| [2018] FWCFB 4332 |
| FAIR WORK COMMISSION |
DECISION |
Fair Work Act 2009
s.604 - Appeal of decisions
Mr Luke Tamu
v
Australia for UNHCR
(C2018/3932)
JUSTICE ROSS, PRESIDENT | MELBOURNE, 26 JULY 2018 |
Appeal against adjournment of listing – no utility in adjournment appeal – the other matters raised do not give rise to a competent appeal – public interest not enlivened – permission to appeal refused.
[1] Mr Luke Tamu has applied for permission to appeal, and appeals, against a decision by Commissioner Spencer to adjourn the date for the hearing of a jurisdictional objection to his general protections dismissal application.
[2] The appeal is made under s.604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with permission of the Commission. If permission is granted, the appeal is by way of rehearing. The Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the primary decision maker. 1 This decision concerns whether permission to appeal should be granted. The background to the matter before us may be shortly stated.
[3] On 11 April 2018 Mr Tamu filed a general protections dismissal application in which he alleged that he had been dismissed by Australia for UNHCR (‘UNHCR’) with several general protections contraventions being indicated including that his dismissal was unfair, discriminatory and unlawful; that he had not been paid correctly; and that his termination of employment came about for reasons that included reports made by him of various colleagues committing fraud and timesheet theft. While the application itself is unclear about the precise date of termination, it is apparent that Mr Tamu received a termination letter on 15 March 2018.
[4] Section 366 of the Act deals with the period of time in which a general protections dismissal application must be made:
Time for application
(1) An application under section 365 must be made:
(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or
(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (2).
(2) The FWC may allow a further period if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:
(a) the reason for the delay; and
(b) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and
(c) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and
(d) the merits of the application; and
(e) fairness as between the person and other persons in a like position.
[5] On 12 April 2018, the Commission wrote to Mr Tamu and Australia for UNHCR advising the application had been lodged outside the statutory time frame of 21 days and sought the Respondent’s consent to progress the matter to conciliation. The Respondent did not consent to a conciliation conference and the matter was listed for a jurisdictional hearing on Monday 14 May 2018.
[6] What took place on 14 May 2018 is set out in the decision dealing with a subsequent…
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- Case
- [2018] FWCFB 4332
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had demonstrated a sufficient ground for appeal against the adjournment of his case listing. The court also considered whether other matters raised by Mr Tamu in his appeal application were competent grounds for review. Additionally, the court examined whether the public interest required the appeal to proceed despite the absence of a substantial legal or factual error in the primary decision.
Justice Bromberg held that the applicant had not shown that the adjournment of the listing served no utility or was otherwise unjust. The court found that the concerns about the applicant's mental health did not sufficiently outweigh the considerations that justified the adjournment. Furthermore, the court determined that the other matters raised by Mr Tamu did not constitute competent grounds for appeal. The judge concluded that the public interest did not require the appeal to proceed, given the absence of any substantial legal or factual error in the primary decision. Consequently, the court refused the applicant's application for special leave to appeal.