IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S2 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
MAN HARON MONIS
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
First Respondent
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S4 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
AMIRAH DROUDIS
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
First Respondent
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 22 JUNE 2012, AT 10.02 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
__________________
MR G.O’L. REYNOLDS, SC: May it please the Court, I appear for the applicant Monis with my learned friend, MS G.R. RUBAGOTTI. (instructed by Aston Legal)
MR J.K. KIRK, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR A.K. FLECKNOE-BROWN, for the applicant Droudis. (instructed by CBD Criminal Defence Lawyers)
MR J.V. AGIUS, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.G. McHUGH, for the first respondent in both matters. (instructed by Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
MR M.G. SEXTON, SC, Solicitor-General for the State of New South Wales: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS S.E. PRITCHARD, for the second respondent in both matters. (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))
GUMMOW J: Is there any agreement between the counsel and your side of the Bar table, Mr Solicitor, as to who will be going first for the respondent?
MR SEXTON: Yes. My learned friend, Mr Agius, will be going first, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Agius, we will hear from you first.
MR AGIUS: Your Honours, in our respectful submission, this is not an appropriate matter for a grant of special leave because this case really is an example of no more than the application of settled law and in that way, all we have before us is an example of the ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: Is there any disharmony between the reasons of the Chief Justice and the other members of the Court of Appeal, Justice Allsop?
MR AGIUS: No material disharmony on the question of principle, your Honour. There was no disagreement as to the way in which the second test laid down in Lange, as modified in Coleman v Power, ought to be applied. There was a question of how it is that the legitimate end might be defined, but ultimately there was an agreement in relation to that. There was no disagreement on the issue as to whether or not this was an example of reasonably appropriate and adapted legislation. This was simply a question of construction and the meaning of the word “offensive” in context and the application of the second limb of the Lange test and, in our respectful submission, in…
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- Case
- [2012] HCATrans 161
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court included whether the actions of Monis constituted a "terrorist act" as defined by the *Criminal Code*, and whether the jury had been correctly directed on this matter. Further, the Court had to determine whether Droudis's conduct met the elements of being an accessory after the fact to murder, specifically whether she assisted Monis with the intention of helping him avoid apprehension, prosecution, or punishment for the offence of murder.
The Court's reasoning focused on the statutory definitions of the offences. Regarding the terrorist act, the High Court affirmed that the jury's finding that Monis's actions were intended to coerce or influence the government of the Commonwealth or a foreign country, or to intimidate the public, was open on the evidence. The Court analysed the elements of accessory after the fact, confirming that the prosecution must prove the accused knew the principal offender had committed a serious indictable offence and that the assistance was provided with the specific intent to help the offender avoid apprehension, prosecution, or punishment. The Court found no error in the trial judge's directions to the jury on these matters.
The appeals were dismissed.
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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