[2007] HCATrans 594
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S17 of 2007
B e t w e e n -
DAWN MARIE BAKER
Applicant
and
STEPHEN JAMES RIGG
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 5 OCTOBER 2007, AT 9.37 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR T.E.F. HUGHES, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR C.P. TAYLOR for the applicant who was the applicant for
annulment of the sequestration order. (instructed by Paul Stubbs Law Office)
MR T.G.R. PARKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.C. PRICE, for the respondent. (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Cashman)
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Hughes.
MR HUGHES: Your Honour, I do not propose to reiterate the content or any part of the content of our summary of the argument. The Court will have read it and taken it into account. In the first paragraph of his reasons, the primary judge aptly observed that the circumstances in which the applicant sought the annulment of the sequestration order were unusual. A primary unusual feature of the case is that as noted by the primary judge at paragraph 19 of his reasons at application book 4. The applicant deposed in her affidavit supporting the annulment application that her only debts were debts that arose out of her endeavours to save herself from eviction from her home of more than 30 years that she had inherited under her husband’s will. “Otherwise” she said, “she was solvent”.
The applicant, your Honours, “was not required to attend for cross‑examination”, as observed by the primary judge at paragraph 16 of his reasons, page 4 of the application book. As at the date of the annulment hearing the only other crystallised debt payable by her, apart from the debt created for the costs judgment connected with the caveat proceedings, was by a cruel twist of fated, your Honours may think, owed to the respondent, Mr Rigg, because the mortgagee of the homestead block, the Commonwealth Bank, had assigned to him a judgment debt that the applicant had incurred by agreeing in 2001 in an attempt to stave off eviction to pay to the bank the interest that would accrue in future on the balance of Rigg’s debt to the bank, a debt that he had incurred in clear breach of his obligations under the deed of residence.
It was a debt under a mortgage that Rigg had given over the homestead block thereby imperilling the applicant’s right of residence in it. That was a debt for about $47,000. We say that on ordinary principles of contribution, the applicant would have a clear claim to a set off against Rigg in respect of any attempt by him to enforce against her the debt that had been assigned to him by the bank.
GUMMOW J: Mr Hughes, we have to find or…
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- Case
- [2007] HCATrans 594
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Public Trustee, acting as executor of the estate, had a duty to make an application for a family provision order under the *Succession Act 1981* (Qld) on behalf of a beneficiary who was a minor. This involved determining the scope of the Public Trustee's powers and responsibilities, particularly when acting for beneficiaries under a legal disability.
The High Court reasoned that the Public Trustee's statutory powers and duties did not extend to initiating family provision claims on behalf of beneficiaries. Their Honours noted that the *Public Trustee Act 1978* (Qld) conferred broad powers, but these did not encompass the specific discretion required to make such an application, which was a matter for the individual beneficiary or their legal representative. The Court emphasised that the *Succession Act 1981* (Qld) contemplated that an application for a family provision order would be made by the eligible person themselves, or by a person authorised to act on their behalf, rather than by the executor of the estate.
The appeal was dismissed.
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