MJ Arthurs Pty Ltd v Portfolio Housing Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

MJ Arthurs Pty Ltd & Anor v Portfolio Housing Pty Ltd & Anor [2015] QCA 86

PARTIES:

MJ ARTHURS PTY LTD
ACN 145 344 056

MICHAEL JAMES ARTHURS
(first appellant)
(second appellant)v
PORTFOLIO HOUSING PTY LTD
ACN 155 425 826

SHAUN MICHAEL DAVISON
(first respondent)(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 7462 of 2014
SC No 1897 of 2013

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

General Civil Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:


Supreme Court at Brisbane – [2014] QSC 151

DELIVERED ON:

19 May 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

26 March 2015

JUDGES:

Gotterson and Philippides JJA and Ann Lyons J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders

ORDERS:

1.   Appeal allowed.

2.   Declare that for the purpose of determining the question posed in Order 1 made on 5 June 2014, that the Defendants’ entitlement to profit share according to Exhibit 29, flowing from the Plaintiffs’ termination of the relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, is to be calculated only in respect of construction contracts completed as at 19 November 2012.

3.   The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal to be assessed.

4.   Otherwise remit the matter to the learned primary judge:

(a)     for further directions as to matters still in dispute between the parties; and

(b)     to make such further or other orders (including orders as to costs) as are deemed fit.

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH JUDGE'S FINDINGS OF FACT – OTHER MATTERS – where from 2005 the second appellant and second respondent had undertaken building projects together – where the second respondent would identify building project opportunities and the second appellant would undertake the building work – where after the building construction was completed, the second appellant and second respondent would share net profits equally – where routinely, a corporate vehicle and a business trust structure were used to carry out each project – where the second appellant and second respondent had a falling out in the middle of 2012 and the second appellant sent an email which, it was agreed by all parties, had the effect of terminating whatever contractual arrangements were in place between the parties and their respective entities as at that date – where the appellants claimed relief based upon the agreement for the Mackay project – where the appellants sought the following relief: a declaration that certain real property was held on trust for the first and second appellants; money judgments in stated amounts for debt or moneys had and received; an account of moneys paid to the first respondent or its bank account since 19 November 2012 by purchasers under construction contracts with the first appellant; and damages for breach of contract – where the respondents counterclaimed $2,481,541.50 being “one half of the profits earned” on some 66 construction contracts under the Mackay project which were the contracts that had been entered into by the date of termination, but…

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Details
Case
[2015] QCA 86
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In MJ Arthurs Pty Ltd v Portfolio Housing Pty Ltd, the appellants, MJ Arthurs Pty Ltd and others, appealed against findings made by the learned primary judge regarding the timing of the respondents' entitlement to profit share under an oral agreement. The factual background revealed that the parties had been engaged in building projects since 2005, with the respondents identifying opportunities and the appellants undertaking the construction work. Profits were shared equally upon completion of each project. The dispute arose from a falling out in mid-2012, leading to the termination of their contractual arrangements. The appellants sought relief based on the agreement for the Mackay project, while the respondents counterclaimed for profit share from the construction contracts completed by the termination date. The central legal issue was whether the respondents' entitlement to profit share arose upon the presentation of a construction contract for execution or upon the completion of the construction.

The court held that the primary judge's finding that the respondents' entitlement to profit share arose upon the presentation of a construction contract for execution was not supported by evidence or the pleadings. The evidence and the respondents' own pleadings indicated that the respondents had tasks and responsibilities extending beyond the presentation of the contract and up to the completion of the construction. Therefore, the respondents' entitlement to profit share did not arise until the completion of the construction contract. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge's declaration, and remitted the matter for further directions and orders. The court also ordered that the respondents pay the appellants' costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Declare that for the purpose of determining the question posed in Order 1 made on 5 June 2014, that the Defendants’ entitlement to profit share according to Exhibit 29, flowing from the Plaintiffs’ termination of the relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, is to be calculated only in respect of construction contracts completed as at 19 November 2012.

3. The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal to be assessed.

4. Otherwise remit the matter to the learned primary judge:

(a) for further directions as to matters still in dispute between the parties; and

(b) to make such further or other orders (including orders as to costs) as are deemed fit.

Background

Background to the litigation

At its heart, this appeal is against a finding made by the learned primary judge as to the time at which the respondents’ entitlement to profit share arises under an oral agreement between them and the appellants. The litigation has arisen in the following factual setting.Factual background Mr Arthurs and Mr Davison had, since about 2005, undertaken projects together. The essential nature of the project business was that Mr Davison would identify building project opportunities and Mr Arthurs would undertake the building work. After the building construction was completed, they would share net profits equally. Routinely, a corporate vehicle and a business trust structure was used to carry out each project. The litigation concerned the last of the projects carried out by Mr Arthurs and Mr Davison together. The learned primary judge described features of that project, its development and its ultimate termination in the following way:“[3]The final project in which they were engaged involved the building of houses in Mackay. By that time, Mr Davison had become a ‘permanently excluded individual’ under the relevant provisions of the then Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991. That legislation also limited the engagement which Mr Arthurs, a licensed builder, could have with Mr Davison with respect to building projects, Mr Arthurs and Mr Davison were concerned to ensure that their business dealings did not fall foul of the legislation. They took legal and accounting advice. The upshot was that the Mackay projects were conducted through the first defendant, Portfolio Housing Pty Ltd (‘Portfolio’).[4]The Mackay project also involved an external marketer, Optima Homes Pty Ltd (‘Optima’). Optima sold ‘house and land’ packages to members of the public. Typically, Optima would require that the purchaser sign both a contract to acquire a particular block of land and a building contract with Mr Arthurs (or his company). The involvement of Optima required some modification to the way in which money was received and disbursed from the third parties for whom houses were being built. Whereas in previous projects, those third parties had paid their progress payments under their respective building contracts to Mr Arthurs (or his company, which also held a building licence), Optima required ‘control’ of the funds generated under the building contracts.[5]Under the particular arrangement with Optima, progress payments under a building contract were not paid to Mr Arthurs, but to a specific account which was jointly controlled by Optima and Portfolio. Optima would be paid its marketing commission from that account, and the balance would be transferred into another account controlled by Portfolio. Mr Arthurs would then he paid his construction costs from that account.[6]Construction of houses on the Mackay project commenced from the middle of 2012. Mr Arthurs and Mr Davison then had a falling out. On 19 November 2012, Mr Arthurs sent an email to Mrs Davison which, it is agreed by the parties, had the effect of terminating whatever contractual arrangements were in place between the parties (and their respective entities) as at that date.[7]As I have mentioned, there were, as at 19 November 2012, a number of houses in the Mackay project on which construction had been completed. There was also, at that date, a number of lots in respect of which construction contracts had been signed, but work had either not commenced or had not been completed.”[1][1]AB348. These facts are uncontentious.The claims in the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the hearing of the appeal, the respondents sought to sustain the finding at first instance as to when an entitlement to profit share arose on two alternative bases. One was that it was expressly agreed between the parties that the respondents’ entitlement to profit share arose upon entry into a construction contract with a third party.[14] The other was that the contract between the appellants and respondents contained an implied term to the effect that upon termination of it, the respondents would be entitled to a profit share on any construction contract that had been entered into before termination.[15] Both of these bases necessarily rely upon the concession in the Westralian Farmers principle that the parties to a contract may agree on terms that would confer an entitlement to payment on a party before performance by it of all acts of performance required of it under the contract.[14]Tr1-33 ll1-11.[15]Tr1-40 l36 – Tr1-41 l3.The evidence and pleadings relied on by the appellants Both Mr Arthurs and Mr Davison gave evidence concerning their roles on behalf of the appellants and respondents respectively. In evidence-in-chief, Mr Arthurs answered questions on that topic in this way:“All right. Now, did you and Mr Davison have a discussion about the respective roles and obligations that you’d each play in this development?---Yes.Where did you have those discussions?---At various places. One of them was on a - remember it was on the plane back from Mackay when we first, like, had a look at all the properties up there.Right?---And we just discussed what – what each side would do. Well, Mr Davison would – he would source, like, the time ---Well, I just want to focus with you at the moment. Now, what did you and Mr Davison discuss about your role in this venture?---I would be building. Building site.And in what form? In your own name or in some other name? How was that to be [indistinct]?---Well, at the time, I had – I had a company but it wasn’t – It didn’t have a BSA licence and I had a personal licence. So we were going to build – I was going to build the houses in my personal licence until such times as the – the company was licensed.All right. And who would enter into building contracts for the construction of houses on these lots?---I would.In your own name?---In my own name.And what would happen when the company came along?---Well, then I – I’d start doing the contracts in the company name.All right. And did that occur?---It did. Yeah. It did occur.All right. Now, was your sole function that of a builder?---Yes.All right. Now, did you discuss with Mr Davison what performance – what tasks he might [indistinct]?---Yes.And what did you discuss with him and where?---He said that he was going to take care of the administration side of the business; both him and his wife. They were – they were to provide the preparation of the building contracts. They were to select lots --- sorry. House – houses for particular lots.What do you mean by select houses?---We had – I had approximately six, maybe eight, house designs.Right?---So the marketer would send the – an outline of the – the proposed lot. We would have to work out what type of – one of my houses would fit on there. So when they’d done that, we’d send it off to – well, Mr Davison would send it off to the marketer at an agreed price and then it was up to the marketer whether they accepted it or not.Now, who communicated with the purchasers?---I thought it was Mr Davison, but it was – but it turned out to the marketer.Who issued the progress claims?---It was supposed to be Mr Davison, but it turns it out it was – It was the marketer.All right. And who collected the progress claims?---Both the marketer and the Davisons.And who attended to handover and completion of construction?---It was supposed to be the Davisons, but that never occurred.All right. Now, what happened when money was received on account of progress claims for your account – your building work? What happened to the money, physically?---The money would go from the client into a joint held account by Portfolio Housing Trust and it was controlled by Optima. And then it would go – it would be moved – my percentage of the money – sorry. It – that would move from the Portfolio Housing Trust---Just go slowly. You say that there was – In an account controlled by Optima, what happened with the money in that account so far as Optima was concerned?---They would take their commission.I see. And how much was their commission?---It varied. I can’t say a figure on it. It – it varied.All right. Now, after Optima had taken the commission out of the money, what happened to the funds in those accounts?---Portfolio Housing would then move it across to another account which I had access to and then I’d pay all my payments and construction bills from that account.”[16][16]AB51 Tr1-51 l31 – AB53 Tr1-53 l15.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I mention at this point that in supplementary submissions made after the hearing of the appeal, the respondents drew attention to facts to pleaded in paragraph 3(i) of the third further amended defence[23] and to evidence which supported those facts. In summary, the facts pleaded are that the parties never discussed or agreed that “payment of one half of the profit would be paid upon completion” of the construction of individual houses and that, as a matter of practice, the parties would draw from the project bank accounts on an “as needed” basis and would discuss drawings periodically “to ensure such drawings were equal”. Neither of these facts speaks to the issue of when an entitlement to profit share on a construction contract was to arise. They do not, in my view, support either the express term or the implied term for which the respondents contend.[23]AB298.Conclusion The finding by the learned primary judge that the respondents’ entitlement to profit share on a construction contract arose when it was presented by Mr Davison for execution is not justified in principle or on the evidence at trial. That evidence did not support an express or implied term of the contract between the appellants and the respondents to the effect that the entitlement to profit share would arise at that point. To the contrary, the evidence, supported by the respondents’ own pleading, justified a finding that, conformably with principle, the respondents, through Mr Davison, were required to perform tasks and responsibilities after presentation of a construction contract for execution and up to the point of completion of it, in order to derive such an entitlement. Since the finding that underpins the declaration made on 15 July 2014 cannot be sustained, the declaration itself cannot be sustained. It must be set aside and substituted by a declaration in conformity with the finding justified by the evidence.Disposition The appellants have submitted a draft order containing four orders that they propose be made in the event that the appeal succeeds. The respondents have indicated that in that event, they would not oppose the first three of them. The fourth order proposes that the matter be remitted to the learned primary judge for further directions as to matters still in dispute and necessary further orders. The respondents have proposed instead an amendment to Order 1 of the orders made on 1 August 2014 which, they submit, would obviate remitting the matter. The orders made then deal in detail with the scope of work to be undertaken by a Special Referee. They are not, themselves, the subject of appeal. As well, an order as to costs of the proceedings at first instance is yet to be made by the learned primary judge. I am therefore unpersuaded that the amendment proposed would have the outcome for which the respondents contend.Orders I would propose the following orders:1.Appeal allowed.2.Declare that for the purpose of determining the question posed in Order 1 made on 5 June 2014, that the Defendants’ entitlement to profit share according to Exhibit 29, flowing from the Plaintiffs’ termination of the relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants, is to be calculated only in respect of construction contracts completed as at 19 November 2012.3.The respondents pay the appellants’ costs of the appeal to be assessed.4.Otherwise remit the matter to the learned primary judge:(a) for further directions as to matters still in dispute between the parties; and(b) to make such further or other orders (including orders as to costs) as are deemed fit.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the oral agreement between the appellants and the respondents and the evidence presented at trial to determine when the respondents' entitlement to profit share arose. The respondents argued that their entitlement arose when a construction contract was presented for execution, while the appellants contended that the entitlement arose only upon the completion of the construction contract. The learned primary judge had found in favour of the respondents, but the appellate court disagreed.

The court held that the finding by the learned primary judge that the respondents' entitlement to profit share arose when a construction contract was presented for execution was not justified in principle or on the evidence at trial. The evidence showed that the respondents, through Mr Davison, were required to perform tasks and responsibilities after the presentation of a construction contract for execution and up to the point of completion of it, in order to derive such an entitlement. The court found that the finding that underpins the declaration made on 15 July 2014 cannot be sustained, and therefore, the declaration itself cannot be sustained. It must be set aside and substituted by a declaration in conformity with the finding justified by the evidence.

The court also considered the supplementary submissions made by the respondents after the hearing of the appeal. The court found that the facts pleaded and the evidence which supported those facts did not speak to the issue of when an entitlement to profit share on a construction contract was to arise. Therefore, these facts did not support either the express term or the implied term for which the respondents contended.

In conclusion, the court held that the learned primary judge erred in finding that the respondents' entitlement to profit share arose when a construction contract was presented for execution. Instead, the court concluded that the respondents' entitlement to profit share arose upon the completion of the construction contract. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in the context of an oral agreement between parties engaged in building projects, the entitlement to profit share arises upon the completion of the construction contract and not when the contract is presented for execution.