SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Moreau v Moreau and Another [2022] QSC 91
PARTIES:
ZIA CASSANDRA MOREAU
(Applicant/respondent)
v
ATALANTA MOREAU(First Respondent/applicant)
andDAVID KAULKMAN
(Third Respondent)
FILE NO/S:
8751/19 and 924/20
DIVISION:
Trial Division: Application
PROCEEDING:
Applications (2)
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court of Queensland, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
18 May 2022
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
20 April 2022
JUDGE:
Ryan J
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. In 924/20:
Pursuant to section 127(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), caveat number 719698458, registered over the land described as lot 8 on registered plan 913578 and having title reference 50185356, be removed.
2. In 8751/19:
Pursuant to section 127(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), caveat number 719411678, registered over the land described as lot 6 on registered plan 159534 and having title reference 15809183, be removed.
3. The claims for compensation in each application are dismissed.
4. The applicant, Zia Moreau, is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, Atalanta Moreau, of each application, on the standard basis.
CATCHWORDS:
REAL PROPERTY – TORRENS TITLE – CAVEATS AGAINST DEALINGS – REMOVAL – PARTICULAR CASES – where, decades ago, the first respondent mother offered to subdivide her large property and gift her son and daughter (the applicant) a lot each – where son accepted the offer and mother subdivided her property to give a lot to him – where daughter did not accept offer when it was made – where, now, daughter wants to accept offer – where mother unable to meet her financial commitments – where mother has entered into an agreement to sell property to meet her debts – where daughter lodged caveats on property – where mother applied to have caveats removed – whether daughter had commenced “proceedings” within relevant period of time – whether daughter’s claim gave rise to a serious question to be tried – whether balance of convenience favoured retention of the caveats – whether disconnect between interest claimed and land which daughter identified in caveats
Land Title Act 1994, sections 122, 126, 127
Property Law Act 1974, section 55Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rules 9, 22, 149
Allen v Synder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685
Bell v Graham [2000] VSC 142
Cousins Securities Pty Ltd v CEC Group Limited [2007] QCA 192
Goldstraw v Goldstraw [2002] VSC 491
Lloyd v Tedesco [2002] WASCA 63
Re Henderson’s Caveat [1998] 1 Qd R 632COUNSEL:
C D Coulsen for the applicant/first respondent
Respondent/applicant self-representedSOLICITORS:
Sajen Legal for the applicant/first respondent
Respondent/applicant self-represented
OVERVIEW
Zia Moreau’s mother, Atalanta Moreau, owns property on the Sunshine Coast. The property comprises two lots – Lot 6 and Lot 8. In 1994, Atalanta[1] offered her two children – Zia and her brother – a block of land each, carved out of Lot 8. Zia’s brother accepted the offer and received a block of land in 1997. Zia did not accept the offer at the time it was made but wishes to do so now. As…
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- AGLC
- Moreau v Moreau [2022] QSC 91
- Case
- [2022] QSC 91
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that Zia's claim did not give rise to a serious question to be tried. Zia did not consistently lay claim to any particular part of the property and her contributions to the property did not directly add value to it. The court held that a constructive trust may arise from proprietary estoppel, but Zia's contributions did not go beyond contributions to the material wellbeing of the parties to the relevant relationship. The court also found that the balance of convenience favoured the removal of the caveats, as Atalanta was unable to meet her financial commitments and the sale of the property was necessary to meet those debts.
The court further held that there was a disconnect between the interest claimed and the land which Zia identified in the caveats. Zia did not consistently lay claim to any particular part of the property and her contributions did not relate to the generation of wealth as a joint effort. The court found that the caveats were invalid and ordered that they be removed. The applicant, Zia Moreau, was also ordered to pay the costs of the First Respondent, Atalanta Moreau, of each application, on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. In 924/20:
Pursuant to section 127(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), caveat number 719698458, registered over the land described as lot 8 on registered plan 913578 and having title reference 50185356, be removed.
2. In 8751/19:
Pursuant to section 127(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), caveat number 719411678, registered over the land described as lot 6 on registered plan 159534 and having title reference 15809183, be removed.
3. The claims for compensation in each application are dismissed.
4. The applicant, Zia Moreau, is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, Atalanta Moreau, of each application, on the standard basis.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Goldstraw v Goldstraw [2002] VSC 491, Dodds-Streeton J at [26] explained the circumstances in which a caveat may be validly based on a constructive trust (my emphasis) – An interest based on a constructive trust may form the basis of a caveat. Such an interest could arise in a wide variety of circumstances. Examples include part performance of an agreement for disposition of an interest in land, where parties have acquired land pursuant to a failed joint venture, where the claimant has made an indirect contribution to the purchase price of the property to which another takes title; or there is a common intention that a person will acquire an interest in a particular property to which another party holds legal title, and the person acts on that belief to his or her detriment, such that it would constitute a fraud to deny the interest intended to be acquired.The contributions necessary to found a constructive trust must be related in some way to the generation of wealth as a joint effort The sort of contributions necessary to found a constructive trust must go beyond contributions to the material wellbeing of the parties to the relevant relationship. They must be contributions to the acquisition, maintenance, or improvement of the property in respect of which the trust is claimed. In Lloyd v Tedesco [2002] WASCA 63 at [30] and [31], Murray J (with whom Hasluck J agreed), explained (in the context of a marriage relationship) that the guiding principle was unconscionability. There needed to be something more than the performance of a valuable role in providing love, care or support. Such a contribution will be sufficient “only if it is related in some factual way to the generation of wealth as part of a joint effort or endeavour to provide for the parties’ mutual material welfare and security”. His Honour continued (my emphasis) – That need not, of course, be the only purpose of the provision of such assistance to the defendant, but it must be one of the material purposes because it is that which marks out the character of the joint endeavour as being one which will generate a claim, upon the failure of the relationship, without the fault of the plaintiff, to a share in the property created, acquired, maintained and improved during the course of the relationship, where the endeavour can be seen to be related to particular items of property, or will generate a claim for compensation representing the value of the contributions made by the claimant to the increased in the material wealth which was intended to be enjoyed by the parties jointly.A joint endeavour of this character is one which has the aim of adding to the parties’ material wealth for their mutual benefit rather than being one where the plaintiff simply provides loving care and support to the defendant as a normal incident of a defacto relationship. In that sense it is right to say that the joint endeavour must be one intentionally or deliberately entered into for the purpose of advancing the parties’ mutual material wealth. Only if it bears that character will it be unconscionable to allow the defendant to retain the entirety of the beneficial interest in that wealth. To hold otherwise, and in particular to hold that it would be sufficient if in fact the efforts of the plaintiff advance the defendant’s capacity to acquire wealth, would, in my opinion, be to commit the error to which Deane J adverted in Muschinski of giving undue rein to the Court’s idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice.A constructive trust may arise from proprietary estopple