Milton and Milton

[2013] FamCA 499

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MILTON & MILTON [2013] FamCA 499

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Application by husband to alter interests generally – Not just and equitable to do so – Husband fails to comply with orders for filing affidavit evidence – Right to participate limited to cross-examination.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

Black and Kellner (1992) FLC 92-287
Chang and Su [2002] FamCA 156; (2002) FLC 93-117
Coghlan and Coghlan (2005) 33 Fam LR 414; (2005) FLC 93-220
K and K [2002] FamCA 1150
Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348
Stanford and Stanford [2012] HCA 52
Weir and Weir (1993) FLC 92-338

APPLICANT: Ms Milton

RESPONDENT: Mr Milton

FILE NUMBER: MLC 1427 of 2012

DATE DELIVERED: 28 June 2013

PLACE DELIVERED: Melbourne

PLACE HEARD: Melbourne

JUDGMENT OF: Cronin J

HEARING DATE: 24 June 2013

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms Devine

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Trapski Family Law

THE RESPONDENT: In Person

Orders

1. That the husband forthwith do all things necessary to withdraw the caveat … lodged on 24 January 2012.

2. That to the extent that the husband refuses or neglects to provide the withdrawal of caveat, the wife have leave to make an urgent application for orders under s 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

3. That the response filed by the husband on 14 May 2013 is dismissed.

4. That within 90 days of the date of this order, the wife do all such acts and things as may be necessary to obtain a discharge of the mortgage to the Westpac Banking Corporation encumbering the title to the property at … B Street, Suburb C and being the whole of the land described in Certificate of Title Volume … Folio … .

5. If the wife defaults in providing to the husband a discharge of that mortgage in the period of time referred to in the preceding order, she do all such acts and things as may be necessary to place the property at … B Street, Suburb C on the market for sale and upon the settlement of the sale, the proceeds be applied as follows:

   (a)       First, to pay all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale;

   (b)Secondly to discharge any encumbrance to the Westpac Banking Corporation;

   (c)       Thirdly, to retain the balance for herself.

6. That the husband be responsible for and indemnify the wife in respect of any liability arising out of the conduct by either of the parties of the entity A Pty Ltd in its capacity as the trustee for the Milton Trust including any liability for income tax arising out of any distributions or payments made by the said company.

7. That the wife indemnify the husband in respect of any liability for any claim by her parents arising out of their contributions/loans to the parties.

8. That the wife sign all such documents as may be required at the expense of the husband to transfer any interest in or obligation arising out of any of the business entities of the husband including A Pty Ltd in its capacity as the trustee of the Milton Trust.

9. That to the extent that the wife is an account holder on any credit card account of which the husband is the primary cardholder, at the request of the husband, she provide to him all such cards where she is a secondary holder.

10. That the Court declares that the husband has no interest in the superannuation entitlements of the wife and the wife has no interest in the superannuation entitlements of the husband.

11. That the application of the wife filed 18 February 2013 is otherwise dismissed.

IT IS CERTIFIED:

1. That pursuant to Order 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 it was reasonable to engage counsel to attend.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Milton & Milton has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE

FILE NUMBER: MLC 1427  of 2012

Ms Milton

Applicant

And

Mr Milton

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. Mr Milton (“the husband”) married Ms Milton (“the wife”) in October 2004 after they had lived together for about 2½ years.  From their relationship D, (“the child”), was born.  She now lives with the wife and the husband has a very limited role in her life.  The parties managed to sort out the parenting arrangements for the child and on 19 June 2013, final orders were made by the Court at their request.  What they did not and could not sort out however, was the alteration of the very modest property they have.  That task required the Court’s determination. 

2. The proceedings began in February 2012 principally about the child but property was then still an issue.

3. On 11 April 2013, a conciliation conference was held with a registrar but it was unsuccessful.  In anticipation of that conference, the parties were ordered by Senior Registrar FitzGibbon to exchange details about their assets and liabilities and superannuation along with obtaining asset appraisals.  The parties’ focus should therefore have been on financial issues as long ago as April 2012. 

4. The litigation pathway in this case becomes important because although the husband participated, his role was limited because he had not filed any evidentiary material.  That role was restricted to cross-examination of the wife.

5. The husband was represented by solicitors until April 2012.  They filed a response for him seeking imprecise property orders.  He rectified that in a later response he filed.

6. At the conciliation conference on 11 April 2013, the husband consented to an order that an accountant be appointed to complete tax returns for A Pty Ltd “forthwith”.  That never happened.  Indeed, tax returns for this company and apparently other entities have never been done nor have financial statements been prepared.  At the conference, the husband also consented to an exchange of a variety of financial documents. 

7. In cross-examination, the husband asked the wife whether the documents that she was responsible to produce had ever been provided.  She not only maintained that they had but also produced a letter admittedly addressed to the husband’s former lawyers about it.  That letter was written in June 2012.  The solicitor for the husband had filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act for him in April 2012 but the letter spoke for itself.  The solicitors had advised the wife’s solicitors in May 2012 that they were again acting for the husband and the documents were therefore forwarded by the solicitor for the wife to the solicitors for the husband. 

8. In February 2013, I made orders for the parties to attend a directions hearing on 6 March 2013.  I made the specific order that the wife file and serve an amended application by 15 February 2013 and the husband an amended response by 1 March 2013.  Although the wife’s amended application was filed, I later accepted that there was not strict compliance with the order but rather accepted that she had filed the application only three weeks before.  On the other hand, the husband filed nothing.

9. On 10 May 2013, I refused the wife’s application to proceed on an undefended basis.  Various alterations were made to the dates for the wife to file material.  I gave the husband a right to set out what orders he was seeking and eventually a right to cross-examine the wife.  It will be remembered that at that particular time, there were extant parenting disputes as well.  The husband was reticent to participate in litigation saying that he wanted the issues resolved by some form of conciliation.

10. On 24 June 2013, the husband informed me that he did not dispute the asset position portrayed by the wife but he wanted to cross-examine her about the evidence that she had given.  He did so with an obvious well-planned set of questions.  The husband otherwise had no evidence to present to the Court.

11. Determinations in these reasons have been made on the evidence as presented.  The onus of proving any assertion lies with the party making it.  Where there is a conflict in the evidence, the findings have been determined on the balance of probabilities.

12. The Full Court of this Court set out in Re F: Litigants in Person Guidelines [2001] FamCA 348 the matters about which a court should be conscious in a case involving an unrepresented litigant. To the extent that those matters are relevant here, it was obvious from the discussion with the husband and his submissions and cross-examination, he clearly understood what the process was about. Where the wife’s evidence was unclear and the husband had difficulty formulating questions, I clarified details for him.

13. In respect of the property proceedings, the wife sought orders that she retain the former matrimonial home subject to the mortgage and otherwise retain the assets in her possession.

14. The husband’s position was set out in his amended response filed on 14 May 2013.  He simply sought orders that the wife pay him 40 per cent of the “net joint marital assets, less any monies already paid” and that both husband and wife jointly apportion 40 per cent of the “growth” in their respective superannuation assets since the commencement of cohabitation and otherwise indemnify each other for future claims. 

15. The wife relied upon an affidavit that she filed on 24 May 2013 together with affidavits of her parents.  She also relied upon a financial statement filed 14 March 2012.  The husband acknowledged having all of those documents including the wife’s outline of argument.  That evidence was largely unchallenged.

16. Before the parties began living together, the wife had purchased a property at b Street, Suburb C.  This property was then, and still is, registered in the name of the wife alone and she completed its purchase in 2001 with the assistance of a mortgage to the Westpac Bank.  Although the Certificate of Title did not so indicate, it was common ground that in 2008, the husband became a joint mortgagor or at least a guarantor for the debt when it was at a level of $250,000.  The purpose of the husband becoming a joint mortgagor or guarantor was to enable the debt to be increased to $300,000 which was used to consolidate the parties’ indebtedness generally.  The mortgage debt is now still $300,000.

17. Suburb C was complete when the husband moved in but not landscaped.  The wife’s equity in it was about $35,000.  The husband assisted with the landscaping subsequent to moving in.  For his part, the husband was said by the wife to have had some savings when they commenced cohabitation but when reminded by the husband, she acknowledged that he had credit card debt.  The wife said that she thought it was $7300 but the husband informed her that it was $13,000.  That debt was partially satisfied when he sold his motor car but the balance was paid out from drawing against the wife’s mortgage.

18. What was also significant and not raised by the wife was that she had been in her superannuation scheme for some years.  She could not say what balance she had but the husband suggested and she did not disagree, she had about $60,000.  Over the ensuing ten years, the wife has worked for about nine years of that time.  The compulsory contributions during those nine years were made as part of her salary.  The $60,000 must therefore be seen as significant as a springboard to the current balance of $128,000.

19. The child was born and the wife went out of the workforce.  There was a dispute between the parties whether or not the wife declined to return to work after the birth of the child because of post-natal depression.  In my view, it matters very little.

20. The husband and wife were therefore initially both in paid employment until about the time of the birth of the child.  In 2004, the husband wanted to start his own business and did so.  Thereafter followed a number of ventures.  The wife’s evidence, which was not disputed by the husband, was that over 10 years, the husband earned a total of about $30,000 from these business ventures.  Apart from the absence of any evidence from the husband, there was also a distinct lack of any form of tax or company returns that might have given some insight into the profitability or productivity of these ventures.  They must have been serious attempts because a corporate trustee was set up with the wife originally as director.  The trust, according to the husband, and not denied by the wife, (she confessing she had no knowledge of the legal and/or accounting affairs) was a trading trust.  Further, somehow, the husband removed the wife or the wife resigned (again no-one seemed sure) around the time of separation and now, the husband has absolute control of the entities such as they may be.  The husband also has a number of business name registrations which he controls.

21. The husband’s financial position remained a mystery including his income and earning capacity.  Despite that, the Child Support Agency has a claim against him for about $121,000.  His unusual cross-examination of the wife was to seek that she confirm that most of that debt lay in penalties and interest.  The wife was unaware or unable to confirm one way or the other. 

22. The husband obtained from the wife a concession that he had once worked for a major Australian company and the money he earned was paid in two tranches.  This money eventually went into the mortgage account and some time thereafter, the husband bought a motor cycle.  There was an interesting series of questions about why he did that and how it was linked to the advertising of the business he was then conducting.  The reality is that no records were kept.  The husband sold the motor cycle and retained the proceeds or if he did not, he gave no indication as to what happened to them. 

23. The husband cross-examined the wife about a number of bank accounts that he suggested she had not disclosed to him.  She readily agreed she had not told him prior to separation what she was doing because she wanted to have an account to use to maintain her car.  He put to her that she transferred money around but the wife was unable to assist what the transactions related to.  Again, this cross-examination was more by way of discovery than attempting to discredit the wife.  It should have been done much earlier than the final hearing itself.  The husband’s response to my suggestion about that was that he had been busy. 

24. In relation to non-financial contributions, the husband said that he put in his skills at least in relation to landscaping Suburb C but he also acknowledged that he had occupied the property as well.  That was during a period when his income seems to have been negligible.  During the latter period of the relationship, the wife borrowed significant sums from her parents.  That money is outstanding and was the subject of the affidavit material of her parents.  The husband did not challenge that evidence.  In cross-examination, the husband suggested to the wife that his parents had lent money as well but her response was that it had been repaid.  No other evidence was provided by the husband.

25. There was a period after the initial separation where the parties attempted a reconciliation during which, the wife obtained another credit card and they went out on what could only be described as a furniture spending spree.  The difficulty with that was that the money had to be repaid.  I find the wife did take responsibility for reduction of what were three credit cards at the time of separation totalling about $14,000 leaving the current debt of about $7000.  The husband made no contribution to that.  The husband seemed to be suggesting to the wife that while she had paid the debt, she had also retained the furnishings.  He readily acknowledged that they had significantly depreciated in any event.  There is no evidence before me as to the valuation of those items other than the admission against interest by the wife.

26. Another example of the unusual financial arrangements can be seen in the disposal of the wife’s car.  It was sold for $8500 and the husband kept the proceeds.  What he did with them is another mystery.  There was some evidence about threats and problems with the purchaser but I propose to ignore all of that.

27. The wife’s claim of owing her parents appeared in the outline of case document at $40,000 but in evidence, she said it was now down to $32,500.  I find on the evidence that that money was used by the wife for the purposes of household bills including the mortgage.  The husband asked to see the receipts for these purchases but I find that that was a little bit pedantic.  The wife’s parents provided affidavit material and no notice was given that they should attend for cross-examination.  I therefore accept that the wife does owe her parents money and that it must be repaid.

28. There was no challenge by the husband to the wife’s evidence that:

    ·    He refused to do maintenance about the home or garden when he was not working and the child was in childcare;

    ·    The husband has a Certificate qualification and had at some point started to do a professional course;

    ·    The husband had run up traffic fines using the wife’s car registered in her name and for which payment had to be made by the wife;

    ·    The husband has run up legal fees with his lawyers and signed a charge over any interest he may have had in the Suburb C home as well as lodging a caveat in his own right based on some unclear equitable principle.

29. The husband seemed to also suggest through his cross-examination that his role as a parent was significant but absent evidence, I could not make such a finding.  I am able to find:

    ·    The wife has a far greater physical role in the care of the child and the husband’s role will be limited to having some supervised time with her; and

    ·    There is a large child support debt outstanding and nothing I heard indicated any effort was being made by the husband to reduce it.  That enables the Court to be reasonably confident that no child support will be paid in the future.

30. In respect of child support, the husband asked the wife how the assessment system worked and she replied that she did not know.  As a matter of law, I can take notice that the system is income based.  To achieve a debt as high as the husband has, even allowing for penalties and interest, the Child Support Agency must have had some income-based assessment material and no payments have been made for quite a long time.  That was perplexing because the husband said that he had not done any tax returns whilst at the same time, he has also done nothing about the debt nor provided the wife with any financial assistance for the child.  I have little confidence that he will support the child in the future. 

31. The wife earns a reasonable salary but she also has the debts to pay along with her legal costs and the sole support of the child.

32. I find that the wife has legal interests in property as follows:

    ·    The property at B Street, Suburb C valued at $380,000;

    ·    The wife’s car $35,000;

    ·    The wife’s household chattels $5000.

33. In respect of those assets however, there are liabilities.  They are:

    ·    The mortgage encumbering Suburb C $300,000;

    ·    The finance on the wife’s car $35,988;

    ·    The credit card debts $7000;

    ·    The debt to the wife’s parents $32,500.

34. The husband’s asset and liability position is unknown.  The only asset that I can understand he has is the motor bike that he bought and the retention of the proceeds of the sale of the wife’s car.  He has retained all of the business entities and what they are worth is also unknown.

35. To the extent that it is necessary for me to say so on the evidence, I am unaware of whether there are any equitable interests in assets that the husband has.  I could not find that he has an equitable interest in the Suburb C home having regard to the fact that he filed no evidence.  I am conscious of the fact that since the relationship began, the husband has had the use and occupation of the home and seems to have contributed very little by way of finance and there is no evidence of his non-financial role other than the fact that there was an acknowledgment that he did some landscaping.

1. I am unaware of the husband’s employment status. 

2. The determination of these proceedings falls within the provisions of Part VIII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) and specifically s 79 of it. Section 79(2) of the Act provides that in proceedings relating to the alteration of the interests of parties in property, the Court shall not make an order unless it is satisfied that in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order. Section 79(4) provides that in considering what order (if any) should be made, a number of matters are to be taken into account. They are clearly set out in the provision and relate specifically to financial contributions as well as non-financial contributions. The Court is also however obliged to take into consideration the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family including any contribution in the capacity of homemaker and parent. Other provisions that must be considered include the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of any party and the matters set out in s 75(2) of the Act insofar as they are relevant. The other consideration relates to the question of any child support that is to be provided or for which a party may be liable to provide in the future.

3. In respect of the evidentiary matters before the Court, the wife presented her case on the basis that it was just and equitable to make the orders she sought having regard to what had occurred and what her future will be bearing in mind her responsibilities for the child.

4. As I have made clear, the husband filed no evidence. Rule 13.04 of the Family Law Rules 2004 requires a party in a financial case to make full and frank disclosure of their financial circumstances not only in respect of their various interests in property and the interests of legal entities over which they have control but also their income. The husband did not provide any of that information.

5. In Weir and Weir (1993) FLC 92-338, the Full Court referred to the earlier decision in Black and Kellner (1992) FLC 92-287 in which the Court discussed the duty falling upon a party to make full disclosure of their financial circumstances. As the Full Court said, once a court was satisfied that there had been a deliberate failure to disclose, the court should not be troubled about making findings in favour of the party who had complied. As the Court also said, to do otherwise encouraged a lack of honesty. The Court can take a robust approach in circumstances where a party knows their duty to be frank and fails to do so. In Chang and Su [2002] FamCA 156; (2002) FLC 93-117, the Full Court heard an appeal from a trial judge who had a similar situation to that which I face here in that I have to deal with limited material and a clear non-disclosure by the husband. As was pointed out by the Full Court, the ultimate imperative is to make an order which is just and equitable. That is, what is fair in circumstances where someone declines to provide information or evidence? In K and K [2002] FamCA 1150, the Full Court made clear that non-disclosure does not necessarily have to be deliberate because the duty to disclose is absolute. In this case, the husband had been represented by legal practitioners when the proceedings began and indeed, filed a statement of financial circumstances on 22 February 2012. As part of that financial statement, he swore an affidavit indicating that he had read the Family Court Rules in relation to his obligation of disclosure. Accordingly, I propose to take a less cautious approach about his financial position.

6. In Stanford and Stanford [2012] HCA 52 the High Court of Australia emphasised the importance of s 79(2) of the Act and observed that the Court should first determine whether it is just and equitable to make an order. The plurality said that the power to make a property settlement order was not to be exercised in an unprincipled fashion and that the question of whether it was just and equitable to make an order was not to be answered by assuming that the parties’ rights or interests in property are or should be different from those that then exist. That is very relevant in this case because there is no evidence from the husband as to the nature of the equitable claim that he might have notwithstanding his apparent assertion that he made various contributions including landscaping of the home. As their Honours observed, the question presented by s 79 of the Act is whether or not the rights and interests of the parties should be altered.

7. The power to make an order is to be exercised in accordance with legal principles including those which are laid down in s 79. As the High Court said:

   To conclude that making an order is “just and equitable” only because of and by reference to various matters in s 79(4), without a separate consideration of s 79(2), would be to conflate the statutory requirements and ignore the principles laid down by the Act.

8. The starting point therefore is to decide whether it is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances of the case to make an order taking into account the way in which the parties have not only set up their interests in property but also the evidence that they have presented to the Court.  In this case, I find that it is not just and equitable to make the sorts of orders that the husband seeks because he has presented no evidence that would satisfy any of the tests just mentioned. 

9. One of the issues that was barely touched on in this case relates to the parties’ respective interests in superannuation.  I find there is no basis in this case to make a superannuation splitting order predominantly because the husband failed to provide any evidence that would indicate that there was some plan that the parties were contributing towards their respective funds for their joint retirement or because it was agreed that they would assist each other so that the wife could retain employment that had the added benefits of a superannuation scheme.  To the extent that the decision of the Full Court in Coghlan and Coghlan (2005) 33 Fam LR 414; (2005) FLC 93-220 is binding, the Full Court noted that s 90MS does no more than provide that superannuation interests are but another species of asset in addition to the property defined in s 4(1) of the Act in relation to which orders can be made of the nature sought by husband. The Full Court pointed out that because of the obligation under s 79(2) to make a just and equitable order, the Court should wherever there is a superannuation interest, apply the provisions of s 79(4) to which I earlier referred. The Full Court said that that approach should be taken whether or not a splitting order was sought. It will be noticeable in this case that no superannuation splitting order has been sought.

10. In my view, the superannuation in this case should be treated separately from the non-superannuation assets because:

    ·    The wife is almost 20 years away from receiving any benefits;

    ·    The wife made a significantly greater contribution than did the husband indirectly to her superannuation even if her contributions were made as part of her employer’s obligations by virtue of her employment;

    ·    The non-superannuation assets are of such minimal value that equating them with superannuation would not be reasonable as a comparison; and

    ·    The husband has superannuation as well (to the extent that he disclosed it) and still has similar opportunities to the wife to accrue money before his retirement.

11. The husband put to the wife in cross-examination that he was an employee of the supposed family trust company and therefore should have been getting similar benefits to those of the wife.  However, the evidence does not support such a proposition.  First, the wife was not in real control of the entity and secondly, no disclosure has been made by the husband as to what he has done with the business trading trust.  I do not know whether when the financial statements of the entities are completed, he will show himself as a paid employee, director or simply a contractor.  He has failed to complete his obligations as a taxpayer in relation to this own personal returns so presumably he is uncertain as to what his position is.

12. As I earlier indicated, the husband’s approach was to simply ask for 40 per cent of the “net” property.  In my view, there is here no justification for such an order being made where the husband has:

    ·    Made so little contribution;

    ·    Unlikely to make a contribution towards the child in the future;

    ·    Not disclosed his financial position;

    ·    Not challenged the wife’s portrayal of the assets nor how they were acquired or improved; and

    ·    Has retained all of the business structures and entities without indicating any value or their potential.  

13. Thus, to remove the house from the wife would not be just and equitable.  The wife has agreed and the husband did not dispute that she should take responsibility for the mortgage encumbering the home.  Having regard to the way the parties conducted their financial affairs and altered the mortgage but not the legal interest in the home, I am satisfied it would not be just and equitable to change that situation now.  The husband will have the benefit of having the mortgage indebtedness removed from his shoulders. 

14. Accordingly, I am satisfied to make a finding that it would not be just and equitable to make an order having regard to the way in which the parties have conducted their affairs. 

15. Another approach that can be taken is to consider that if it was important to look at the matters in s 79(4) which include s 75(2), I would be content to find that the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the husband has done very little here in the 10 years that the parties were together. He contributed little by way of finances. I have no idea what non-financial contribution he has made but it certainly could not match that of the wife particularly since separation. The husband made little contribution to the wife’s superannuation. He has made no payment of child support nor is he likely to in the future. To the extent that it is necessary to assess contributions as some form of percentage, I would certainly find that the wife has contributed 80 per cent bearing in mind that I have presumed that the husband has retained the assets in his control such as the money from the wife’s car and the motor bike. I also take into account that the husband received money early in the proceedings.

16. Section 79(4)(e) requires the Court to contemplate the matters that are relevant in s 75(2). In contemplating those, I find the following:

    ·    Both parties have a good earning capacity;

    ·    Both enjoy good health;

    ·    The wife has the responsibility for the child who has significant medical issues which may impinge upon the wife’s earning capacity as the child grows older;

    ·    The wife cannot rely on any assistance financially or otherwise from the husband; and

    ·    The assets retained by the wife are already very modest.

17. Those findings justify an adjustment in the wife’s favour.  If I was to contemplate that adjustment in percentage terms, I would give the wife at least another 10 per cent.  That would mean that in terms of the non-superannuation assets that the wife has, she would be at least entitled to retain those. 

18. The same approach should be taken in respect of the superannuation.  For the reasons I have indicated, similar assessments should be made in respect of the parties’ respective superannuation interests bearing in mind that I am not entirely sure what the husband’s financial position is.  To the extent that the wife is getting more than approximately 90 per cent of the pool of superannuation if she retains her superannuation, in my view it would be just and equitable to allow her to do that having regard to the fact that the husband has received more than he would probably otherwise be entitled to if I assessed the non-superannuation assets as I have.

19. In my view, therefore even apart from any question of whether it is just and equitable to make an order having regard to the principles set out in Stanford above (supra), looking at the overall circumstances of the parties having regard to s 79(4) of the Act, there is no justification for the orders that the husband seeks nor for that matter, any order.

20. In the circumstances, I find that it is just and equitable to make the orders set out at the start of these reasons. 

I certify that the preceding Fifty Five (55) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Cronin delivered on 28 June 2013.

Associate: 

Date:  28 June 2013