondent had not discharged an evidentiary burden in relation to part of the allegations made against him. This submission has no merit. A statement was filed by FedEx made by Ms Subramanian – it was a police statement she had made which I was asked to take as her witness statement – and did so. She confirmed the veracity of that Statement under oath and was subjected to cross examination.
Mr Sagadevan filed a Statement of Evidence, an Outline of Argument and an Outline of Submissions in Reply. He also filed several other documents containing his own assertions of fact and argument. His Form F2 Application also contained a range of factual assertions. I took all of this material into evidence, after Mr Sagadevan confirmed its veracity under oath. He was also subjected to cross examination.
The nature of the evidence
As is dealt with in more detail below, FedEx terminated Mr Sagadevan’s employment after he was involved in an incident which included unwelcome physical contact he engaged in with respect to his former partner, Ms Subramaniam, while they were both at work. In a “show cause” process conducted by FedEx, Mr Sagadevan provided a written response in which he conceded that he kissed Ms Subramaniam, and in which he recognised his behaviour was “extremely inappropriate”. However, despite having been reasonably forthcoming in this initial response, during the course of this proceeding, it appeared to me that Mr Sagadevan struggled to provide a fulsome and honest account of his conduct. I will stop short of suggesting Mr Sagadevan was deliberately untruthful. Rather, it appeared to me that the process of the litigation drew him into attempts to rationalise his conduct to the point where he may have formulated an alternative and self-serving reality which impugns his credibility. For this reason, where there was an inconsistency between Mr Sagadevan’s evidence and other evidence before me, I generally prefer the other evidence.
Findings of fact
Consistent with his apparent difficulty in providing an honest and fulsome account of his conduct, Mr Sagadevan sought to draw my attention to a range of matters which were either peripherally relevant or not relevant at all to the matter I must determine in relation to this application. For example, Mr Sagadevan appeared to submit to me that he is also a “victim” in this matter, and it is unfair that supports provided to Ms Subramanium by FedEx contrast with a lack of support it provided to him. While these kinds of submissions did not assist Mr Sagadevan, I have considered all of the material provided to the Commission by both parties in relation to this matter even if not directly referred to below in my summary findings of fact about this matter. That summary follows.
Mr Sagadevan began working for FedEx on 15 August 2022 and, after the termination of his employment on 5 March 2025, had worked for two years and five months.
Mr Sagadevan worked as a courier. He worked out of depots in Dandenong and Hallam in Victoria.
Mr Sagadevan claims to have experienced mental health and substance abuse problems, and some information was provided to the Commission of a medical nature which appeared to confirm this is the case.
Mr Sagadevan’s former partner, Ms Subramanium, also works for FedEx as a courier. At some point Mr Sagadevan and Ms Subramanium became estranged. In January 2025 an Order often described in these proceedings as an “AVO” (Apprehended Violence Order) was made against Mr Sagadevan in respect of Ms Subramanium. A copy of this Order was not provided to the Commission, nor was a great deal of detail given. However there seemed no dispute that the AVO required that Mr Sagadevan not “contact or communicate” with Ms Subramanium by any means, or “approach or remain within 5 metres” of Ms Subramanium, or “go to or remain within 200 metres of any place” where she lives or works. Ms Subramanium applied for and was granted a period of family and domestic violence leave in January / February 2025, relating to the issue of the AVO.
It appears FedEx became aware of the AVO by having been informed of it by Victoria Police and, likely simultaneously, because Ms Subramanium informed one of its managers, who she was acquainted with, of its existence. FedEx contacted Mr Sagadevan, and an arrangement was made such that he would begin working from the Dandenong Bulk Depot instead of the Hallam depot. This was to attempt to ensure that he would not have proximity to Ms Subramanium consistent with the terms of the AVO.
Mr Sagadevan claims to have been embarrassed by having been approached by his FedEx manager about the AVO without he himself having disclosed it. While on the evidence before me, he did not appear to have made his protestations known to FedEx at the time, as this proceeding wore on, his apparent indignation that this matter had been revealed to his employer without his knowledge or consent intensified.
In any event, it appears the arrangement that was put in place by FedEx could have operated effectively to allow the respective employment of both Mr Sagadevan and Ms Subramanium to continue without breach of the AVO. This was until the events of 20 February 2025.
On 20 February 2025 a parcel of some description was distributed to Mr Sagadevan by it being put in his “bay” at his depot. Mr Sagadevan said he noticed the delivery was for Schnieder Electric Distribution Centre, located at 85 Portlink Road, Dandenong South.
Ms Subramanium gave evidence that this location was one at which she ordinarily started her delivery route each day. She said this would have been known to Mr Sagadevan and I accept that to be the case.
Mr Sagadevan said he checked with the “Depot debrief member” “to confirm whether I could proceed with all the fright deliveries assigned to my truck” and upon this being confirmed, took this as an instruction to deliver the parcel to the relevant address.
FedEx sought to assert, to some extent, that Mr Sagadevan had deliberately contrived to be allocated a package to provide him with a reason to visit the relevant location. I do not consider the evidence provides sufficient basis to support that proposition. However, on the evidence before me, I consider it inescapable that Mr Sagadevan had noted the location of the delivery, and knew it was one which Ms Subramanium frequented. And he most certainly did not raise with the Depot de-brief member or any other manager the possibility the delivery might bring him into proximity with Ms Subramanium, in breach of the AVO.
CCTV footage of the carpark at Schnieder Electric was obtained. It shows that Mr Sagadevan and his colleague arrived at the location at about 9:23AM on 20 February 2025. It appears their van was emptied, and the delivery apparently made at about which point another FedEx vehicle arrived. Ms Subramanium was driving this vehicle.
After arriving, the footage shows that Ms Subramanium’s vehicle was paused for a short period of time at what looked like a location close to the entry of the carpark. Mr Sagadevan can be seen some distance away. Mr Sagadevan gave evidence that he could see Ms Subramanium staring at him from inside her vehicle, but Ms Subramanium said that she did not see Mr Sagadevan until she began moving her vehicle through the carpark towards the loading area. This seems more consistent with the footage and the apparent alignment of the vehicles. While for Mr Sagadevan, the proposition that Ms Subramanian was staring at him for some period might be important, purportedly as part justification for his emotional conduct that followed, I do not consider much turns on this factual divergence – even if Ms Subramanium was staring at Mr Sagadevan (which I consider on balance, she was not) it would not have justified the conduct that followed.
As Ms Subramanium’s vehicle began moving towards the loading area, Mr Sagadevan can be seen in the footage approaching her vehicle – albeit it is moving slowly. He appeared to return to the area near his vehicle, but when Ms Subramanium’s vehicle stopped moving, he again approached her vehicle and can be seen opening its driver-side door.
Ms Subramanium gave evidence that she was “terrified” and was “scared and panicked” and tried to lock the door but could not. Mr Sagadevan said she did not appear panicked.
In giving his evidence, Mr Sagadevan seemed at times to struggle to be able to answer questions about his conduct on 20 February 2025 because of a lack of recall about the events of the day, related to his apparently heightened emotional state.
By contrast, Ms Subramanium gave evidence in a forthright and honest manner, despite the difficult circumstances. Taking this into account, and the concerns I have about Mr Sagadevan’s credibility generally, and his stated difficulties in recalling information about this incident given his emotional state, I accept Ms Subramanium’s evidence as to the traumatic nature of this confrontation.
Ms Subramanium said she said to Ms Sagadevan “please go”, “Ma”. Mr Sagadevan’s evidence was roughly similar – that Ms Subramanium had said “Ma inga Varathe” which he said translates to “My love, don’t come to me”.
In her evidence Ms Subramanium did not agree that the use of the word “Ma” means “my love”. She described it as a term of respect – one that she used during her relationship with Mr Sagadevan. She said she used this familiar term to attempt to de-escalate the situation.
Mr Sagadevan’s evidence about what Ms Subramanium said was in my view, plainly self-serving. By suggesting the use of the word “Ma” equates to “love” I consider Mr Sagadevan was effectively inviting me to find Ms Subramanian’s conduct was permissive or acquiescent. It was not. She was scared and asked him to “go”.
Mr Sagadevan then made physical contact with Ms Subramanium by grabbing her around the shoulder and neck area. He pulled Ms Subramanium towards him and then kissed her. Mr Sagadevan said the kiss was on the forehead – Ms Subramanium said it was on the right cheek.
Mr Sagadevan then climbed down from the door and walked back to his van and got in it. The footage then shows the van moving away.
It also shows, fairly clearly, Ms Subramanium almost immediately disappearing from drivers' cabin, apparently into the rear of her van. Her evidence was that she did this – that she locked herself in the back of her van and called for help. She said she was so scared and upset that she could not drive.
Again, Mr Sagadevan apparently took issue with the proposition that Ms Subramanium was scared or upset by this incident, presumably for the purposes of attempting to convince the Commission it was less serious than it may seem. However, the footage showing Ms Subramanian apparently taking refuge in the back of her van is entirely consistent with her evidence that she was in fact terrified. Mr Sagadevan himself can be seen abruptly leaving the scene in any event – making it unlikely he would have been able to observe Ms Subramanium’s reaction for more than a few seconds, and therefore difficult for him to contradict her evidence, that she was extremely upset by the incident.
Several people came to assist Ms Subramanium. One such person was Mr Francis, who gave evidence in this proceeding, who tracked Ms Subramanium’s location down via her scanner. He said when he eventually made contact with her, she was “crying, shaking, screaming and she appeared visibly fearful”.
Some of Mr Francis’ evidence was based on conversations he had on the phone with other people who went out to assist Ms Subramanium. None of those people gave evidence in this matter. Having had the benefit of hearing Ms Subramanium’s direct evidence about the incident and also that of Mr Francis, I did not consider it necessary to consider these other second-hand accounts.
On 27 February 2025 FedEx sent Mr Sagadevan a letter described in the proceeding as a “show cause” letter. The letter outlined the incident which took place on 20 February 2025, asserted that Mr Sagadevan had breached the FedEx code of conduct and workplace harassment and discrimination policy and advised consideration was being given to the termination of his employment based on serious misconduct. The letter advised of a meeting to occur the following day for the purposes of obtaining Mr Sagadevan’s response. It advised that he could bring a support person. It also advised he was permitted to provide a written submission at the meeting, which if provided would be referred to “management” for consideration. It advised that Mr Sagadevan would be placed on a period of paid suspension and provided information about the FedEx Employee Assistance Program that Mr Sagadevan was entitled to access.
Mr Sagadevan attended a meeting at FedEx on 28 February 2025. He did not bring a support person with him – he said that he was unable to find anyone at that stage and his mental and emotional wellbeing were not stable enough for him to think clearly or organise proper support.
The meeting was held with Mr Brett Herrick, Operations Manager, and Ms Georgina Scully, People Operations Specialist, neither of whom gave evidence in this proceeding. Mr Sagadevan said he attempted in this meeting to explain the mental health challenges he had been facing. He also alleged that gossip had been circulating within the Company about Ms Subramanium. He also attempted to raise his concern that information about the AVO concerning him had been revealed without his consent, breaching his confidentiality. He said that at a point in the meeting, he became emotionally unable to continue speaking. He said he pleaded for a warning instead of termination, and asked that FedEx consider his situation before making a final decision. He also asked for a time extension so he could gather his thoughts and respond more clearly.
The next day Mr Sagadevan provided FedEx with a written response to the matters that had been put to him. This response, among other things:
a.Expressed “deep regret for the situation and any distress it may have caused”, and provided his apology;
b.Confirmed that Mr Sagadevan had been experiencing mental health challenges and was receiving treatment;
c.Claimed that he had approached Ms Subramanium because workplace gossip had been circulating concerning Ms Subramanium;
d.Asked that the alleged gossip be addressed by management
e.Conceded that he attempted to kiss Ms Subramanium;
f.Conceded his behaviour was “extremely inappropriate” and that he was aware of company policies and procedures;
g.Claimed that Ms Subramanian did not push him away, scream or seek help;
h.Complained about the unauthorised disclosure of his private information;
Advised that he was prepared to continue his duties after a brief break to reflect on the situation.
Later, on 28 February 2025, Ms Scully emailed Mr Sagadevan asking him to provide specific details about the gossip or harassment claims he had made. It does not appear that Mr Sagadevan did this.
On 5 March 2025 FedEx sent Mr Sagadevan a letter advising that it had decided to terminate his employment on the basis of serious misconduct, relating to the incident in question, referencing its consideration of his verbal and written responses to the allegations provided during the “show cause” process.
Ordering a remedy in relation to unfair dismissal.
Section 390 of the Act provides that the Commission may order remedy if:
a.the Commission is satisfied that the Applicant was protected from unfair dismissal at the time of being dismissed; and
b.the person has been unfairly dismissed.
Section 396 requires that the Commission decide several matters relating to an application for an unfair dismissal remedy before considering the merits of the application. Those matters are:
a.whether the application was made within the period required in s 394(2);
b.whether the person was protected from unfair dismissal;
c.whether the dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (the Code);
d.whether the dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy.
It was not argued, nor was it the case that Mr Sagadevan’s dismissal was a case of genuine redundancy, and his application was made within the period required in s 394(2) of the Act. FedEx is not a small business, and the Code is not relevant.
Section 382 of the Act provides that a person is protected from unfair dismissal if, at the time of being dismissed:
a.the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and
b.one or more of the following apply:
i.a modern award covers the person;
ii.an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;
iii.the sum of the person’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold.
At the time of his dismissal, Mr Sagadevan had been employed a period longer than the minimum employment period and his annual rate of earnings was less than the high income threshold, which at that time was $175,000.00 per annum. I find that Mr Sagadevan was a person protected by unfair dismissal at the time he was dismissed.
Statutory provisions - unfair dismissal
Section 387 of the Act provides that, in considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the Commission must take into account:
a.whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
b.whether the person was notified of that reason; and
c.whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
d.any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
e.if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person – whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
f.the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
g.the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
h.any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.
I am required to consider each of these factors, to the extent they are relevant to the factual circumstances before me[1].
Was there a valid reason for dismissal related to Mr Sagadevan’s capacity or conduct?
It is well established that order to be a valid reason, the reason for the dismissal should be “sound, defensible or well founded” and should not be “capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced” [2].
In Rode v Burwood Mitsubishi[3] a Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission said: “...the meaning of s.170CG(3)(a) the reason for termination must be defensible or justifiable on an objective analysis of the relevant facts. It is not sufficient for an employer to simply show that he or she acted in the belief that the termination was for a valid reason.” Where a dismissal relates to an employee’s conduct, the Commission must be satisfied that the conduct occurred, and justified termination[4].
Merely establishing the factual basis for the reason for dismissal does not by itself demonstrate it was a valid reason. Dismissal must be a justifiable response to the relevant conduct or issue of capacity[5]. A reason not of sufficient gravity to justify dismissal is not sound, defensible or well-founded[6].
Even where conduct is alleged to be “serious misconduct”, a finding the conduct falls within the definition of serious misconduct provided in reg 1.07 of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (the Regulations) is not necessary for the conduct to amount to a “valid reason”[7].
It is appropriate that I note Mr Sagadevan sought, in his submissions, to distinguish the incident that led to his dismissal from an employment matter, describing it instead as a “family matter”. In making this submission, Mr Sagadevan appears to miss an important point – his conduct was at work, and it involved another employee.
There is no question Mr Sagadevan engaged in physical contact of an intimate nature with another employee while at work. On the evidence before me, that contact was unwelcome, and left the other employee distressed and fearful.
In this case the conduct was even more inappropriate than it might have otherwise been taking into account its context. That context was that the other employee was a person in respect of whom an Order has been made that Mr Sagadevan not have contact with her, arising from domestic violence.
Mr Sagadevan’s employer, FedEx, had taken steps to ensure that he not have contact with Ms Subramanium. I consider that by taking these steps, it should have been apparent to Mr Sagadevan that his employer did not want him to have contact with her.
Thus, when Ms Subramanium arrived at Schnieder Electrics, both because of the operation of the AVO and also because his employer had put in place arrangements to ensure he not have contact with Ms Subramanium, he should have left immediately.
Instead of leaving, he approached Ms Subramanium and accosted her.
Mr Subramanium’s heightened emotional state is no excuse for Mr Sagadevan’s actions. It is in fact a poor excuse. It provides FedEx no comfort that such incidents would not have occurred again.
Mr Sagadevan’s conduct is plainly a valid reason relating to his capacity or conduct.
Was Mr Sagadevan notified of the reason for dismissal?
Notification of the valid reason for dismissal must be given to the employee explicitly and in plain and clear terms. But crucially, this must occur before the decision to terminate the employment is made[8].
Mr Sagadevan was alerted to the reason for his dismissal on 27 February 2025 and given an opportunity to address the allegations. Thus, when he was advised of the decision to terminate his employment he had earlier been notified of the reason, so he could respond. His response, once given, was informed by the relatively comprehensive notification of the allegations which were in the end, the reason for his dismissal. I consider Mr Sagadevan was notified of the reason for the dismissal.
Was Mr Sagadevan given an opportunity to respond to the valid reason?
An employee protected from unfair dismissal should be notified of a valid reason for the termination of their employment before a decision is taken to terminate that employment so that they can respond to it in such a way as there is an opportunity to influence the ultimate decision[9]. While the opportunity to respond does not require formality and this factor is to be applied in a common-sense way to ensure the employee is treated fairly[10], the employee must be aware of the precise nature of the employer’s concern about his or her conduct or performance and has a full opportunity to respond to this concern[11].
The “show cause” process conducted by FedEx provided Mr Sagadevan with this opportunity. This involved a meeting, on 28 February 2025, the opportunity to provide a written response and then the call for further information to be provided (which was not taken up). I consider Mr Sagadevan was provided with an opportunity to respond to the valid reason.
Did FedEx unreasonably refuse to allow Mr Sagadevan to have a support person present to assist at discussions relating to the dismissal?
While Mr Sagadevan did not have a support person present at the meeting held in relation to his possible dismissal on 28 February 2025, this was not because he was unreasonably deprived of the opportunity. He was notified of the meeting the day before and specifically advised of his right to have a support person present. He did not do so – he said he did not have time to arrange for someone to be present. In the circumstances, I do not consider it was unreasonable for FedEx to conduct the meeting the following day despite no support person being present and do not consider this amounted to a refusal to allow Mr Sagadevan to have someone present.
Was Mr Sagadevan warned about unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal?
The reason for the dismissal of Mr Sagadevan’s employment did not relate to his performance. This consideration therefore weighs neither for nor against a finding that the termination of Mr Sagadevan’s employment was unfair.
To what degree would the size of FedEx enterprise or the absence of human resources management specialists or expertise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal?
FedEx is not a small enterprise and appears to have internal human resources specialisation or expertise. I cannot fault the procedures it followed effecting the dismissal of Mr Sagadevan’s employment. I do not consider this factor weighs for or against a finding as to whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.
What other matters are relevant?
In giving consideration to whether the termination of Mr Sagadevan’s employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable I have given consideration to several other factors. These are:
a.The effect of the termination of Mr Sagadevan’s employment over his personal and economic circumstances, and his family;
b.Mr Sagadevan’s apparent state of mental health;
c.Whether Mr Sagadevan was the subject of provocation within the workplace;
d.Whether Mr Sagadevan’s emotional state with respect to Ms Subramanium mitigates against his conduct.
Mr Sagadevan submitted both to the Commission and to FedEx that the termination of his employment after some two and a half years employment would have an extremely significant effect over his personal and economic circumstances. This consideration weighs somewhat in favour of a finding that the decision to terminate his employment is harsh or unreasonable.
Mr Sagadevan was clearly suffering mental health challenges, and provided the Commission with some evidence to that effect. In so far as those challenges manifested in the incident which occurred on 20 February 2025, I note there was no other evidence before me of any other similar incident, or indeed any performance or conduct issue of any kind regarding Mr Sagadevan’s employment. If the incident that occurred, being apparently a singular mistake for which Mr Sagadevan expressed remorse and regret, was a manifestation of his mental health challenges, this weighs somewhat in favour of a finding that the decision to terminate his employment as a result was harsh or unreasonable.
I do not consider there is any evidence before me that Mr Sagadevan was provoked in relation to this incident. While he claimed Ms Subramanium had been the subject of workplace gossip, to which he took umbrage, there was no evidence before me of any such gossip and even if there had been, it would not have justified his conduct or weighed in favour of a finding of unfairness with respect to his dismissal.
Undoubtedly, Mr Sagadevan was struggling with the emotional impact of the breakdown of his relationship with Ms Subramanium and I accept his assertion that this emotional impact triggered his behaviour on 20 February 2025. However, I do not consider that this weighs against a finding that his dismissal was a fair and justifiable response to his conduct. A man carrying the burden of disappointment over the breakdown of his relationship has to carry that burden. It simply does not justify, or excuse improper conduct directed against his former partner, and does not weigh against a finding in this matter that the decision to dismiss Mr Sagadevan’s employment was fair.
Conclusion
Having considered each of the factors set out in s 387 of the Act, I find that they largely weigh in favour of a determination that FedEx’ decision to dismiss Mr Sagadevan was not harsh, unjust or unreasonable. In particular, I consider FedEx plainly had a valid reason for the decision, and implemented a process providing Mr Sagadevan with procedural fairness in relation to the decision. While several matters relating to Mr Sagadevan’s personal circumstances mean the consequences of termination for him are no doubt significant, they do not outweigh the other factors which justify the decision.
On this basis the application is dismissed, and an Order[12] will be issued conjointly.
COMMISSIONER
Appearances:
Ms Turga Chandran for the Applicant
Ms Catherine Tirado for the Respondent
Hearing details:
2025
Melbourne
Thursday 12 June
[1] Sayer v Melsteel Pty Ltd[2011] FWAFB 7498 [14]
[2] Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371 [373]
[3] PR4471
[4] Edwards v Giudice [1999] FWC 1836 [7]; B, C and D v Australian Postal Corporation T/A Australia Post[2013] FWCFB 6191; Owen Sharp v BCS Infrastructure Support Pty Limited[2015] FWCFB 1033
[5] Raj Bista v Glad Group Pty Ltd t/a Glad Commercial Cleaning[2016] FWC 3009 [34]
[6] Kylie Smith v Bank of Queensland Ltd[2021] FWC 4 [124], [126]
[7] Joshua Jiminez v Accent Group t/a Platypus Shoes (Australia) Pty Limited[2016] FWCFB 7201 [17] – [18]
[8] Newton v Toll Transport[2021] FWCFB 3457 [182]
[9] Crozier v Palazzo Corporation (1996) 98 IR 137 [73]
[10] RMIT v Asher (2010) 194 IR 1 [14] – [15]
[11] Gibson v Bosmac Pty Ltd (1995) 60 IR 1 [7]
[12] PR788452
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