FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jalal [2000] FCA 1370
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION – cancellation of Class 100 (Spouse) Visa pursuant to s 128 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where false statements made by applicant for visa – whether Minister had power to cancel visa for non-compliance with provisions relating to the application form when the Minister was aware of the non-compliance when visa granted – whether transitional provisions of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) as in force 31 January 1996 operate so as to permit Minister to cancel visa granted in respect of an application made before 1 September 1994 notwithstanding that visa applicant has not entered Australia
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Reprint 6 - 31 January 1996) ss 101, 102, 105, 107, 108, 109, 115, 116, 128
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Reprint 4 - 31 January 1993) ss 14, 17, 20, 16, 35
Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth)Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (SR 1994 No. 268) Sch 4, cl 4001(4)
Migration (1993) Regulations (Cth) (SR 1992 No. 367)Newcastle City Council v GIO General Limited (1997) 191 CLR 85 considered
Explanatory Memorandum for the Migration Reform Bill 1992
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v
SYED JAMAL JALAL and HAMIDI JALALV178 of 2000
RYAN, MARSHALL & EMMETT JJ
MELBOURNE
28 SEPTEMBER 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V178 of 2000
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
AppellantAND:
SYED JAMAL JALAL
First RespondentAND:
HAMIDI JALAL
Second RespondentJUDGES:
RYAN, MARSHALL & EMMETT JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
28 SEPTEMBER 2000
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS:
1. That the appeal be dismissed.
That there be no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 178 of 2000
ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
AppellantAND:
SYED JAMAL JALAL
First RespondentAND:
HAMIDI JALAL
Second Respondent
JUDGES:
RYAN, MARSHALL and EMMETT JJ
DATE:
28 SEPTEMBER 2000
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The first respondent, Syed Jamal Jalal (“Mr Jalal”) is a national of Afghanistan. At about 12 noon on 28 August 1998, a delegate of the appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Minister”), granted a visa to Mr Jalal to travel to, enter and remain in Australia. At about 1 p.m. on the same day the Minister cancelled the visa under s 128 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). Mr Jalal then filed an application to the Court for an order of review of the decision to cancel the visa. On 3 March 2000 a judge of the Court ordered that the decision be set aside. The Minister now appeals to the Full Court from that order.
Mr Jalal is married to…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1370
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the language of the statute, particularly sections 116(1)(d) and 115(3)(c), to assess if they could be interpreted to extend the visa cancellation power to non-entrants. The court noted that the language of the statute was specific and detailed, and there was no basis for implying additional words into the provisions. It concluded that the closing words of section 116(1)(d) could not extend the power of cancellation to individuals who had not entered Australia because one cannot be "immigration cleared" without having "entered Australia". The court found that the transitional provision in section 115(3)(c) did not apply to Mr Jalal as section 20 of the Migration Act 1994 did not apply to him.
Ultimately, the court rejected the Minister’s argument that the visa cancellation power could be extended to non-entrants, finding that there was no warrant for reading the legislation otherwise than literally. The court held that the statutory language did not support the Minister's interpretation, and the visa cancellation was not applicable in this case.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister contends that a person who has not entered Australia is, for the purposes of the exercise of the cancellation power that is conferred by s 128 of the 1996 Act, in combination with ss 116(1)(d), 109 and 107 of the 1996 Act, deemed to have entered Australia and to have been immigration cleared. That deeming is said to be effected by the closing words of s 116(1)(d). Section 116(1) provides as follows:“Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that:…………………………(d) if its holder has not entered Australia or has so entered but has not been immigration cleared – it would be liable to be cancelled under Subdivisions C (incorrect information given by holder) if its holder had so entered and been immigration cleared; or…………………………” [Emphasis added]Thus, the Minister contends, if the person is otherwise within s 20 of the 1994 Act, Subdivision C is made applicable to him or her by s 115(3)(c). The Minister contends that ss 128, 116(1)(d), 115(3)(c), 109 and 107 of the 1996 Act are, for relevant purposes, linked and that, in combination, they have the effect that a person who, without actually entering Australia, otherwise falls within the scope of s 20 of the 1994 Act, is liable to have his or her visa cancelled pursuant to Subdivision C of the 1996 Act. However, it is tolerably clear that the closing words of s 116(1)(d) were intended to do no more than extend the power of cancellation to a visa held by a person who did not satisfy s 107(1) by having been “immigration cleared”. One cannot be “immigration cleared” unless one has “entered Australia”. There was no concept of “immigration clearance” in the 1994 Act. It is difficult to see how s 116(1)(d) was intended to do the work that the Minister contends. Having regard to the extremely detailed and specific approach taken in the drafting of the relevant legislation, there is no warrant for reading the legislation otherwise than entirely literally. There is no warrant for treating the closing words of s 116(1)(d) as qualifying the express reference to s 20 in the transitional provision contained in s 115(3)(c). It would, of course, be a different matter altogether if s 115(3)(c) referred to the holder as a person to whom s 20(1) or s 20(2) would apply if the person had entered Australia. That is the drafting technique adopted in relation to s 20(3) of the 1994 Act. However, one does not get to s 116(1)(d) unless s 20 applies, and for the reasons indicated, s 20 does not apply. In other words, even if Mr Jalal had entered Australia before cancellation of the visa, it would not have been liable to be cancelled under Subdivision C because s 20 did not apply to him, and there is no provision that deems s 20 to have applied to him. The Minister contends, alternatively, that s 115(3)(c) should be read as though it contained, at the end, the following additional words:“…or would have applied if the person had entered Australia.”Clearly, if such words had been included that would have been sufficient to render Subdivision C applicable in the present case. However, having regard to the drafting approach adopted in relation to the legislation, there is no warrant for reading words into the 1996 Act that are not there. One object of adopting such a detailed drafting approach was presumably administrative certainty. It would be quite contrary to that object if so called “drafting deficiencies” could be remedied by reading additional words by implication into the provisions of the Act.