Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Shume

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Shume [2013] FCA 158

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Shume [2013] FCA 158
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v YIMAM SHUME
File number: NSD 1246 of 2012
Judge: YATES J
Date of judgment: 4 March 2013
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal which set aside decision to cancel the first respondent’s visa under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – judicial review – whether the Tribunal’s decision was vitiated by jurisdictional error – whether the applicant was denied procedural fairness – whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider primary considerations – whether the Tribunal failed to respond to a substantial and clearly articulated submission  

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 75 ALD 630
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389

Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 110 ALD 302
Lafu v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 1
McAuliffe v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Re Lafu and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 107 ALD 678
Rosson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 390

Date of hearing: 3 December 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Applicant: DLA Piper Australia
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr I Chatterjee of Surry Hills Legal Centre
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1246 of 2012

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Applicant

AND:

YIMAM SHUME
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 MARCH 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari be granted quashing the decision of the second respondent (the Tribunal) in Re Yimam Shume and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA 465 (No 2012/1973).

2.A writ of mandamus be granted directing the Tribunal to determine the first respondent’s application according to law.

3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.  

Note:  Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1246 of 2012

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Applicant

AND:

YIMAM SHUME
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

YATES J

DATE:

4 MARCH 2013

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) which set aside a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (the Minister). The Minister had…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCA 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Shume involves the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship seeking to review a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT). The Minister challenged the Tribunal's decision not to cancel the visa of the first respondent, an Ethiopian citizen residing in Australia. The dispute centred on whether the Tribunal appropriately considered the character test and procedural fairness in relation to the first respondent’s visa cancellation.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in not considering all relevant factors under the character test and whether it afforded procedural fairness to the Minister by not responding to his arguments. Specifically, the Minister argued that the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the fact that the first respondent arrived in Australia as an adult, which the Minister contended should weigh in favour of visa cancellation. Additionally, the Minister claimed that the Tribunal did not properly consider the first respondent's criminal history and his potential impact on Australian society.

The court found that the Tribunal did not err in its consideration of the character test or in denying procedural fairness to the Minister. In relation to the character test, the court observed that the Tribunal was aware of the first respondent's arrival in Australia as an adult but did not explicitly state whether it considered this factor. However, the court concluded that the Tribunal's overall assessment of the first respondent's character, including his criminal history and the nature of his relationship with Australia, was sufficiently comprehensive. Regarding procedural fairness, the court held that the Tribunal's decision not to delve into the specific argument about the first respondent’s age at arrival did not deprive the Minister of a fair opportunity to present his case. The court found that the Minister had other avenues to present his arguments and that the Tribunal's decision did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the Minister's appeal, upholding the Tribunal's decision not to cancel the first respondent’s visa. The Minister's contentions regarding the Tribunal's failure to consider certain factors and afford procedural fairness were not upheld, and the Tribunal's original decision stood.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The matters of particular significance in the present case are those in (b) and (c). The Minister contended that the Tribunal erred by failing to take each matter into account. The Minister also contended that the Tribunal failed to afford procedural fairness to him by failing to respond to a substantial, clearly articulated argument that each matter was a consideration that should weigh in favour of the first respondent’s visa being cancelled. BACKGROUND The facts by reason of which the first respondent did not pass the character test are not in dispute. It is convenient to refer to the relevant passages from the Tribunal’s findings at [16]-[24] of its reasons: The Applicant was born in Ethiopia on or about 18 April 1960. He left Ethiopia in the early 1990s because of his involvement in political activity. After spending time in refugee camps in Sudan and Kenya he was accepted by New Zealand as a refugee in 2000. In 2005 he was granted New Zealand citizenship.In September 2007 he “met” a woman resident in Australia on the internet. He visited the woman on a couple of occasions before moving to Australia. In May 2008 he left New Zealand where he was permanently employed and moved to Australia. He lived with the woman in her house with her two children. Apparently the partnership was successful and the Applicant formed a close bond with his then partner's children.Unfortunately, the relationship soured in December 2008 as the Applicant was unable to find employment. At the end of March 2009 he was asked by his partner to move out of her house. This he did, although with his ex‑partner's encouragement he continued to visit her children on weekends. Apparently the ex-partner held out some hope of a reconciliation should the Applicant obtain employment.Notwithstanding his ex-partner's suggestion of a possible reconciliation the Applicant became aware that she was seeing another man.On the night of 7 June 2009 the Applicant attempted to contact his ex-partner by phone. When he was told that she was out with a friend, the Applicant went to her home. He questioned his ex-partner's children about their mother's whereabouts, found that she was out with another man and the children were in the care of a babysitter. When his ex-partner returned home he attacked her with a knife causing two stab wounds which, whilst requiring suturing, were not life threatening.After stabbing his ex-partner and whilst still armed with a knife he chased her male companion down the road, but that person was able to out run the Applicant.The Applicant then returned to his ex-partner's home where she had secured herself, her children and the 18 year old babysitter inside. After breaking the knife blade attempting to force open a window, the Applicant threw a pot plant through a glass sliding door to gain entry. He then again assaulted his ex-partner.During these events the babysitter, who was herself only 18, had taken the victim's children into a bedroom. The Applicant, after assaulting his ex-partner, entered the bedroom and spoke to the children assuring them that he did not intend to harm them but spoke in derogatory terms about their mother.When police arrived at the scene they found the Applicant in front of the house. He was arrested and later made detailed admissions to police. As stated, the Applicant pleaded guilty to the offences in the District Court.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the third consideration (the second alleged concession), the first respondent relied upon the following exchange:MS DARCY: … As for the other considerations, it’s very thin on the evidence that he’s not currently in a relationship and does not have any family in Australia. Although he has had some employment in Australia, there’s no evidence that his removal would cause any disruption to those businesses. As to the applicant’s health, we’ve noted that he has HIV.[TRIBUNAL]: New Zealand is the same.MS DARCY: It’s a comparable healthcare system. That’s our submission, Senior Member. Although the applicant’s evidence is that he has no links in New Zealand, we would say that he has spent eight years there and was employed for most of that period. His current links to Australia are generally based on connections to charitable organisations. [TRIBUNAL]: I suppose it could be said in one sense that his links to New Zealand are no less than his links to Australia at the moment.MS DARCY: It’s almost as though the factors balance each other out and almost become neutral to that extent. CONSIDERATION I am not satisfied that, at the hearing before the Tribunal, the Minister made the concessions which the first respondent says were made. First, in relation to the second primary consideration, the Minister advanced a specific submission in the statement of facts and contentions that the first respondent was an adult when he began living in Australia and that this consideration should weigh in favour of cancelling his visa. The Minister developed this submission by referring to the remarks made by Rares J in Rosson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 191 FCR 390 at [20] and [21] concerning the application of the Direction to a person who arrived in Australia as an adult. The salient aspects of his Honour’s remarks were that that was a factor that a decision-maker was bound to take into account and which may warrant adverse consideration so far as the visa applicant or holder is concerned because, as an adult, he or she can be taken to have arrived in Australia “with the knowledge, duties and responsibilities of an adult”. His Honour stressed, however, that the weight, if any, to be given to that factor was a matter for the decision-maker. As I have noted, in the statement of facts and contentions, the Minister urged on the Tribunal that this was a factor in the present case that weighed in favour of cancellation. When the Minister’s legal representative came to articulate that contention in oral argument, the Tribunal forestalled any debate by asking: “That doesn’t come into it, does it?”. The Minister’s legal representative’s response was not to agitate the point but to ask the Tribunal whether she should “[s]kip over” the contention, to which the Tribunal said she should. It is difficult to know what was in the Tribunal’s mind when it intervened in that particular way. It is possible that the Tribunal was merely remarking that the first respondent was not a minor when he arrived in Australia. This acknowledgment is manifest in [43] of the Tribunal’s reasons. It is also possible that the Tribunal had other matters in mind. It is possible, for example, that the Tribunal was expressing a view, elliptically, that the first respondent could not call in aid, favourably, that he was a minor when he arrived in Australia. If so, it does not follow that the Tribunal was not also alert to the fact that the Minister was contending that the second primary consideration should be considered adversely to the first respondent.