FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for the Environment v Hansen [2016] FCA 1146
ORDERS
ACD 86 of 2015 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
Applicant
AND: CHRISTOPHER GEORGE HANSEN
Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMWICH J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 September 2016
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
On 6 April 2014, the respondent, Christopher George Hansen, contravened s 354(1)(f) of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (the Environment Protection Act)…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1146
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the penalty imposed on Mr. Hansen was sufficient to achieve the primary objective of deterrence, as outlined in the High Court decision in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate. The court examined the balance between the financial gain from the illegal activity, estimated at about $200, and the need for a substantial penalty to deter both Mr. Hansen and others from similar actions in the future. The court also considered the relevance of prior civil penalty outcomes and the principles guiding the acceptance of an agreed civil penalty proposal.
The court concluded that a penalty of $28,000 was appropriate, given the significant need for deterrence and the relatively minor financial gain from the illegal activity. The decision underscored the importance of protecting Australia's marine reserves for the sustainability of the fishing industry and the broader community. The court found that the proposed penalty would effectively deter Mr. Hansen and others from engaging in illegal fishing activities, thereby promoting compliance with environmental laws. The court also noted that Mr. Hansen had achieved a favourable outcome, considering the circumstances.
The final orders required Mr. Hansen to pay a pecuniary penalty of $28,000 and the Minister’s costs, which could be assessed or agreed upon, or alternatively, the Minister could apply for a fixed costs order within seven days. If such an application was made, Mr. Hansen would have an additional seven days to respond, and the application would be determined on the papers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent, Christopher George Hansen, pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty of $28,000 pursuant to s 482 of the Environment Protection Act by reason of the above contravention.
2. The respondent, Christopher George Hansen, pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to these proceedings as taxed or agreed.
3. In lieu of proceeding to taxation or seeking to reach agreement as to the applicant’s costs, the applicant may, within 7 days, or such further time as the Court allows, elect to file and serve an application by way of an affidavit for a fixed costs order pursuant to s 43(3)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
4. If the applicant does make an application in accordance with order 3 above, the respondent, Christopher George Hansen, be given a further 7 days, or such further time as the Court allows, in which to file any affidavit or submission in opposition to a fixed costs order being made.
5. If any application is made in accordance with order 3 above, whether or not it is opposed the determination of the application will be made on the papers in Chambers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Notwithstanding the above, no submission was made that Mr Hansen was not in a position to pay either the agreed penalty or the Minister’s costs, although the quantum of costs was not able to be agreed. Nor was any application made for time to pay. In light of the findings I have made, that was probably a wise forensic choice and it is unlikely that any such submissions would have enjoyed success without compelling evidence, able to be tested. As discussed below, Mr Hansen has achieved quite a favourable agreed outcome in all the circumstances.ConsiderationPrimacy of deterrence The plain and express objective of the Minister in bringing these proceedings was not to punish, but rather to deter. That approach accords with the decision of the High Court in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46; (2015) 326 ALR 476 (the CFMEU civil penalty case). The plurality in the CFMEU civil penalty case made it clear at 490 [55] that the proper function of a civil penalty is “primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance”, citing and quoting from Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076 at 52,152. This case involves a clear example of the application of the principles endorsed in the CFMEU civil penalty case, given that the gain from the conduct of about $200 was relatively trivial compared to the sanction and costs to be imposed, and the need for deterrence, both general and specific, was substantial. The notion of deterrence in the context of this case warrants some further elaboration. Applying the CFMEU civil penalty case approach to deterrence for the purposes of the protection of the environment, and having regard to the circumstances of this specific contravention, the Minister, on behalf of the community, simply wants Mr Hansen and other would be wrongdoers to think twice and decide not to act against the strong public interest in properly maintaining Australia’s marine reserves. Importantly, such reserves are a vitally important contribution to the maintenance of a viable and sustainable recreational and commercial fishing industry, for the benefit of the entire Australian community. The cost and difficulties of enforcement of any environment protection law, and of marine environment protection laws in particular, from detection, through to investigation and on to commencing and conducting civil penalty (or for that matter, criminal prosecution) proceedings makes specific and general deterrence of particular importance. Any effective enforcement of positive obligations and of prohibitions to protect the environment necessarily depends on successful compliance activity, including surveillance and other enforcement activity and the bringing of proceedings such as these, increasing the risks associated with non-compliance. That is especially so when the benefits of non-compliance are not just matters of convenience or self-indulgence, but material benefits such as profit or other personal gain. It is not that convenience or self-indulgence are in any way mitigatory, but rather that those motives may be seen to be more easily displaced by the deterrence of a risk of a substantial monetary sanction.