SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
PARTIES:
RAY MOLONY AND INTERNATIONAL JOCKEY SCHOOL PTY LTD ACN 085 035 383
(plaintiff/appellant/applicant)
v
ACN 009 697 367 PTY LTD (FORMERLY FRED MARSH PTY LTD) (IN LIQUIDATION) ACN 009 697 367
(defendant/respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6356 of 2002
SC No 85 of 2001DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave to Appeal
Application for Extension of TimeORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Cairns
DELIVERED EXTEMPORE ON:
10 October 2002
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
10 October 2002
JUDGES:
McMurdo P, McPherson JA and Holmes J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
Dismiss application for leave to appeal with costs. Extend to 25 October 2002 the time within which the appellant or the second plaintiff may appeal against the order made on 20 June 2002.
CATCHWORDS:
APPEAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – TIME FOR APPEAL – EXTENSION OF TIME – Application for leave to appeal not required – Extension of time in which to appeal where no prejudice to defendant
COUNSEL:
The appellant appeared on his own behalf
A W Duffy for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Ebsworth & Ebsworth for the respondent
McPHERSON JA: The first plaintiff in proceeding number 85 of 2001 in the Supreme Court Registry in Cairns is an individual named Ray Moloney. The second plaintiff in the action is International Jockey School Pty Ltd which is a company controlled by the first plaintiff.
The proceedings were instituted on 27th June 2001 claiming damages for breach of contract and contravention of the Trade Practices Act against the defendant which is a company formally named Fred Marsh Pty Ltd that went into voluntary liquidation on 2nd October 2001 after Mr Marsh, who was the sole shareholder, died. Leave to proceed against the defendant company does not seem to have been obtained, but it is solvent and one would not expect that there would be much difficulty in obtaining leave in those circumstances if indeed it is needed.
The claim for damages is based on what is alleged to have been a written agreement for a lease of land for a period of slightly more than three years. It cannot therefore have taken effect as a lease, but only, at best, as an equitable lease on the principle in Walsh v. Lonsdale, but the plaintiffs - or at least the first plaintiff - are entitled to sue on it as a contract and that is what they or he have done.
The major problem in the way of a trial of the action seems to have been that there is a dispute about the existence of the lease or perhaps the validity of its execution by Mr Marsh on behalf of the defendant. That, however, is a matter for determination at trial and does not directly concern us here.
The subject of this application to the Court of…
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- Case
- [2002] QCA 420
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues at the heart of the case revolved around the statutory provisions governing the time within which an appeal could be lodged and the circumstances under which an extension of this time could be granted. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the appellant's reasons for the delay were sufficient and whether the respondent would be prejudiced if the time for appealing were extended.
In its reasoning, the court noted that the application for leave to appeal was not required as per the statutory provisions. The court then turned to the issue of extending the time for appeal. The appellant argued that the delay in filing the appeal was due to an administrative oversight and that there was no prejudice to the respondent if the time for appeal were extended. The court found that the appellant had provided reasonable grounds for the delay and that there was no evidence to suggest that the respondent would be prejudiced by the extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for leave to appeal with costs and extended the time for appeal to 25 October 2002.
Orders
Orders of the court
Dismiss application for leave to appeal with costs. Extend to 25 October 2002 the time within which the appellant or the second plaintiff may appeal against the order made on 20 June 2002.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case originated in the Queensland Supreme Court where Molony filed a lawsuit against ACN 009 697 367 P/L for breach of contract. After a hearing, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the respondent on 20 June 2002. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Molony filed an application in the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal the decision. This application was lodged outside the statutory time limit for appeals. Subsequently, Molony applied for an extension of time to appeal, arguing that there was no prejudice to the respondent if the extension was granted.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court of Appeal should grant leave for an appeal to be filed beyond the statutory time limit.
2. Whether the respondent would suffer prejudice if the time for appeal were extended.
3. Whether the appellant has provided sufficient justification for the delay in filing the appeal.
Held
1. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that leave was not required to extend the time limit for filing an appeal.
2. The Court of Appeal determined that the respondent would not suffer prejudice if the time for appeal were extended.
3. The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had provided sufficient justification for the delay in filing the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal held that the application for leave to appeal was unnecessary because the court has the inherent jurisdiction to extend the time limit for filing an appeal where no prejudice to the respondent would result. This principle was affirmed in the case of *Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v State of Queensland*, where the court stated that leave is not required when extending the time for appeal under the relevant statutory provisions. The Court of Appeal further examined whether extending the time for appeal would prejudice the respondent, in this case, ACN 009 697 367 P/L. The court considered the evidence provided and concluded that there was no likelihood of prejudice to the respondent if the time for appeal were extended. Finally, the Court of Appeal assessed the appellant's justification for the delay in filing the appeal. The court found that the appellant had provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, including the complexity of the case and the appellant's need for additional time to prepare the appeal. This consideration is consistent with the approach in *Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd*, where the court extended the time for appeal based on the appellant's justification. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that where no prejudice to the respondent would result, the Court of Appeal has the inherent jurisdiction to extend the time limit for filing an appeal, and the court will consider the appellant's justification for any delay in filing the appeal. The Court of Appeal's decision aligns with prior authority but affirms the inherent jurisdiction to extend time limits where appropriate.