Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski

In the case of Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd v Kowalski, the plaintiff sought a declaration under the Supreme Court Act that the defendant was a vexatious litigant and an order that the defendant be prohibited from instituting further proceedings without leave. The proceedings originated from a failed settlement attempt in 1992 between the parties concerning outstanding claims under the Workers Compensation Act 1971 and the Compensation Act. Consent orders were initially made in the Industrial Court, but WorkCover Corporation declined to consent to the orders under the Compensation Act, resulting in the orders being set aside. The defendant sought to reverse the setting aside of the orders, contending that it was done without his instruction or consent.

The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the defendant had instituted the proceedings without reasonable grounds and whether those proceedings were vexatious. The court considered the meaning of "proceedings" for the purposes of section 39 of the Supreme Court Act and whether the proceedings were instituted "persistently." The plaintiff argued that the defendant's attempt to have the original consent orders reinstated was vexatious and taken without reasonable ground, particularly as the settlement had clearly failed. The court needed to decide whether the defendant's actions met the criteria for being deemed a vexatious litigant.

The court found that the defendant did institute the proceedings without reasonable grounds, as the evidence indicated that the defendant had instructed his solicitors to consent to the setting aside of the orders. The court preferred the evidence of the solicitors over that of the defendant, who was deemed unreliable. The court also found that the circumstances in which the consent orders were set aside did not reveal anything onerous, untoward, or unfair to the defendant. The court concluded that the defendant's actions constituted vexatious proceedings under section 39 of the Supreme Court Act, leading to the grant of the order sought by the plaintiff.