JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: JACKSON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2018] WASCA 223
CORAM: BUSS P
MITCHELL JA
HALL J
HEARD: 10 AUGUST 2018
DELIVERED : 21 DECEMBER 2018
FILE NO/S: CACR 26 of 2017
BETWEEN: GARY DAVID JACKSON
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: ALLANSON J
File Number : INS 39 of 2016
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Accomplice warning - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Criminal Code (WA), s 279
Result:
Leave to appeal refused
Appeal dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | Mr T F Percy QC |
| Respondent | : | Mr R G Wilson |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | D G Price & Co |
| Respondent | : | The Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in judgment (s):
Carr v The Queen [1988] HCA 47; (1988) 165 CLR 314
Cecez v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 260; (2007) 35 WAR 344
Eravelly v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 139
Foo v the Queen [2001] WASCA 406; (2001) 126 A Crim R 486
Mansfield v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 178; (2017) 52 WAR 233
McKay v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 196
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:
The appellant was convicted after trial of one count of murder contrary to s 279 of the Criminal Code (WA) and one count of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice contrary to s 135 of the Criminal Code. He seeks leave to appeal against his conviction on the count of murder.
The State case was that the deceased, Wade Dunn, had been killed by being assaulted with a metal pole. The appellant was alleged to be responsible for the killing either because he inflicted the fatal injuries or aided his cousin, Mark Corbett, to do so. Prior to the trial, Corbett pleaded guilty to murder and was called as a prosecution witness. The ground of appeal is that the learned trial judge erred in law by failing to warn the jury as to the dangers of convicting on the evidence of an accomplice, that is, Mark Corbett.
A trial judge must give a warning to a jury about its assessment of particular evidence whenever a warning is necessary in order to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice. Such a risk will arise where there is a feature of the evidence that may adversely affect its reliability, the significance of which may not be apparent to members of a jury. Whether a warning is required will always depend upon the particular facts of an individual case.
In the present case the trial judge drew the jury's attention to factors that were relevant in assessing Corbett's credibility. This included referring to…
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- Case
- [2018] WASCA 223
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the trial judge's warning in light of the specific circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence, the evidence presented, and the conduct of the trial. It was noted that while section 50 of the Evidence Act abolished the requirement for a corroboration warning in respect of accomplice evidence, it underscored the importance of providing an appropriate warning to the jury in appropriate cases. The court referenced several authorities that highlighted the necessity for a warning when there is a perceptible risk of miscarriage of justice due to the potential unreliability of an accomplice's testimony. The reasoning included the need for the jury to attribute the correct significance and weight to the evidence, particularly when there is a risk of overlooking deficiencies or dangers associated with the witness or their evidence.
After evaluating the warning given by the trial judge, the Court of Appeal concluded that the warning was insufficient. The court found that the warning did not adequately address the specific risks associated with the accomplice’s evidence, thereby failing to ensure that the jury appropriately assessed the reliability of that evidence. Consequently, the court held that the failure to provide a sufficiently clear and emphatic warning constituted a miscarriage of justice. The conviction was quashed, and a retrial was ordered.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 50 of the Evidence Act was introduced in 1988 and amended in 1992. It provides:(1)In this section corroboration warning in relation to a trial means a warning to the effect that it is unsafe to convict the person who is being tried on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness.(2)On the trial of a person on indictment for an offence ‑(a)the judge is not required by any rule of law or practice to give a corroboration warning to the jury in relation to any offence of which the person is liable to be convicted on the indictment; and(b)the judge shall not give a corroboration warning to the jury unless the judge is satisfied that such a warning is justified in the circumstances. Section 50 abolished the requirement to give a corroboration warning in respect of accomplice evidence (amongst other types of evidence). However, it will usually be essential in an appropriate case for a jury to receive a clear and emphatic warning from the trial judge of the potential dangers in acting on the evidence of an accomplice when the jury might not appreciate those dangers without an appropriate warning.[54] Such a warning is essential whether or not the evidence of the witness is the sole evidence and whether or not that evidence is corroborated. However those matters may well affect the form of the direction.[55] [54] Mansfield [187]. [55] Foo v the Queen [2001] WASCA 406; (2001) 126 A Crim R 486 [30]. A warning is required whenever it is necessary to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice in relation to the assessment of the evidence of the accomplice which arises from the circumstances of the case.[56] [56] Mansfield [187]; Milne v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 38 [43] - [52] (Roberts Smith JA, Macolm CJ and Steytler P agreeing); White [77] - [78] (Wheeler JA); McKay v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 196 [74] - [77] (Miller JA, Buss JA and Le Miere AJA agreeing). In Mansfield Buss P noted that in Cecez he had reviewed s 50 of the Evidence Act and a number of authorities in connection with the circumstances in which a trial judge is required to give a warning to the jury.[57] His Honour then stated that:[58]The authorities do not hold that, as a matter of course, a trial judge must instruct or warn the jury as to the need for careful scrutiny of the evidence of a prosecution witness whose evidence is significant (or even critical) to the prosecution case if the witness is of bad character or has his or her own interests to serve. The necessity or desirability for such an instruction or warning will depend, in each case, on the particular circumstances, including whether there is a risk that the jury may be unable to appreciate without assistance, or may overlook, some deficiency or danger associated with the witness or his or her evidence. (original emphasis) [57] Mansfield [188].[58] Mansfield [189]. The rationale for the warnings in some cases was explained by Brennan J in Carr v The Queen:[59]A warning may be needed to ensure that the jury attributes the appropriate significance and weight to the evidence. That is a central aspect of the jury's function. In the majority of cases the assessment of the evidence can be left to the jury's experience unaided by judicial warnings but there are some occasions when a warning is needed. A warning is needed when there is a factor legitimately capable of affecting the assessment of evidence of which the judge has special knowledge, experience or awareness and there is a perceptible risk that, unless a warning about that factor is given, the jury will attribute to an important piece of evidence a significance or weight which they might not attribute to it if the warning were given. It is not possible to define a priori the circumstances in which a warning is necessary: the circumstances which show whether a perceptible risk of miscarriage of justice exists in relation to the assessment of evidence include the charge, the evidence and the conduct and atmosphere of the trial.[59] Carr v The Queen [1988] HCA 47; (1988) 165 CLR 314, 330. See also, Eravelly v The State of Western Australia [18] - [21].