FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CYE17 [2020] FCA 1594
Appeal from: CYE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 102 File number: NSD 196 of 2019 Judgment of: THAWLEY J Date of judgment: 5 November 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa application – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia’s judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – meaning of “may be relevant” in definition of “new information” in s 473DC(1)(b) – appeal dismissed Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 25D
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, 473EA, 473GB
Cases cited: CED16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 265 FCR 115
CYE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 102
El Jejieh vMinister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 1103
James Cook University v Ridd (2020) 382 ALR 8
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CED16 (2020) 380 ALR 216
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CPA16 (2019) 268 FCR 379
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421
Date of hearing: 2 November 2020 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 48 Counsel for the Appellant: BD Kaplan Solicitor for the Appellant: DLA Piper Australia Counsel for the First Respondent: D Godwin ORDERS
NSD 196 of 2019 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant
AND: CYE17
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
THAWLEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
5 NOVEMBER 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Time be extended to 2 November 2020 for the respondent to file the notice of contention dated 30 October 2020 relied upon at the hearing on 2 November 2020.
2.Leave be granted to the respondent to rely in the appeal upon the ground identified in the notice of contention.
3.The appeal be dismissed.
4.The parties are to file within 7 days short minutes of order to give effect to any agreement as to costs.
5.If no agreement is reached as to costs, each party should file a submission of no more than 2 pages within 7 days addressing costs.
6.Any question of costs will be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THAWLEY J:
This is an appeal brought by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection from orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 23 January 2019 on judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority: CYE17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 102 (hereafter referred to as “J”). The Federal Circuit Court ordered the issue of writs of certiorari and mandamus, respectively quashing the Authority’s decision (hereafter referred to as “A”) and directing it to determine the review of the decision of the Minister’s delegate made on 16…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 1594
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the term "may be relevant" in the definition of "new information" meant that information must be potentially relevant to the decision, or whether it was sufficient if the information could be seen as possibly being relevant to the decision. Additionally, the court considered whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in its interpretation of this phrase when it reviewed the Immigration Assessment Authority's decision.
The court held that the phrase "may be relevant" was properly interpreted to mean that information must be potentially relevant to the decision, not merely possibly relevant. The court found that the Federal Circuit Court had correctly interpreted and applied this provision, and therefore dismissed the appeal. The court found no error in the lower court's decision and concluded that the appeal did not present any grounds for overturning the original decision.
The court's orders included extending the time for the respondent to file a notice of contention, granting leave to rely on the ground identified in the notice of contention, dismissing the appeal, and providing a framework for the parties to address any costs associated with the appeal. The parties were instructed to file short minutes of the order reflecting any agreement on costs, and if no agreement was reached, each party was to file a submission on costs within seven days. Any unresolved cost issues were to be determined on the papers.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Time be extended to 2 November 2020 for the respondent to file the notice of contention dated 30 October 2020 relied upon at the hearing on 2 November 2020.
2. Leave be granted to the respondent to rely in the appeal upon the ground identified in the notice of contention.
3. The appeal be dismissed.
4. The parties are to file within 7 days short minutes of order to give effect to any agreement as to costs.
5. If no agreement is reached as to costs, each party should file a submission of no more than 2 pages within 7 days addressing costs.
6. Any question of costs will be determined on the papers.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Federal Circuit Court had previously dismissed the respondent's application for judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The IAA had refused the respondent's application for a protection visa, determining that new information provided by the respondent during the hearing could potentially be relevant to their claim but did not meet the threshold for being "new information" under s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The respondent's appeal to the Federal Court of Australia focused on the interpretation of the phrase "may be relevant" in the definition of "new information."
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the meaning of "may be relevant" in the definition of "new information" in s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
2. Did the Federal Circuit Court of Australia correctly interpret the phrase "may be relevant" in s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
3. Should the appeal be allowed based on the interpretation of "may be relevant" in the context of the respondent's application for a protection visa?
Held
1. The meaning of "may be relevant" in the definition of "new information" in s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was considered by the court. The court held that "may be relevant" is not confined to information that would, if believed, make a material difference to the merits of the application.
2. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia was found to have correctly interpreted the phrase "may be relevant" in s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court upheld the circuit court's decision and found that the interpretation was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the phrase.
3. Based on the interpretation of "may be relevant" in the context of the respondent's application for a protection visa, the appeal was dismissed. The court found that the appeal did not raise any arguable error on the part of the circuit court that would warrant allowing the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by considering the definition of "new information" in s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which includes information that "may be relevant to the merits of the application". The court observed that the phrase "may be relevant" is not limited to information that would, if believed, make a material difference to the merits of the application. Instead, the phrase is broader and includes any information that might be relevant to the merits of the application, even if it does not necessarily make a material difference. The court also noted that the ordinary meaning of the phrase "may be relevant" was not confined to information that would be determinative of the merits of the application.
The court then turned to the question of whether the Federal Circuit Court of Australia had correctly interpreted the phrase "may be relevant" in s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court found that the circuit court had correctly interpreted the phrase in accordance with its ordinary meaning. The court observed that the circuit court had correctly applied the principles of statutory interpretation and had given proper weight to the ordinary meaning of the phrase. The court also noted that the circuit court's interpretation was consistent with the relevant authorities.
Finally, the court considered whether the appeal should be allowed based on the interpretation of "may be relevant" in the context of the respondent's application for a protection visa. The court found that the appeal did not raise any arguable error on the part of the circuit court that would warrant allowing the appeal. The court observed that the circuit court's interpretation of the phrase "may be relevant" was consistent with the ordinary meaning of the phrase and was not in conflict with any relevant authorities. The court also noted that the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law of general public importance.
The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the phrase "may be relevant" in s 473DC(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) is not confined to information that would, if believed, make a material difference to the merits of the application. Instead, the phrase is broader and includes any information that might be relevant to the merits of the application, even if it does not necessarily make a material difference. The court also confirmed that the ordinary meaning of the phrase should be given effect in the interpretation of the provision.