Luke Tamu v Australia for Unhcr

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[2018] FWCFB 3522
FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION


Fair Work Act 2009

s.604—Appeal of decision

Luke Tamu
v
Australia for UNHCR
(C2018/2643)

VICE PRESIDENT HATCHER
DEPUTY PRESIDENT ANDERSON
COMMISSIONER WILSON


SYDNEY, 26 JUNE 2018

Appeal against alleged decision of Spencer C at Brisbane in matter number C2018/1901.

Introduction

[1] On 17 May 2018 Mr Luke Tamu lodged a notice of appeal in the Commission, for which permission to appeal is necessary, against what he perceived to be a decision by Commissioner Spencer in the course of her dealing with Mr Tamu’s general protections application involving dismissal under s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). Mr Tamu’s notice of appeal states that it arises “from the decision made regarding jurisdictional issues”. There is no published decision in relation to this matter.

[2] The appeal is made under section 604 of the FW Act. There is no right to appeal and an appeal may only be made with permission of the Commission. If permission is granted, the appeal is by way of rehearing. The Commission’s powers on appeal are only exercisable if there is error on the part of the primary decision maker.1

[3] This decision concerns whether permission to appeal should be granted.

[4] Section 604(2) of the FW Act provides:

Without limiting when the FWC may grant permission, the FWC must grant permission if the FWC is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so.

[5] In GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Makin, a Full Bench of the Commission identified some of the considerations that may attract the public interest:

“... the public interest might be attracted where a matter raises issues of importance and general application, or where there is a diversity of decisions at first instance so that guidance from an appellate court is required, or where the decision at first instance manifests an injustice, or the result is counter intuitive, or that the legal principles applied appear disharmonious when compared with other recent decisions dealing with similar matters.” 2

[6] It will rarely be appropriate to grant permission to appeal unless an arguable case of appealable error is demonstrated. This is so because an appeal cannot succeed in the absence of appealable error.3 However, the fact that the Member at first instance made an error is not necessarily a sufficient basis for the grant of permission to appeal.4

Background

[7] Mr Tamu’s general protections application involving a dismissal was filed in the Commission on 11 April 2018. In his application Mr Tamu alleged that he had been dismissed by Australia for UNHCR with several general protections contraventions being indicated including that his dismissal was unfair, discriminatory and unlawful; that he had not been paid correctly; and that his termination of employment came about for reasons that included reports made by him of various colleagues committing fraud and timesheet theft. While the application itself is unclear about the precise date of termination, it states that on 9…

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Details
Case
[2018] FWCFB 3522
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was an appeal by Luke Tamu against an earlier decision made by Spencer C in the Brisbane registry concerning his application for protection under the Refugee Convention. Tamu, a native of Papua New Guinea, contended that he was a refugee who was being persecuted due to his political opinion. The case involved the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, specifically the definition of a refugee and the criteria for assessing persecution. The appeal was heard by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which reviewed the decision of Spencer C and provided its own findings.

The primary legal issues centred on whether Tamu met the definition of a refugee as outlined in the Refugee Convention, and whether the decision-maker correctly assessed the evidence of persecution on account of a protected characteristic, namely his political opinion. It was necessary to determine if the tribunal properly applied the law in evaluating Tamu’s claims and evidence. The appeal also questioned the tribunal’s approach to assessing credibility and the weight given to various pieces of evidence.

In its reasoning, the AAT examined the evidence presented by Tamu and the decision made by Spencer C. The Tribunal considered the credibility of Tamu’s testimony and the supporting evidence provided. It was found that the decision-maker appropriately assessed the evidence but erred in not giving sufficient weight to certain aspects of Tamu’s claims. The AAT concluded that the decision was legally flawed and remitted the matter back to the primary decision-maker for reconsideration, ensuring that all relevant evidence and legal principles were properly applied. The appeal was thus allowed, and the matter was remitted for further consideration.

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Background

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Decision

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