Minister Administering the Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 v Tarkine National Coalition Inc - [2016] TASFC 4

[2016] TASFC 4

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (FULL COURT)

CITATION: Minister Administering the Mineral Resources Development Act 1995

v Tarkine National Coalition Inc [2016] TASFC 4

PARTIES: MINISTER ADMINISTERING THE MINERAL

RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT 1995
v
TARKINE NATIONAL COALITION INC

FILE NO: 856/2016
JUDGMENT

APPEALED FROM: Tarkine National Coalition Inc v Minister Administering

the Mineral Resources Development Act 1995
[2016] TASSC 11

DELIVERED ON:  26 August 2016
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  19 August 2016
JUDGMENT OF:  Blow CJ, Estcourt and Brett JJ

CATCHWORDS:

Administrative Law – Judicial review – Reviewable decisions and conduct – Refusal of requests for reasons – Decisions of Ministers to grant mining leases – Whether association's interests "adversely affected" by decisions – Further statutory approvals required.

Judicial Review Act 2000 (Tas), s 7(1)(a).
Argos Pty Ltd v Corbell (2014) 254 CLR 394; Tooheys Limited v Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 421; H A Bachrach Pty Ltd v Minister for Housing (1994) 85 LGERA 134, referred to.
Aust Dig Administrative Law [1016.5]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Appellant:  M E O'Farrell SC
             Respondent:  J Delany QC, J Forsyth
Solicitors:
             Appellant:  Solicitor-General
             Respondent:  EDO (Tasmania) Solicitors

Judgment Number: [2016] TASFC 4
Number of paragraphs: 58

Serial No 4/2016
File No 856/2016

MINISTER ADMINISTERING THE MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT 1995 v TARKINE NATIONAL COALITION INC

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT

BLOW CJ
ESTCOURT J
BRETT J
26 August 2016

Order of the Court

Appeal dismissed.

Serial No 4/2016
File No 856/2016

MINISTER ADMINISTERING THE MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT 1995 v TARKINE NATIONAL COALITION INC

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT

BLOW CJ

26 August 2016

I have read the judgment of Estcourt J. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed. I fully agree with his Honour's reasons. There is a little that I would like to add, particularly in relation to the statutory context of the relevant decisions.
Some years ago, Venture Minerals Ltd applied to the Minister for Resources for the granting of two mining leases with a view to undertaking open cut mining operations in an area of Tasmania known as the Tarkine. The applications were granted by different Ministers in 2012 and 2014. The respondent requested that it be provided with a written statement of reasons relating to each decision, relying on s 29(1) of the Judicial Review Act 2000 ("the JR Act"). Its requests were refused. It applied for orders under s 35 of the JR Act requiring the current Minister to provide statements of reasons. Wood J made the orders sought: Tarkine National Coalition Inc v Minister Administering the Mineral Resources Development Act1995 [2016] TASSC 11. The Minister has appealed.
Requests for statements of reasons under s 29 and applications under s 35 for orders to give such statements may only be made by "a person who is aggrieved by a decision". Section 7(1)(a) of the JR Act provides that, "a reference to a person aggrieved by a decision is taken to be a reference to … a person whose interests are adversely affected by the decision". The learned primary judge concluded that the respondent association was a person whose interests were adversely affected by the decisions to grant the mining leases, but the appellant contends that that conclusion was erroneous.
Its contentions concern the nature of the decisions to grant the mining leases, not the status of the respondent association. The respondent is an area-specific organisation, whose activities and interests concern the conservation and management of the Tarkine area, including the provision of advice, lobbying, tours for the public, publicity, and opening up of areas for members of the public to enjoy. The appellant does not contend that its interests would not be adversely affected by a decision whose immediate result would be the commencement of open cut mining operations on the land in question. The appellant contends that the decisions to grant the mining leases do not expose the land in question to development or environmental degradation because the lessee will need to obtain permits and approvals under other legislation before mining operations may commence, and that they therefore did not adversely affect the respondent's interests.
Before mining operations may commence, the lessee needs not only a mining lease, but also a planning permit under the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 ("the LUPA Act") and a favourable determination by the Board of the Environment Protection Authority ("EPA") pursuant to s 25 of the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 ("the EMPC Act").
The West Coast Interim Planning Scheme 2013 applies to the land in question. Its provisions prohibit the use of land for mining activities unless a permit pursuant to s 57 of the LUPA Act is granted.
The proposed mining activities constitute "level 2 activities" for the purposes of the EMPC Act. When an application is made to a council for a planning permit for such activities, the council is required to refer the application to the Board of the EPA pursuant to s 25(1) of the EMPC Act. The Board then has various powers under that Act. It may direct the council to refuse the permit: s 25(5)(b)(i). It may require the council to impose conditions or restrictions: s 25(5)(a)(i). Alternatively, it may determine that it does not need to assess the activity: s 25(3).
Thus, as a result of all the relevant statutory provisions, the mining company needs three favourable statutory decisions in order to commence any mining operations. In relation to each of the relevant pieces of land, it has obtained the first favourable decision, and needs two more. Can it be said that the interests of the respondent might be adversely affected by the second and third decisions, but could not be adversely affected by the first? For the reasons stated by Estcourt J, I think its interests were adversely affected when decisions unfavourable to it were made at the first stage.
There are some additional points that I would like to make. In this case, the mining leases were granted before the lessees sought planning permits, and therefore without the proposed activities having been considered by the Board of the EPA. In my view it is significant that subsequent decision-makers might take into account in favour of the mining company the fact that Ministers have considered the applications for the mining leases and concluded that it was appropriate to grant them. Such reasoning could be adopted by the West Coast Council, or by the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal on determining any appeal from a decision of the council, or by the Board of the EPA.
Further, it is possible that significant damage to the environment could be caused prior to the granting of a permit under the LUPA Act as a result of exploratory and preliminary works. The first of the two mining leases required the lessee to lodge a security deposit of $150,000 upon the granting of the lease, and prior to the granting of the planning permit, in respect of exploration and preliminary works. Under s 196(1) of the Mineral Resources Development Act 1995, the Minister may use a security deposit for various purposes, including the mitigation of "any damage to the environment caused by mining operations or exploration under a licence or lease held by a licensee or lessee. As far as I know, there was no evidence before the learned primary judge as to whether a similar security deposit was required or paid in respect of the second mining lease.
At least in relation to the earlier of the two leases, the interests of the respondent were affected not only by the granting of a lease which, subject to favourable decisions under the LUPA and EMPC Acts, would permit mining operations to be undertaken. Its interests were also affected by the granting of the first lease because its environmental interests in relation to the leased land were imperilled by the authorisation of exploration and preliminary works.
I would dismiss the appeal.
File No 856/2016

MINISTER ADMINISTERING THE MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT 1995 v TARKINE NATIONAL COALITION INC

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT

ESTCOURT J
26 August 2016

The appeal

This is an appeal against the decision of Wood J in Tarkine National Coalition Inc v Minister Administering the Mineral Resources Development Act1995 [2016] TASSC 11. In that decision her Honour granted the respondent's application for an order pursuant to s 35(2) of the Judicial Review Act 2000 ("JR Act") requiring the appellant to provide a statement of reasons for certain decisions that had been made by the Ministers of the day.
The decisions made by the Ministers were the granting of applications for two mining leases in an area known as the Tarkine, located in the northwest region of Tasmania.
The respondent, Tarkine National Coalition Inc, is an incorporated association dedicated to the conservation and management of the Tarkine and its forests.
In the case of both decisions the appellant has refused to provide a written statement of reasons for their making as requested by the respondent. As a result, the respondent applied to the Court for an order requiring the appellant to provide the requested reasons.

The primary decision

The respondent's application came before the learned primary judge. The principal question for her Honour was whether in the case of each of the decisions the respondent was a person whose interests were "adversely affected" within the definition of the term "person aggrieved" set out in s 7 of the JR Act.
The decisions granting the leases were made under s 78 of the Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 ("MRD Act"). That section conferred discretion upon the relevant Minister to grant or refuse the applications for the leases. Section 78A(1) of that Act sets out the essential criteria which must be met before the Minister could grant such an application.
In refusing to provide the written statements of reasons as requested, the appellant asserted that the respondent was not entitled to make the requests because its interests were not adversely affected by the decisions. The appellant asserted that this was because the decisions to grant the leases would not of themselves produce any relevant physical effect or damage upon the environment of the Tarkine.
The appellant's arguments relied on the statutory framework applicable to the approval of mining operations. In particular, the appellant relied on the MRD Act, the Environmental Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 ("EMPC Act") and the Land Use Planning and Approvals Act 1993 ("LUPA Act").
Essentially the Minister's argument was that that suite of legislation demonstrated that the decisions to grant the mining leases did not necessarily result in any actual mining operations being lawfully commenced.
To explain, by virtue of the provisions of the LUPA Act the leaseholder cannot carry out any mining operations until it secures a planning permit and relevant permissions under the EMPC Act. The appellant argued that because of that statutory scheme the decisions did not affect any interests of the respondent.
The appellant also contended that the learned primary judge ought not exercise her discretion under s 35(2) of the JR Act in view of the statutory regime and the availability of another remedy. That remedy was identified by the appellant as the respondent's ability to object to the leaseholder's application for planning and environmental permissions under the LUPA Act and the EMPC Act, and if necessary to appeal against any relevant permissions to the Resource Management and Planning Appeal Tribunal.
The learned primary judge noted that the appellant's argument was similar to that advanced in HA Bachrach Pty Ltd v Minister for Housing (1994) 85 LGERA 134, that is, that the decisions fell outside the JR Act because of their "contingent" nature. Her Honour held that for the reasons stated by Kiefel J in Bachrach the appellant's argument should be rejected. The learned primary judge's view was that the contingent quality of the decisions was not fatal to the respondent's application because the words "are adversely affected" were to be equated in the circumstances with "exposing interests to peril", and her Honour held that the respondent's well established interests were imperilled by the appellant's decisions.
Her Honour held at [37]:
"I conclude that a decision to issue a mining lease is a decision about which a person may be aggrieved. The legal effect of the decisions is to authorise mining operations. The authorisation is essential to the proposed mining operations and, in the context of the stages of the approval process governing proposed mining operations, it is, of itself, a significant decision. The fact that there are other procedural stages before the decision can be carried into effect does not deprive the decision of its inherent importance."
I do not propose to set out the entirety of her Honour's analysis of the material she considered, or to record here her complete process of reasoning. Features of the present case are redolent of Bahonko v Sterjov [2008] FCAFC 30, where Gyles, Stone and Buchanan JJ observed at [4]:
"The main judgment under appeal is long and thorough. It appears to us that the appellant had the benefit of a patient and conscientious consideration of all her complaints and of the admissible evidence upon which she relied to advance her claims. The fact that the proceedings did not result in a more favourable outcome for her reflects the character and content of her case at first instance rather than any error in the approach taken by the primary judge. Any attempted summary of the factual matters with which the judgment deals would be inadequate."
Nor do I propose to set out the learned primary judge's consideration of whether the legal or practical operation of the decisions actually did adversely affect the identified interests of the respondent. It is sufficient for narrative purposes to note that in holding that it did, her Honour found that there was ample evidence that the respondent had an interest greater than an ordinary member of the public, that its interest in the Tarkine was long-standing, and that its reason for existing was to protect the natural values of the Tarkine.
Her Honour found that it was clear that the decisions authorising mining in the Tarkine adversely affect the respondent's interests. She held that the respondent was a "person aggrieved" for the purpose of s 7 of the JR Act.
The learned primary judge fully considered the appellant's argument that the process by which a planning permit is issued afforded the respondent rights to make a representation and ultimately to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal, resulting in effect in a merits based review of the decisions to grant the leases in the first place. However, her Honour rejected the submission that it followed she should decline to make the order sought in the exercise of her discretion under the JR Act.
Her Honour said at [46]:
"However, this overlooks the fact that the applicant has an interest in the particular decisions made by the Minister to grant the applications for mining leases, not just an interest in the ultimate result with respect to mining operations and any conditions that may be imposed. The applicant has an interest in knowing why the decisions granting the leases were made and in seeing that they were correctly made. The right to appeal to the Appeal Tribunal does not provide a remedy specific to grievances about ministerial decisions in granting the mining leases. If the decisions to grant the applications for leases were flawed with reference to any of the grounds in s 17(2) of the JR Act, then judicial review under the JR Act is an appropriate remedy. Moreover, reasons are essential to enable those decisions to properly be reviewed: Landon–Lane v Minister for Economic Development and Tourism and Premier of Tasmania (2009) 19 Tas R 72 at [14]."
Finally, the learned primary judge rejected the appellant's further argument that a consideration of the respondent's constitution demonstrated that it was acting ultra vires its objectives and powers in requesting reasons for the decisions.
Her Honour said at [50]:
"There is no reasoned basis for suggesting that the seeking of reasons of the Minister is ultra vires the objectives of the applicant. Seeking reasons for a ministerial decision to issue mining leases in the Tarkine area is intra vires any number of the listed objectives, such as the objective of protecting the natural environment of the Tarkine area. As to the powers of the association, it may be noted that cl 3.6 provides a power 'to object to developments or activities that may threaten the natural environment."
The learned primary judge concluded at [56] in respect of each of the Minister's arguments as follows:
"For the abovenamed reasons, I am satisfied that I should make the order sought in these proceedings. The applicant qualifies as a person who is 'aggrieved by the decision' and, under the JR Act, was entitled to request reasons. I am satisfied that the Court's discretion should be exercised in favour of making the order. Accordingly, pursuant to s 35(2) of the JR Act, I shall order the Minister to give a statement of reasons to the applicant. Before making the order, I shall hear from the parties as to the time period to allow for the provision of those reasons."

The nature of the appeal

There is no merit in the Minister's appeal.
In Chu v Russell [2016] TASFC 1 at [61]–[64] I had occasion to observe:
"The appellant's notice of appeal as to the finding of liability against him contains 12 grounds. A number of those grounds fail, to a greater or lesser extent, to identify either where or how the asserted errors are to be found in the judgment under appeal, and fail to specify whether any such errors involve a mistake of fact or law or both, or arise in some other way.
62        As was pointed out by Porter J in Calvert v Badenach [2015] TASFC 8 at [46], although this is an appeal by way of rehearing, the appellant nonetheless needs to show an error on the part of the primary judge.
63        In Allesch v Maunz [2000] HCA 40; (2000) 203 CLR 172 at 180 Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said at [23]:
'23 For present purposes, the critical difference between an appeal by way of rehearing and a hearing de novo is that, in the former case, the powers of the appellate court are exercisable only where the appellant can demonstrate that, having regard to all the evidence now before the appellate court, the order that is the subject of the appeal is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error, whereas, in the latter case, those powers may be exercised regardless of error...'. (Footnotes omitted.)
64        In Bahonko v Sterjov (above) at [3], the Full Court of the Federal Court stated at [3]:
'Notwithstanding the obligation of an appeal court, where it is able to do so, to make its own evaluation of the material at first instance, it is a fundamental aspect of the appellate process that appeals are made available for the correction of error (see Coal & Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47; (2000) 203 CLR 194 at [14]; Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [22]-[30]; Poulet Frais Pty Ltd v The Silver Fox Company Pty Ltd (as trustee for the Baker Family Trust) [2005] FCAFC 131; (2005) 220 ALR 211 at [45]). This basic principle imposes an obligation upon an appellant to identify where error is to be found in a judgment under appeal, whether it be an error of fact, law or general principle. It is not necessary for an appeal court to hunt through all the material at first instance and recanvass every aspect of it unless an occasion arises for suspecting, on reasonable grounds (generally those provided by the appellant), that such an examination may yield a conclusion of appealable error'."

The present appeal is, in my view, a shining example of an appeal failing to identify an error on the part of the primary judge.
The notice of appeal comprises three grounds. Those grounds in effect do no more than assert that the learned primary judge was wrong in finding that the respondent was a person aggrieved, and was wrong in determining that the decisions to grant the mining leases affected any interest of the respondent.
The grounds of appeal fail to identify any legal, factual or discretionary error.

Discussion

I have read the written submissions which each of the parties relied upon before the learned primary judge. These submissions do not form part of the appeal book before this Court, but they were filed in the Registry and are on the file of material maintained in respect of the original proceedings.
Her Honour considered every argument raised by the appellant and, as will be seen, on the appeal before this Court nothing was raised in the appellant's submissions that is in reality new or different.
It is of course not sufficient proof of absence of error to point out that the learned primary judge minutely analysed the appellant's arguments below. Nor is it sufficient to add that the findings and conclusions were very closely reasoned. However, in respect of her Honour's reasons in the present case not only were both those features evident in full measure, but in addition, it is clear that her Honour's critical findings and conclusions were supported by what I regard as strong and unambiguous authority.
Moreover, in my respectful observation, her Honour's conclusions were in conformity with sound and well established principles of administrative law, were jurisprudentially rational and involved an eminently reasonable exercise of discretion.

The appellant's submissions

In the written submissions filed on the appeal the appellant contends as follows:
"Error
The learned Primary Judge was required to address two critical questions being:
·What was the legal and practical operation of the decision?
·Did the legal and practical operation of the decision result in an adverse effect on the interests of the person?
It is submitted that, while her Honour, at [40] asked those questions, she did not answer either of them. This was an error."
I reject that submission. The greater part of the learned primary judge's reasons was devoted to addressing those questions. However, to the doubtful extent that a specific identifiable "answer" is required to the questions posed by her Honour, the first was so answered at [37] of her reasons and the second at [44].
As I have already set out above, at [37] her Honour said:
"I conclude that a decision to issue a mining lease is a decision about which a person may be aggrieved. The legal effect of the decisions is to authorise mining operations. The authorisation is essential to the proposed mining operations and, in the context of the stages of the approval process governing proposed mining operations, it is, of itself, a significant decision. The fact that there are other procedural stages before the decision can be carried into effect does not deprive the decision of its inherent importance."
Her Honour then continued at [39]:
"Having examined the legal and practical operation of the decisions, it is necessary to consider whether the legal or practical operation of the decisions has adversely affected identified interests of the applicant."
Then the learned primary judge answered the second question, and in my view, contrary to the appellant's submission, did so with more than ample analysis, as follows at [44]:
"The nature of the interest of the applicant, and its proximity to the decision made, is not contentious. There is ample evidence that the applicant qualifies as a person aggrieved. It possesses an interest greater than an ordinary member of the public. Its interest in the Tarkine is long-standing and has not been generated by the present proceedings. The applicant's reason for existing is to protect the natural values of the Tarkine. As I have mentioned, its objectives include achieving World Heritage status and National Park status for the Tarkine. It has engaged in activities that demonstrate its commitment to conservation and protection of the natural values of the Tarkine. The mining operations will affect its objectives. The operations are large in scale and the environmental footprint of these operations and impact on the natural environment within the lease areas will be substantive. Both mining leases fall within the boundaries of the proposed National Park. Clearly, the decisions authorising mining in the Tarkine adversely affect the applicant's interests."
The only other argument made before this Court by the appellant is that HA Bachrach Pty Ltd v Minister for Housing (above) should have been distinguished by the learned primary judge on the basis that the notion of "peril" is significantly wider than the tests propounded by the High Court in Argos Pty Ltd v Corbell, Minister for the Environment and Sustainable Development (2014) 254 CLR 394; that the facts of Bachrach were different, and that the case involved an antecedent question that the learned primary judge was unable to determine on the available evidence. I reject that submission. The passage from Bachrach relied on by the learned primary judge was cited in the context of the appellant's submission that the respondent's interests were not adversely affected. Kiefel J said at 137:
"I do not however consider that the sections require that an applicant show an immediate adverse effect, or that a decision be the final link in a chain of causative events. If the decision has potential for such damage, a person's interests are exposed to peril, and are adversely affected within the meaning of the section. To construe the section as narrowly as the Minister would contend for would be to read the words as limited to interests which are thereby injured." (Primary judge's emphasis.)
The use by her Honour of the observations of Kiefel J was not dependent upon the facts of Bachrach or upon the meaning or breadth of the word "peril". Rather, the learned primary judge was conveying that the respondent did not have to show an immediate adverse affect, and did not have to demonstrate that a decision was the final link in a chain of causative events. That is to say, the proposition her Honour drew from Bachrach, correctly, in my view, was that it is no answer to the respondent's request for the appellant to say the decision to grant the leases is merely contingent and depends upon other permissions before mining operations could commence in earnest.
I agree with the learned primary judge's reasoning at [30], that on a plain interpretation, a person's interests could be said to be "adversely affected" by a decision "if it opens the way for an outcome which will have a detrimental impact". The question which her Honour posed, "If the Minister's decision stands and is carried into effect, what will the impact be upon the applicant?" was entirely apposite and does, in my view, as her Honour said, correctly reflect the task of deciding whether a person's interests are adversely affected by a decision. As I apprehend it that reasoning was not contrary to any principle to be derived from Argos.
Indeed, the phrase "exposed to peril" did not have its genesis in the judgment of Kiefel J in Bachrach. It was, as Kiefel J acknowledged in that case at 137, drawn from the judgment of Spender J in Queensland Newsagents Federation Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1993) 46 FCR 38, where his Honour made some obiter remarks in elucidation of an oft cited passage from the judgment of the Ellicott J in Tooheys Ltd v Minister for Business and Consumer Affairs (1981) 54 FLR 421 at 437, which passage was adopted by the Full Court of the Federal Court in US Tobacco v Minister for Consumer Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 520 at 527.
Having set out that passage in Queensland Newsagents at 42, Spender J went on to say:
"In my opinion, not only must there be the existence of a special interest in a decision, but also a person must show that the decision sought to be challenged will in some way expose that interest to peril." (Emphasis added.)
The passage from the judgment of Ellicott J in Tooheys Ltd at 437 was approved by the High Court in Argos, per French CJ and Keane J at [28] and by Hayne and Bell JJ at [60]. The passage from Toohey's Ltd at 437 is as follows:
"The words 'a person who is aggrieved' should not in my view be given a narrow construction. They should not, therefore, be confined to persons who can establish that they have a legal interest at stake in the making of the decision. It is unnecessary and undesirable to discuss the full import of the phrase. I am satisfied from the broad nature of the discretions which are subject to review and from the fact that the procedures are clearly intended in part to be a substitution for the more complex prerogative writ procedures that a narrow meaning was not intended. This does not mean that any member of the public can seek an order of review. I am satisfied however that it at least covers a person who can show a grievance which will be suffered as a result of the decision complained of beyond that which he or she has as an ordinary member of the public. In many cases that grievance will be shown because the decision directly affects his or her existing or future legal rights. In some cases however the effect may be less direct. It may affect him or her in the conduct of a business or may, as I think is the case here, affect his or her rights against third parties (cf Robinson v Western Australian Museum (1977) 138 CLR 283)."
Furthermore, Gageler J pointed out in Argos at [86], that in adopting that passage from Tooheys Ltd in United States Tobacco, the Full Court of the Federal Court "correctly emphasised" that "[t]he necessary interest need not be a legal, proprietary, financial or other tangible interest". (Emphasis added.)
In Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493 at 530, Gibbs J (as he then was), observed that an "interest" for present purpose does not mean a mere intellectual or emotional concern. That however is not the present case, and the appellant at no time has contended that it was. Her Honour was right, in my opinion, to conclude that the respondent was a person aggrieved for the purpose of s 7 of the JR Act.
Her Honour was also right, in my opinion, to conclude that a decision to issue a mining lease is a decision about which a person may be aggrieved. That the respondent's interests are capable of being affected by a decision to grant a mining lease in quite a different way to a decision to grant a planning permit is self-evident from the fact that a mining lease can be obtained without a planning permit for a mine, and an appropriately conditioned planning permit for a mine could be obtained without a mining lease.
In my view the learned primary judge's findings and conclusions are unarguably correct. In reaching the view I have, namely that the appeal should be dismissed, I respectfully adopt the entirety of her Honour's reasoning.

Disposition

I would dismiss the appeal.
File No 856/2016

MINISTER ADMINISTERING THE MINERAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT 1995 v TARKINE NATIONAL COALITION INC

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FULL COURT

BRETT J
26 August 2016

I have read the reasons for judgment, in draft, of the Chief Justice and Estcourt J. I agree with their Honours that, for the reasons stated by them, the appeal should be dismissed.