SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Mowen v The Morning Bulletin/APN & Ors [2013] QCA 36
PARTIES:
BEVAN ALAN MOWEN
(appellant)
v
THE MORNING BULLETIN/APN
(first respondent)
EVAN SCHWARTEN
(second respondent)
MELINDA SIEGMEIER
(third respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 7233 of 2012
SC No 221 of 2012DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Rockhampton
DELIVERED ON:
8 March 2013
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
14 February 2013
JUDGES:
Holmes and Fraser JJA and Dalton J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. The application to adduce further evidence is dismissed.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The appellant is to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal on an indemnity basis.
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – LIMITATION OF PARTICULAR ACTIONS – OTHER CASES AND MATTERS – where appellant alleged the respondents defamed him – where appellant was barred by s 10AA Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) – where appellant’s application to extend time pursuant to s 32A Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) was dismissed – where appellant’s claim and statement of claim were struck out – where appellant complains that the primary judge failed to recognise that the relevant stories were still being published – where appellant argues ignorance of the law as a ground of appeal – whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s application – whether the primary judge erred in striking out the appellant’s claim and statement of claim
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – POWERS OF COURT – FURTHER EVIDENCE – where appellant sought leave to introduce new evidence – where much of the material the appellant wished to rely upon was available to him at the hearing before the primary judge – whether the appellant’s application to adduce further evidence should be dismissed
Anti‑Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 46
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 5(2), s 10AA, s 29, s 32AClarke v Japan Machines (Australia) Pty Ltd [1984] 1 Qd R 404, considered
COUNSEL:
The appellant appeared on his own behalf
R Anderson for the first and second respondents
No appearance for the third respondentSOLICITORS:
The appellant appeared on his own behalf
Bennet & Philip Solicitors for the first and second respondents
No appearance for the third respondent
HOLMES JA: I agree with the reasons of Dalton J and the orders she proposes.
FRASER JA: I agree with the reasons for judgment of Dalton J and the orders proposed by her Honour.
DALTON J: In May 2009 the appellant stood trial on criminal charges in the District Court at Rockhampton. He was acquitted. On 21 May 2012 he filed proceedings alleging that on 7 August 2006 and 19 May 2009 the defendants published articles in The Morning Bulletin which concerned that criminal case, were inaccurate, and defamed him. He alleged publication locally in the paper, and on the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Mowen v The Morning Bulletin/APN and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] QCA 36
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s application to extend the time limit, whether the primary judge erred in striking out the appellant’s claim and statement of claim, and whether the appellant's application to introduce further evidence should be dismissed. The court considered the statutory provisions, the availability of evidence at the original hearing, and the grounds for the appeal.
The court found that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the application to extend the time limit or in striking out the claim and statement of claim. The court held that the stories in question were not being continuously published in a manner that would restart the limitation period, and the appellant's ignorance of the law did not provide a valid ground for relief. The court also dismissed the application to introduce further evidence, noting that much of the material was already available at the original hearing.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondents' costs of and incidental to the appeal on an indemnity basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application to adduce further evidence is dismissed.
2. The appeal is dismissed.
3. The appellant is to pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the appeal on an indemnity basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mowen initially filed his claim in the District Court of Queensland. The respondents successfully applied to have the matter transferred to the Supreme Court of Queensland. Mowen's application to extend the time to bring his action under section 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) was dismissed by the primary judge. Subsequently, Mowen's claim and statement of claim were struck out. Mowen appealed to the Court of Appeal, challenging both the dismissal of his application to extend time and the striking out of his claim and statement of claim. The appeal was heard in the Queensland Court of Appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s application to extend time pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
2. Whether the primary judge erred in striking out the appellant’s claim and statement of claim.
3. Whether the appellant’s application to adduce further evidence should be dismissed.
Held
1. The court held that the primary judge did not err in dismissing the appellant’s application to extend time pursuant to section 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld).
2. The court held that the primary judge did not err in striking out the appellant’s claim and statement of claim.
3. The court held that the appellant’s application to adduce further evidence should be dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the appellant's application to extend time to bring his claim under section 32A of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The court found that the appellant had not provided a sufficient explanation for the delay in bringing the claim, which was required under the statutory provisions. The court noted that ignorance of the law does not constitute a sufficient ground for extending time, and that the appellant had been aware of the limitation period for some time before making the application. Therefore, the dismissal of the application to extend time was upheld.
Regarding the striking out of the claim and statement of claim, the court considered whether the appellant's claim was statute-barred under section 10AA of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). The court found that the appellant's defamation claim accrued when the relevant articles were published, and the limitation period had expired before the claim was filed. The court held that the primary judge correctly found the claim to be statute-barred and struck out the appellant's claim and statement of claim.
Finally, the court addressed the appellant's application to adduce further evidence. The court noted that much of the material the appellant wished to rely upon was available to him at the hearing before the primary judge. The court held that the appellant had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify the introduction of new evidence. The court dismissed the application to adduce further evidence, and the ratio decidendi in this respect is that applications to introduce new evidence should only be granted in exceptional circumstances where there is a compelling reason for the delay in presenting the evidence.
The court's decision to dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the respondents' costs on an indemnity basis was in line with the outcomes reached on each of the issues. The court did not identify any error in the primary judge's reasoning or decision-making process, and therefore the appeal was dismissed.