FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Shume [2013] FCA 158
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Shume [2013] FCA 158 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v YIMAM SHUME File number: NSD 1246 of 2012 Judge: YATES J Date of judgment: 4 March 2013 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal which set aside decision to cancel the first respondent’s visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – whether the Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error – whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider primary considerations – whether the Tribunal failed to respond to a substantial and clearly articulated submission
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 110 ALD 302
Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1
McAuliffe v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Lafu and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 107 ALD 678
Rosson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 390Date of hearing: 3 December 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 57 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the Applicant: DLA Piper Australia Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr I Chatterjee of Surry Hills Legal Centre Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1246 of 2012
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: YIMAM SHUME
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE OF ORDER:
4 MARCH 2013
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari be granted quashing the decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal) in Re Yimam Shume and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 465 (No 2012/1973).
2.A writ of mandamus be granted directing the Tribunal to determine the first respondent’s application according to law.
3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1246 of 2012
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: YIMAM SHUME
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
YATES J
DATE:
4 MARCH 2013
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) which set aside a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (the Minister). The Minister had…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Shume and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2013] FCA 158
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in not considering all relevant factors under the character test and whether it afforded procedural fairness to the Minister by not responding to his arguments. Specifically, the Minister argued that the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the fact that the first respondent arrived in Australia as an adult, which the Minister contended should weigh in favour of visa cancellation. Additionally, the Minister claimed that the Tribunal did not properly consider the first respondent's criminal history and his potential impact on Australian society.
The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its consideration of the character test or in denying procedural fairness to the Minister. In relation to the character test, the court observed that the Tribunal was aware of the first respondent's arrival in Australia as an adult but did not explicitly state whether it considered this factor. However, the court concluded that the Tribunal's overall assessment of the first respondent's character, including his criminal history and the nature of his relationship with Australia, was sufficiently comprehensive. Regarding procedural fairness, the court held that the Tribunal's decision not to delve into the specific argument about the first respondent’s age at arrival did not deprive the Minister of a fair opportunity to present his case. The court found that the Minister had other avenues to present his arguments and that the Tribunal's decision did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the Minister's appeal, upholding the Tribunal's decision not to cancel the first respondent’s visa. The Minister's contentions regarding the Tribunal's failure to consider certain factors and afford procedural fairness were not upheld, and the Tribunal's original decision stood.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the third consideration (the second alleged concession), the first respondent relied upon the following exchange:MS DARCY: … As for the other considerations, it’s very thin on the evidence that he’s not currently in a relationship and does not have any family in Australia. Although he has had some employment in Australia, there’s no evidence that his removal would cause any disruption to those businesses. As to the applicant’s health, we’ve noted that he has HIV.[TRIBUNAL]: New Zealand is the same.MS DARCY: It’s a comparable healthcare system. That’s our submission, Senior Member. Although the applicant’s evidence is that he has no links in New Zealand, we would say that he has spent eight years there and was employed for most of that period. His current links to Australia are generally based on connections to charitable organisations. [TRIBUNAL]: I suppose it could be said in one sense that his links to New Zealand are no less than his links to Australia at the moment.MS DARCY: It’s almost as though the factors balance each other out and almost become neutral to that extent. CONSIDERATION I am not satisfied that, at the hearing before the Tribunal, the Minister made the concessions which the first respondent says were made. First, in relation to the second primary consideration, the Minister advanced a specific submission in the statement of facts and contentions that the first respondent was an adult when he began living in Australia and that this consideration should weigh in favour of cancelling his visa. The Minister developed this submission by referring to the remarks made by Rares J in Rosson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 390 at [20] and [21] concerning the application of the Direction to a person who arrived in Australia as an adult. The salient aspects of his Honour’s remarks were that that was a factor that a decision-maker was bound to take into account and which may warrant adverse consideration so far as the visa applicant or holder is concerned because, as an adult, he or she can be taken to have arrived in Australia “with the knowledge, duties and responsibilities of an adult”. His Honour stressed, however, that the weight, if any, to be given to that factor was a matter for the decision-maker. As I have noted, in the statement of facts and contentions, the Minister urged on the Tribunal that this was a factor in the present case that weighed in favour of cancellation. When the Minister’s legal representative came to articulate that contention in oral argument, the Tribunal forestalled any debate by asking: “That doesn’t come into it, does it?”. The Minister’s legal representative’s response was not to agitate the point but to ask the Tribunal whether she should “[s]kip over” the contention, to which the Tribunal said she should. It is difficult to know what was in the Tribunal’s mind when it intervened in that particular way. It is possible that the Tribunal was merely remarking that the first respondent was not a minor when he arrived in Australia. This acknowledgment is manifest in [43] of the Tribunal’s reasons. It is also possible that the Tribunal had other matters in mind. It is possible, for example, that the Tribunal was expressing a view, elliptically, that the first respondent could not call in aid, favourably, that he was a minor when he arrived in Australia. If so, it does not follow that the Tribunal was not also alert to the fact that the Minister was contending that the second primary consideration should be considered adversely to the first respondent.