Mills & Mills
[2022] FedCFamC1A 138
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Mills & Mills [2022] FedCFamC1A 138
Appeal from: Mills & Mills [2022] FedCFamC2F 348 Appeal number(s): NAA 51 of 2022 File number(s): SYC 2306 of 2021 Judgment of: MCCLELLAND DCJ Date of judgment: 22 August 2022 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Where the appellant failed to duly file her evidential material – Matter proceeded on an undefended basis – Appellant contends that she had been denied procedural fairness – Appellant given ample notice of her obligation to file material – Appellant failed to file Summary of Argument in the appeal – Notice given pursuant to r 13.45(3) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – Appeal dismissed pursuant to r 13.45. Legislation: Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) r 1.08
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 67, 68
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 13.45
Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009] HCA 27
Bethke & Bethke (2019) FLC 93-906; [2019] FamCAFC 106
Number of paragraphs: 35 Date of hearing: 22 August 2022 Place: Sydney The Applicant: Litigant in person Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Lawson Solicitor for the Respondent: Di Lizio & Associates ORDERS
NAA 51 of 2022
SYC 2306 of 2021FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MS MILLS
Applicant
AND: MR MILLS
Respondent
order made by:
MCCLELLAND DCJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 AUGUST 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Notice of Appeal filed 18 March 2022 is dismissed pursuant to rule 13.45 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the 2021 Rules”).
2.Within 14 days of the date of these orders, the respondent file and serve submissions as to the question of costs, pursuant to rule 13.45(4) of the 2021 Rules, not exceeding three (3) pages.
3.Within 28 days of the date of these orders, the appellant file and serve her response to the respondent’s submissions in respect to costs, not exceeding three (3) pages.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Mills & Mills has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MCCLELLAND DCJ:
This matter concerns an appeal from a judgment delivered by the primary judge on 18 February 2022, in circumstances where her Honour dealt with the matter on an undefended basis. This occurred in circumstances where the matter had been listed on 10 February 2022 for the purpose of seeking clarification regarding the preparedness of the parties to present their case at hearing. The transcript of proceedings on 10 February 2022 indicates that the appellant mother had not, at that time, filed the evidentiary material upon which she sought to rely in respect to the property aspect of the parties’ dispute and, on that basis, on 10 February 2022, the matter was adjourned until 18 February 2022 to enable the appellant to have additional time to file her evidentiary material.
The transcript of proceedings of 10 February 2022 indicates that the primary judge advised the appellant that, in the event of the appellant failing to file her evidentiary material prior to the matter’s next listed hearing date on 18 February 2022 in accordance with directions she made on that day, the matter would be dealt with on an undefended basis. Specifically, the primary judge said “I expect you to comply with my orders as to filing of your material and if you do not I will make orders as sought by the [respondent] on the next occasion.”[1]
[1] Transcript 10 February 2022, p.21 lines 31–33.
The appellant did not file her material prior to the next listing of the matter and, on 18 February 2022, the primary judge dealt with the matter on an undefended basis and, ultimately, made orders as sought by the respondent.
By Notice of Appeal filed on 18 March 2022, the appellant appealed the orders of the primary judge contending six grounds which included, in substance, that she had been denied procedural fairness on 18 February 2022. Subsequent to filing the Notice of Appeal, the appellant has filed an appeal book and also the transcript of proceedings. In those circumstances, the matter cannot be regarded as one where the appeal has been abandoned pursuant to the relevant Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”). However, the appellant has failed to file her Summary of Argument in accordance with directions made by the relevant appeals registrar on 28 April 2022 despite her attention being drawn to that fact, as I will summarise in greater detail below. It is on that basis that the respondent makes an application for this matter to be dismissed pursuant to r 13.45 of the Rules, which provides:
(1)This rule applies if:
a.An appeal is not taken to have been abandoned; and
b.A party (the defaulting party) has not:
i.Met a requirement under these Rules or the Family Law Regulations; or
ii.Complied with an order in relation to the appeal (including and application for leave to appeal or any other application in relation to an appeal); or
iii.Shown reasonable diligence in proceeding with an appeal or application.
(2)A court having jurisdiction in the appeal or application may:
a.If the defaulting party is the appellant or the applicant:
i.Dismiss the appeal or application; or
ii.Fix a time by which a requirement is to be met and order that the appeal or application will be dismissed of the order imposing the requirement is not complied with; or
b.If the defaulting party is the respondent:
i.Fix a time by which a requirement is to be met and order that the appeal or application will proceed if the order imposing the requirement is not complied with; or
ii.Proceed to hear the appeal or application.
(3)The court may make an order under subrule (2) on its own initiative if, at least 14 days before making the order, written notice has been given to the parties about the date and time the court will consider whether to make the order.
(4)An application for costs in relation to an appeal or application dismissed under this rule must be made within 28 days after the dismissal.
Before addressing the specific circumstances of this case, I will set out the relevant law, which has been usefully summarised by the Full Court in the decision of Bethke & Bethke (2019) FLC 93-906, in particular at [25]–[32]:
In Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at 528, Gummow & Hayne JJ said:
…when an appellant has instituted an appeal within time, if all other things are equal, the bare fact that the appellant has failed to take some interlocutory step within the time fixed by the rules would not be reason enough to shut that appellant out from the pursuit of the appeal unless it were clear that the appeal would fail. Of course, the qualification “if all other things are equal” is very important and it should not be permitted to obscure the fact that very often the fact that an appeal is pending may itself affect the respondent adversely in some way. …
Applying the above principle, the Full Court in Connor & Cosgrove (2017) FLC 93‑769 (“Connor”) found at [25] that:
…All other things are not equal and it would represent an injustice to the mother to permit the appeal to continue in circumstances where the father would, in all likelihood, not file a summary of argument for at least a further three months…
In Connor, the Full Court cited (at [17]), with approval, McHugh J in Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 553:
A limitation period should not be seen therefore as an arbitrary cut off point unrelated to the demands of justice or the general welfare of society. It represents the legislature’s judgment that the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within the limitation period, notwithstanding that the enactment of that period may often result in a good cause of action being defeated.
Though that case was concerned with time limits for commencing proceedings, the Full Court in Connor stated at [17] that it “nonetheless resonates on the question of delay and justice”.
Similarly, s 97(3) of the Act states:
In proceedings under this Act, the court shall proceed without undue formality and shall endeavour to ensure that the proceedings are not protracted.
Rule 1.04 expresses that the main purpose of the Rules is “to ensure that each case is resolved in a just and timely manner at a cost to the parties and the court that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case”. Further, r 1.08 imposes a responsibility on all parties to “promote and achieve the main purpose” of the Rules by inter alia “ensuring readiness for court events” (r 1.08(c)), “complying with time limits” and “assisting the just, timely and cost-effective disposal of cases” (r 1.08 (e) and (g)).
As discussed by the Full Court in Connor at [19], r 22.45 of the Rules is mirrored in r 21(2)(b) of the Court Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT), considered by the High Court in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 where it was said, at [92], per Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel & Bell JJ:
The purposes stated in r 21 reflect principles of case management by the courts. Such management is now an accepted aspect of the system of civil justice administered by courts in Australia. It was recognised some time ago, by courts here and elsewhere in the common law world, that a different approach was required to tackle the problems of delay and cost in the litigation process. In its report in 2000, Managing Justice: A review of the federal civil justice system, the Australian Law Reform Commission noted that: “Over the last ten years Australian courts have become more active in monitoring and managing the conduct and progress of cases before them, from the time a matter is lodged to finalisation”.
(Footnotes omitted)
Even allowing for the incarceration of the appellant, he has been given multiple opportunities to prosecute his appeal but has not. He has not filed an Amended Notice of Appeal joining his Trustees as directed by the Registrar since April 2018 (over ten months). Given the procedural history of this matter, the appellant has offered no adequate explanation for his failure to prosecute his appeal.
I note that the principles referred to by the Full Court, as reflected in r 1.08 of the then applicable Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) and Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 are now reflected in ss 67 and 68 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth).
CONSIDERATION
I now turn to the application of the principles adumbrated in those authorities to the facts of this case and, relevantly, those facts are as follows.
By order made on 28 April 2022, a judicial registrar ordered that “the appellant file and serve the summary of argument and list of authorities upon which they wish to rely by 4.00pm on Friday 17 June 2022”.
By email sent to the appellant on 29 June 2022, the solicitor for the respondent noted that the appeal had been listed for hearing on 22 August 2022. The correspondence further noted:
The orders made at the directions hearing required you as the Appellant to file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities by 17 June 2022. To date we have not received your Summary of Argument and List of Authorities.
Can you advise whether you have filed the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities and if so please provide us with a copy of same as a matter of urgency.
(Emphasis in original)
The next relevant event is that, on 29 July 2022, the solicitor for the respondent wrote to the relevant appeals registrar of the Court dealing with the appeal by way of email. The email noted that, in a letter forwarded by the registry to the parties dated 24 June 2022 reminding the parties of the orders that had been made on 28 April 2022, there had been a typographical error where the registry referred to the respondent, in the first instance, being required to file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities by 17 June 2022 instead of correctly referring to the appellant. That email pointed out the required correction, which was that the orders made on 28 April 2022 actually required the appellant to file and serve her Summary of Argument and List of Authorities by 17 June 2022 and the respondent to file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities by 8 July 2022. The appellant’s email address was copied into that email.
The next relevant event is that, by letter dated 1 August 2022, the appeals judicial registrar responsible for the case management of this matter wrote to the appellant, noting that the appellant had failed to comply with what was stated to have been orders made on 28 July 2022 that the appellant was to file and serve the Summary of Argument and List of Authorities by 17 June 2022. The letter specifically referred to the provisions of subrule 13.45(2)(a)(i) of the Rules, noting that “…the Court may dismiss an appeal if an appellant is the defaulting party who has failed to comply with an order in relation to the appeal.”
Further, the correspondence specifically noted that:
This correspondence serves as written notice that the Court will consider whether to make such an order dismissing the appeal at the hearing listed at 10.00 am on Monday 22 August 2022.
(Emphasis in original)
That notice is relevant because subrule 13.45(3) refers to the precondition to the exercise of power pursuant to that rule, being that the party who is in default of their compliance with the orders of the Court must be provided with 14 days’ notice of the possibility of their matter being summarily dismissed. I pause to note that the letter of 1 August 2022 that was initially sent to the parties contained an error in that, instead of correctly referring to orders made by the Court on 28 April 2022, there was a reference to orders having been made on 28 July 2022. In fact, in response to an email sent by the appellant to the appeals registrar regarding the error at 10 pm on 1 August 2022, that error was addressed by the appeals registrar on the following day at 8.22 am with a further letter which specifically deleted the reference to 28 July 2022 and replaced it with reference to 28 April 2022.
Accordingly, it is quite clear that, as at 1 August 2022, the appellant was aware of her obligation to file and serve her Summary of Argument in accordance with the orders made on 28 April 2022 and the potential consequence if she failed to do so. I respectfully agree with the submission made by counsel for the respondent that the letter from the appeals registrar satisfied the procedural fairness requirements set out in r 13.45 of the appellant receiving procedural fairness by way of notice of the potential for the proceedings to be dismissed on 22 August 2022.
Also relevant to the factual issues to be considered in this appeal is that, also on 1 August 2022, the appeals registrar sent an email to the appellant wherein the appellant’s concern that she did not have legal advice was acknowledged and it was further noted that the Court was unable to assist with the provision of legal advice. Nonetheless, it was further noted that:
Litigants who are unable to obtain legal representation but seek to pursue their litigation, in this case your appeal, are required to comply with the rules and orders of the Court and prepare documentation as best as they are able.
It was further noted that:
After the procedural hearing [on 28 April 2022], you received copies of the orders made and references to relevant Rules including a copy of the rules detailing the requirement for a summary of argument (further copy attached).
If you wish to be heard in your appeal, you should forthwith prepare and file:
•a summary of argument addressing your grounds of appeal;
•an application in an appeal seeking that the Court accept the late filing of the summary
•an affidavit in support explaining your delay and the reasons why the court should accept the late filed document.
It was not in dispute that the appellant had not filed the documents which she was requested to file by the appeals registrar in the event that she wished to press her appeal.
Regrettably, rather than filing an affidavit explaining the reasons for her failure to comply with that request made by the appeals judicial registrar, and failing to explain why she has failed to file her Summary of Argument, the appellant today sought to present evidence explaining her non-compliance by way of a submission from the virtual bar table. To the credit of counsel for the respondent, no objection was taken to the manner in which the appellant sought to present evidence in explanation for her delay. That explanation was, effectively, that she has not had the opportunity to obtain legal representation and that she believes that every litigant has that entitlement.
As desirable as it should be for all litigants to have representation, regrettably, it is simply not possible for taxpayers to fund each and every litigant. In the circumstances of this case, it was not disputed that the property which was the subject of the family law proceedings had been sold and that, while the appellant had not taken steps to receive the proceeds of sale, she has a legal entitlement to a substantial portion of those monies. This entitlement, it was speculated by counsel for the respondent, would impact upon the ultimate consideration of any Legal Aid application that she may make.
It is not, however, for the purposes of this decision, necessary to engage in or determine whether that speculative assessment by counsel for the respondent is or is not accurate. The fact of the matter is that the appellant has known, as and from 28 April 2022, that she was without legal representation as a result of the legal representatives she had previously engaged in the proceedings filing a Notice of Ceasing to Act. When asked about the matter today, the appellant indicated that she had made inquiries regarding the potential for legal assistance from a pro bono service and had made telephone inquiries to Legal Aid NSW. She confirmed, however, that she has not lodged an application for legal aid, but stated that she is “in the process of doing so”.
The delay on the part of the appellant in making a formal application for legal aid is, therefore, a matter that I have considered as being relevant to the exercise of my discretion in considering the respondent’s application for these proceedings to be dismissed pursuant to r 13.45.
Of additional relevance is the history of this matter, not only in respect to the manner in which the appellant has prosecuted her appeal, but also in respect to the manner in which she has conducted legal proceedings to date. That history is set out from [1]–[5] of the reasons for judgment of the primary judge dated 18 February 2022 as follows:
This is a property application commenced by the [respondent] on 31 March 2021. By way of history, the matter was first before the Court on 30 June 2021. The [appellant] appeared on that date. Orders were made for her to file her material by 16 July 2021. On 13 October 2021 the matter was again before the Court. The [appellant] had failed to file her material in accordance with the orders of 16 July 2021. Orders were made on that date for the parties to attend a conciliation conference on 17 December 2021. The [appellant] then filed her material on 21 October 2021, however, has not engaged in the proceedings or filed any material since that date, other than her short appearance on the last occasion before me on 10 February 2022.
On 17 December 2021 the [appellant] failed to engage in the conciliation conference, and, as such, it was unable to proceed. Costs were reserved due to the [appellant’s] non-attendance. It is noted that her legal representatives appeared but did not have instructions to engage in the conciliation conference.
The matter came before me on 19 January 2022, at which time I made orders for the [respondent] to file any application in a proceeding he wished to be heard by 27 January 2022, and for the [appellant] to respond to such application by 3 February 2022. The [appellant] did not respond. A notation was contained on those orders outlining that the Court may consider making orders on a final basis in the [appellant’s] absence should she not appear on the next court date.
The [appellant] appeared on that occasion, but no material had been filed. At the time, she advised the Court she wished to resist the application to sell the house as she wanted to move into it. As such, I gave the [appellant] one final opportunity to place evidence before the Court before I dealt with the application. I again made it very clear in the orders that I made on that occasion that I would deal with the matter on an undefended basis should the [appellant] not comply with the orders that I had made.
The matter now comes before me today with the [appellant] again failing to file any material despite me giving her a further opportunity to do so. As a result of the [appellant’s] non-compliance with orders and failing to engage in the proceedings, I intend to deal with the application for property orders on a final basis as an undefended matter. This is pursuant to r. 1.33 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021, due to a failure to comply with orders made by this Court on several occasions as outlined in the background I have provided.
Dealing with those matters referred to in those relevant paragraphs of the decision of the primary judge, the appellant took issue with the fact of her non-attendance at the conciliation conference, which occurred in December 2021. She stated that, while she did not attend, she was represented by her lawyers on that occasion and that occurred in circumstances where her mother had arrived from England after she had not seen her for a period of two years during the travel restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 lockdowns. That may well be the case, however, her lawyers on that day noted that, while they were in attendance at the conciliation conference, they were without instructions.
The appellant’s conduct in that respect – that is, her instructing lawyers to attend at a conciliation conference but failing to make a genuine attempt to resolve the matter by failing to provide instructions to her lawyers – was contrary to the core principles set out in the Court’s Central Practice Direction – and I refer in that respect, for example, to paragraph 3.11.
In addition to these core principles of the Central Practice Direction to which I have referred, I also refer to paragraph 5.31, which provides:
Parties will be expected to engage in good faith negotiations and make a genuine effort to resolve all issues in dispute at a Dispute Resolution event, and where this is not possible, to utilise Dispute Resolution to limit or reduce the areas of dispute and to record all agreements reached in writing.
I am satisfied that by failing to provide her lawyers with instructions to engage in the conciliation conference, the appellant has, when the opportunity presented itself, failed to make a genuine effort to resolve the issues in dispute between the parties.
Additional arguments advanced by the appellant as to why an order should not be made pursuant to r 13.45 dismissing the proceedings included that, at a court event on 19 January 2022, the appellant was unable to positively engage as a result of her children attending an appointment with a paediatrician. Accordingly, I have not had regard to the inability of the appellant to engage in proceedings on 19 January 2022. The appellant further contended that her understanding was that the court event on 18 February 2022 was a mention or directions hearing, rather than a substantive hearing. For reasons which I have indicated, however, that understanding is not reasonably open to the appellant. This is in circumstances where she was specifically advised that, in the event of her failing to file and serve her evidentiary material by 18 February 2022, the matter would proceed on an undefended basis.
The appellant further stated that she continued to check the Court portal but that she could not locate documents relating to events that were occurring including, presumably, the matter being listed for hearing on 18 February 2022. In circumstances where the applicant has not filed an affidavit, it is not possible for me to confirm whether it is or is not the case that those documents were published, nor, for that matter, is it possible for the respondent to have an opportunity to reply to that assertion. It remains the case, however, that the appellant was clearly present on 10 February 2022 and was advised of the impact of her failing to comply with the directions for her to file her evidentiary material.
The appellant further refers to difficulty she faced in obtaining legal assistance from the Family Advocacy and Support Service (“FASS”), which is a service provided through Legal Aid NSW by officers being appointed to the Court to assist litigants. Again, in the absence of the appellant filing details regarding those discussions, it is not possible to identify what efforts the appellant did or did not make, nor advice she did or did not receive from FASS. The appellant further contended that she received misleading advice in relation to the Court event on 18 February 2022 that she should attend the Federal Court rather than the Family Court. It is difficult to know what relevance that has with respect to this matter, in circumstances where the appellant was clearly advised on 10 February 2022, as indicated by the transcript, that the hearing on 18 February 2022 would be conducted electronically.[2]
[2] Transcript 10 February 2022, p.21 lines 39–41.
The appellant further contended that, in considering the respondent’s application to strike out the proceedings, a fundamental issue is that she does not have access to funds currently to obtain legal advice and that she has been prejudiced as a result of the absence of that advice. Further, the appellant has made submissions as to why the outcome of the proceedings, in her opinion, was an unfair outcome and has prejudiced both herself and her children in terms of difficulty it has presented in her obtaining accommodation for herself and the children, particularly as a result of losing a rental income stream in the sum of approximately $2000 per week.
Those matters, however, relate to the substance of the appeal and I have not embarked on a consideration of the parties’ respective contentions in respect to the appeal. This is primarily as a result of the fact that neither party has filed a Summary of Argument that can inform the Court of the issues involved in the appeal.
That brings the consideration back to the initial starting point. The reason the Court is unable to consider the parties’ respective contentions is that the appellant has not, despite being ordered to do so on 28 April 2022, filed her Summary of Argument and has continued to neglect to do so despite being reminded of that obligation by correspondence from the solicitor for the respondent and despite being advised by the Court as to steps she could take to remedy that situation, that is, by filing an Application in a Proceeding supported by an affidavit explaining her reasons for delay and seeking to rely upon a Summary of Argument filed out of time.
Further, the appellant was clearly provided with procedural fairness by way of correspondence sent to the parties on 2 August 2022 consisting of a corrected letter, albeit originally dated 1 August 2022, again reminding the parties of the obligation to file a Summary of Argument and informing the parties, by way of formal notice, that their failure to comply with that obligation may result in the proceedings being dismissed pursuant to r 13.45 of the Rules.
Accordingly, my reasons for making an order as sought by the respondent to dismiss the proceedings pursuant to r 13.45 can be summarised as follows:
·An order was made on 28 April 2022 for the parties to respectively file their Summaries of Argument.
·That was not attended to by the appellant and, until that occurred, the respondent was not in a position to file his Summary of Argument in response.
·The appellant was reminded of her obligation to do so by the correspondence from the solicitor for the respondent to which I have earlier referred of that obligation.
·The Court advised the appellant by correspondence dated 1 August 2022 (and sent corrected to the parties on 2 August 2022) of that obligation to file the Summary of Argument, noting that the respondent was not in a position to file the Summary of Argument until the appellant did so, and specifically providing notice that, in the event that the appellant remained in dereliction of her obligation to comply with that order of the Court made on 28 April 2022, the proceedings may be dismissed.
·Additionally and related to the earlier paragraph is the fact that, by email dated 1 August 2022, the appellant was advised of procedures that she should take to rectify her noncompliance with the orders made for her to file her summary of argument and the appellant has neglected to do so.
·While it is the case that it would be desirable in each and every case for a litigant to be legally represented, the appellant has had ample opportunity since at least 28 April 2022, when her solicitors filed a Notice of Ceasing to Act, to take such steps as she is able to obtain legal aid and she has indicated in today’s proceedings that she has not, as yet, formally applied for legal aid but is in the process of doing so.
·Finally, as a secondary consideration to the conduct of the appellant in respect to this appeal specifically, I have had regard to the background of the matter as summarised by the primary judge at [1]–[5] of her decision regarding the appellant’s non-compliance with procedural orders of the Court in respect to the case management of this matter leading up to the hearing and determination of the matter at first instance on 28 February 2022.
Accordingly, for all of those reasons, I accede to the application by the respondent and dismiss the appeal in this matter pursuant to r 13.45 of the Rules.
I certify that the preceding thirty-five (35) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Deputy Chief Justice McClelland. Associate:
Dated: 5 September 2022
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