Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Richards

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(1959-1995) 14 Tas R 221
92/1991
List "A"

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT)

CITATION:              Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Richards [1991] TASSC 98; [1991] 14 Tas R 221; A92/1991

PARTIES:  MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD
  v
  RICHARDS, Carol

FILE NO/S:  FCA 83/1990
JUDGMENT

APPEALED FROM:                   Richards & Richards v The Motor Accidents Insurance Board B51/1990

DELIVERED ON:  5 November 1991
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
JUDGMENT OF:  Underwood, Crawford and Zeeman JJ
CATCHWORDS:

Appeal—General Principles—Excessive or inadequate damages—Circumstances for appellate intervention—Personal injuries.

Judgment Number:  A92/1991
Number of paragraphs:  60

Serial No 92/1991
List "A"
File No FCA 83/1990

MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD
v CAROL RICHARDS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  FULL COURT

UNDERWOOD J
CRAWFORD J
ZEEMAN J
5 November 1991

Order of the Court

Appeal dismissed.

Serial No 92/1991
List "A"
File No FCA 83/1990

MOTOR ACCIDENTS INSURANCE BOARD
v CAROL RICHARDS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  FULL COURT

UNDERWOOD J
5 November 1991

  1. The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 21 August 1983. The appellant admitted liability to pay damages. The learned trial judge assessed damages in the sum of $214,864.70 under the following heads:

Past economic loss  $ 13,674.41

Future economic loss  $ 75,000.00

Hospital, medical and pharmaceutical expenses

(a)          Past  $    3,270.29


        

(b)          Future  $  15,100.00

Home alterations  $    1,000.00

Past and future needs for household assistance

(a)          Past  $  17,820.00


        

(b)          Future  $  34,000.00

Pain, suffering and loss of amenities  $  55,000.00

$214,864.70

  1. By notice of appeal, the appellant gave notice that this Court would be moved:

"for orders so that so much of the judgment of [the trial judge] whereby his Honour awarded the respondent $55,000 for general damages and $34,000 for future needs for household assistance be set aside on the following grounds:

1That the sum of $55,000 awarded for general damages was manifestly excessive taking into account all those findings of fact made by his Honour in the judgment.

2That the award of $34,000 for future needs for household assistance was excessive in all the circumstances."

  1. The notice of appeal seeks an order that "in lieu thereof [this Court] assess such sums for general damages and future household assistance as the court considers appropriate".

  1. The terms of the notice of appeal and the appellant's argument in support of them call for a consideration of the principles applicable on a determination of an appeal against an assessment of damages for personal injuries. The Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act, s40 gives the Full Court jurisdiction to hear and determine "appeals from all judgments, orders and other determinations". In the present matter the only relevant order (there was another plaintiff, not a party to this appeal) is that judgment be entered for the respondent against the appellant for $214,864.70 and the only relevant judgment is that the respondent recover from the appellant that sum and costs to be taxed. Thus, the notice of appeal is misconceived in that it does not appeal against any order, judgment or determination. In this context judgments, orders and determinations "refers…

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Details
Case
[1991] TASSC 98
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Motor Accidents Insurance Board appealed against a judgment of the Supreme Court awarding Carol Richards $214,864.70 in damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The appeal focused on two aspects of the damages awarded: $55,000 for general damages (non-economic loss) and $34,000 for future household assistance. The Board argued that these amounts were manifestly excessive. The Supreme Court, in a full court hearing, dismissed the appeal. The court found that the total sum awarded was not manifestly excessive. Regarding the $55,000 for general damages, the court noted that while the amount might appear high, it was not disproportionate when considering the severity of the injuries and their long-term impact on the respondent's life. The court also upheld the award for future household assistance, finding it reasonable given the agreed hourly rate and the necessity for four hours of assistance per week. The court concluded that the trial judge's award was within the appropriate range and did not warrant appellate intervention.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Richards pertains to an appeal by the Motor Accidents Insurance Board against damages awarded to Carol Richards by the trial judge in the Supreme Court of Tasmania. The trial judge assessed the damages resulting from a motor vehicle accident suffered by Richards on 21 August 1983 at $214,864.70. The damages were categorised into several heads including past and future economic loss, hospital, medical and pharmaceutical expenses, home alterations, past and future needs for household assistance, and pain, suffering, and loss of amenities. The Insurance Board appealed against the amounts awarded for general damages and future needs for household assistance, arguing they were manifestly excessive.

The injuries sustained by Richards were severe and included a fractured right ankle, fractured right clavicle, fractured left ribs, fractured right rib, fractured right medial malleolus, fractured right talus, facial lacerations, traumatic deafness in the right ear, strain injuries to the neck and jaw, and injuries to the liver and spleen causing haematomas. The trial judge highlighted that these injuries had a continuous or intermittent effect on major aspects of Richards' industrial, social, and family life. Richards experienced prolonged pain and discomfort, developed bedsores, suffered temporary loss of taste and smell, faced limitations in leisure activities, had a tendency to stutter, and experienced deterioration in her relationships and sexual life with her husband.

The appeal focused on the amounts awarded for general damages ($55,000) and future needs for household assistance ($34,000). The Insurance Board argued that the award for general damages was manifestly excessive given the totality of the findings and that the award for future household assistance was excessive considering the circumstances. The appeal raised issues concerning the principles applicable to appellate review of damages assessments, particularly whether the appellate court should intervene if the total sum awarded is not manifestly excessive, even if individual components appear disproportionate.

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania considered the appeal based on established legal principles that appellate courts are generally slow to reverse trial judges' assessments of damages unless there is a clear error of principle, misapprehension of facts, or a wholly erroneous estimate of damages. The court emphasised the importance of examining the total sum awarded rather than individual components in isolation. After reviewing the injuries and their impact on Richards' life, the Full Court concluded that while the award for general damages might be at the higher end of the spectrum, it was not so excessive as to warrant appellate intervention when considering the totality of the award and the severe, long-term impact of Richards' injuries. The court also found that the award for future household assistance was reasonable given the agreed hourly rate and the necessity for services over the respondent's remaining life expectancy.

This case came before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania as an appeal against a judgment of the trial judge, His Honour Mr Justice Wright, who assessed damages for the respondent, Carol Richards, in the amount of $214,864.70 following a motor vehicle accident. The Motor Accidents Insurance Board, the appellant, contested the assessment, particularly the amounts allocated to general damages for non-economic loss ($55,000) and future household assistance ($34,000). The notice of appeal initially mischaracterised the judgment by attributing specific amounts to certain heads of damages, which the Full Court noted was a misapprehension of the nature of the judgment. Despite this, the Full Court proceeded to consider the merits of the appeal, particularly focusing on whether the total sum awarded was manifestly excessive or inadequate, as per established legal principles. After examining the nature and extent of the respondent's injuries, and the principles guiding the assessment of damages for personal injuries, the Full Court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's assessment, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the sum of $55,000 awarded for general damages (non-economic loss) was manifestly excessive.
2. Whether the award of $34,000 for future needs for household assistance was excessive in all the circumstances.
3. Whether the total judgment sum of $214,864.70 was so inordinately high as to be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered.

Held
1. Whether the sum of $55,000 awarded for general damages (non-economic loss) was manifestly excessive. The court concluded that the sum of $55,000 for non-economic loss was not manifestly excessive; appeal dismissed.
2. Whether the award of $34,000 for future needs for household assistance was excessive in all the circumstances. The court concluded that the award of $34,000 for future household assistance was not excessive; appeal dismissed.
3. Whether the total judgment sum of $214,864.70 was so inordinately high as to be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. The court concluded that the total judgment sum was not so inordinately high as to be a wholly erroneous estimate; appeal dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Supreme Court of Tasmania's Full Court was called upon to review the quantum of damages awarded in a personal injury case, Motor Accidents Insurance Board v Richards. The key issue was whether the total judgment sum of $214,864.70 was so inordinately high as to be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered by the respondent, Carol Richards. The Court examined two major components of the damages: $55,000 awarded for general damages (non-economic loss) and $34,000 for future needs for household assistance.

The Court first addressed the principle that an appellate court will not disturb a primary judge's award of damages for personal injury unless it is convinced that the trial judge acted on a wrong principle of law, misapprehended the facts, or the award is so inordinately low or high as to be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. This principle was established in Wilson v Peisley and reiterated in cases such as Gamser v The Nominal Defendant and Sharman v Evans. The Court held that in the absence of error in principle or misapprehension of fact, the discretion will only have miscarried if the final award is manifestly excessive or inadequate.

Applying this principle, the Court found that the $55,000 awarded for general damages, while seemingly large, was not so disproportionate to the respondent's injuries and their consequences that it could be said to be a wholly erroneous estimate. The injuries sustained by Richards were severe and had a profound impact on her quality of life, and the Court noted that a sum in the order of $50,000 should be reserved for the most severe cases. Although the Court thought that $55,000 was at the higher end of the scale, it was not so far above the prevailing standard as to reflect error in the exercise of the judicial discretion.

The Court also found that the $34,000 award for future needs for household assistance was not excessive. The respondent required four hours per week of household assistance at an agreed rate of $10.50 per hour, and the trial judge had substantially discounted this amount for contingencies. The Court held that a significantly higher allowance under this head could not be described as manifestly excessive.

Finally, the Court considered the total judgment sum of $214,864.70 in the context of the injuries and their consequences. Given the severity of Richards' injuries and their long-term impact, the Court concluded that the judgment sum was not so inordinately high as to call for appellate intervention. The Court emphasised that the award must be proportionate to the situation of the claimant party and not to the situation of other parties in other actions.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an appellate court will not disturb a trial judge's award of damages for personal injury unless the award is so inordinately high as to be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered, considering the totality of the injuries and their consequences. In the absence of error in principle or misapprehension of fact, the Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the trial judge merely because the award seems high in isolation.