Milne v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Milne v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 41

Citation: Milne v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCAFC 41
Appeal from: Milne v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 495
Parties: WILLIAM THOMAS DUNBAR MILNE v
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number(s): VID 628 of 2010
Judges: RYAN, BENNETT AND EDMONDS JJ
Date of judgment: 23 March 2011
Catchwords: MIGRATION – visa – cancellation – failure to pass character test – substantial criminal record – imprisonment for sexual offences against children – whether Tribunal denied appellant procedural fairness by failing to alert him that his willingness to undertake a sex offender’s course and the contribution such a course could make to his rehabilitation might be critical to the Tribunal’s decision – effect of appellant’s having notice of the instructions to decision-makers in Ministerial Direction No 21 – effect of appellant’s failing to adduce evidence at first instance of the information or submissions which he would have put before the Tribunal had he been alerted to the issue which arguably proved critical.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A, 499, sub-ss 500 (6H), (6J) and (6L) and s 501(2)
Cases cited: Goldie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs  (2001) 111 FCR 378
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Milne v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship and Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2010] FCA 987
Dagli v Minister for Immigration& Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 541
NARV v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 89
Tuncok v Minister for Immigration& Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1069
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Pilbara Land Council v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (2000) 103 FCR 539
Date of hearing: 18 November 2010
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J A Gibson with Mr C Fairfield
Solicitor for the Appellant: Rea Hearn Mackinnon Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R Knowles
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 628 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

WILLIAM THOMAS DUNBAR MILNE
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

RYAN, BENNETT AND EDMONDS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MARCH 2011

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 628 of 2010

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

WILLIAM…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 41
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Milne v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the appellant, Milne, sought to challenge the cancellation of his visa by the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. The dispute centred around whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) denied Milne procedural fairness by not alerting him that his willingness to undertake a sex offender’s course and the potential contribution of such a course to his rehabilitation might be critical to the Tribunal’s decision. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The legal issues that the court was required to decide included whether the Tribunal breached the appellant's entitlement to procedural fairness by failing to alert him to the relevance of his willingness to undertake a sex offender’s program and whether the appellant's failure to adduce evidence at first instance of the information or submissions he would have made had he been alerted to this issue, precluded him from succeeding on appeal. The court also considered whether the Tribunal was required to expose Milne to the issue of his potential rehabilitation and whether it was obliged to postpone its decision to enable evidence on that issue to be gathered.

The court concluded that the obligation on a tribunal or other decision-maker to expose a party to material which may be influential in the making of the ultimate decision is not unlimited. It does not extend to reminding the party of information which has been disclosed as part of the party’s own case. The court held that information about Milne’s willingness to undertake a sex offender’s program and the reasons why no such program had been available to him before the Tribunal hearing was within Milne’s own knowledge. Furthermore, the court noted that the Tribunal was not required to make Milne’s case for him or to defer its decision until further evidence about rehabilitation might have become available. The court found that Milne had not demonstrated any appealable error in the reasons of the primary Judge.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

We accept that, had he been asked whether, at the time of the hearing before the Tribunal, he was willing to undertake a sex offender’s program, the appellant would have responded affirmatively. However, that would not, of itself, have led the Tribunal to a different result because the Tribunal expressly found, at [21] of its reasons, that the appellant “was prepared to participate in any sexual offender program but this had not occurred.” That expression of the Tribunal’s finding suggests acceptance of the appellant’s continuing preparedness to undertake a program. However, it left open two related questions of whether any such program was available to the appellant outside prison and while he was on parole and what rehabilitating effects any available program might have. Although the appellant was represented before the learned primary Judge by Counsel (other than Counsel who appeared for him on the appeal), no evidence was led at first instance to suggest that the appellant might have persuaded the Tribunal to resolve those questions in his favour. In the circumstances, we regard it as unlikely that mere submissions to the Tribunal by the appellant would have had the requisite persuasive effect.Conclusion It follows, from our resolution of the two issues identified in our consideration of the appeal, that we have been unable to discern any appealable error in the reasons of the primary Judge. In the light of this conclusion it has been unnecessary for us to express a view on the alternative reason for refusing relief which his Honour founded on sub-ss 500(6H), (6J) and (6L) of the Migration Act; see [18]-[19] above. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In a related way it was argued that it was not for the Tribunal to make the appellant’s case for him and it could not have postponed its decision until further evidence about rehabilitation might have become available. The relevance of the issue of further rehabilitation was obvious and it was not incumbent on the Tribunal to remind the appellant of it. The inability of the Tribunal to defer its decision to enable evidence on that issue to be gathered and put before it flowed from sub-ss 500(6H) and (6J) of the Migration Act which require a written statement of the evidence to be given to the Minister at least two business days before the Tribunal hearing. As well, the Tribunal was constrained by sub-s 500(6L) of the Migration Act to make a decision within 84 days of the appellant’s having been notified of the delegate’s decision, i.e., by 8 June 2009. In all the circumstances, it was unclear, in any event, what further evidence the appellant could usefully have adduced on the issue of future rehabilitation. Consideration(a) Was the appellant denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal? The obligation on a tribunal or other decision-maker to expose to a party material which may be influential in the making of the ultimate decision is not unlimited. It does not extend to reminding the party of information which has been disclosed as part of the party’s own case or in prior, relevant, statements of the party such as a declaration in support of an application for a visa. Thus, in Alphaone, the Full Court in the passage quoted at [24] above stressed that the entitlement of a party to rebut or qualify material by further information or comment on it by way of submission exists in respect of “adverse material from other sources” (emphasis added). As we understand it, the words which we have emphasised refer to information from sources not under the control of the party claiming the entitlement. In the present case, information about the appellant’s willingness to undertake a sex offender’s program and the reasons why no such program had been available to him before the Tribunal hearing was peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant. Another aspect of the obligation to expose an issue to a party arises where the issue is not apparent from the nature of the decision entrusted to the decision-maker “or the terms of the statute under which it is made”; see the passage from Alphaone already cited. In our view, the reference in that passage to “the statute” under which the decision is made extends beyond the four corners of the governing Act to subordinate or delegated legislative instruments like Ministerial Direction No 21 which was applicable to the decision in the present case. It was apparent from the terms of Direction No 21 that the decision-maker was required to have regard, as a primary consideration, to “the likelihood that [the appellant’s] conduct may be repeated (including any risk of recidivism).” Moreover, it was indicated at cl 2.10 that a factor particularly relevant to assessing the likelihood of a repeated offence and the risk of recidivism was:(c)the extent of rehabilitation already achieved, the prospect of further rehabilitation and the positive contribution to the community the person may reasonably be expected to make.