SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Criminal Appeal)
MORAN v THE QUEEN
[2020] SASCFC 30
Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal
(The Honourable Justice Bampton, The Honourable Justice Parker and The Honourable Justice Doyle)
30 April 2020
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
Appeal against sentence imposed by a Judge – where the appellant pleaded guilty to participating in a criminal organisation – whether the appellant was a repeat serious offender.
Held (per Bampton J, Parker and Doyle JJ agreeing): Appeal allowed – the appellant was not a repeat serious offender – the appellant is resentenced to a head sentence of six years, two months, and 19 days and a non-parole period of three years and eight months.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 83D; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 47, s 52, s 53, s 54, s 25(4), s 94, s 96; Criminal Code Act 1989 (Qld) s 69, s 320; Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 144; Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), referred to.
R v Culley [2019] SASCFC 143; R v Harradine [2019] SASCFC 144; X7 v Australian Crime Commission & Anor (2013) 248 CLR 92; Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; R v Phanos (2015) 122 SASR 129; Stenecker v Police (2014) 120 SASR 18; Harmer v Police (2017) 127 SASR 320; R v Karnage [2019] SASCFC 82, considered.
MORAN v THE QUEEN
[2020] SASCFC 30Court of Criminal Appeal: Bampton, Parker and Doyle JJ
BAMPTON J: Ramon Moran was charged with the offence of participating in a criminal organisation contrary to s 83E of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (“the CLCA”) between 1 August 2015 and 28 May 2016 (“the participation offence”). He pleaded guilty to the participation offence on 25 July 2019, shortly before his trial in the District Court.
Mr Moran and Christopher Khoury, who was also charged with the offence of participating in a criminal organisation and had pleaded guilty at committal, were sentenced by Judge in the District Court on 7 November 2019.
A criminal organisation is defined by s 83D of the CLCA to mean (a) a criminal group or (b) a declared organisation. Mr Moran and Mr Khoury participated in a criminal group as defined by s 83D to be a group consisting of two or more persons (“the criminal group”), whose aim includes engaging in conduct, or facilitating engagement in conduct, constituting a serious offence that is intended to benefit the group, persons who participate in the group, or their associates.
By their pleas, Mr Moran and Mr Khoury acknowledged that they occupied positions of leadership in the criminal group, the aims or activities of which were:
(1)the trafficking of controlled drugs including methylamphetamine, MDMA, and cannabis within South Australia and…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was whether Mr Moran qualified as a "repeat serious offender" under the relevant legislation. This determination hinged on whether a partially suspended sentence previously imposed on Mr Moran in Queensland for a grievous bodily harm offence constituted a "suspended sentence" for the purposes of the legislation, thereby triggering the repeat serious offender provisions.
The Court allowed the appeal, holding that Mr Moran was not a repeat serious offender. The Court reasoned that the legislation concerning repeat serious offenders must be construed strictly, and any departure from the principle of proportionality in sentencing requires clear and express legislative intent. The Court found that the phrase "other than a suspended sentence" in the relevant section of the legislation did not, with irresistible clearness, exclude partially suspended sentences from its operation. Therefore, the partially suspended sentence imposed in Queensland did not fall within the category of sentences that would render Mr Moran a repeat serious offender under the South Australian provisions. Consequently, Mr Moran was resentenced to a head sentence of six years, two months, and 19 days, with a non-parole period of three years and eight months.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In summary, the Director submitted that Mr Moran committed a significant drug trafficking offence during the term of the bond imposed by the Queensland Court in July 2009, which resulted in the Queensland Supreme Court ordering that he serve the balance of the 2009 partially suspended sentence. The Director submitted that the Judge was, therefore, correct in treating the partially suspended sentence as a qualifying occasion falling within the criteria of s 53(1)(b) given the fact that Mr Moran ended up serving that sentence in custody. To suggest otherwise, it was submitted, would be to effectively ignore the fact that the suspended sentence bond had been breached and the remainder of the sentence was served in custody. To ignore these fundamental sentencing implications for a relevant qualifying offence, it was submitted, is entirely contrary to the legislative policy of the SRO provisions, which are concerned with “protecting the safety of the public and personal and general deterrence [being] the paramount consideration”.[24][24] R v Karnage [2019] SASCFC 82 at [70] (Nicholson J).Consideration As stated in Phanos, the legislative encroachment on the common law sentencing principle of proportionality should be read strictly on the basis that departure from it is intended only when and to the extent expressly and clearly declared.[25] Further, the fact that the Legislature has decreed that a category of offenders be denied the protection of the principle is not a reason “to construe more widely the judicial power to declare offenders to be serious repeat offenders”.[26][25] (2015) 122 SASR 129 at [5].[26] R v Phanos (2015) 122 SASR 129 at [6]. If the SRO provisions were intended to apply to partially suspended sentences it must “be expressed with irresistible clearness”.[27] Put another way, the words “other than a suspended sentence” in s 52(3) do not express with irresistible clearness an intention on the part of the Legislature to apply the SRO provisions to partially suspended sentences.[28][27] X7 v Australian Crime Commission & Anor (2013) 248 CLR 92 at [158] (Keifel J).[28] R v Phanos (2015) 122 SASR 129. It must be obvious from the Act that the Legislature directed its attention to the exclusion of partially suspended sentences from the phrase “(other than a suspended sentence)” in s 52(3). The Director argued that the phrase should be interpreted as meaning “other than a wholly suspended sentence”. This interpretation is not obvious and it is certainly not expressed with irresistible clearness. The 2008 GBH offence is, pursuant to s 52(1)(h), an offence under the law of Queensland that would, if committed in this State, be a serious offence. It is also, pursuant to s 52(2), regarded as a serious offence as it carries a maximum penalty of at least five years imprisonment. The reference to “a suspended sentence” in s 52(3), in the absence of an irresistibly clear expression to the contrary, should be interpreted as meaning a sentence of imprisonment that if the sentencing court “thinks good reason exists for doing do so”[29] is suspended either wholly or partially. Accordingly, the partially suspended sentence imposed for the 2008 GBH offence is not a sentence of imprisonment for the purposes of s 52(3)(a). As such, the 2008 GBH offence is not an offence to which the SRO provisions apply.[29] Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 96(1).