Milne v The State of Western Australia

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   MILNE -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2005] WASCA 38

CORAM:   MALCOLM CJ

STEYTLER P
ROBERTS-SMITH JA

HEARD:   1 FEBRUARY 2005

DELIVERED          :   9 MARCH 2005

FILE NO/S:   CCA 65 of 2004

BETWEEN:   STEWART MILNE

Applicant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal - With intent to defraud, obtaining benefit by deceit - Inducement - Evidence - Approval by bank of overdraft facility - Misleading information supplied by applicant - Relied upon by bank officer recommending approval - Approving officer not called - Inference - Whether evidence capable of satisfying jury beyond reasonable doubt approval was induced by misleading information

Criminal law - Evidence - Accomplices - Warning - Corroboration - Form of warning - Whether necessary to identify evidence capable of constituting corroboration

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 409(1)(c)

Result:

Leave to appeal against conviction refused

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant:     Mr S M Brennan

Respondent:     Ms E C J Needham

Solicitors:

Applicant:     Brennan & Co

Respondent:     Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Aydlett & Nielson v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 920346; 25 June 1992

Chidiac & Asfour v The Queen (1991) 171 CLR 432

Conway v The Queen (2000) 98 FCR 204

Davis v The Queen (1990) 5 WAR 269

Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729

Foo v The Queen (2001) 167 FLR 423

Galluzzo v The Queen (1986) 23 A Crim R 211

Kelleher v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 534

Khan v The Queen [1971] WAR 44

Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79

Nanette v The Queen [1982] VR 81

R v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658

R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426

R v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103

R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250

Raspor v The Queen (1958) 99 CLR 346

Schokker v The Queen [2001] WASCA 84

Case(s) also cited:

B v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 599

Doney v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207

King v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 423

Lander v The Queen (1989) 52 SASR 424

  1. MALCOLM CJ:  In my opinion, this appeal against conviction should be dismissed.  I have reached this conclusion for the reasons to be published by Roberts-Smith JA with which I agree.  I only wish to add some comments of my own.  The contention in ground 1 was that the evidence in respect of inducement was not capable of excluding any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.  The question whether there is evidence upon which a jury may reasonably find an issue in favour of a party upon whom the burden of proof rests is a question of law:  Raspor v The Queen (1958) 99 CLR 346. In my opinion, the evidence of Mr Naquesage which is dealt with in the reasons to be published by Roberts‑Smith JA was sufficient…

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Details
Case
[2005] WASCA 38
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Milne v The State of Western Australia was heard in the Western Australian Court of Appeal. The appellant, Milne, was convicted of obtaining a benefit by deceit and appealed against his conviction. The crux of the dispute involved whether the jury was adequately directed in relation to the evidence provided by an accomplice witness. Specifically, the case examined whether the trial judge was required to provide a corroboration warning and, if so, whether the warning provided was sufficient.

The legal issues at the heart of this case revolved around the sufficiency of the corroboration warning given by the trial judge to the jury. The appellant argued that the warning was inadequate and that the trial judge should have provided a more emphatic warning given the nature of the evidence presented by the accomplice. The court had to determine whether the warning given was in line with the requirements set out in section 50 of the relevant legislation, which stipulates that a warning is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

In delivering the judgment, the court held that section 50 does not mandate a specific form of words for the corroboration warning and that each case must be evaluated on its own merits. The court noted that the warning must be tailored to the circumstances of the case and should convey the potential dangers of relying on the evidence of an accomplice with strength and emphasis. The court found that the trial judge had adequately warned the jury, emphasizing the necessity of corroboration in cases involving accomplice evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was upheld.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal against conviction be dismissed, and the conviction be upheld. The court affirmed that the trial judge's warning to the jury was appropriate and sufficient under the circumstances.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

That section provides that:"(1) In this section 'corroboration warning' in relation to a trial means a warning to the effect that it is unsafe to convict the person who is being tried on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness.(2)On the trial of a person on indictment for an offence -(a)the judge is not required by any rule of law or practice to give a corroboration warning to the jury in relation to any offence of which the person is liable to be convicted on the indictment; and(b)the judge shall not give a corroboration warning to the jury unless the judge is satisfied that such a warning is justified in the circumstances." Section 50 replaced s 36BE which provided that on the trial of a person for a sexual offence the trial Judge was not required to warn the jury that it was unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant, which was the subject of consideration by the High Court in Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79. Section 50 is a general provision applying to all offences and applies also to the evidence of accomplice witnesses. The application of s 50 in the context of a case involving the evidence of an accomplice was explained by Parker J in Foo v The Queen (2001) 167 FLR 423 at [12] ‑ [21]. A warning is required whenever it is necessary to avoid a perceptible miscarriage of justice. Each case is to be considered on its own facts and the terms of the direction are to be tailored to the circumstances of the case. The fact that a witness has been given immunity from prosecution should generally be mentioned and explained to the jury (Aydlett & Nielson v The Queen, unreported; CCA SCt of WA; Library No 920346; 25 June 1992). In Foo, Parker J (with whom Steytler J and Olsson AUJ agreed), said at [30]:"It has long been settled that even a full conventional accomplice warning does not involve any particular form of words; see for example Wong v The Queen [2001] WASCA 32 at [28]. Notwithstanding the effect of s 50, however, it will usually be essential in this State, in an appropriate case, that a jury receive a clear and emphatic warning from the trial judge of the potential dangers in acting on the evidence of a witness to convict, which dangers exist because that witness is an accomplice, and which the jury might not appreciate without the warning. That will usually be essential whether or not the evidence of the witness is the sole evidence and whether or not there is corroboration of that evidence. The form of the direction may well differ inter alia by virtue of those matters. While other matters will often be the subject of at least comment to the jury, in respect of the evidence of an accomplice the direction given needs to be more than mere comment. It should convey this warning to the jury and do so with strength and emphasis." On the point whether a particular form of words is required, Olsson AUJ said in the same case at [101]:"… It would be most unfortunate if this Court was seen to mandate use of a rigid formula of words, borne of a past legal and social environment, which had the practical effect of seeking to qualify or circumscribe the degree of flexibility contemplated by the High Court in Longman…"