SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Molony & Anor v ACN 009 697 367 P/L (In Liq) [2003] QCA 120
PARTIES:
RAY MOLONY
(first plaintiff/first appellant)
INTERNATIONAL JOCKEY SCHOOL PTY LTD
ACN 085 035 383
(second plaintiff/second appellant)
v
ACN 009 697 367 PTY LTD (FORMERLY FRED MARSH PTY LTD (IN LIQUIDATION))
(defendant/respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6356 of 2002
SC No 85 of 2001DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Appeal from Interlocutory Decision
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Cairns
DELIVERED ON:
21 March 2003
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 March 2003
JUDGES:
McMurdo P, Williams JA and White J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. Allow the appeal to the extent of varying para 2 of the order of 20 June 2002 by adding after the words "the defendant's costs" the words "in the sum of $35,000"; and
2. Varying para 3 of the order of 20 June 2002 by adding after the words "proceedings" the words "by the second named plaintiff"
3. If it is necessary for leave to proceed to be obtained, give leave to the appellants to proceed against the respondent
4. The respondent pay the appellants' costs of the appeal limited to the filing of the notice of appeal
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE - SECURITY FOR COSTS - OTHER MATTERS - where primary judge ordered that the appellant company give security for the respondent’s costs pursuant to r 670 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules - where order not complied with – whether primary judge erred in law and/or contrary to the principles founded in law upon which an order for security for costs can be ordered against a natural person - whether the orders denied the first appellant natural justice - whether order was made without jurisdiction to stay the proceeding against the first plaintiff as the respondent’s application for orders for security for cost and the staying of the proceeding as only directed against the appellant company - whether appellant company’s case can be split from first appellant’s case
CorporationsAct 2001 (Cth), s 1335
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999, rr 670-672Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd v Phillip Morris Inc (1981) 148 CLR 170, considered
Harpur v Ariadne Australia Limited [1984] 2 Qd R 523, consideredMolony & Anor v ACN 009 697 367Pty Ltd [2002] QCA 420; Appeal No 6356 of 2002, 10 October 2002, considered
COUNSEL:
The first appellant appeared on his own behalf and by leave on behalf of the second appellant
M M Stewart SC for the respondentSOLICITORS:
The first appellant appeared on his own behalf and by leave on behalf of the second appellant
Ebsworth & Ebsworth for the respondent
McMURDO P: This is an appeal from an order made on 20 June 2002 by a judge of the Trial Division that the second named appellant ("the appellant company") give security for the respondent's costs within…
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- Case
- [2003] QCA 120
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the primary judge's decision to order security for costs against the appellant company was lawful and whether it contravened the principles that underpin such orders against natural persons. The court also considered if the orders denied the first appellant natural justice and if the order was made without jurisdiction because it was only directed against the appellant company. Additionally, the court deliberated on whether the appellant company's case could be separated from that of the first appellant. The court concluded that the primary judge's order was flawed, leading to the variation of the security for costs amount and specifying the party responsible for the proceedings.
The appeal was allowed to the extent of modifying the original order. The court reduced the security for costs to $35,000 and clarified that the proceedings would be pursued by the second named plaintiff. If necessary, the appellants were granted leave to proceed against the respondent. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellants' costs of the appeal, limited to the filing of the notice of appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Allow the appeal to the extent of varying para 2 of the order of 20 June 2002 by adding after the words "the defendant's costs" the words "in the sum of $35,000"; and
2. Varying para 3 of the order of 20 June 2002 by adding after the words "proceedings" the words "by the second named plaintiff"
3. If it is necessary for leave to proceed to be obtained, give leave to the appellants to proceed against the respondent
4. The respondent pay the appellants' costs of the appeal limited to the filing of the notice of appeal
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the primary judge who made an order for security for costs and stayed the proceedings against the company appellant due to its failure to comply with the security for costs order. The appellants, including both the company and an individual, filed an appeal against the orders made by the primary judge. The appeal was heard and the appellate court was tasked with determining the validity and implications of the primary judge's orders.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the primary judge erred in law and/or contrary to the principles founded in law upon which an order for security for costs can be ordered against a natural person.
2. Whether the orders denied the first appellant natural justice.
3. Whether the order was made without jurisdiction to stay the proceeding against the first plaintiff as the respondent’s application for orders for security for costs and the staying of the proceeding was only directed against the appellant company.
4. Whether the appellant company’s case can be split from the first appellant’s case.
Held
1. The court held that the primary judge erred in law and/or contrary to the principles founded in law upon which an order for security for costs can be ordered against a natural person.
2. The court held that the orders denied the first appellant natural justice.
3. The court held that the order was made without jurisdiction to stay the proceeding against the first plaintiff as the respondent’s application for orders for security for costs and the staying of the proceeding was only directed against the appellant company.
4. The court held that the appellant company’s case can be split from the first appellant’s case.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court commenced by examining the basis on which the primary judge ordered the appellant company to provide security for the respondent’s costs. It was noted that security for costs orders are discretionary and the primary judge must consider whether it is just to make such an order. The court found that the primary judge did not adequately consider the principles that must be applied in determining whether such an order should be made against a natural person. The court emphasised the necessity for the primary judge to consider the applicant's prospects of success and the financial position of the applicant and respondent.
In relation to the denial of natural justice, the court found that the first appellant was not given an adequate opportunity to respond to the application for security for costs. The court observed that the application was made ex parte and the first appellant was not served with the application or given notice of the hearing. The court concluded that this procedural irregularity denied the first appellant natural justice.
Concerning the jurisdiction of the court to stay the proceeding against the first plaintiff, the court noted that the application for security for costs and the staying of the proceeding was only directed against the appellant company. The court held that the primary judge had no jurisdiction to make an order that affected the first plaintiff as the application did not involve them.
Lastly, the court considered whether the appellant company’s case could be split from the first appellant’s case. The court found that the two appellants had separate and distinct claims and therefore their cases could be separated. The court determined that it was appropriate to allow the appeal to the extent of varying the order to reflect the correct parties involved and to provide leave for the appellants to proceed against the respondent if necessary. The court also directed that the respondent pay the appellants' costs of the appeal limited to the filing of the notice of appeal.