Moon v Conmah Pty Ltd
[2009] NSWWCCPD 134
•21 October 2009
| WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION | |||||
| DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR | |||||
| CITATION: | Moon v Conmah Pty Limited [2009] NSWWCCPD 134 | ||||
| APPELLANT: | Douglas John Moon | ||||
| RESPONDENT: | Conmah Pty Limited | ||||
| INSURER: | CGU Workers Compensation (NSW) Limited | ||||
| FILE NUMBER: | A1-2551/09 | ||||
| ARBITRATOR: | Mr R O’Moore | ||||
| DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: | 9 July 2009 | ||||
| DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: | 21 October 2009 | ||||
| SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: | Compensation for a consequential loss; alleged estoppel from consent order | ||||
| PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: | Deputy President Bill Roche | ||||
| HEARING: | On the papers | ||||
| REPRESENTATION: | Appellant: | PK Simpson & Co | |||
| Respondent: | Bartier Perry | ||||
| ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: | Paragraph one of the Arbitrator’s determination of 9 July 2009 is revoked and the following order made in its place: “1. As a result of injuries sustained to the worker’s right shoulder in the course of his employment with the respondent employer up to 6 February 2006, the worker has developed tendonitis and a rotator cuff syndrome in his left shoulder. 2. The matter is remitted to the Registrar for referral to an Approved Medical Specialist for assessment of whole person impairment resulting from the condition of the applicant worker’s left upper extremity (left shoulder) with a deemed date of injury of 6 February 2006. 3. The respondent employer is to pay the applicant worker’s costs as agreed or assessed.” | ||||
| The respondent employer is to pay the appellant worker’s costs of the appeal, assessed at $600.00 plus GST. | |||||
INTRODUCTION
This appeal concerns a claim for lump sum compensation as a result of a left shoulder condition allegedly caused as a consequence of overuse of the left arm as a result of an accepted injury to the right arm and shoulder.
BACKGROUND
The appellant worker, Mr Moon, started work as an electrical/car radio installer with the respondent employer (‘Conmah’) in January 2000. In the course of his duties he sustained multiple injuries to various parts of his body.
Mr Moon initially claimed compensation against Conmah in matter No 1534 of 2004 (‘the first proceedings’). Those proceedings were resolved by consent and the Commission issued a Certificate of Determination on 21 May 2008 in the following terms:
“1. Award for the Respondent in respect of the Applicant’s allegation of injury to the cervical spine, lumbar spine and left upper extremity.
2. The Applicant discontinues the claims for lump sum compensation in respect of the right upper extremity, right lower extremity and left lower extremity.
3. The Applicant discontinues the claim for payment of s.60 expenses.
4. The Respondent will pay the Applicant’s costs as agreed or assessed.
5. The requirement that a Notice of Discontinuance be filed is dispensed with.
Notation:
1. The parties will execute a Complying Agreement in respect of lump sum compensation payable pursuant to ss.66 and 67 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (“the Act”) as a result of injury to the right upper extremity.
2. The parties will execute a Complying Agreement in respect of lump sum compensation payable pursuant to s.66 of the Act as a result of injury to the left lower extremity and right lower extremity.”
As per the above terms, the parties executed the complying agreements on 30 May 2008 under which Mr Moon was paid lump sum compensation in the sum of $2,500.00 in respect of a whole person impairment of 2% as a result of injuries to both lower extremities (both feet), $13,750.00 in respect of a whole person impairment of 11% as a result of injuries to the right upper extremity (right elbow and shoulder), and $8,500.00 in respect of pain and suffering.
In an Application to Resolve a Dispute (‘the Application’) registered in the Commission on 2 April 2009, Mr Moon claimed lump sum compensation in the sum of $35,500.00 in respect of a 17 per cent whole person impairment alleged to have resulted from injuries to his neck, arms, back, legs, feet, and as a result of anxiety and/or depression. The case presented at arbitration bore little resemblance to the case alleged in the Application.
At the arbitration, counsel for Mr Moon discontinued any claim for lump sum compensation in respect of the cervical and lumbar spines. The claims for lump sum compensation in respect of the right upper extremity and the left and right lower extremities were in fact claims for additional lump sum compensation and those claims were, by consent, remitted to the Registrar for referral to an Approved Medical Specialist (‘AMS’) for assessment.
The only matter remaining in dispute before the Arbitrator was a claim for lump sum compensation as a result of an alleged impairment of the left upper extremity (left shoulder) said to have resulted from the accepted injury to Mr Moon’s right upper limb. The injury to the right upper limb occurred on 21 December 2002 when Mr Moon injured his right elbow in the course of his employment and when he injured his right shoulder as a result of the repetitive nature of his duties between January 2000 and 6 February 2006.
The Commission issued two Certificates of Determination on 9 July 2009. The first deals with the consent orders and is in the following terms:
“1. The Applicant withdraws and discontinues his claims for permanent impairment of the right inguinal direct, cervical spine and lumbar spine.
2. The requirement to file a Notice of Discontinuance in respect of those claims is dispensed with.
3. Leave is granted to the parties to file the late material filed with the Commission dated 15 May 2009, 18 May 2009, 22 June 2009, 2 July 2009, X-Ray and Ultrasound of Dr Mullins dated 5 February 2009 and Workcover certificate of Dr Kay dated 10 February 2009.
4. The matter is remitted to the Registrar for referral to an AMS for assessment of whole person impairment in relation to;
(a)the deterioration of the right upper extremity pursuant to agreed
dates of injury on 21 December 2002 and 6 February 2006 and
(b)the deterioration of the left lower extremity and right lower extremity (both plantar fasciitis) for an agreed date of injury 6 February 2006
The late material referred to above (except for the radiological report and Workcover certificate relating to the left shoulder) is additional documentation filed in the proceedings and should be referred to the AMS.
No material in the Application and Reply is excluded.I note that the section 60 claim for medical expenses is not denied for the body parts the subject of prior awards or complying agreements.”
The second deals with the left upper extremity and states:
“1. Award Respondent in respect of the Applicant’s claim for permanent impairment of the left upper extremity.”
In an appeal filed on 3 August 2009, Mr Moon seeks leave to challenge the Arbitrator’s determination in respect of the left upper extremity.
LEAVE TO APPEAL
Monetary Threshold
Before proceeding to deal with an appeal the Commission must determine whether the application meets the requirements of section 352 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’).
It is not disputed that the monetary thresholds in section 352(2) of the 1998 Act are satisfied.
Interlocutory
The employer submits that the Arbitrator’s determination is an interlocutory order. I do not accept this submission. The Arbitrator made a final determination in respect of Mr Moon’s entitlement to compensation in respect of any lump sum compensation as a result of impairment of his left upper extremity. Unless overturned on appeal, that order is final and conclusive and is clearly not interlocutory.
Time
The appeal was lodged within 28 days of the Arbitrator’s decision in compliance with section 352(4) of the 1998 Act.
I grant leave to appeal.
ON THE PAPERS
Section 354(6) of the 1998 Act provides:
“(6) If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Having regard to Practice Directions Numbers 1 and 6, the documents that are before me, and the submissions by the parties that the appeal can proceed to be determined on the basis of these documents, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.
ISSUE IN DISPUTE
The issue in dispute in the appeal is whether the Arbitrator erred in making an award for the employer in relation to the claim for compensation in respect of Mr Moon’s left upper extremity.
THE ARBITRATOR’S REASONS
In an ex tempore decision the Arbitrator stated:
(a) he would have expected a complaint to a treating doctor and some investigation (about the left upper extremity) if Mr Moon suffered symptoms by way of gradual onset over time (T14.44);
(b) he was faced with the medical evidence and whether he was “satisfied that there [was] sufficient evidence of injury and pathology and continuing symptoms which might give rise to a permanent impairment which needs to be assessed” (emphasis added) (T14.55-58);
(c) the evidence was rather scant until 2009, three years after the original injury, and he was “surprised” that there was no complaint recorded at least before that time about the onset of symptoms;
(d) Dr Kay appeared to question the pathology;
(e) the question was whether there was a “causal connection between the left shoulder complaint and employment” (emphasis added) (T15.16), and
(f) he was not satisfied that the left upper extremity “injury” was established and he did not propose to refer that body part for assessment of permanent impairment (T15.39).
EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS
Though the parties have tendered hundreds of pages of material in this case, they have given little thought to properly preparing the case and obtaining and tendering relevant material. As a result, the Commission has been forced to spend considerable time reading and sifting through irrelevant material that should never have been tendered.
Mr Moon relies on three documents, his statement of 7 April 2009, a report from Dr Nash, consultant vascular and general surgeon, dated 2 February 2009, and a report from Dr Peter Giblin, orthopaedic surgeon, dated 16 December 2008.
Mr Moon’s statement has been poorly drafted and is most unsatisfactory. The only evidence in it dealing with the issue that arises on appeal is paragraph seven, which states:
“I have also developed over time symptoms in my left shoulder (due to my right shoulder injury), neck and back due to my work injuries.”
One would have thought that, at a minimum, details would have been provided as to when the left shoulder symptoms commenced and in what circumstances. Mr Moon’s statement should also have dealt with the nature and extent of the injuries to the right upper extremity and their impact on his use of his left shoulder. The failure to deal with these issues in Mr Moon’s statement is unfortunate and unsatisfactory. As a result, it has been necessary to piece together Mr Moon’s case from the medical histories.
Dr Giblin saw Mr Moon on 15 December 2008 and reported on 16 December 2008. He took a history that Mr Moon experienced the following symptoms:
“(1) right shoulder pain;
(2) left shoulder pain (this has been slowly deteriorating as he favours the right one more and more);
(3) right foot and left foot pain, and
(4) right and left knee pain.”
On examination, he found Mr Moon to have a restricted range of movement in his left shoulder, which he equated to a 5 per cent whole person impairment. He concluded that the natural history for Mr Moon’s injuries was for a gradual deterioration which “would be most pronounced particular[ly] on the left shoulder as he favours the right one more and more.”
Dr Nash examined Mr Moon on 15 December 2008 and reported to his solicitors on 2 February 2009. He took a history that Mr Moon injured his right elbow when he struck it on a heater while working on a car on 21 December 2002. He was ultimately diagnosed with traumatic bursitis of the right elbow. He also developed pain in his right shoulder and was referred to Dr Frawley in 2003 and diagnosed with subacromial impingement secondary to a rotator cuff tendon tear. Mr Moon underwent decompression and rotator cuff tendon repair to his right shoulder in February 2004 and a manipulation and arthroscopic debridement in June 2004. He was certified fit for his pre-injury duties on 14 October 2004.
Mr Moon’s right shoulder symptoms recurred in 2007 and he again saw Dr Frawley who arranged for an MRI scan of the right shoulder which revealed most of the rotator cuff to be intact, but Dr Frawley felt that part of it looked as if it had been re-torn.
In respect of the left upper extremity, Dr Nash recorded “more recently he developed pain in the left arm because of overuse” (emphasis included). On examination, Dr Nash noted Mr Moon to have a restricted range of movement in his left shoulder and he diagnosed him to be suffering from tendonitis of the left shoulder.
Under “opinion”, Dr Nash noted Mr Moon to have many “co morbidities” principally being “a re-tear of the right supraspinatus tendon, and to a lesser extent tendonitis of the left shoulder following overuse.” The doctor added that Mr Moon “developed left shoulder symptoms due to overuse and also the nature and conditions of his work.” He noted that Mr Moon had a left shoulder arthroscopy and release of the common extensor tendon of the left elbow on 4 November 1999, but was able to perform his normal work following that surgery. The reference to left shoulder surgery in 1999 is an error. The 1999 surgery was only to the left elbow. Dr Nash concluded that, based on the history and his clinical examination, it appeared that Mr Moon’s employment as a car installer was a significant contributing factor to his current disabilities.
Conmah relies on a report from Dr Huntsdale, orthopaedic surgeon, dated 26 March 2009. He recorded that Mr Moon’s right shoulder was painful and that he had a restricted range of motion. Mr Moon complained to the doctor of pain in his left shoulder and was “keen to put it down to overuse because he is sparing his right shoulder”. He said that his left shoulder became sore in October 2008. The doctor referred to the left shoulder x-rays showing degenerative change in the glenohumeral joint and some faint calcification in the rotator cuff. An ultrasound of the left shoulder was reported as showing impingement in the subacromial bursa with an intact rotator cuff and some “calcific tendinitis” [sic].
Dr Huntsdale said that it was of interest that the pain in Mr Moon’s left shoulder started in October 2008, “well and truly after he has ceased work”. The doctor recorded that Mr Moon did not do much by way of activities of daily living, but did note that he had trouble showering himself because he could not move his shoulders freely. He did not do any housework other than sweeping the floor, but he did mow the lawn.
On examination, Dr Huntsdale observed that movements of both shoulders were markedly reduced.
Under “summary”, Dr Huntsdale noted:
“Mr Moon has a long history of working in confined spaces and has had an accepted claim for a right rotator cuff tear and bilateral plantar fasciitis. He is asserting that he now has left shoulder pain and that this is due to his work. This came on however in 2007 [sic, 2008] and he has not worked since 2006. He believes it is due to overuse of his left shoulder.”
Dr Huntsdale diagnosed Mr Moon to have a right rotator cuff tear and “in all probability he has tendinitis [sic] and a left rotator cuff tear.” He concluded that the left shoulder condition was not due to Mr Moon’s employment.
In a supplementary report (also dated 26 March 2009) Dr Huntsdale was asked “Do you consider the worker’s employment with our client contributed to any current disability or incapacity the worker suffers?” The doctor replied:
“I believe that the worker’s left shoulder is not a work-related injury. The symptoms came on in October last year, well after he had finished work. I do not accept that the left shoulder has deteriorated because it is doing more work than the right. Rotator cuff degenerative change is common with age and should not be automatically assumed to be as the result of work.” (emphasis added)
Conmah also relies on several reports from Dr Frawley, who saw Mr Moon for treatment to his right shoulder on several occasions in 2003 and 2004. In a report dated 14 October 2004, Dr Frawley noted that there was a slight loss of movement in the right shoulder (flexion, abduction and external rotation) and that internal rotation was considerably restricted. He anticipated continued improvement and discharged Mr Moon from his care.
Mr Moon again saw Dr Frawley for his right shoulder in March 2007. On that occasion he took a history that Mr Moon’s employment had been terminated because he was not able to keep up an adequate workload. Mr Moon complained of pain in his right shoulder, which limited his activities during the day and interrupted his sleep. On examination, Dr Frawley noted a restricted range of movement of the right shoulder. He arranged for a further MRI scan which revealed that most of the rotator cuff was intact, but part of it looked like it has been re-torn. The possibility of further surgery on the right shoulder was discussed, but Mr Moon was not keen on another operation.
Dr Frawley reported to CGU on 2 October 2007 that Mr Moon had not improved much with his right shoulder and that the major problem was stiffness.
Conmah also relies on clinical notes from Mr Moon’s treating general practitioner, Dr Kay. On 29 January 2009, Dr Kay recorded:
“Still pain right shoulder and feet.
Left rotator cuff syndrome with supraspinatous tendon pathology ? Tear or impingement.
Doug attributes this to overuse of the left arm [to] compensate for the right shoulder”
Dr Kay recorded on 10 February 2009:
“Left supraspinatous tendon impingement with calcific tendonitis.
Doug feels this is related to compensating with the left arm for the right arm pathology and may be workers compensation related”
It is submitted on behalf of Mr Moon that, in rejecting the claim for the left shoulder on the basis that there was no complaint contemporaneous with or close in time to the date of injury to the right shoulder, the Arbitrator erred. Mr Moon’s claim is that his left shoulder problem has arisen as a result of excessive use because of the weakness and restrictions in his right upper limb because of his significant right shoulder injury. He does not allege that he injured his left shoulder in the course of his employment with Conmah.
It is submitted on behalf of Conmah that:
(a) in the first proceedings, Mr Moon claimed to have injured his left arm as a result of the nature and conditions of his employment or as a result of an incident in or about December 2002. By consent, those proceedings were resolved with an award being made in favour of Conmah;
(b) there is no evidence from a treating doctor suggesting that Mr Moon’s left upper extremity symptoms were caused as a result of overuse of the left arm due to the right arm injury. No treating doctor recorded any injury or complaint to the left arm until about January 2009 when Dr Kay noted complaints in the left shoulder;
(c) Dr Kay has not expressed any opinion as to the cause of the left shoulder problem, but has merely recorded Mr Moon’s history;
(d) the opinions from Drs Giblin and Nash are unsatisfactory and unreliable because the doctors have not provided an adequate explanation as to how the left shoulder problem was caused. The doctors did not relate their diagnosis to the mechanism of injury and did not indicate what Mr Moon did in order to conclude it was an overuse syndrome. There is no evidence of what Mr Moon did between ceasing work in February 2006 and his complaints to Dr Kay in January 2009;
(e) the Arbitrator preferred the opinion of Dr Huntsdale;
(f) the Arbitrator was not satisfied that Mr Moon had established a left upper extremity injury;
(g) Mr Moon failed to provide satisfactory evidence to establish a left upper extremity injury and the evidence from Drs Nash and Giblin has not adequately explained the mechanism of injury. Due to the vagueness of the allegations and considering the allegation made about the left upper extremity in the previous proceedings, it is clear that the left arm injury is not directly or indirectly related to the work injury, and
(h) as a result of the previous award in favour of Conmah in respect of the left upper extremity injury, Mr Moon is estopped from making a claim in respect of the same injury again (Humphries v Plaspak Closures Pty Limited [2006] NSWWCCPD 98).
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
The Arbitrator’s decision, and Dr Huntsdale’s evidence, is confused as to the nature of the present claim. Mr Moon is not claiming that he injured his left arm or shoulder in the course of his employment with Conmah. He is alleging that as a result of the accepted injury to his right arm and shoulder he has increased the use of his left arm and shoulder and, as a result, has developed symptoms in his left shoulder.
The evidence in support of this allegation is brief but clear. It is obvious that Mr Moon has experienced significant restrictions in the use of his right arm and shoulder for several years. It is not disputed that that restriction has resulted from his employment with Conmah. As a result, he has used his left arm and shoulder to compensate for his right shoulder condition. Therefore, Mr Moon is claiming compensation for a consequential loss. That is, a loss or impairment that he alleges has resulted from his previous compensable injury to his right shoulder (see Roads & Traffic Authority (NSW) v Malcolm (1996) 13 NSWCCR 272).
It is therefore not necessary for Mr Moon to establish that he suffered an “injury” to his left shoulder within the meaning of that term in section 4 of the 1987 Act. All he has to establish is that the symptoms and restrictions in his left shoulder have resulted from his right shoulder injury. Therefore, to the extent that the Arbitrator and Dr Huntsdale approached the matter on the basis that Mr Moon had to establish that he sustained an “injury” to his left shoulder in the course of his employment with Conmah they asked the wrong question.
The test of causation in a claim for lump sum compensation is the same as it is in a claim for weekly compensation, namely, has the loss “resulted from” the relevant work injury (see Sidiropoulos v Able Placements Pty Limited (1998) 16 NSWCCR 123; Rail Services Australia v Dimovski & Anor [2004] NSWCA 267; (2004) 1 DDCR 648).
The Court of Appeal considered the meaning of the expression “results from” in Kooragang Cement Pty Limited v Bates (1994) 35 NSWLR 452 (‘Kooragang’) where Kirby P (as his Honour then was) said at 463-4;
“The result of the cases is that each case where causation is in issue in a workers compensation claim, must be determined on its own facts. Whether death or incapacity results from a relevant work injury is a question of fact. The importation of notions of proximate cause by the use of the phrase ‘results from’, is not now accepted. By the same token, the mere proof that certain events occurred which predisposed a worker to subsequent injury or death, will not, of itself, be sufficient to establish that such incapacity or death ‘results from’ a work injury. What is required is a common sense evaluation of the causal chain. As the early cases demonstrate, the mere passage of time between a work incident and subsequent incapacity or death, is not determinative of the entitlement to compensation. In each case, the question whether the incapacity or death ‘results from’ the impugned work injury...is a question of fact to be determined on the basis of the evidence, including, where applicable, expert opinions.”
Applying the above principles to the present case it is irrelevant, and unsurprising, that Mr Moon experienced no symptoms in his left shoulder whilst working for Conmah. That is not the allegation. The evidence of the development of his left shoulder symptoms, and that those symptoms have resulted from the restricted use of his right shoulder, is found in the clinical notes from Dr Kay and in the medical histories in the reports from Drs Nash, Giblin and Huntsdale. Evidence in a medical history is evidence of the truth of the history (R v Welsh (1996) 13 NSWCCR 674; Papercoaters Pty Limited v Jessop [2009] NSWCA 1 at [42]). Therefore, notwithstanding the shortcomings in Mr Moon’s statement, I am comfortably satisfied, based on the histories set out in the medical evidence, that Mr Moon’s left shoulder symptoms have resulted from his right shoulder injury.
The connection between the left shoulder symptoms and the right shoulder injury – the overuse of the left shoulder as a result of restrictions in the right shoulder – is, in the circumstances of the present case, so obvious that it requires no further explanation by the medical experts (Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 at [88]-[89]).
The Arbitrator’s reliance on Dr Huntsdale’s evidence was misplaced. Dr Huntsdale’s evidence is unpersuasive because he wrongly focused on whether Mr Moon had injured his left shoulder at work. To the extent that Dr Hunstdale concluded that Mr Moon’s left shoulder condition is age related, it is for the AMS to assess the extent that any impairment resulting from the condition of Mr Moon’s left upper extremity (left shoulder) has resulted from any pre-existing condition (section 323 of the 1998 Act).
In respect of Conmah’s argument that Mr Moon is estopped from bringing a claim for lump sum compensation in respect of the condition of his left shoulder, it is necessary to consider the terms of the previous consent orders (see [3] above). Orders made by consent may create estoppels between the parties to the orders, however, they do so only as to those matters that are necessarily decided (see Habib v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Limited [2009] NSWCA 231 at [186]). The award in favour of Conmah was in respect of Mr Moon’s “allegation of injury” (emphasis added) to the left upper extremity. Were Mr Moon to seek compensation for an “injury” to his left upper extremity covered by the terms of the consent award, he would be estopped from doing so. However, he is not seeking compensation for an “injury” to his left upper extremity sustained in the course of his employment with Conmah but is seeking compensation for a consequential loss resulting from his accepted right shoulder injury. That is an entirely different claim and no estoppel arises from the previous consent orders that prevent him from pursuing such a claim. Therefore, the consent orders in the first proceedings do not create any estoppels that prevent Mr Moon from pursuing the present claim.
It follows therefore that Mr Moon is entitled to have the question of any whole person impairment resulting from his left shoulder condition assessed by an AMS.
CONCLUSION
Having conducted a review on the merits (per Spigelman CJ in State Transit Authority of NSW v Fritzi Chemler [2007] NSWCA 249; (2007) 5 DDCR 287 at [28]), I have concluded that the true and correct view is that Mr Moon’s symptoms in his left upper extremity (left shoulder) have resulted from the accepted injury to his right shoulder. As a result, he is entitled to have the question of any whole person impairment resulting from the condition of his left upper extremity assessed by an AMS.
DECISION
Paragraph one of the Arbitrator’s determination of 9 July 2009 is revoked and the following order made in its place:
“1. As a result of injuries sustained to the worker’s right shoulder in the course of his employment with the respondent employer up to 6 February 2006, the worker has developed tendonitis and a rotator cuff syndrome in his left shoulder.
2. The matter is remitted to the Registrar for referral to an Approved Medical Specialist for assessment of whole person impairment resulting from the condition of the applicant worker’s left upper extremity (left shoulder) with a deemed date of injury of 6 February 2006.
3. The respondent employer is to pay the applicant worker’s costs as agreed or assessed.”
COSTS
The respondent employer is to pay the appellant worker’s costs of the appeal, assessed at $600.00 plus GST.
Bill Roche
Deputy President
21 October 2009
I, TUYET WALLIS, CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF BILL ROCHE, DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
ASSOCIATE
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