Monteiro v State of New South Wales

[2025] NSWSC 1235

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Amendment notes

Medium Neutral Citation:

Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 1235

Hearing dates:

22 – 24 September 2025

Date of orders:

21 October 2025

Decision date:

21 October 2025

Jurisdiction:

Common Law

Before:

Rigg J

Decision:

Extended supervision order imposed by Fagan J not revoked; two conditions imposed by Fagan J but previously deleted reimposed; orders made for redaction and management of scandalous material.

Catchwords:

CIVIL LAW – high risk offender – plaintiff’s application for revocation of extended supervision order (ESO) – index aggravated sexual assault offence – defendant’s application to vary and/or reimpose conditions of the ESO – no real or live constitutional issue – no reduction in risk of committing a further serious offence – no other reason for revocation – plaintiff’s application to revoke ESO dismissed – condition 4 and 8 of the ESO reimposed – electronic monitoring reimposed – condition requiring the plaintiff to not spend the night anywhere other than his approved address reimposed 

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW)

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)

Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)

Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)

Oaths Act 1900 (NSW)

Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v C G Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd and Others (1999) 95 FCR 292; [1999] FCA 1151

Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46

Lawrence v State of New South Wales (2020) 103 NSWLR 401; [2020] NSWCA 248

Monteiro v Commissioner of Corrective Services and Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network; Monteiro v State of NSW [2022] NSWSC 1489

Monteiro v R [2022] NSWCCA 37

Monteiro v State NSW [2024] NSWSC 1667

Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWCA 126

Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2024] NSWSC 864

Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 235

R v Monteiro [2021] NSWDC 340

Re Application by Simon Monteiro [2022] NSWCCA 10

State of New South Wales v Carr [2020] NSWSC 643

State of New South Wales v Monteiro (aka Lowe) (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 349

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Simon Monteiro (Plaintiff)
State of New South Wales (Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel:
Plaintiff (self-represented)
H El-Hage SC / A Mykkeltvedt (Defendant)

Solicitors:
Plaintiff (self-represented)
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Defendant)

File Number(s):

2023/454715

Publication restriction:

Orders were made by Weinstein J on 18 December 2023, Garling J on 2 May 2025 and Campbell J on 5 May 2025 pursuant to the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW)

JUDGMENT

1. The plaintiff, Simon Monteiro, was made subject to a five year extended supervision order (“ESO”) with 26 conditions to it, under the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (“the Act”) by Fagan J on 6 July 2020: State of New South Wales v Monteiro (Final) [2020] NSWSC 881. Because of subsequent breaches of the ESO and periods of imprisonment, it now expires in February 2027. There is a protracted history of litigation in which the plaintiff has sought release from the obligations of the ESO, of which this decision forms part. This history contextualises the evidence placed before the Court now in support of the plaintiff’s application, pursuant to s 13 of the Act, that the ESO be revoked.

2. The judgment of Fagan J sets out the plaintiff’s extensive criminal history and the seriousness of the index aggravated sexual assault offence which gave rise to the power to make the ESO, as well as further criminality surrounding it and the physical and verbal aggression by the plaintiff towards the victim throughout their brief relationship, prior to his sexual assault of her. His Honour’s judgment sets out the psychiatric evidence and risk assessment reports which were part of the body of evidence supporting the requisite finding to make the ESO; namely, satisfaction, to a high degree of probability that the plaintiff posed an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under an ESO. His Honour set out other evidence adduced by the State of New South Wales, the defendant in the current proceedings (sometimes “the State”) and the moving party before Fagan J, required to be taken into account under the Act. His Honour described the evidence relied on by the plaintiff, and provided comprehensive reasons for his determination to make the ESO.

3. The evidence accepted by his Honour demonstrated that the plaintiff meets the criteria for a severe personality disorder (narcissistic personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder, or personality disorder with narcissistic, antisocial and borderline traits) with a high loading of psychopathic traits and a pathological level of denial of his past offending and risk factors. The evidence his Honour acted upon demonstrated the plaintiff’s personality traits are entrenched and unlikely to change in the short term or at all, that he fell within the highest category of risk for re-offending, with the most likely scenario for a “serious offence” being a sexual offence against an intimate partner. An additional risk factor established by this evidence was the plaintiff’s capacity to ingratiate himself with potential intimate partners and superficially present as pleasant and law abiding, with the greatest risk to a future intimate partner, but a present risk in relation to any female he meets and spends time with. The evidence demonstrated that an important aspect of any ESO would be the monitoring of the plaintiff’s movements and future relationships.

4. Initially after the imposition of the ESO there was an attempted appeal to the Court of Appeal, which is available as of right under s 22 of the Act if made within 28 days of the determination and with leave thereafter. Such appeal may be on a question of law, a question of fact or a question of mixed law and fact. On 4 August 2020 the plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal against the orders made by Fagan J.

5. On 18 August 2020, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with three counts of failing to comply with his ESO contrary to s 12 of the Act. He was refused bail, and on 14 September 2020 the plaintiff was charged with a further 38 counts of failing to comply with his ESO contrary to s 12 of the Act.

6. On 16 September 2020 the appeal proceedings were listed for hearing on 3 November 2020 and timetabling orders were made for the filing and service of evidence. On 30 September 2020 the hearing date of 3 November 2020 was vacated. The matter was subsequently adjourned to enable the plaintiff to pursue an application for Legal Aid and to allow him to be sentenced in respect of the failures to comply with the ESO.

7. On 16 June 2021 the plaintiff was sentenced by Bright DCJ in respect of a number of charges of failing to comply with the ESO – some on indictment, taking into account others on a Form 1 document under s 32 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), and some on a certificate pursuant to s 166 of that Act. Her Honour imposed an aggregate term of imprisonment of 2 years and 8 months, with a non-parole period of 2 years, to commence on 18 August 2020 when the plaintiff was first arrested: R v Monteiro [2021] NSWDC 340.

8. Following his sentencing for the breaches, the appeal proceedings were adjourned on a number of occasions to allow the plaintiff to pursue an application to issue subpoenas to various persons, including “Corrective Services NSW”, “Justice Health and NSW” and “The proper officer, NSW Police”, requiring the production of certain material. I note that throughout these reasons Corrective Services NSW (“CSNSW”) and Community Corrections are used somewhat interchangeably, generally in accordance with the relevant piece of evidence or submission being addressed.

9. In September 2021 the plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal in the Court of Criminal Appeal (“CCA”) in respect of his sentence for the breaches of the ESO.

10. On 12 November 2021, the plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for the issue of the subpoenas in the ESO appeal proceedings was dismissed and the matter was listed for directions on 17 November 2021. On that date, as the plaintiff sought to appeal the decision of the Registrar which had been unfavourable to him as to the subpoenas, he was directed to file any further motion in relation to the issue of subpoenas by 1 December 2021. On 1 December 2021 the Court of Appeal proceedings were adjourned to 23 February 2022 for further directions.

11. The CCA appeal was originally due to be heard on 9 February 2022 but this was relisted for 17 June 2022 as the grounds expanded. The CCA heard an application for bail on 9 February 2022. It became apparent that the bail application required consideration of the merit of the severity appeal, with a requirement to demonstrate “special or exceptional circumstances” that did not apply in relation to determination of the severity appeal itself, such that the substance of the application for leave to appeal was determined. The CCA made orders on 17 February 2022 which resulted in the plaintiff’s release from custody: Monteiro v R [2022] NSWCCA 37. The plaintiff was granted leave to appeal and resentenced on successfully arguing that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive. The Court sentenced the plaintiff to an aggregate fixed term of 18 months imprisonment, commencing on 18 August 2020 and expiring on 17 February 2022.

12. The Court at [39]-[41] explained that the breaches were of conditions that facilitate supervision. They went to the use of a different name; the use of electronic equipment; and the use of programs of a kind that were either prohibited or not approved by the plaintiff’s supervising officer. The Court concluded that while compliance with such conditions is important, where they were not related to serious offending (either the commission of it or in preparation of it, nor increasing the risk of serious offending) it was not correct for the sentencing judge to assess their objective seriousness as in the “mid-range”. The Court took the view that the offences were not at the lowest level, but well below mid-range.

13. At [44] the Court found that because the offences went to the heart of the supervision process, and amounted to a significant impediment to the supervision process being fully implemented, the requirement of s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) for determination that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate, before a court sentences an offender to imprisonment, was satisfied. In resentencing the plaintiff the Court nominated indicative sentences for each of the offences on indictment and the s 166 certificate, after 25% discount for the guilty pleas, of between 2 months and 12 months imprisonment. At [50] the Court recorded its determination that “Applying the principle of totality, and bearing in mind that any parole period and the conditions on parole would be less restrictive than the conditions imposed as a result of the ESO, we would impose a fixed sentence, with no parole period, of 18 months’ imprisonment.” This is consistent with the general understanding that a fixed term of imprisonment corresponds with the non-parole period that would be appropriate.

14. In the preparation for the CCA appeal, the plaintiff sought orders for production of documents, seemingly directed towards attacking the imposition of the ESO, which application was rejected by Beech-Jones CJ at CL as misconceived: Re Application by Simon Monteiro [2022] NSWCCA 10. His Honour said this at [8]:

“Mr Monteiro was given the opportunity to lodge submission specifying the basis for seeking the orders. His response dated 31 January 2021 included various scurrilous allegations against judges, lawyers and police as well as threat to create a website attacking me in the event that the matter is determined adversely to him. His conduct can be considered in the event that the circumstance arises in which there is an assessment of the risk he poses to others and the likelihood that he will comply with court orders. Otherwise, Mr Monteiro is now on notice that the inclusion in submissions of any form of threat against a judicial officer if they rule against him is, amongst other offences, potentially a serious contempt of court and may be dealt with as such.”

15. On 23 February 2022, the ESO appeal proceedings were adjourned to 21 March 2022 for directions with a notation that a motion in relation to the issue of subpoenas would be filed. On 21 March 2022 the Registrar made orders that the ESO appeal proceedings be listed for directions on 27 April 2022. The plaintiff was directed to file written submissions by 20 April 2022. At the directions hearing on 27 April 2022 the plaintiff did not appear, and no written submissions had been filed. The matter was stood over for further directions to 1 June 2022 and the plaintiff was further directed to file and serve written submissions by 25 May 2022. An order was also made for the Registry to issue a notice under Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 13.6 directed to Mr Monteiro to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed or struck out for his non-attendance at the directions hearing of 27 April 2022.

16. The plaintiff did not file written submissions by 25 May 2022. On 1 June 2022 the Registrar ordered that the plaintiff’s submissions be filed and served by 6 July 2022 and stood the matter over for further directions on 11 July 2022 for the plaintiff to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of due despatch. The Registrar also made an order that, if the plaintiff’s submissions were not filed by 6 July 2022, he was to file and serve an affidavit by 7 July 2022 outlining why the appeal should not be dismissed for want of due despatch. A further order was made for the Registry to issue a notice under r 13.6 of the UCPR directing the plaintiff to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed or struck out for his non-attendance at the directions on 1 June 2022.

17. The plaintiff did not comply with the direction for written submissions and did not file any affidavit explaining why the appeal should not be dismissed in accordance with the orders made on 1 June 2022. On 11 July 2022, the matter was listed for hearing before Meagher JA in the Court of Appeal. On 15 July 2022, his Honour delivered judgment and made orders directing the plaintiff to file and serve any Notice of Motion asking that the Court receive additional evidence on the hearing of the appeal, any affidavit evidence relied on as establishing the grounds for the Notice of Motion, any evidence which the plaintiff wanted the Court to receive on the hearing of the appeal, an amended Notice of Appeal which included a statement of the specific grounds relied on in support of the appeal in accordance with r 51.18(1)(e) of the UCPR, and written submissions in support of the appeal by 15 September 2022. His Honour also made guillotine orders dismissing the appeal in the event that such written submissions and an amended Notice of Appeal were not filed by 15 September 2022: Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2022] NSWCA 126. His Honour at [30] described the following occurrence:

“There is one further matter to which reference should be made. After the completion of argument the Court reserved its decision, and did not give leave to either party to make any further written submissions. On 14 July 2022 Mr Monteiro sent an email to my chambers. No copy of that email was sent to the respondent or its counsel. The Court replied to both parties confirming that no regard would be had to the content of that document. That said, it should be recorded that the email contains allegations directed to judges or former judges of the Court. Depending on the circumstances, the making of those allegations, which address matters wholly irrelevant to any issue before the Court, would constitute a serious contempt of court on the part of Mr Monteiro. Nothing more need be said.”

18. No further material was filed by 15 September 2022, and the guillotine order came into effect.

19. A previous Notice of Motion seeking revocation pursuant to s 13 of the Act was filed on 20 October 2021. The proceedings were dismissed for want of due despatch by Bellew J on 4 November 2022: Monteiro v Commissioner of Corrective Services and Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Network; Monteiro v State of NSW [2022] NSWSC 1489.

20. The current proceedings have their genesis from December 2023. There are problems on the face of the originating documents included in the Court Book with their dates. For example a summons in the Court Book, stamped by the Court as filed on 7 December 2023, has the signature of the plaintiff’s legal representative at the time on 12 December 2023 and the affidavit of the plaintiff in support dated 15 December 2023. The evidence for the defendant indicates that the summons was filed in this Court on or about 15 December 2023. The relief claimed in that summons is:

“(1) Pursuant to S13(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act the Supreme Court of NSW may at any time [vary] or revoke the extended supervision order.

(2) An order to vary the Extended Supervision Order to:

(a) Leave the State of NSW from 18 December 2023 to 7 January 2024.

(b) No reporting requirements during this time.”

21. In another summons contained in the Court Book which has a signature on it dated 18 December 2023, but which does not have a filing stamp, the relief claimed is:

“RELIEF CLAIMED

Pursuant to any and all sections relevant to my application of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006,

A An order that the Commissioner has been unreasonable, made irrelevant considerations [sic] and did not at the time provide reasons for refusal to grant permission to leave the State be made [and] has not made relevant considerations in making an administrative decision, an order be made that the decision deprives me of due process, procedural fairness and natural justice.

B An order that the Commissioner must not now give a formal direction in response to this judgment, or internal direction, that the applicant not leave the State.

C An order that the Court rule that the material the Crown has served on me at the eleventh hour is onerous excessively to say the least and will make it impossible for me to fairly continue this application, and that the material is inadmissible, as it must be filed before the case started and when the Commissioner made a decision I must receive the reasons for his decision.

D An order that the Commissioner’s decision is unlawful and/or invalid and/or unreasonable and/or not in accordance with the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006.”

22. The 7 February 2024 affidavit of Johanna Fisher, solicitor, read for the defendant in the current proceedings, indicates that on 18 December 2023 Weinstein J determined to list the matter for further hearing on 12 and 13 February 2024 and made timetabling orders in relation to the proceedings. These were not complied with by the plaintiff. Ms Fisher’s affidavit of 13 December 2024 describes the vacation of those proceedings on the plaintiff’s application, by consent. Ms Fisher describes multiple case management orders made by Button, Yehia and Garling JJ in the first half of 2024, including the listing of the matter for a two day hearing on 21 May 2024, which was vacated. For at least some of this time the plaintiff was legally represented. The plaintiff in the meantime had sought to issue 38 subpoenas to various persons and agencies for the production of documents and to compel their attendance at the 21 May 2024 hearing. The Registrar’s refusal to grant leave to issue all bar two came before Harrison CJ at CL for review on 1 July 2024.

22. The final amended summons at Court Book page 421 seeks the following relief:

“Relief Claimed

(1) Pursuant to section 13(1) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act NSW and other relevant sections of the Act, and pursuant to the relevant section/sections of which ever Act is appropriate in NSW, I seek the following:

(A) The Supreme Court make an order that the Extended Supervision Order be immediately and totally revoked.

(B) The Supreme Court make a finding and order that the Extended Supervision Order was unlawfully imposed, as the information relied on by the Court was known to be fraudulently misleading, untrue, manipulated, exaggerated, by the Crown, CSNSW et al, and that due process, procedural fairness and natural justice was not afforded to me in critical areas and areas that made the imposition of the order unlawful & unconstitutional. This occurred at both the ISO hearing and ESO hearing.

(C) An order be made for damages in the form of financial compensation/relief, being awarded to me for being deliberately criminally tortured in Goulburn prison in 2014 and at other prisons (including Goulburn Prison) before and after 2014 by custodial & medical staff, for deliberately mistreating me in and out of custody in deliberate, cruel, spiteful, inhumane, perverse, odious, criminally assaulting me & purposely inflicting as much pain & suffering as correctional staff in custody and community corrections staff in the community could dream up and scheme. The damages sought are $10,000,000.00 (Ten Million dollars). This also would include CSNSW/CCNSW staff deliberately depriving me of reasonable conditions, management supervision et al that would enable me to run a business, pursue employment, study or plan my future.

(D) The Supreme Court make an order the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act NSW is unconstitutional by design, and application at the regulatory and administerial level.

(E) That the applicant, by order of the Supreme Court of NSW be lawfully and effectively enabled to litigate (sue) government employees personally and that these individuals have their government immunity/judicial immunity stripped (per Salvatore Vasta FCJ Case) for deliberately abusing & exceeding their employment remit job description, rules & regulations, policy and procedures, legislational and regulatory requirements and boundaries. Those individuals will be named in a statement of claim, affidavit, written & oral submissions.

(F) An order be made that my name may not be published unless an application be made to the Supreme Court and not until the applicant is present to defend the application to publish.

(G) An order be made & a finding that the treatment the applicant has been subjected to from 2008 until present by CSNSW/CCNSW, has been, and remains to be, extremely cruel, perverse, odious, deliberate, tantamount to a personal vendetta sponsored by the State, akin to terrorism of my very existence, extremely inhumane, criminally torturous (torture) at times and purposely, by design, to be as uncomfortable, difficult, intolerable and has destroyed my physical, emotion & mental health to the point I may never recover and function normally ever again, due to the damage being so profound.

(H) An order/finding be made, that an unacceptable risk was never established requisite to justify the imposition of an ISO/ESO.

(I) An order/finding be made that the investigating officers of the NSW Police, [JB] detective / [JH] Detective withheld crucial/relevant evidence and misled the court in statements and statements of facts/antecedents, resulting in the applicant being unnecessarily/unfairly/without justification imprisoned for 2 years based on purported technical only breaches of the ESO that was unlawfully imposed.”

24. Leave was granted to the plaintiff by Harrison CJ at CL to file that document in Court on 1 July 2024: Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2024] NSWSC 864 at [9]. In his Honour’s reasons for decision at [12], he indicated that he understood the plaintiff by that time wished to prosecute at least the following claims:

1. An order that the extended supervision order made on 6 July 2020 be revoked.

2. Further or in the alternative, by reason of the matters that were before Fagan J, an order that the extended supervision order made on 6 July 2020 is invalid and of no force or effect.

3. In the alternative to order (2), a declaration that the extended supervision order made on 6 July 2020 is constitutionally invalid.

4. Damages for personal injuries, including psychological injuries, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income caused or occasioned to him by reason of the mode of application and enforcement of the conditions of his extended supervision order made on 6 July 2020.

5. Damages for personal injuries, including psychological injuries, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of income caused or occasioned to him by reason of the illegal and improper treatment of him whilst an inmate of the New South Wales prison system.

25. The plaintiff had filed in late 2023 a Statement of Claim in relation to his alleged treatment in custody (and seemingly also in the community while subject to parole and the ESO), which is not being heard with his application under s 13 of the Act for revocation of the ESO. The Statement of Claim is not in evidence in the current proceedings.

26. The plaintiff was in custody bail refused between 7 and 22 August 2024 for alleged breaches of the ESO which are still undetermined. On 4 November 2024 the solicitor for the defendant filed a Notice of Motion seeking to separate the application for revocation of the ESO from the civil claim for damages. By way of a Notice of Motion served on the defendant by email on 20 November 2024 the plaintiff sought interlocutory determination of his request for revocation of specific conditions. On 28 November 2024 Garling J ordered that the following question be heard and decided separately from all other questions and before the hearing of any further trial in the proceedings, namely: “Whether the extended supervision order imposed by this Court (Fagan J on 6.7.2020) should be varied in part or revoked in whole as sought by Notice of Motion served by the plaintiff on the defendant by email on 20.11.2024.” His Honour ordered that the claim for interlocutory relief in respect of that separate question as articulated in the Notice of Motion served by the plaintiff on 20 November 2024 be fixed for hearing on 19 December 2024 for a maximum of one day. Various orders for amended statements of claim and related issues pertaining to the civil damages claim, and management of those proceedings, were made. His Honour made orders in relation to the filing and service of material for the interlocutory application.

27. Garling J heard the interlocutory application on 19 December 2024 and on 20 December 2024 made orders varying the ESO, included the deletion of condition 4 which required the plaintiff to submit to electronic monitoring as directed: Monteiro v State NSW [2024] NSWSC 1667. As will be seen below, the State seeks the rescission of these orders or alternatively the reimposition of the order removed or varied by his Honour.

28. His Honour fixed for hearing on 5 May 2025, with an estimate of 3 days, the plaintiff’s application for revocation of the ESO. Significant timetabling was ordered for the filing of evidence and submissions. His Honour made a referral for pro bono assistance for the plaintiff in connection with his civil damages proceedings. No evidence was filed or served for the plaintiff by 28 February 2025 as Garling J had ordered. The State filed the evidence it intended to rely upon on 4 April 2025 in accordance with those orders. An affidavit of a woman who has been given the pseudonym Jane in these proceedings, dated 1 May 2025, was served by the plaintiff on the defendant on 2 May 2025. An affidavit by a woman who has been afforded the pseudonym Joanne was sworn on 5 May 2025, and it was filed and served. The hearing of 5 May 2025 was vacated on the application of the plaintiff. It was relisted for hearing on 25 to 27 August.

29. On 3 June 2025 Campbell J vacated the hearing date of 25 August 2025. This was on the application of the plaintiff as new lawyers had been recently instructed. On 5 June 2025 Campbell J made orders in chambers by consent including that the plaintiff file and serve any evidence and submissions by 8 August 2025. The defendant’s evidence and submissions were to be filed by 5 September, and any evidence or submissions in reply for the plaintiff were to be filed by 15 September 2025. A working folder of material to be tendered at the hearing was to be provided to the judicial officer to hear the matter by the defendant by 4:00 pm 17 September 2025.

30. The plaintiff’s aunt and uncle in Queensland swore affidavits on 19 August 2025. The State chronology says these were filed on 22 August 2025. Written submissions under the hand of senior and junior counsel for the plaintiff, dated 22 August 2025, were filed and served. On 12 September 2025 McNaughton J granted leave to the plaintiff’s last retained legal representatives to withdraw.

31. On 15 September 2025 Chen J made orders in his capacity as Duty Judge, addressing the plaintiff’s Notice of Motion of the same date, extending the time for the plaintiff to file and serve evidence and submissions in reply to 18 September 2025 at 4:00 pm. The plaintiff’s applications pursuant to the same Notice of Motion for leave to issue subpoenas and produce documents were stood over by his Honour to the Duty Judge on 17 September 2025. His Honour directed the State, if possible, to provide a short summary outlining its position regarding these notices as well as the procedural history of the matter.

32. The Court Book was provided to my Associate on the morning of 17 September 2025 by agreement. In circumstances where the plaintiff had seemingly only filed four affidavits in the proceedings (his aunt and uncle, and the May 2025 affidavits of Jane and Joanne) the State included these, the written submissions of senior and junior counsel filed for the plaintiff in August 2025, three sets of written submissions relied upon by the plaintiff before Garling J when he was self-represented, as well as all the affidavits and exhibits relied upon by the plaintiff in the proceedings before Garling J, lest he proposed to rely upon any of this material as well. Also included in the Court Books were the transcript of a number of Court proceedings in which the plaintiff has been involved, in case either party wished to tender any of this.

33. On 17 September 2025 Wright J, in his capacity as Duty Judge, stood the hearing of the applications to issue subpoenas and produce documents over to be determined in the substantive hearing listed to commence before me on 22 September 2025.

34. As I placed on the record at the commencement of the hearing on 22 September 2025, the plaintiff filed and served an affidavit under his name and a set of written submissions by 4:00 pm on Thursday 18 September 2025, the extended time ordered by Chen J. Although these were not strictly in reply, these documents have been read and considered to the extent they are relevant and admissible, as outlined below.

35. However further to this the plaintiff left at the Registry a large tub of documents, apparently seeking assistance with photocopying the following day. This tub was collected by the plaintiff on Friday 19 September 2025 at my suggestion, and advice was forwarded to him that anything within the tub that he wished to tender would be addressed on Monday 22 September in Court.

36. The plaintiff additionally left with the Registry two large lever arch folders of material, a large bull-clipped bundle of documents and a manila folder stated to contain references. These were initially erroneously understood when brought to me by officers of the Registry on Friday 19 September 2025 to be Court folders of filed material. When it transpired that this was not the case, this was brought to the plaintiff’s attention on 22 September 2025. One of these large folders and the large bull-clipped bundle inside it was the subject of my ruling excluding the proposed tender of material on 23 September 2025 and returned to the plaintiff. The other folder and manila folder were not referred to during the hearing before me, and were collected by the plaintiff or his representative from the Court later in the week of the hearing.

37. A purported link to documents was also sent by email on behalf of the plaintiff to the Court and the legal representatives of the defendant after hours on Thursday 18 September 2025 but it was inaccessible to the Court or the defendant.

38. Forwarded to my Associate electronically on the afternoon of Sunday 21 September 2025, copying in the defendant, were 12 emails each with an annexure, attaching collectively over 1,000 pages of documents. Opening the first two of these annexures indicated a mix of documents which were duplicates of material in the Court Book, multiple copies of the same (additional) documents, and documents with no apparent relevance. As I indicated in Court on 22 September 2025, I had not reviewed in any way anything beyond the first two such annexures before proceedings commenced that morning.

39. The defendant by Notice of Motion filed 4 April 2025 seeks the following orders:

1. The orders made on 20 December 2024, to vary on an interlocutory basis the conditions of the ESO against the plaintiff on 6 July 2020, is rescinded.

2. In the alternative to order 1, pursuant to ss 11 and / or 13 of the Act, conditions 4, 8, 13, 18 and 23 deleted by order on 20 December 2024 be reimposed and conditions 15, 16, 19, 21, and 22 be varied to reflect their formulation as existed before the variation effected by the order on 20 December 2024.

3. Such further or other orders as the Court considers appropriate.

40. It is apparent from uncontradicted aspects of the defendant’s evidence and written submissions before me, statements made from the bar table by the plaintiff during the hearing, and the judgment of Garling J in relation to a claim of public interest immunity giving rise to redaction of certain documents provided to the plaintiff by that point in time in Monteiro v State of New South Wales [2025] NSWSC 235, that the plaintiff has been provided with many thousands of pages of documents of the kind he was previously seeking by way of subpoenas, and which do not form part of the evidence tendered by the defendant in the current proceedings.

41. Proceedings in connection with the above described application by the defendant, and the plaintiff’s application under s 13 of the Act that the ESO be revoked, commenced before me on 22 September 2025 and various occurrences since Thursday 18 September 2025 were placed on the record. I received the defendant’s evidence, mostly without objection. The plaintiff objected to the defendant’s tender of case notes without the authors attending for cross-examination, and the tendering of the reports of Dr Eagle and Dr Furst that were in evidence before Fagan J, but I over-ruled those objections. It was at that stage expected that the defendant’s witnesses EM and Dr Richard Parker would attend the following day for cross-examination once the evidence for the plaintiff had been identified. The plaintiff later withdrew his request for those witnesses to be made available for cross-examination.

42. I commenced receiving evidence for the plaintiff, mostly provisionally to save the time of reviewing it in Court, to be the subject of submissions as to admissibility after the receipt of evidence was concluded. The plaintiff was permitted to make some opening remarks regarding what he expected the evidence would reveal. A 16 page document headed “Table of Contents” forwarded electronically to the Court and the defendant on the afternoon of 22 September was marked MFI 15 the following morning. It provided some assistance in forecasting the documents the plaintiff was proposing to tender, after it was confirmed by him that the material the defendant had included in the Court Book (relied upon by the plaintiff before Garling J) was relied upon by him, and I indicated that it would be provisionally read and admitted, subject to argument as to admissibility in closing submissions. The plaintiff identified multiple further affidavits of his which he wished to read, as well as a number of documentary exhibits, moving a small way through the documents listed in MFI 15. No issue was taken by the defendant or the Court with the non-compliance with Court orders as to filing and serving this evidence, and they were read provisionally on the same basis.

43. On the afternoon of 22 September and morning of 23 September 2025 an area of proposed tender was determined by me to require a more rigorous approach than provisional tender, given the volume of documents involved and the discrete issue presented; namely, the extent to which I was prepared to consider detail of outstanding criminal charges against the plaintiff and Joanne, and further allegations allegedly made by Joanne about the plaintiff, for the purpose of these proceedings. I delivered ex tempore reasons refusing to admit this body of evidence after the morning adjournment on 23 September 2025. The Court continued to receive affidavits read by the plaintiff and evidence tendered by him, provisionally.

44. Just before lunch on 23 September 2025 the plaintiff came to topic 11 in MFI 15, headed “CSNSW – Conspiring with my brothers.” The corresponding documents were received for the purpose of determining admissibility, and because they also seemed to relate to the outstanding application of the plaintiff that Detective GB be required to attend the proceedings to be cross-examined. I have used that officer’s initials not because there is a non-publication order in place to protect him, as there are for a number of people who were potential witnesses or mentioned in the evidence, as a result of earlier orders of the Court. I have simply determined that given the wide-reaching allegations aired by the plaintiff in these proceedings there is merit in referring to most people by their initials.

45. The plaintiff was asked to consider over lunch on 23 September 2025 any further aspects of the evidence already adduced, or further evidence, he would wish for me to take into account in determining his outstanding application regarding Detective GB. Two documents were forwarded electronically to the Court over the lunch break – one the plaintiff’s affidavit of 3 May 2024 which was already in the Court Book and thus provisionally read, and another document headed as an affidavit, undated and unsworn, which I have marked MFI 28.

46. Submissions were made after lunch on 23 September 2025 by the plaintiff on the two related issues of the admissibility of the material in topic 11 of the Table of Contents, and the requirement for Detective GB to give evidence. I indicated that I rejected the tender of the documents in category 11, and would provide reasons the following morning. I sought further submissions regarding the compulsory attendance of Detective GB. Before long the plaintiff indicated that he was “getting very close to asking for an application to recuse.” The plaintiff was offered time to consider this issue, but continued to make submissions for a short while.

47. The plaintiff sought that I make a decision on the tender of one document in the Court Book which had been provisionally admitted, which was exhibit O before Garling J. I indicated a preference to deal with that once I had an understanding of the totality of the evidence the plaintiff relied upon, and hearing submissions, as I could see no relevance in it on the material I had perused. I indicated to the plaintiff that on the submissions he had made I was not going to order the attendance of Detective GB, but asked him to advance submissions regarding the other outstanding procedural notices. The plaintiff asked for and was provided a ten minute adjournment.

40. On resumption, before the reading or tendering of the plaintiff’s evidence had concluded, or closing submissions for either party made, the plaintiff indicated that he would no longer participate in the proceedings. As noted above, the evidence for the State had already been read and tendered in his presence before that occurrence. He stated “So I’ve had enough now. I’ll be leaving now, whatever I have to deal with I’ll deal with conflicts of interest in the future and on an appeal and that’s all I’m going to have to say.” It was confirmed while the plaintiff remained in Court that the two outstanding applications were still before me, and that he did not wish to adduce any additional evidence or make any submissions in relation to them, and did not wish to remain to hear the oral submissions for the defendant. Proceedings were adjourned to 24 September 2025 to enable the State to consolidate its closing submissions based on the evidence ultimately before the Court.

41. An email to my Associate after Court, and an email to the chambers of the Chief Judge at Common Law and my Associate the following morning, sent on behalf of the plaintiff, suggested that I was required to disqualify myself or be removed from the case. The plaintiff did not attend to make any such application on the morning of 24 September 2025 but to the extent that I was on notice of such a suggestion having been made, I determined to dismiss it and proceed to finalise the hearing, which occurred in the absence of the plaintiff. I reserved my decision. This correspondence was tendered by the defendant.

42. After I reserved judgment a number of further emails were sent on behalf of the plaintiff, to the chambers of the Chief Judge at Common Law copying in my Associate. These have been marked for identification but disregarded for the purposes of my determination.

Statutory framework

51. The plaintiff’s application for revocation of an ESO is brought pursuant to s 13 of the Act. It is in the following terms:

13   Supervision order may be varied or revoked

(1)  The Supreme Court may at any time vary or revoke an extended supervision order or interim supervision order on the application of the State or the offender.

(1A)  The period of an order must not be varied so that the period is greater than that otherwise permitted under this Part.

(1B)  Without limiting the grounds for revoking an extended supervision order or interim supervision order, the Supreme Court may revoke an extended supervision order or interim supervision order if satisfied that circumstances have changed sufficiently to render the order unnecessary.

(2)  For the purpose of ascertaining whether to make such an application in relation to an extended supervision order, the Commissioner of Corrective Services must provide the Attorney General with a report on the offender at intervals of not more than 12 months.

(3)  The report must indicate whether the Commissioner considers the continuation of the extended supervision order to be necessary and appropriate.

52. The making of an ESO is governed by ss 5B and 9(1)(a) of the Act. Those sections provide as follows:

5B Making of extended supervision orders—unacceptable risk

The Supreme Court may make an order for the supervision in the community of a person (an extended supervision order) if—

(a) the person is an offender who is serving (or who has served) a sentence of imprisonment for a serious offence either in custody or under supervision in the community, and

(b) the person is a supervised offender (within the meaning of section 5I), and

(c) an application for the order is made in accordance with section 5I, and

(d) the Supreme Court is satisfied to a high degree of probability that the offender poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the order.

9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

(1) The Supreme Court may determine an application for an extended supervision order—

(a) by making an extended supervision order, or

(b) by dismissing the application.

…

53. The power to make an ESO pursuant to s 5B is discretionary. In that regard, the Court is guided by the objects of the Act, and the paramount consideration and matters set out in s 9 to which the Court must have regard in determining whether or not to make an ESO. Relevant provisions of the Act in these respects include the following:

3 Objects of Act

(1) The primary object of this Act is to provide for the extended supervision and continuing detention of high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders so as to ensure the safety and protection of the community.

(2) Another object of this Act is to encourage high risk sex offenders and high risk violent offenders to undertake rehabilitation.

9 Determination of application for extended supervision order

…

(2) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the safety of the community must be the paramount consideration of the Supreme Court.

…

(3) In determining whether or not to make an extended supervision order, the Supreme Court must also have regard to the following matters in addition to any other matter it considers relevant—

…

(b) the reports received from the persons appointed under section 7 (4) to conduct examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such examination,

(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist, registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of the offender committing a further serious offence, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such assessment,

(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a further serious offence,

(d1) any report prepared by Corrective Services NSW as to the extent to which the offender can reasonably and practicably be managed in the community,

(e) any treatment or rehabilitation programs in which the offender has had an opportunity to participate, the willingness of the offender to participate in any such programs, and the level of the offender’s participation in any such programs,

(e1) options (if any) available if the offender is kept in custody or is in the community (whether or not under supervision) that might reduce the likelihood of the offender re-offending over time,

(e2) the likelihood that the offender will comply with the obligations of an extended supervision order,

(f) without limiting paragraph (e2), the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject while on release on parole or while subject to an earlier extended supervision order,

(g) the level of the offender’s compliance with any obligations to which he or she is or has been subject under the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 or the Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004,

(h) the offender’s criminal history (including prior convictions and findings of guilt in respect of offences committed in New South Wales or elsewhere), and any pattern of offending behaviour disclosed by that history,

(h1) the views of the sentencing court at the time the sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the offender,

(i) any other information that is available as to the likelihood that the offender will commit a further serious offence.

54. A “serious offence” is defined in s 4 of the Act and includes a “serious sex offence” and a “serious violence offence”.

55. Section 5D of the Act provides that the Court is not required to determine that the risk of an offender committing a serious offence is more likely than not in order to determine that there is an unacceptable risk of the person committing such an offence.

56. Section 21 of the Act provides that proceedings under this Act are civil proceedings and, to the extent to which the Act does not provide for their conduct, are to be conducted in accordance with the law (including the rules of evidence) relating to civil proceedings. Section 25(3) of the Act provides for the admissibility of certain documents obtained under s 25 of the Act by the Attorney General.

The plaintiff’s evidence

The plaintiff’s evidence, generally

57. The plaintiff tendered photographs showing the vegetable garden he previously maintained in the community as referred to in a number of affidavits. He tendered documents confirming enrolment in 2014 whilst he was in custody in a Graduate Diploma of Aviation (Human Factors), enrolment in a TAFE Digital Diploma of Project Management due to be undertaken between March 2020 and February 2021, and enrolment in trimester 2 of 2025 in the Griffin University bachelor of business. He tendered a civil aviation medical certificate relevant to a commercial pilot license valid to 12 April 2020 (class 1) and 12 April 2022 (class 2), following a medical examination on 12 April 2019.

58. The plaintiff sought to read a large number of his own affidavits, in addition to those already in the Court Book and that sworn or affirmed on 18 September 2025. He identified particular affidavits, mostly previously filed in other proceedings, which each had a label “2” and a letter of the alphabet (up to 2AA), in general accordance with category or topic 2 of his Table of Contents, MFI 15 (but not including all of those there listed). It was identified that some of these were within the second of the two email annexures forwarded to the Court on the afternoon of Sunday 21 September 2025, which had been printed; and the affidavits otherwise were handed to the Court and shown to Senior Counsel for the defendant for consideration. It was determined that these affidavits would be provisionally read, but that, additionally to any orthodox issues of admissibility, there would need to be some care to reject or otherwise control aspects of these documents that were scandalous. I will deal with some of these affidavits in general terms shortly, and otherwise note aspects of them of potential relevance to particular topics thereafter. The plaintiff’s three affidavits in the Court Book (those before Garling J sworn/affirmed 3 May, 1 August and 20 November 2024), and his 18 September 2025 affidavit, were similarly read provisionally, and require control for scandalous material.

59. Rule 4.15 of the UCPR, is in the following terms:

4.15   Court’s power to deal with scandalous matter in documents (cf SCR Part 38, rule 8, Part 65, rule 5; DCR Part 30, rule 8, Part 47, rule 7; LCR Part 25, rule 8, Part 36, rule 8)

(1)  If any matter contained in a document on the court file is scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, irrelevant or oppressive, the court may order—

(a)  that the matter to be struck out of the document, or

(b)  that the document be placed in a sealed envelope on the court file, or

(c)  that the document be taken off the court file.

(2)  A sealed envelope referred to in subrule (1)(b) may not be opened except by order of the court.

60. The State has identified in MFI 23 specific aspects of a number of documents relied upon by the plaintiff which it submits come within the terms of r 4.15. In almost all respects I accept that contention. The identified passages appear in affidavits of the plaintiff, and written submissions. I regard the fact of the plaintiff making these assertions as generally relevant, but the content itself scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant. Unless I indicate otherwise, I admit this evidence but limit its use pursuant to s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to the fact that the plaintiff has made these assertions, and direct that unredacted versions of these documents be placed in a sealed envelope not to be opened other than by order of the Court, and that the copy of the documents maintained on the Court file be redacted to exclude the relevant material.

61. A large portion of the plaintiff’s affidavit of 12 January 2022, labelled 2G, relates to contentions about the propriety of his convictions for breaching the ESO, and the conduct of his legal representatives in those proceedings. This affidavit was filed in the CCA proceedings, and, as the CCA noted, these collateral attacks on the convictions were not relevant to its determination of the plaintiff’s severity appeal. The plaintiff has contended that he proposes to appeal against those convictions. I reject as irrelevant the plaintiff’s evidence which goes to the validity of his guilty pleas in connection with the breaches of the ESO. The entirety of this affidavit was objected to on the grounds of relevance. Except to the extent that I mention aspects of this affidavit, I uphold that objection. To the extent that objection is taken to part of it as being in the nature of submissions, I take it into account as representing the plaintiff’s submissions so much of it as advances his case.

62. Another affidavit of 12 January 2022 labelled 2H is objected to as irrelevant. I uphold this objection insofar as it relates to the integrity of the plaintiff’s guilty pleas to the ESO breach offences, noting again that this affidavit was filed in the CCA. Paragraphs [8]-[12] are relevant to the fact of the plaintiff issuing threats and demonstration of vindictiveness, but are scandalous and will be redacted from the copy of the affidavit kept on the Court file and limited as noted above. The plaintiff also threatens to advise the Chinese Communist Party, via his contacts, of the alleged information he has about judicial officers. I similarly limit the use of these paragraphs to the fact that the plaintiff has so alleged and threatened, but this does not require redaction.

63. The plaintiff’s affidavit of 12 January 2022 labelled 2I is objected to as irrelevant, and again a portion is objected to pursuant to r 4.15 of the UCPR, on the basis that the content is scandalous, vexatious or irrelevant. I propose to address these objections by reference to an affidavit affirmed on 1 November 2021 and labelled 2U which is otherwise in identical terms, but can be seen to have been produced earlier in time. This affidavit is primarily concerned with complaints about former legal representatives in the ESO proceedings before Fagan J. Otherwise it includes complaints about the conditions of the plaintiff’s incarceration which are relevant, if at all, to his civil damages claim which is not before me. There is further material in the nature of submissions.

64. I have taken into account on the plaintiff’s application to produce documents (a mobile telephone) the representation in this affidavit that he filmed the psychiatric interview with Dr Eagle, but otherwise reject it as irrelevant to the proceedings before me with the following exceptions. I admit the plaintiff’s statement in this document that:

“All the ESO has achieved, other than unfairly impose a draconian set of conditions upon me to decimate my life, is to motivate me to hate Supreme Court Judges with a passion. I am not a hateful person. My various projects and conduct in the community are testament to this fact. My first inclination is to always help fellow persons to avoid any form of suffering. The aforementioned conduct in the community is indefensible evidence of this fact.”

65. Although this statement is partly in the nature of a submission it is also evidence that, if accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceedings. I otherwise uphold the State’s objection to this affidavit. I uphold the objection under r 4.15 of the UCPR to the second last paragraph on page 3 of this affidavit which will be redacted and limited in its use. The affidavit in identical terms but with a different date, labelled 2I, is rejected as it is the same bar the label and date, as indicated above.

66. The plaintiff’s affidavit dated 12 January 2022, labelled 2M, is rejected as irrelevant in its entirety. It includes a variety of complaints about his former legal representatives. It was filed in the CCA on the plaintiff’s severity appeal (where he sought to collaterally attack the convictions, which was not permitted).

67. General criticisms of Corrective Services and police, of no relevance to this case, are excluded. These include the contents of the plaintiff’s affidavit dated 12 January 2022 labelled 2N. I admit as relevant, but limit the use of, the plaintiff’s assertion on page 2 of that affidavit that “This is the gang NSW Court judges choose to side with in almost all cases before the courts”, and that the plaintiff intends to make the Chinese government aware of the wilfully blind Court in Australia. Insofar as the document otherwise refers to the alleged conduct of particular members of the legal profession and threatens to expose the same to the Chinese Communist Party, I limit the use of the evidence and will redact the version maintained on the Court file. I admit as relevant, but limit the use of, the plaintiff’s statement “Either thrown CSNSW to the wolves where they belong, or I will dedicate my life to exposing the scumbaggery of the Supreme Court et al, and there are plenty of skeletons in the closet of the Supreme Court.” I similarly admit and limit the plaintiff’s statement that he will pay others to do his bidding in “exposing swines” to avoid media repercussions to himself, and his threat to handwrite what he has to say and leave it in property he will leave in an outside area, which he expects will result in publication.

68. The plaintiff’s affidavit dated 12 January 2022 labelled 2J contains general assertions as to his positive lifestyle before incarceration (on 18 August 2020, it would seem in context) including safely piloting helicopters and aeroplanes, receiving positive feedback from members of the community, engaging in lawful endeavours, developing a WHS accident prevention model as a thesis for a Masters-Degree study pathway with Swinburne University of Technology (in which he was said to be enrolled, but presently deferred), developing an environmental preservations documentary film project with others (called “GIGO”), maintaining friendships, creating a community garden for those experiencing economic hardship or compromised health, evolving as a human being including via various teachings including that of the Lord Buddha, Anthony Robbins’ text “Unlimited Power” and transcendental meditation, yoga theory and yoga asanas. He states that he carefully considered his thoughts, speech and actions prior to engaging, avoided being impulsive, cared for the elderly generally and cared for his father. He states that in the community he was “not, in any way behaving or conducting myself in a way that could possibly be described as being an unacceptable risk, or indeed a risk at any level. I was maintaining the position of being a careful and considered member of the community.”

69. I am prepared to admit, subject to weight, the plaintiff’s representations as to what he has done and thought. I do not admit his statements as to feedback from others as it is hearsay.

70. The plaintiff states in this affidavit, in a passage to which objection is taken on the grounds of relevance, “The absolutely horrific way in which the police and Corrective Services NSW (“CSNSW”) have falsely portrayed me is provable to have no substance and accordingly, the court should give very little weight to it.” Other than as an example of the generalised way in which the plaintiff’s evidence and submissions are framed, I can place no weight on this. A further affidavit dated 12 January 2022 but labelled 2Q is in precisely the same terms (bar that label) and is rejected.

71. The first 9 paragraphs of the plaintiff’s affidavit of 12 January 2022 labelled 2T, relied on in support of appeals bail in the CCA, are inadmissible and rejected. The plaintiff’s statement in paragraph [10] of the same affidavit that he is not impulsive, harbouring a lack of concern for others, prone to negative emotionality, incapable of cooperation with supervision, incapable of relationship stability or a psychopath is admitted but carries very little weight. His statement within that paragraph that “Police/Crown and CSNSW all have hidden and withheld all positive feedback from females and independent witnesses” is not only unspecific thus affecting adversely understanding its relevance, but also, if based on anything he was in fact told, is hearsay. I limit its use to the fact that the plaintiff makes the allegation in this document.

65. The plaintiff’s representations under his point 11 in this affidavit called “False Allegations of Threatening to Kill Judges” is not admitted as it is directed towards an alleged case note dated 20 May 2019 created by EM which the State does not rely upon and is not otherwise in evidence, and includes hearsay evidence on pages 3, 4 and the top of page 5 of the affidavit in the plaintiff’s account of his response to it. The same applies to the plaintiff’s assertion in his affidavit of 18 September 2025 at [10](xliii) that this case note is false.

66. Otherwise page 5 of the affidavit, from the first full paragraph to the end of the page and over to the partial paragraph at the top of page 6, is objected to by the defendant under r 4.15 of the UCPR. These portions are admitted and limited in their use to the fact that the plaintiff has made these allegations in this affidavit, and sought to use them in these proceedings, and redacted. An affidavit dated 14 January 2022 and labelled 2V is in identical terms save for those differences of date and label, and is rejected.

67. The plaintiff’s 38 page affidavit of 3 May 2024 was included by the defendant in the Court Book, as it was in evidence before Garling J, and read provisionally after the plaintiff indicated he wished to rely upon it. I refer below at [208] to a portion of paragraph [12] of that affidavit. Paragraphs [13]-[22], and the bullet points in paragraphs [23] and [24] up to page 489 in the Court Book, and pages 492 to 494 of the Court Book are irrelevant to these proceedings. There may be some relevance to his civil proceedings for damages. Within those pages there are two references to false case notes, directed primarily to the plaintiff’s time in custody but also referring to a Community Corrections case note regarding intention to stage violent revolution and kill judges which is not relied upon by the State, as I indicated above.

68. The content following the bullet point half way down the page on Court Book page 489 relates to the plaintiff’s time on parole, and is also hearsay. I will not take this material into account. The first bullet point on Court Book page 490 alleges an unreasonable refusal of attendance at an appointment in 2023. This affidavit at Court Book page 491 asserts an allegedly unreasonable direction by CS which was immediately overruled, following which CS was removed as the plaintiff’s case manager. I am not able to make anything of these directions. The plaintiff’s account of contact between this officer and Jane (who is referred to extensively below), her partner and JZ is hearsay. However as I will take into account their respective accounts of their communications with Community Corrections or police from their own affidavits, I am also prepared to admit this evidence of the plaintiff, limited to confirming his understanding of that contact.

69. On page 495 of the Court Book the affidavit contains what are essentially submissions in relation to the proceedings for an Interim Supervision Order (“ISO”) before Cavanagh J. I have taken this material into account, and it is referred to in other evidence and submissions, and considered further below. At the base of page 496 of the Court Book there is a reference to Community Corrections having lied in case notes after the plaintiff’s release into the community in 2018, but no particulars are provided. Names of 11 particular officers (“and almost all other CSNSW staff”) are alleged in the same affidavit, at a point corresponding with page 505 of the Court Book, to have “lied in case notes about me…” The plaintiff has provided no evidence as to which case notes relied upon by the defendant in the proceedings before me, if any, he takes issue with.

70. Allegations contained in this affidavit corresponding with pages 497 to 508 of the Court Book are irrelevant or hearsay except as otherwise noted. I refer below to other aspects of the affidavit that I have taken into account, often for a limited purpose. I uphold the State’s contention regarding r 4.15 of the UCPR as to this document, as set out in MFI 23.

71. The plaintiff makes a general assertion in this affidavit at a point corresponding with page 504 of the Court Book that “This ESO has destroyed every relationship, personal and professional, decimated my physical, emotional, spiritual and mental health, utterly devastated every aspect of my existence to the point I have absolutely no quality of life”. As with the plaintiff’s other allegations of this nature, I take into account the fact that he has said it; but it has no probative value in proving anything that has actually occurred under the operation of the ESO. The plaintiff makes a graphic threat of self harm if the order stays, at a point corresponding with Court Book page 505. This threat has been made on multiple other occasions.

72. I am satisfied that the plaintiff did intend to read his affidavit dated 20 November 2024 (labelled 2E, and also included in the Court Book at tab 20 of folder 2, having been read in the proceedings before Garling J). However the document is not relevant and I reject it. It could only have relevance in relation to his civil proceedings for damages.

73. As to the plaintiff’s affidavit of 18 September 2025, I refer to specific aspects below. In particular in heading or point [10] of the affidavit the plaintiff crystallises his complaints in relation to particular topics. This paragraph however contains a number of topics that are not relevant to the issues that require determination in these proceedings, and are rejected. It includes the general allegation at [10](xxv) headed “Terrorising as Sport” that Community Corrections have deliberately, wilfully and knowingly destroyed his life, and that he holds irrefutable evidence of this conduct, some of which has already been tendered with further evidence to be provided to the Court at hearing. As will become apparent, no such evidence was produced.

74. The plaintiff has produced a receipt for a taxi fare for $1,600 on 17 February 2022, which was exhibit O before Garling J. The plaintiff’s affidavit of 18 September 2025 at [10(xxxiii)] says this came about as a result of a decision by Community Corrections on his release from custody, after his success in the CCA, refusing permission to travel home by public transport through the ACT. He says this forms part of his $10 million civil claim (which has been revised to $20 million). The affidavit provided no details as to the identity of the person who made this decision, nor much of the background to it. As best as I can understand the asserted relevance of it to the applications currently before the Court is its suggested demonstration of tendency; namely animosity on the part of Community Corrections towards the plaintiff. The evidence does not have significant probative value for the purposes of s 97 of the Evidence Act, and I do not admit this document nor that portion of the plaintiff’s affidavit.

Jane and her family

82. A woman who has been given the pseudonym Jane met the plaintiff on 19 November 2022 at an Ecstatic Tantra ticketed event, when they were paired by the event organisers later in the evening for the final activity. She is an active Christian described in the evidence as in a nine year relationship with DP, with young adult children. The plaintiff in opening submissions referred to DP as Jane’s “ex-partner” and submitted that those implementing the ESO had destroyed that relationship. She and the plaintiff have grown to be close friends and business partners. She was present assisting him in Court. A character reference and number of affidavits of Jane are relied upon by the plaintiff.

83. The State objects to Jane’s affidavits as each is contended to be “replete with submissions and expressions of opinion and other gratuitous commentary that are likely to be misleading or confusing or cause unfair prejudice; it is more an exercise of advocacy than the provision of evidence and, if admitted, should be afforded little weight.” There is much force in this submission, and there are, further, more particular bases for not receiving parts of the evidence (some of which have been additionally pointed out in the defendant’s schedule of objections, MFI 23). Objection is taken to the character reference of Jane on the basis that it contains material that is irrelevant, and inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence. I am prepared to admit aspects of Jane’s evidence.

84. The plaintiff relied on a character reference written by Jane dated 22 September 2023, formerly exhibit D before Garling J and exhibit 16 in these proceedings. She described him as a man of remarkable compassion, empathy and understanding towards others. She said he had a genuine passion for people and takes a sincere interest in their stories, consistently opens doors of opportunity and offers assistance selflessly, expecting nothing in return. She had observed his dedication to his father, which she described in some detail. She described her observation of his demonstration of respect and kindness to everyone he encounters, and her own family embracing him as part of it. He had attended at her family’s church. She described him as a person of remarkable intelligence, courage, kindness and love.

85. Jane at that stage made general assertions of the treatment of the plaintiff by the State as unjust and heavy-handed. I have not taken these into account unless she has provided evidence of a specific observation, which I have included in these reasons. There are no such tangible observations in this document which are not inadmissible hearsay.

86. Jane swore an affidavit on 4 April 2024 which was provisionally read and in the Court Book being evidence in the proceedings before Garling J. At that point in time her relationship with the plaintiff had evolved to one of her being his mentor, business associate and close friend. She states that a named officer told her, early on in her relationship with the plaintiff, that they have a Community Governance committee of up to 10 people from different departments sit around a table every day to discuss the plaintiff. This is irrelevant, and hearsay.

87. In paragraph [8] Jane describes having experienced “distressing actions from Community Corrections” and “persistent efforts made to separate me from Simon.” I do not place weight on these assertions except to the extent that specific examples are provided in this affidavit. I understand there to be a specific complaint of a CSNSW officer (CS) calling Jane within the first week of meeting the plaintiff, asking if she had felt unsafe in his company and whether she was aware of his past. She told the officer that she was extremely comfortable with him, had been told everything about his past, and did not want to be contacted again – but that she would call if she had any concerns. She provides an account of contact between officers administering the ESO with her daughter JZ and partner DP. Insofar as JZ and DP provide that evidence themselves, I am prepared to accept Jane’s evidence of her upset at being advised of this. Other portions of this paragraph are hearsay.

88. I take into account Jane’s statement in this affidavit that she spends a significant amount of time with the plaintiff, and has spent considerable time with him in a wide range of social and professional environments, and has only ever observed him to be participating in the community normally, respectfully and lawfully. She confirmed her observations of his care for his sick father, and kindness to her own elderly aunt. She stated that “His genuine compassion and consideration for others set him apart as the most compassionate and considerate person I have ever encountered.”

89. Jane states in paragraph [34] of this affidavit that she has witnessed many phone calls from Community Corrections to the plaintiff, and being horrified and traumatised by these. There is no explanation for this reaction, and it is not capable of directly or indirectly contributing to the determination of any issue before the Court. Further, to the extent that it depends on hearsay evidence of the plaintiff’s account to her of what he had been told in the telephone calls, it would depend on inadmissible hearsay. The plaintiff has not adduced evidence of such representations, far less the truth of such representations. There is some evidence, referred to below, of Jane witnessing herself what has been said to and by the plaintiff because she has attended a meeting or been in the car with the plaintiff with the phone on speaker. This assertion is limited in its use to understanding Jane’s perspective of the plaintiff’s situation, unless she describes a relevant direct observation.

90. This affidavit at [34] makes clear that the plaintiff had by 4 April 2024 threatened self harm to Jane if he was not successful in having the ESO revoked.

91. In an affidavit dated 11 July 2024 Jane described an occurrence on 20 June 2024. She states that she was in the car with the plaintiff when he had a telephone conversation with CSNSW officer JB that she could hear. Of potential relevance, she heard the officer question the plaintiff as to why he was not in a relationship with Jane, if he loves her so much / thinks the world of her / speaks so highly of her / if she is that nice. The plaintiff and Jane both told the officer that they were friends. Jane states that she was so distressed by this occurrence, and her discussions with her partner about it, that they almost ended their nine year relationship.

92. Jane confirmed in this affidavit that she supports the plaintiff financially with money she does not have, and he comes at times to her church. She confirmed her opinion of the plaintiff as one of the most compassionate, generous, kind and honest people she has ever known.

93. In her affidavit of 1 August 2024 Jane confirmed that the plaintiff remains one of the most honest, kind-hearted and considerate individuals she knows. Jane’s affidavit of 20 November 2024 (at tab 21 of the Court Book) seems to be a duplicate of this affidavit, but with a different date. This affidavit is rejected.

94. Jane’s final affidavit is dated 1 May 2025. She set out the detail of her meeting the plaintiff, as referred to above at [82]. She described having communicated with the plaintiff every day since meeting him. She describes having played an active role in mentoring him and managing his legal communications, and ensuring that his cases were managed properly. She describes their shared moments of friendship, her provision of financial assistance to him, and his attendance at her church. She offers the opinions that “His decency, honesty and respectfulness as a human is far greater than most humans walking this earth …” and that his presence in her life has been a constant source of inspiration and empowerment. She states that his compassion, kindness and generosity remain unchanged, and she continues to witness his selfless acts of kindness daily. She stated that he continued to check in on his elderly father with great pride in him, and still visits her elderly aunt in the nursing home.

95. Jane’s affidavit indicates her observation of the relief of the plaintiff since the ankle monitoring was removed in December 2024. He is to her observation far less agitated and he is more at ease, and not so scattered in his interactions.

96. Jane describes herself as privileged to be the plaintiff’s closest friend, business partner and legal confidant. She states “As a dedicated Christian woman, I stand by him with deep pride, honouring not just who he is but what he stands for.”

97. The 1 May 2024 affidavit of JZ, Jane’s daughter, describes the plaintiff as embodying compassion and kindness. She states that his character shines brightly, especially in his interaction with animals. She states she has never witnessed any behaviour from him that could reasonably be interpreted as an unacceptable risk in the community. I refer below at [212] to a particular aspect of her affidavit. Apart from that aspect of her evidence and the paragraphs corresponding with the issues just noted, her affidavit is not admissible. It otherwise contains irrelevant material, hearsay, inadmissible opinion evidence, and advocacy.

Other potentially relevant topics addressed in plaintiff’s evidence

Relationships:

98. The plaintiff’s affidavit dated 16 April 2021 labelled 2P was sworn or affirmed whilst he was in custody. He refers to his time in the community after release in December 2018, before incarceration in August 2020. He makes passing reference to having had a fiancée – “During my entire period of time in the community, my fiancée and I feared for our lives on a moment to moment/daily basis.”

99. The plaintiff’s affidavit of 12 January 2022, labelled 2J, makes reference to a number of positive things he was doing in the community. Other evidence indicates he had been in custody at that point in time since 18 August 2020. The plaintiff stated that in the community he had maintained a positive, respectful and loving relationship with an intimate partner for approximately one year. This suggests that the relationship with CL (a woman he was said to have met about seven months before he was interviewed by Dr Eagle on 30 April 2020) had come to an end before or at the time of his incarceration on 18 August 2020. I am not aware of any reference to an ongoing relationship with her after that point in time. The plaintiff did not adduce any evidence from her as to the length or nature of their relationship from her perspective.

100. In his affidavit of 3 May 2024 the plaintiff asserts at a point appearing on page 500 of the Court book, while making allegations against CSNSW in relation to the administration of his conditions of parole, that they destroyed his relationship with his fiancée CL. His affidavit of 18 September 2025 at [10](xxxv) states that his relationship was destroyed because of the raid on the premises at which he was living with CL in connection with the 36 charges of breach of ESO laid against him in 2020. I admit this evidence for the limited purpose of the fact that the plaintiff has said it, and as confirming that the relationship with CL did end.

101. Speaking more generally of CSNSW, seemingly including the time of the ESO as well as when on parole, in this affidavit at a point corresponding with Court Book page 500, the plaintiff states “I cannot work, I cannot have friends, I cannot have an intimate relationship as they terrorise everyone I know and make them feel they are on parole, I cannot travel anywhere as they pollute everyone wherever I go, covertly wording up all and sundry.” I admit this evidence for the limited purpose of the plaintiff having said it.

102. In the same affidavit, at a point corresponding with Court Book page 503, the plaintiff states that a named Departmental Supervising Officer (“DSO”) stalked a female LS to her home, uninvited, absent calling her first, after the plaintiff disclosed he was in an intimate relationship with her. This is hearsay and I do not admit it.

103. In her character reference dated 22 September 2023 Jane (who spoke generally of her observations of the plaintiff with people) said “I have also met other individuals with whom Simon has formed connections, notably [LS].” She states that “we” were forthright with her about his past “and she still chose to pursue a relationship with him with full understanding.”

104. At [10](xxvii) of his 18 September 2025 affidavit the plaintiff contends that Community Corrections have made false accusations that he was in intimate relationships with women, stalked LS to her residence as “victim hunting”, and that “This pattern of behaviour has been repeated with other women, including CD and many more. As a result, a number of women who could provide evidence in my favour are too intimidated to do so, fearing media exposure and harassment if they come forward.” I reject this evidence as partly irrelevant, and otherwise based on inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence.

353. It was submitted that the evidence of Mr Awit does not engage with the plaintiff’s well-established severe personality disorder, nor any assessment of risk.

Determination

360. A preliminary point was determined on 22 September 2025; namely, that the hearing could proceed without notices to the Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and of the States being required by virtue of s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). Although the word “unconstitutional” is used in some of the plaintiff’s documents, I accepted the submission for the defendant that there was not a matter arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. The defendant relied upon the decision of French J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v C G Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd and Others (1999) 95 FCR 292; [1999] FCA 1151. His Honour determined at [14] that s 78B of the Judiciary Act does not impose the duty no matter how trivial, unarguable or concluded the constitutional point may be.

361. I agreed with the defendant’s submission that there was no real or live constitutional issue in the proceedings. Although the word “unconstitutional” is used in points B and D of the plaintiff’s final amended summons (quoted above at [22]), neither the submissions written by senior and junior counsel filed for the plaintiff in August 2025, nor his further written submissions filed 18 September 2025, address such contentions.

362. As noted above at [338], in February 2022 when the plaintiff was endeavouring to make collateral attacks on his convictions for breaching the ESO, in his CCA proceedings, he stated in an affidavit that the combination of the situation alleged concerning JB, and Cavanagh J’s use of the “carte blanche” document, made the ESO “unconstitutional”. As explained below, the plaintiff has misunderstood each of these issues.

363. The plaintiff’s affidavit of 18 September 2025 asserts that the Act is unconstitutional by its design, administration and practical application. However no submission was advanced as to this proposition. At times the plaintiff uses the word “unconstitutional” as an adjective meaning to convey with force his assertion of unfairness of some action: see for example above at [342]. I note the plaintiff’s submission before Garling J dated 16 December 2024 (quoted above at [352]) to the effect that it was unconstitutional for his legal instructions to have been photographed, and (in respect of his breach convictions) for an act to be made a crime for one man which is not a crime for another.

364. Legislation similar to the Act has been held to be constitutionally valid, in that the power to determine whether an order under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) is not incompatible with the Court’s institutional integrity: Lawrence v State of New South Wales (2020) 103 NSWLR 401; [2020] NSWCA 248 at [73] (Bathurst CJ with whom Bell P and Leeming JA agreed). The Court of Appeal closely considered the decision of the High Court in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46.

365. When the issue was raised early in the hearing on 22 September 2025, the plaintiff submitted (without any elaboration) that the legislation is impossible to defend, and that the ESO was unconstitutional because the directions given to him are unfair. He submitted that he had not read the Constitution, but common sense must prevail. He submitted that a lot was going badly in the world and a police State or “Fortress Australia” should not be permitted. The legislation was also submitted to be unconstitutional because “let’s not have trials”, moving to his allegations of criminal conduct by judicial officers. He submitted that his win in the CCA also established important case law going to a constitutional issue: that it is wrong to make an action criminal for one man which is not for another.

366. Asserted unfairness in the implementation of the ESO does not raise a matter under the Constitution or involving its interpretation. The State legislature clearly has power to make non-compliance with a validly imposed order an offence. There is no merit in the plaintiff’s contention that applications for an ESO are unable to be defended and this is unconstitutional. As will be explained further below, the plaintiff has also misunderstood the effect of the CCA decision.

367. As to the merits of the plaintiff’s application for revocation, I accept that there is a broad discretion, but I also accept the submission for the defendant that there is an onus on the plaintiff as the moving party to establish that the ESO should be revoked. The application is not an appeal against Fagan J’s decision. An application of that nature is permitted separately under the Act. Assertions that may be applicable to appeal proceedings, such as the denial of procedural fairness, or inadequacy of reasons (which the plaintiff is arguably asserting by his submission that one is “left to ponder” the basis for Fagan J’s determination) are not themselves points that would support revocation; as they do not address the merits of the ESO, imposed under an obligation to give the safety of the community paramount consideration. Success on grounds of this nature in the context of an appeal would generally require the reconsideration of the application.

368. It is furthermore imperative to recognise that the defendant is not endeavouring to satisfy the Court now to a high degree of probability that the plaintiff poses an unacceptable risk of committing another serious offence if not kept under supervision under the ESO. That has already occurred. The defendant adduced significant evidence before Fagan J, much of which is not now before the Court. Nor are the submissions for the State or Mr Monteiro made before Fagan J currently before the Court. These proceedings are not amenable to an argument that the finding of Fagan J was not open on the material before his Honour, as might be pursued as a ground of appeal. To the extent that his Honour’s judgment is read as a standalone document, and in light of the parts of the evidence before his Honour that are currently before the Court, his Honour’s reasons explained comprehensively why the ESO was imposed.

369. Despite these observations, a number of the plaintiff’s complaints can be clearly shown to be without merit, and are accordingly addressed lest the plaintiff was endeavouring to argue that flaws in the proceedings before Fagan J in combination with occurrences since the imposition of the ESO, warrant its revocation. Although the plaintiff did not remain to explain his submissions regarding the “blank document” before Cavanagh J, it would seem from the transcript of proceedings before his Honour, and his judgment on 23 March 2020, that the plaintiff is mistaken in his view that Cavanagh J relied upon a blank document to make the interim orders sought by the State. In a preliminary procedural application to which the defendant was not a party, heard immediately prior to the substantive hearing of the State’s application for interim orders under the Act, his Honour relied upon a confidential affidavit, which disclosed the content of redacted material in documents produced to the Court on subpoena, to resist the production of the unredacted documents or access being granted thereto, on the grounds of public interest immunity. The confidential affidavit and material the subject of the successful claim for public interest immunity formed no part of the material relied upon by the State in support of the ISO or other interim orders obtained before Cavanagh J such as his Honour’s directions regarding the plaintiff’s attendance upon Doctors Eagle and Furst, and their production of reports to the Court.

370. As to the plaintiff’s point regarding the allegedly false sexual assault allegation made in 2019 by JB, and reliance by Fagan J on it and other allegations that did not result in convictions, the plaintiff has not placed in evidence the material he complains Fagan J took into account. I am able to glean part of it from the reports of Doctors Eagle and Furst, the plaintiff’s criminal history (as a bail report), and the judgment of Fagan J. I have set out above at [238]-[247] the relevant aspects of the evidence of the psychiatrists. In a section of the decision of Fagan J headed “Earlier criminal record and charges undetermined – s 9(3)(h)” his Honour set out at [17]-[22] details of charges which had been undetermined or resulted in an acquittal. His Honour then stated, at [23]-[25]:

“Police intelligence records include numerous other complaints from females alleging that they have had relationships with the defendant, that those relationships have become verbally and physically abusive, that the defendant has behaved in a paranoid and controlling manner and that upon endeavouring to break off contact with the defendant he has subjected them to stalking, harassment, physical confrontation threats and/or sexual assault or other violence. The incidents that are the subject of these reports span all of the years from 1997 (when the defendant was aged 30) up to the present, except for periods when he was in prison.

The defendant denies all of these allegations. As earlier mentioned, he also denies the allegations that resulted in his conviction for the index offence committed on 2 January 2008. In respect of the matters that did not proceed to verdict, without having heard those complainants’ evidence, including under cross examination, and without having taken evidence from the defendant in response, the Court cannot make direct use of the complaints and unresolved charges. In those circumstances, the only materiality of these unproved matters is for use in connection with statistical tools that are applied by the forensic psychiatrists in assessing the risk of re-offending.

Drs Eagle and Furst gave evidence that research conducted in North America, the United Kingdom and other parts of Europe has shown a correlation between the number of charges against a person for conduct of this nature and the degree of likelihood that the person will commit sexual and/or violent offences in the future. The statistical correlation has been demonstrated irrespective of whether the charges result in conviction. Accordingly, the Static 99R actuarial tool (further discussed below) relies upon the number of charges as one of the factors upon which a score is calculated, giving rise to a prediction of recidivism. This actuarial tool has been widely validated amongst the populations referred to. I accept the evidence of both Dr Furst and Dr Eagle that this statistical model has been found by professionals in their field to be valid for the Australian population and that scores derived by applying the Static 99R tool deserve to be given weight in assessing the risk of re-offending under s 5B(d) and s 9 of the Act.”

371. Thus his Honour very clearly and carefully stated that he did not directly rely upon any allegation that had not resulted in a conviction, but regarded this material as only indirectly relevant to the extent that it was relied upon by the experts in their application of risk assessment tools. The experts had carefully explained how the numerous sexual charges laid against the plaintiff were required to be taken into account in their application of Static-99R. This evidence is unchallenged and uncontradicted. The experts did not take the allegations of JB into account in their use of this risk assessment tool, as the police did not charge the plaintiff. The report of Dr Furst that was in evidence before Fagan J clearly states subsequent police investigation did not support her version of events.

372. The plaintiff’s assertion of deficiencies in the reports of Doctors Eagle and Furst such that relevant material was withheld from the Court is similarly baseless. Apart from the fact that they are expert witnesses, with specialised knowledge the plaintiff does not have to ask the questions pertinent to forming their respective opinions, their reports addressed all the matters the plaintiff complains they left out: see above at [248]-[256]. The plaintiff has no expertise to allege that this information should have caused them to form different opinions, and has adduced no such expert evidence.

373. These three contentions of the plaintiff – the “carte blanche” document before Cavanagh J, the information pertaining to JB’s allegations before Fagan J, and the asserted deficiencies in the expert reports just dealt with – are the only areas raised by him as potentially supporting his claim for relief B in his final amended summons. Although as I have said this would be more amenable to be addressed as an appeal ground, where the merits of the application for an ESO would thereafter be addressed again if the ground was made out, it has been argued by the plaintiff in support for revocation and is completely meritless. I will accordingly dismiss this claim for relief, and also note that the matters raised do not contribute in any way to the plaintiff’s application for revocation.

374. I do not place any reliance upon the plaintiff’s currently outstanding charges. He is presumed to be innocent in relation to them. Their existence cannot support his case, and I am unable to articulate any rational process of reasoning in support of the State that does not undermine the plaintiff’s presumption of innocence. Stating that the material is relied upon as relevant to risk, or subject to weight, does not logically advance the defendant’s position in this case.

375. However the evidence establishes that the plaintiff does not come before the Court with any favourable evidence at all of successful intimate relationships with women since the ESO was imposed. This is not to be held against him, but his situation is different from one of someone who might come to Court with evidence that he had been engaging positively in an intimate relationship or relationships.

376. Fagan J’s reasons for imposing the ESO recognised that the plaintiff was then in an intimate relationship and that his then partner did not perceive risk to herself from the relationship. His Honour stated at [61] that “the evidence shows that he has had relationships of at least several months with numerous other female partners and that a number of these have ended with charges being laid against him of violence, sexual offending, stalking and intimidating or the like. The fact that the current relationship has continued for some months makes no difference to the basis upon which the two court-appointed experts have expressed their opinions or to the validity and impressiveness of their conclusions.”

377. That relationship seems to have continued for not long, if at all, after the imposition of ESO (ending prior to the plaintiff’s incarceration from 18 August 2020 to 17 February 2022). The evidence details other disclosed intimate relationships with women the plaintiff’s supervising officers have not been able to speak to. I referred additionally to an alleged fiancée in Queensland in December 2023, with no evidence adduced from or about her. Although the plaintiff filed evidence from Joanne in support of a functional relationship of some weeks in May 2025, he no longer has the benefit of any such suggestion. Although I do not take into account the plaintiff’s outstanding charges relevant to her, the fact is that the relationship was very brief, and has ended. I accept the submission for the defendant that it is appropriate to take into account the spitefulness with which the plaintiff spoke of her in Court. Similarly, although I do not take into account the truth of outstanding charges arising from September 2023, I regard the plaintiff’s description of the woman relevant to those charges and his communications with her as demonstrative of his personality disorder.

378. The defendant’s evidence comprehensively indicates that the plaintiff has significantly impeded the capacity of those supervising him under the ESO to monitor his intimate relationships, and that this has worsened since the removal of the requirement for electronic monitoring.

379. As to the plaintiff’s general allegations of false OIMS notes, a number of things can be said. Despite service in advance of the defendant’s evidence, the plaintiff adduced no evidence that he disagreed with any particular note, or even category or type of allegation in the notes. His evidence and submissions have included numerous instances of disputing a note from 2019 made by EM, which the defendant did not rely upon. His submissions clearly state that his abuse is responsive to the unfairness with which he contends the ESO has been administered, which involves an admission of the abuse. Having read all the notes carefully, I am struck by their consistency, including as between multiple different authors, between recorded emails and text messages sent by the plaintiff and verbal comments, and between his abuse of staff implementing the ESO and his evidence and submissions filed in these proceedings.

380. The plaintiff’s threats contained in his evidence and submissions in these proceedings plainly do not advance his case. Although the judgment of Fagan J refers to the plaintiff’s abusive and threatening conduct in the evidence before the Court in 2020, the impression I have is that this conduct has worsened. Without knowing all the material in this regard before Fagan J, this cannot be said with any certainty. However the fact that the plaintiff has continued to act this way, particularly after the warnings provided by Meagher JA and Beech-Jones CJ at CL I have quoted, is highly disturbing. I accept the unchallenged evidence of Dr Parker that it is demonstrative of the severity of his personality disorder, which is what underlies the risk of him committing a further serious offence.

381. The fact that the plaintiff has not sexually assaulted anybody in the period of over three and a half years in the community under the ESO does not support revocation. As explained in Dr Parker’s unchallenged evidence, this would generally be the case for someone with his assessed risk. Further, the plaintiff has been under supervision, the point of which is to limit the prospect of such occurrence.

382. The favourable evidence of the plaintiff’s character by Jane carries little weight. The evidence is that they are not in an intimate relationship, and that she provides so much for him by way of financial, administrative and emotional support. The plaintiff’s capacity to be charming, personable and so on as set out in the expert evidence may well have had no challenge in their circumstances. Jane has clearly absorbed a view of the plaintiff’s plight which, as will be explained below, is not supported by the evidence. Dr Parker was not ultimately cross-examined by the plaintiff, so as to explore for example whether his current view of the high risk of the plaintiff offending was ameliorated by Jane’s positive view of him.

383. The fact that the plaintiff was regarded well by AF as her client for five months in her work in business coaching adds nothing to the plaintiff’s case for revocation.

384. As to the evidence of Mr Awit, I am prepared to consider, without needing to decide the point, that cogent evidence that a person is being harmed by the operation of an ESO may be a reason to consider its revocation, particularly if it is making the supervised offender more dangerous. The Court would then need to consider whether the purposes of the Act would be best served by revocation or some other course.

385. However I can give no weight to the evidence of Mr Awit of the plaintiff being harmed mentally by the ESO, because the plaintiff has not proved the pertinent aspects of the history provided to Mr Awit by admissible evidence.

386. The plaintiff’s evidence proves no more than that he has said, over and over again, that the ESO has been used to destroy family relationships, friendships, study, work, enjoyment of life and to “victim hunt”. He has not adduced any evidence whatsoever that these things have occurred. There is simply no evidence of any familial relationship or friendship being damaged by virtue of the ESO. There is no evidence of any employer or place of learning being contacted by those administering the ESO.

371. The only meaningful evidence of any employment being prevented was the proposed work for PD in 2019, prior to the imposition of the ESO. The proposed work was incompatible with the requirement of parole that the plaintiff submit in advance schedules of his intended movements, and permission to undertake that work was suspended for that reason. It has no connection with the ESO.

372. Regarding the possible work for a law firm, the plaintiff’s December 2024 written submissions asserted that he was offered a job by a personal injury lawyer where he was to source new clientele who had been victims of sexual assault as this is what the personal injury lawyer specialised in. In his affidavit of 18 September 2025 the plaintiff states he was employed by a lawyer (no date or details are provided) to assist victims of sexual assault and domestic violence by preparing affidavits and statements and referring them for compensation. The plaintiff has no legal qualifications, and on the material before me no other training or experience that would equip him to take on such a task. The direction complained of was withdrawn or removed in 2024, well prior to the filing of the plaintiff’s December 2024 submissions, and his complaint is about the problem caused when the direction was in existence. The change from submitting that a lawyer offered him a job to source new clientele who had been victims of sexual assault in December 2024, to his evidence in September 2025 of having been employed by a lawyer to prepare affidavits and statements for sexual assault victims, is unsatisfactory. As is apparent from his own affidavits in these proceedings, and those of others he has relied upon, the plaintiff does not have the capacity to be employed by a legal practitioner to take draft affidavits for clients who have suffered sexual assault. In the absence of any evidence from the relevant law firm, I do not accept that this was a meaningful work opportunity that was curtailed by the direction given under the ESO. In any event this direction no longer applies.

373. The refusal to allow the plaintiff to travel interstate was not because of condition 13 of the ESO relating to employment, but rather, by reference to condition 10 of the ESO, which provides “The defendant must not leave New South Wales without the approval of the Commissioner of CSNSW”. This is required by s 11(2) of the Act. The ability of NSW authorities to effectively supervise the plaintiff would be significantly constrained while in Queensland. The above evidence indicates that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient information to allow supervising officers to assess the risk associated with the travel and to investigate whether it would be possible for appropriate arrangements to be made for his supervision in Queensland.

374. The evidence of EB does not support the plaintiff’s claim that Community Corrections caused the loss of his job at the power station in 2022. As is clear from the evidence set out above at [127] and [128], the plaintiff’s assertion as to what the evidence shows is simply wrong. Similarly, the documentation regarding the ASIC card and flying helicopters is completely contrary to the plaintiff’s assertions as to what the evidence shows, as outlined above at [177]-[180].

375. Two points arise from the plaintiff’s repeated claim that he was told by the owner of a particular pizzeria that a police officer had told him to not serve him. The first is that this is, conspicuously, the single specific example the plaintiff has provided of any organisation having been encouraged by anyone to not serve him. Although it is hearsay, the plaintiff has not adduced even another hearsay account of a particular business not serving him because of contact by officers of the State. There is general reference in some of his material to a fish and chip shop, but with no detail. That the plaintiff has recognised the importance of including evidence of what he was told by the man in the particular pizzeria, and includes no detail of any other business treating him this way, highlights the utter lack of evidentiary support for his contentions that because of the actions of those administering the ESO cafes, gyms, and other businesses have not served him.

376. Further, and related to the hearsay nature of the evidence regarding the pizzeria, this evidence simply has no bearing on whether the ESO should be revoked. There is no evidence from the owner of the pizza shop as to what the police officer actually said, nor any explanation given. The ESO does not authorise officers of NSW Police, or Corrective Services, to attend businesses and direct the proprietors to not serve the plaintiff. There is no link between this occurrence and the ESO, and certainly no rational process of reasoning that the ESO should be revoked because of this incident. The plaintiff has stated on many occasions that there are police officers who dislike him. A recent example is an OIMS note dated 6 August 2025 in exhibit 6 which records the plaintiff telling his DSO that local police have had a vendetta against him for many years due to claims he has sexually assaulted the daughter of a police officer.

377. Another area where the plaintiff’s ability to point to only one single example, which is itself deficient in proving anything that would warrant revocation of the ESO, is in the case the plaintiff has endeavoured to make of the State “victim hunting.” The sole example regarding which there is any admissible evidence relates to 2018, well prior to the imposition of the ESO. CD was a woman who had been in an intimate relationship with the plaintiff prior to his release to parole in 2018 (presumably prior to his incarceration in 2008, but not necessarily so). She contacted the Parklea Correctional Centre to make sure he could not contact her. That same day, with the plaintiff’s application for parole pending, a police officer was sent to ask whether she had any concerns for her safety if he was released on parole. She stated that she did not want to answer that question, and no one knew where she lived. The evidence of CD and Sergeant AC indicates nothing other than that fairly routine question being asked of a woman in such a position, and a faithful reporting in the police officer’s statement of what she said. Neither the statement of CD nor that of Sergeant AC supports the plaintiff’s contentions regarding their interaction. Their interaction has nothing to do with the ESO.

378. As the plaintiff has failed to prove the relevant history provided to Mr Awit, I do not accept Mr Awit’s evidence of the harm being caused to the plaintiff by the ESO. I further reject the aspect of the plaintiff’s case that is based on this alleged operation of the ESO, independently of Mr Awit’s opinion.

379. The decision of the CCA in Mr Monteiro’s severity appeal does not support the suggestion of any overzealousness in charging the plaintiff with breaches. The Court found that the breach offences went to the heart of the supervision process, and amounted to a significant impediment to it being fully implemented, requiring sentences of imprisonment.

380. The decision of Hamill J in Carr is of no assistance to the plaintiff. His Honour made orders revoking an ESO pursuant to s 13 of the Act on the application of the State, which contended that the evidence demonstrated Mr Carr no longer presented an unacceptable risk to the community. The application was not opposed by Mr Carr. The risk assessment and risk management reports and ESO completion reports before his Honour supported the proposition that Mr Carr did not present a high risk of sexual offending. This is contrary to the unchallenged and uncontradicted evidence of Dr Parker in these proceedings.

381. Additionally, Mr Carr, who had a mild intellectual disability, had spent the vast majority of his adult life in prison, mostly because of failure to comply with the conditions of the ESO in “technical” ways (drug use or failing to comply with curfew or reporting conditions). Of the 16 years that had passed since the expiry of his non-parole period, for a crime committed as a juvenile, he had spent 10 to 11 years in custody, mostly for such breaches of the ESO. His Honour also noted that some of the reports suggested that the impact of the order and the way it was being enforced may be counterproductive to Mr Carr’s rehabilitation, and expressed agreement with this proposition.

382. His Honour was thus satisfied for the purposes of s 13(1B) of the Act that for two reasons the circumstances had changed sufficiently to render the order unnecessary. The first was the expert opinion no longer suggesting a high risk of re-offending. The second was the clear impact of the order, resulting in Mr Carr’s repeated incarceration for relatively minor infractions and consequent institutionalisation, which was adversely impacting on his prospects of rehabilitation. Consequently neither the primary nor secondary objective the legislation was being served by the order remaining in place.

383. The plaintiff has accordingly not established any reason for the revocation of the ESO, and the aspects of the final amended summons seeking revocation must be dismissed.

384. The plaintiff made no submissions in connection with order F sought in the final amended summons, quoted above at [22], regarding non-publication of his name. This claim for relief will accordingly also be dismissed.

385. As to the defendant’s Notice of Motion, I am satisfied on the basis of the unchallenged evidence of EM and Dr Parker, and my own review of the OIMS notes relating to the period of time since 20 December 2024, that the deletion of conditions 4 and 8 has significantly compromised the capacity to supervise the plaintiff, relevant to his risk factors. This development has been contrary to the statutory purpose of the Act of ensuring the safety and protection of the community. These conditions must be reimposed.

386. The evidence does not establish as clearly that there has been difficulty caused by the other orders made by Garling J, and I do not propose to make any orders in relation to them.

387. I note finally that the evidence adduced by the defendant includes material in which the plaintiff has made scandalous allegations. This material needs to be redacted in the version maintained in the Court file, with an unredacted version placed in a sealed envelope, in the same way in which the plaintiff’s evidence is to be treated.

ORDERS

404. Accordingly I make the following orders:

1. The plaintiff’s final amended summons filed on 1 July 2024 is, to the extent that it is before the Court (namely claims for relief A, B, D, F and H) dismissed;

2. The defendant’s Notice of Motion is upheld to the extent that conditions 4 and 8 imposed by Fagan J are reimposed, and is otherwise dismissed;

3. The defendant is to forward to my Associate within 28 days pages with redactions to be included in the Court file in accordance with these reasons, with a schedule of where they are located. The unredacted pages will be placed in a sealed envelope which is not to be opened other than by order of a Judge of this Court.

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Amendments

23 October 2025 - Typographical error paras [224] and [321] - incorrect MFI numbers.

Decision last updated: 23 October 2025