Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v JSFD

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v JSFD [2010] FCA 569

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v JSFD [2010] FCA 569
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v JSFD and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number(s): VID 791 of 2009
Judge: MARSHALL J
Date of judgment: 4 June 2010
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Special Category (Temporary) visa – cancellation of visa by Minister –conviction for serious offences – character test–application for constitutional writs directed to Tribunal in relation to Tribunal’s decision to direct Minister not to cancel first respondent’s visa under s 501(2) of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) –exercise of discretion by Tribunal found not to be in jurisdictional error.

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476A, 499, 500, 501
The Constitution s 75 (v)
Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184
Craig v The State of South Australia (1996) 184 CLR 163
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Pemberton [2010] FCA 430
Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (2010) 239 CLR 531
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Nafeh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2004] FCAFC 232
Re Kamal and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] AATA 555
Re Stone and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 3 ALN 81
The Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82

Date of hearing: 21 May 2010
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr. R Knowles
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr. G Hughan with Ms. C Melis (pro-bono)

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 791 of 2009

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Applicant

AND:

JSFD
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 JUNE 2010

WHERE MADE:

HOBART (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 791 of 2009

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Applicant

AND:

JSFD
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MARSHALL J

DATE:

4 JUNE 2010

PLACE:

HOBART (HEARD IN MELBOURNE)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This proceeding is within the original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia pursuant to s 476A (1) (b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). That provision gives this Court jurisdiction in relation to a migration decision, if the decision is a privative clause decision, or a purported privative clause decision, of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) on review under s 500 of the Act. The jurisdiction invoked is the same as the jurisdiction of the High Court under paragraph 75…

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Details
Case
[2010] FCA 569
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v JSFD involved the Minister seeking to challenge a decision of the Tribunal which set aside a decision to cancel the visa of JSFD, a New Zealand citizen who had resided in Australia since 2006. The Tribunal exercised its discretion not to cancel JSFD’s visa despite his failure to meet the character test. The Minister argued that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider evidence of JSFD’s breaches of judicial orders, including bail. The High Court was tasked with determining whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error.

The central legal issue was whether the Tribunal’s decision to not cancel JSFD’s visa constituted a jurisdictional error. This required examining whether the Tribunal failed to consider a mandatory relevant consideration or asked a wrong question. The Court considered the principles of judicial review, including the distinction between jurisdictional errors and errors within jurisdiction. The Minister argued that the Tribunal’s failure to consider JSFD’s breaches of judicial orders was a jurisdictional error, while the Tribunal contended that its decision was correct and did not involve any jurisdictional misstep.

The Court found that the Tribunal did not err in failing to consider JSFD’s breaches of judicial orders as a factor in its decision-making process. The Tribunal was bound by the Direction which outlined the primary considerations it was to take into account, which did not include breaches of judicial orders. The Court held that the Tribunal properly considered the primary considerations, including the protection of the Australian community and JSFD’s criminal history, and exercised its discretion appropriately. The Tribunal’s decision was within its jurisdiction, and there was no jurisdictional error.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the Minister’s application, upholding the Tribunal’s decision not to cancel JSFD’s visa. The Court confirmed that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant legal principles and had not made any jurisdictional error in its decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

The applicant Minister applies for constitutional writs directed to the Tribunal, of certiorari quashing the Tribunal’s decision of 24 September 2009 and of mandamus to compel the Tribunal to hear and determine the review of the first respondent (“JSFD”) from a decision of a delegate of the applicant Minister according to law.Background On 12 June 2009, a delegate of the applicant Minister made a decision to cancel JSFD’s visa pursuant to s 501 (2) of the Act. Section 501 (2) allows the Minister to cancel a visa if the Minister reasonably suspects that the visa holder does not pass the character test and the visa holder does not satisfy the Minister that he or she passes the character test. Amongst other matters set out in s 501 (6), a person will not pass the character test if that person has a substantial criminal record, which is defined by s 501 (7) of the Act. There is no issue arising from the present proceeding that JSFD did not pass the character test. At the time of the visa cancellation, JSFD held a Class TY subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa. That visa allows a holder of it to remain in Australia indefinitely so long as the holder remains a New Zealand citizen. JSFD was born in New Zealand on 12 July 1990. He visited Australia briefly in 2003-2004. He returned to Australia on 31 December 2006 and has resided here continuously since then. The Tribunal reviewed the decision of the delegate. It set aside the decision under review and substituted that decision by not cancelling JSFD’s visa. Despite JSFD’s failure to pass the character test, there rested a discretion in the Minister not to cancel his visa. At the time of the Tribunal’s decision, there existed a Ministerial Direction made under s 499 (1) of the Act, which controlled the exercise of a discretion under s 501 (2). Direction [No 41] – Visa Refusal and Cancellation under s 501 (“the Direction”), operated on and from 15 June 2009. The Direction provides guidance to decision-makers in making decisions to refuse or cancel a visa under s 501 of the Act, including the exercise of the discretion to decide whether a non-citizen should be permitted to enter or remain in Australia in circumstances where that person does not pass the character test. Compliance with the Direction by the Tribunal was mandatory; see s499 (2A) of the Act. The Tribunal The only issue before the Tribunal was whether or not it should exercise its discretion to cancel JSFD’s visa. In so doing it focused on the Direction. The Tribunal observed that the Direction required it to take into account four primary considerations. Those considerations are set out at [10] of the Direction and are:10-The primary considerations (1) In deciding whether to refuse to grant a person a visa or cancel a person’s visa, the following (the primary considerations) are to be considered: (a)the protection of the Australian community from serious criminal or other harmful conduct, particularly crimes involving violence;(b)whether the person was a minor when they began living in Australia;(c)the length of time that the person has been ordinarily resident in Australia prior to engaging in criminal activity or other relevant conduct; and(d)relevant international obligations, including but not limited to:(i)the best interests of the child, as described in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC); and(ii)the non-refoulement obligations contained in the Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugees Convention), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There was no secondary consideration which weighed in favour of cancellation of the visa.Approach to judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision For the Minister to succeed in his application he must show that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Although, the types of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and may overlap, it is useful to bear in mind McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ’s observation in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [83] that:In particular, it is important to recognise that, if the Tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks a wrong question, ignores relevant material or relies on irrelevant material, it “exceeds its authority or powers”. If that is so, the person who purported to make the decision “did not have jurisdiction” to make the decision he or she made, and the decision “was not authorised” by the Act. As said in Craig v The State of South Australia (1996) 184 CLR 163 at 179:Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it. The following guiding principles referred to by Besanko J recently in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Pemberton [2010] FCA 430 are instructive for current purposes and well sourced in High Court authority referred to in that judgment:·a failure to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration or the asking of a wrong question will result in jurisdictional error;·making a wrong finding of fact will not, of itself amount to jurisdictional error;·a decision maker is not obliged to refer to every piece of evidence before it;·the reasons of an administrative tribunal are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error. To the above may be added the observation made in The Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 at [163] per Hayne J that:There is a jurisdictional error if the decision maker makes a decision outside the limits of the functions and powers conferred on him or her, or does something which he or she lacks power to do. By contrast, incorrectly deciding something which the decision maker is authorised to decide is an error within jurisdiction. (This is sometimes described as authority to go wrong, that is, to decide matters within jurisdiction incorrectly.) The former kind of error concerns departures from limits upon the exercise of power. The latter does not. See also; Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission (2010) 239 CLR 531 at [65].Ground 1 The Minister submits that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to consider evidence that JSFD had breached “judicial orders, including…bail…”. The Minister refers to [10.1.2] of the Direction concerning the assessment of the risk of re-offending and to breach of a bail order being a factor to be considered particularly relevant to that assessment. At the Melbourne Children’s Court on 18 February 2008, JSFD was charged with various matters including “failure to answer bail”. In her submissions to the Tribunal counsel for the Minister referred to JSFD’S failure to answer bail, his breach of a probation order and a youth supervision order as being relevant to the risk of his re-offending. Counsel for JSFD conceded that JSFD had breached a probation order and had failed to answer bail.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal observed that the Direction required it to take into account four primary considerations. Those considerations are set out at [10] of the Direction and are:10-The primary considerations (1) In deciding whether to refuse to grant a person a visa or cancel a person’s visa, the following (the primary considerations) are to be considered: (a)the protection of the Australian community from serious criminal or other harmful conduct, particularly crimes involving violence;(b)whether the person was a minor when they began living in Australia;(c)the length of time that the person has been ordinarily resident in Australia prior to engaging in criminal activity or other relevant conduct; and(d)relevant international obligations, including but not limited to:(i)the best interests of the child, as described in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC); and(ii)the non-refoulement obligations contained in the Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugees Convention), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The Tribunal further observed that [11 (3) (a)] of the Direction provides for other non-primary considerations to be taken into account including:·family ties;·the person’s age and health;·any links to the country to which the person would be removed;·hardship to the person or the immediate family lawfully resident in Australia;·level of education;·any previous advice given to the person of deportation under the character provisions of the Act. The Tribunal made a formal, uncontested finding that JSFD did not pass the character test on account of his substantial criminal record. Despite only being 19 years of age at the time of the Minister’s decision, JSFD had been convicted of offences including theft of a motor vehicle, burglary and reckless conduct endangering life. The Tribunal considered the first primary consideration concerning the protection of the Australian community. It referred to [10.1] of the Direction which at (2) (a) and (b) provides factors relevant to assessing the level of risk of harm to the community as a result of the person’s continued stay. These factors include:·the seriousness and nature of the relevant conduct ; [10.1.(2) (a)]·the risk that the conduct may be repeated; [10.1.(2) (b)]. At [12] of its decision the Tribunal commenced to discuss the seriousness and nature of the conduct of JSFD. It observed that [10.1.1] of the Directions at (1), provides that crimes involving violence and threat of violence are of special concern to the welfare and safety of the Australian community. The Tribunal listed some of the types of offences set out in [10.1.1(2)] of the Direction as examples of offences viewed as serious. The Tribunal then referred to [10.1.1 (3) to (5)] of the Direction which required a consideration of other factors including:·the sentence imposed for the offences;·the number and nature of the offences;·the period between the offences;·the time that has elapsed since the most recent offence;·relevant information about the person, such as judicial comments or professional psychological reports, and·any relevant mitigating factors.