FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Moss v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1008
WILLIAM WAYNE MOSS v NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD
NSD 648 of 2009
COWDROY J
11 SEPTEMBER 2009
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 648 OF 2009
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: WILLIAM WAYNE MOSS
AppellantAND: NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
COWDROY J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 SEPTEMBER 2009
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The Appellant pay the costs of the Respondent.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 648 of 2009
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN: WILLIAM WAYNE MOSS
AppellantAND: NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD
Respondent
JUDGE:
COWDROY J
DATE:
11 SEPTEMBER 2009
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
By Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 6 August 2009, the appellant (known as Mr William Wayne Moss, although in other proceedings referred to hereafter the appellant was known as Mr William Walter Miller) appeals from the decision of Federal Magistrate Driver delivered on 16 June 2009 which upheld a sequestration order made against the appellant by Registrar Morgan of the Federal Magistrates Court on 18 May 2009.
The respondent filed a Notice of Motion on 17 August 2009 with an affidavit of Lyndelle Elizabeth Brown sworn on 14 August 2009 in support. The Notice of Motion seeks summary judgment of the appellant’s appeal pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (‘the Act’) and/or O 52 r 18 of the Federal Court Rules (‘the Rules’).
On 27 August 2009 the Chief Justice, pursuant to provisions of s 25(1A) of the Act, determined that the appellant jurisdiction of the Court in relation to the appeal would be exercised by a single judge.
FACTS
This appeal arises from a number of other current and concluded proceedings in both State and Federal Courts. While such proceedings are not the subject of the current proceeding, it is useful to refer to them to place the current proceedings in context.
The appellant initially brought proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales against the respondent claiming that it had published information provided by him in the Daily Telegraph newspaper in breach of contract. The appellant alleged that the respondent had promised to pay him $250,000 for such information and that it had failed to do so. On 31 January 2008 Delaney J found in favour of the respondent.
The appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (‘Court of Appeal’). That appeal was filed six days out of time and thus leave was sought to file the appeal out of time. On 16 June 2008 Beazley…
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- Case
- [2009] FCA 1008
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to address was whether the Federal Magistrate had erred in upholding the sequestration order despite Moss's ongoing proceedings against his former solicitors. Moss contended that the Federal Magistrate had misled him regarding the trustee's position on his ability to continue the legal action against his solicitors. The court also considered whether the sequestration order should be annulled under section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act, which allows for the annulment of a sequestration order if it 'ought not to have been made'.
The court found that there was no error in the exercise of discretion by the Federal Magistrate, even if there was a misunderstanding regarding the trustee's position. The court held that the Federal Magistrate's decision, while possibly influenced by an incorrect statement, did not detract from the correctness of the decision to uphold the sequestration order. The court also concluded that Moss had not met the criteria for annulment of the sequestration order under section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act, as it was not shown that the sequestration order 'ought not to have been made'.
In light of the above, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The Appellant pay the costs of the Respondent.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: COWDROY J
The Court does not consider that any error in the exercise of discretion of the Federal Magistrate exists of the kind referred to in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499, and his Honour’s observation, even if incorrect, does not detract from the correctness of his decision. The Court rejects the appellant’s ground of appeal.Annulment of sequestration order? Despite the Court’s rejection of the appellant’s single ground of appeal, the Court considers that there is utility in considering the Federal Magistrate’s decision against the criteria of s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act. Such section provides that the Court may annul a bankruptcy if the Court is satisfied that a sequestration order ‘ought not to have been made’. An appeal from a decision to make a sequestration order (or in this case upholding the making of a sequestration order) and an application for the annulment of a bankruptcy under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act are distinct: see Hudson v Whalan [1999] FCA 189 at [7]. However, the Court considers that as the appellant has challenged the making of the sequestration order it is useful to analyse whether the Federal Magistrate should have upheld the sequestration order. In Re Frank; Ex parte Piliszky (1987) 16 FCR 396 at 403 Fisher J (referring to s 154(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act which is relevantly the same as s 153B) said:In my opinion “ought” in s 154(1)(a) is of imperative significance and an order should not be annulled unless the judge was in the circumstances bound not to make it and even then there is a residual discretion not to annul. In Rigg v Baker the Full Court considered whether a bankruptcy should be annulled in proceedings where the bankrupt had, at the date of the sequestration order, an appeal pending in the Court of Appeal. Such proceedings had been instituted by the bankrupt against her solicitors for negligence as well as against other parties for reasons relating to financial arrangements which lead to her bankruptcy. It is important to note that the judgment debt which grounded the sequestration order did not arise from the decision which was subject to the appeal. French J at [63] said:In Pollock v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1994) 94 ATC 4148, Carr J set out five propositions relevant to applications for annulment. They were derived from the judgment of Riley J in Re Calderon (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Riley J, No NSW 573 of 1967, 31 May 1977) as follows (at 4153-4154): 1.It is for the applicant for annulment who alleges, and it is therefore for him to bring himself within the section and satisfy the Court, that the sequestration order ought not to have been made. 2.The Court to whom the application is made seeks to ascertain the actual state of affairs at the time when the sequestration order is made. 3.In order to ascertain that actual state of affairs the Court hearing the application for annulment looks at the facts that were before the Court which made the sequestration order and at any other facts that were not before that Court but are shown on the hearing of the application for annulment to have been in existence when the sequestration order was made.4.Having considered all the facts so looked at, the Court determines whether on those facts the applicant has satisfied it that the sequestration order ought not to have been made.5. If it is so satisfied, the Court is not bound to annul the sequestration order but must consider in all the circumstances of the case whether it ought to be annulled.’