Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v McDade

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v McDade [2001] FCA 457

MIGRATION – cancellation by Minister of a Transitional (Permanent) visa under s 109 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) where Minister had previously given, on different occasions, two notices, both purportedly under s 107 of Act – respondent found to have made statements false or misleading in a material particular to an officer before visa granted to him – respondent held visa as a result of operation of subreg 16(2) or 4(1) of Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations – whether first notice valid – first notice referring to appellant’s not having complied with ss 101, 103 and 104 of Act which came into force after alleged non-compliance –comparable former s 20 of the Act applied at time of alleged non-compliance – first notice not a valid notice under s 107 with result that Minister not prevented from giving second notice based on same facts, relying on former s 20

ESTOPPEL – whether Minister estopped by implied representation from contending that purported notice under s 107 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was invalid – whether detrimental reliance present – effect of suggested estoppel to prevent Minister from ever giving valid notice under s 107 based on same facts – suggested estoppel substantive rather than procedural – discretionary power given by statute to be exercised in public interest

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 115(3)

Iyer v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Jalal [2000] FCA 1370, cited
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Dela Cruz (1992) 34 FCR 348, cited
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193, cited
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Petrovski (1997) 73 FCR 303, distinguished

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS v McDADE
W 83 of 2000

CARR, LINDGREN AND KATZ JJ
26 APRIL 2001
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

W 83 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Appellant

AND:

STEPHEN GERALD McDADE
Respondent

JUDGES:

CARR, LINDGREN & KATZ JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

26 APRIL 2001

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to advance the two further grounds of appeal referred to in [24] of the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered today.

2.        The appeal be allowed.

3.Orders 2, 3, 4 and 5 made on 5 May 2000 in proceeding W 51 of 1999 in this Court be set aside and in lieu of those orders, the present respondent’s application in that proceeding be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 457
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v McDade involved an appeal against the decision of a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia, who had ordered a review of a decision made by the Immigration Review Tribunal to affirm the cancellation of the respondent's Transitional (Permanent) visa. The Tribunal's decision was based on the finding that the respondent had provided false or misleading information in his migration application, which rendered him ineligible for the visa. The primary judge had remitted the matter back to the Tribunal to be reconsidered according to the law.

The key legal issues in this appeal were whether the primary judge had erred in granting the order of review and whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration Regulations. Specifically, the appeal focused on the interpretation and application of subsection 35(2) of the old Act and subregs 4(1) and 16(2) of the Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations.

The Court of Appeal held that the primary judge had not erred in the manner claimed. The Court found that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legal provisions and that the decision to cancel the respondent's visa was consistent with the law. The Court noted that the respondent had made false or misleading statements to an immigration officer, which disqualified him from holding a Transitional (Permanent) visa. The Court further held that the respondent's other arguments at first instance and on appeal were unsuccessful, and thus the Tribunal's decision to cancel the visa was affirmed.

The final orders of the Court of Appeal were to allow the appeal, set aside certain orders made by the primary judge, and dismiss the respondent's application for review. Additionally, the Court granted the appellant leave to advance two further grounds of appeal, which were referred to in the Court's reasons for judgment. The Court also decided not to make any order as to costs at either first instance or on appeal, given the circumstances of the case.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to advance the two further grounds of appeal referred to in [24] of the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered today.

2. The appeal be allowed.

3. Orders 2, 3, 4 and 5 made on 5 May 2000 in proceeding W 51 of 1999 in this Court be set aside and in lieu of those orders, the present respondent’s application in that proceeding be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from certain orders made by a Judge of this Court, on 5 May 2000, which included the granting of an order of review of a decision of the Immigration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 19 May 1999 (there is no cross-appeal from an order dismissing an application for relief under s 39B of the Judiciary Act1903 (Cth)). The Tribunal’s decision was to affirm the decision of a delegate of the appellant to cancel the respondent’s Transitional (Permanent) visa. His Honour remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be decided in accordance with the law. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The following recitation of the factual and procedural background is taken largely from the reasons of the learned primary Judge. The respondent was born in the United Kingdom on 8 March 1958 and is a British citizen. He arrived in Australia with his wife and children (who were the second to fourth applicants at first instance) as migrants with a Class 105 Concessional (Family) visa on 15 July 1991. The respondent’s wife and children continue to reside in Australia, as do other members of his family. On 1 September 1994, due to amendments to the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) and the Migration Regulations, the appellant became the holder of a Transitional (Permanent) visa. A copy of the relevant page in the respondent’s passport was tendered and admitted into evidence before us, without objection. It shows that the visa granted to the respondent in London on 31 July 1990 operated as a “permanent entry permit” on each entry into Australia. In those circumstances, we think that it is reasonably clear that subreg 16(2) or, in the alternative subreg 4(1), of the Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations (Statutory Rules 1994 No 261) (“the Regulations”) operated to produce the result that the respondent was taken to have been granted, on 1 September 1994, a Transitional (Permanent) visa that permitted him to remain indefinitely in Australia. On the basis that the respondent produced a bogus document to an officer or made to an officer a statement which was false or misleading in a material particular, the respondent was a person to whom s 20 of “the old Act” (defined by subreg 3(1) as meaning the Act as in force immediately before 1 September 1994) applied and it was subreg 16(2) that produced that result. This is because subs 35(2) of the old Act would have operated to cancel the respondent’s permanent entry permit well before 1 September 1994. Otherwise, subreg 4(1), which applied where a non-citizen was in Australia as the holder of a permanent entry permit immediately before 1 September 1994, would have operated to produce, in substance, the same result. The Tribunal found that the respondent had indeed made to an officer statements which were false or misleading in a material particular. On 19 September 1994, the appellant’s Department (“the Department”) served the respondent with a “Notice of Intention to Cancel” his visa (“the First Notice”) on the basis that his application to migrate to Australia contained incorrect answers. The respondent responded to this First Notice by giving a “Notification of Incorrect Answers” pursuant to s 105 of the Act. Such a step is provided for under a régime in the Act for the formal correction of mis-statements.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

CARR, LINDGREN AND KATZ JJ
We do not think the primary judge erred in the manner asserted in the Notice of Contention.CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons we would allow the appeal. There remains the question of costs both at first instance and on appeal. The appellant has succeeded on a point not raised at first instance and which he was allowed to raise only by leave from us. The fact that the respondent was otherwise unsuccessful on the various other grounds raised by him at first instance and the fact that the respondent has been largely unsuccessful on appeal should, in our opinion, result in there being no order as to costs either at first instance or in relation to the appeal. The respondent sought a certificate under s 6 of the Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) if the appeal were allowed. That section provides, relevantly, that where a Federal appeal succeeds on a question of law, the Court may grant to the respondent a costs certificate in respect of the appeal stating that in the opinion of the Court it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise a payment under that Act to the respondent in respect of the costs incurred by the respondent in relation to the appeal. It may well be, although in our view it is not necessary to decide the point, that s 6 is intended to operate by way of compensation to a respondent only where a Judge has made an error of law at first instance. Assuming, for the purposes of this matter, that the section is not to be so confined, we would not, as a matter of discretion, grant a costs certificate to the respondent in relation to the appeal. We can state our reasons briefly. The grant to the appellant of leave to raise the ground upon which he was eventually successful was decided by the application of conventional and fairly predictable principles. The respondent must be taken to have weighed up his chances in relation to both the matter of leave and the substantive point. He presented a vigorous opposition to the appellant in both respects. He also advanced the matters referred to in the Notice of Contention without any success. In our opinion, justice will be served if the respondent, in those circumstances, bears his costs without indemnity from the Attorney-General, i.e. we do not think it would be appropriate for the Attorney-General to authorise payment to the respondent of those costs. We order that:1.The appellant have leave to advance the two further grounds of appeal referred to in [24] of the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered today.2. The appeal be allowed. 3.Orders 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the orders made on 5 May 2000 in proceeding W 51 of 1999 in this Court be set aside and in lieu of those orders, the present respondent’s application in that proceeding be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: CARR, LINDGREN AND KATZ JJ

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