FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Islam (No 2) [2010] FCA 1418
Citation: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Islam (No 2) [2010] FCA 1418 Appeal from: Islam and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] AATA 515 Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v MIZAN UL ISLAM and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: ACD 29 of 2010 Judge: BENNETT J Date of judgment: 17 December 2010 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Tribunal review of Minister’s decision to refuse to grant a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) Visa to first respondent pursuant to s 501(1) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – first respondent in criminal detention – Tribunal exercised discretion and applied Minister’s Direction No 41 based on deportation and bail considerations – whether error of law Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501(1), 501(6), 501(7) Cases cited: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 cited
Islam v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1526 cited
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Islam [2010] FCA 1295 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 citedDate of hearing: 19 November 2010 Date of last submissions: 14 December 2010 Place: Canberra Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms A Mitchelmore Solicitor for the Applicant: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Respondents: The First and Second Respondents did not appear
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 29 of 2010
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: MIZAN UL ISLAM
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BENNETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
17 DECEMBER 2010
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY (BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Tribunal be set aside.
2.The matter be remitted to the Tribunal to be decided in accordance with law.
3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
ACD 29 of 2010
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
ApplicantAND: MIZAN UL ISLAM
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BENNETT J
DATE:
17 DECEMBER 2010
PLACE:
SYDNEY (BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The first respondent, Mr Islam, applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) to review a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (the Minister) under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) to refuse him a Temporary Business Entry Class UC Visa (business visa) because he does not pass the character test. It was common ground that Mr Islam did not pass the character test pursuant to s 501(6)(a) of the Act…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 1418
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court involved determining whether the Tribunal correctly identified and applied the relevant statutory criteria in exercising its discretion. Specifically, the court had to assess whether the Tribunal correctly exercised its discretion under s 501(1) of the Act to refuse to grant Mr Islam a business visa, and whether the Tribunal's application of Direction 41 was appropriate. The court also had to consider whether the Tribunal's decision to release Mr Islam on bail was relevant to the exercise of its discretion in reviewing the visa refusal.
The court found that the Tribunal had indeed misidentified the issue and applied the wrong legal criteria. The Tribunal had confused the decision to refuse the visa with the consequences of such a refusal, including deportation. The court emphasised that the Tribunal was required to exercise its discretion in relation to the visa refusal itself, not the potential consequences. The court also noted that the Tribunal's application of Direction 41 was not appropriately aligned with the discretion to refuse the visa. The Tribunal's consideration of Mr Islam's release from custody seemed to be based on a misunderstanding of the scope of its discretion.
The court concluded that the Tribunal had exceeded its authority by misapplying the relevant statutory criteria and making an erroneous finding. The Tribunal's order, which set aside the decision to cancel Mr Islam’s business visa and in substitution exercised the discretion not to refuse the business visa, was set aside. The matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for reconsideration in accordance with the court's findings.
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Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal then said that it ‘sets aside the decision under review and recommends that the Minister approve Mr Islam’s release from custody’.CONSIDERATION It is well established that an administrative tribunal that identifies a wrong issue, asked itself a wrong question or, in some circumstances, makes an erroneous finding or reaches a mistaken conclusion makes an error of law which results in that Tribunal exceeding the authority or powers given to it by the relevant statute (Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [82] per McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The issue for determination in the Tribunal was whether to exercise the discretion under s 501(1) of the Act to refuse to grant a business visa to Mr Islam. If the refusal were upheld, Mr Islam was subject to removal pursuant to s 198 of the Act. The provisions in Division 9 of part 2 of the Act relating to deportation did not apply to him. It is apparent that the Tribunal confused the decision under review and the later consequences of the decision. The Tribunal made a number of references to the possibility of Mr Islam’s deportation, including the statement at [56] that it did not consider his breaches of bail in 2008, while holding the criminal detention visa, were sufficiently serious to warrant deportation. It may well be the case that the refusal of Mr Islam’s business visa application would result in his deportation as a non-citizen, but that was not the decision before the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s application of Direction 41 to the issue of Mr Islam’s deportation is not the same as applying it to the discretion to refuse to grant Mr Islam a business visa. Further, the Tribunal’s consideration seems to be based upon an understanding that its decision determined whether Mr Islam would be released or remain in custody. The decision to set aside the Minister’s refusal to grant the business visa does not necessarily result in the Tribunal’s decision having that consequence. Rather, it leaves the business visa application undetermined for reconsideration by the Minister in accordance with the Tribunal’s reasons. Mr Islam would have a bridging visa pending this reconsideration. If the business visa were granted, Mr Islam might still be in gaol or on bail. If the business visa were refused, Mr Islam would be an unlawful citizen and liable for removal. Either Mr Islam or the Director of Public Prosecutions would then be able to request a criminal justice visa. Otherwise, Mr Islam would be in immigration detention. This can be contrasted with the review of a cancellation decision, the setting aside of which has the effect of reviving a formerly operative visa, unless it has ceased in the meantime. The Tribunal’s order, which set aside the decision to cancel Mr Islam’s business visa and in substitution exercised the discretion not to refuse the business visa, re-enforces the Tribunal’s misunderstanding of the issue at hand. It appears that the Tribunal may have considered Mr Islam’s release from custody as relevant to the setting aside of a cancellation decision.