Milliss and National Archives of Australia - [2000] AATA 565

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2000] AATA 565

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )

) No NZ1999/1

SECURITY APPEALS DIVISION          )
           Re      ROGER WILLIAM MILLISS
  Applicant
           And    NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF AUSTRALIA
  Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal The Hon R N J Purvis, QC, Deputy President Mr M J Sassella, Senior Member Commodore B G Gibbs, Senior Member

Date11 July 2000
PlaceSydney

Decision      The decision under review is varied by granting access to documents described with reference to their numbers shown in volume 1, folio 130 and 133 of this decision. In all other respects the decision under review is affirmed.
  ..............................................
  Deputy President
CATCHWORDS
ARCHIVES – access to Commonwealth records – exempt records – total and partial exemptions claimed – confidential sources – whether release could reasonably be expected to disclose or enable ascertainment of existence of identity of confidential source.
Archives Act1983 ss 33, 40, 43
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 ss 5, 17
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1956 s 5
Arnold v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607
Attorney-General's Department v Cockcroft (1986) 64 ALR 97
Department of Health v Jephcott (1985) 62 ALR 421
Re McKnight and Australian Archives (1992) 28 ALD 95
Re Milliss and Australian Archives (AAT 11192, 23 August 1996)
Re Milliss and Australian Archives (1998) 47 ALD 427
Re Milliss and Australian Archives (AAT 13502, 2 December 1998)
Re Throssle and Australian Archives (1987) 14 ALD 292
Robinson and Department of Foreign Affairs (1986) 11 ALN 48

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Hon R N J Purvis, QC, Deputy President Mr M J Sassella, Senior Member Commodore B G Gibbs, Senior Member

THE APPLICATION

This is an application made on 14 December 1999 by Roger William Milliss ("the Applicant") for review of a decision by the National Archives of Australia ("the Respondent") as varied by decisions of the Tribunal made on 22 February and 28 April 2000. The application is made pursuant to the provisions of section 43 of the Archives Act 1983 ("the Act").
The reviewable decision relates to 58 documents held by the Respondent, it being maintained that the same are exempt documents as defined by section 33 of the Act, hence not to be made available for public access as otherwise required by section 31(1) and 36 of the Act. That is, the Respondent maintains that the relevant documents contain:
(a) information or matter, the disclosure of which under the Act could reasonably be expected to disclose or enable a person to ascertain the existence or identity of a confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law; or
(b) information or matter, the disclosure of which under the Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth.
The relevant documents were generated by and for the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation ("ASIO") in the course of the gathering by it of information concerning the activities of the Communist Party of Australia, associated organisations and members. The material relates to the years 1967 and 1968.
HISTORY OF THE APPLICATION
In the statement lodged pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 the Respondent outlined the progress of the application and the relevant decisions substantially as follows.
On 18 December 1997, the Applicant wrote to the Respondent requesting access to a number of 1967 ASIO records which were due to come into the open period on 1 January 1998. The request included 1967 material referable to himself, his late father and his former wife. The Respondent registered a section 40 application for access on the Applicant's behalf on 23 December 1997, the request being referred to ASIO on 24 December 1997. ASIO later informed the Respondent that they were unable to respond to the Applicant's application within the statutory time, the Applicant choosing not to exercise his rights of appeal against a deemed refusal of access at that time.
On 21 December 1998, the Applicant wrote to the Respondent requesting access to a number of 1968 ASIO records which were due to come into the open period on 1 January 1999. His request included 1968 material referable to himself, his late father and his former wife. The Respondent registered a section 40 application for access on the Applicant's behalf, the same being referred to ASIO on 19 January 1999. On 13 July 1999, the Respondent notified the Applicant of the result of his application for access to 1967 and 1968 ASIO material. It was noted that one file was still outstanding.
At the request of the Applicant, the Respondent lodged a section 42 application for initial reconsideration of the material so released, ASIO advising the Respondent on 27 July 1999 that no changes were to be made to the material already released to the Applicant. On 13 August 1999, examination of the outstanding file was completed and the Applicant notified accordingly.
On 15 October 1999, the Applicant was informed of the result of the section 42 application for reconsideration. A further request was made by the Applicant on 21 October for internal reconsideration of the exemptions granted on the outstanding file, the Applicant being advised in November 1999 that no changes were to be made to the exemptions.
The Applicant made application to the Tribunal for review of the Respondent's decision as to the exempt material from the 1967 and 1968 portion of ASIO's files relating to himself, his late father and his former wife.
In maintaining the exemptions earlier determined, the reviewing officer of the Respondent discussed the relevant statutory provisions, that is, section 33(1)(a), (d), (e)(ii) and (g) and stated:
"In relation to ASIO confidential sources
The material exempted could reasonably be expected to identify individuals or organisations or institutions who provided ASIO with information in confidence…
…
·in order to carry out its statutory responsibilities under the Australian Security Organisation Act 1979 it is necessary for ASIO to rely extensively on confidential sources of information. There is a clearly established confidential relationship between ASIO and its sources and those who provide information have indicated that they would not be prepared to do so if their role might be revealed publicly at some time in the future. Any diminution of ASIO's ability to obtain information from confidential sources would restrict the organisation's capacity to carry out its statutory responsibilities and in consequence cause damage to the security of Australia…
·the public identification of individuals who provide information to ASIO in confidence could result in the embarrassment or harassment of the individuals concerned and would in consequence constitute an unreasonable disclosure of their personal affairs…
In relation to information-sharing relationships between ASIO and foreign security organisations
The material identifies, or could reasonably be expected to identify, agencies of foreign governments which provided ASIO or its predecessor organisations with information in confidence.
In order to carry out its statutory responsibilities under the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 it is necessary for ASIO to rely extensively on information supplied in confidence by agencies of foreign governments. The agencies concerned have indicated to ASIO that they are opposed as a matter of principle to the release of information supplied by them or of information relating to the existence or management of the information-sharing relationship itself.
…
To release information against the wishes of the agencies which supplied it, or to which it relates, could reasonably be expected to adversely affect current information-sharing relationships and to reduce or terminate the supply of information to ASIO by the agencies concerned.
Any diminution of ASIO's ability to obtain information from foreign government agencies would restrict the organisation's capacity to carry out its statutory responsibilities and in consequence cause damage to the security of Australia.
…
In relation to operational procedures and techniques used by ASIO in gathering intelligence
The material exempted contains information concerning operational procedures and techniques used by ASIO.
The public disclosure of such information would have the following consequences:
·individuals or organisations of security interest would be assisted in taking measures to counter investigation by ASIO;
·hostile intelligence services would be better able to assess the extent to which their activities had been subject to surveillance by ASIO.
In both cases the disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to impair ASIO's ability to undertake its statutory functions and in consequence to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth…
In relation to the names/signatures/initials of ASIO officers
The material exempted consists of the names, signatures or initials of present or former officers of ASIO.
There has always existed an understanding between ASIO and its employees that their anonymity should be preserved, both during and after their employment by the organisation. In addition the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 prohibits the identification of the identities of present and former ASIO officers.
The public identification of ASIO officers, past or present, would assist ASIO's targets to identify ASIO personnel who had been engaged in security operations against them. This could affect ASIO's ability to carry out its statutory responsibilities and in consequence cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth…
In view of the understanding between ASIO and its employees referred to above the public identification of present or former ASIO employees would constitute a breach of confidence…
Some members of the public may take an unfavourable view of ASIO and its employees. The public identification of present or former employees of ASIO could result in the embarrassment or harassment of the individuals concerned and would in consequence constitute an unreasonable disclosure of their personal affairs…
…" (T1, p11-13)

The Applicant, in his application of 14 December 1999, stated as his reasons for seeking review:
"I am unconvinced by and dissatisfied with the reasons given by National Archives for withholding the material in question and consider the decision to exempt it from release to be a denial of natural justice and of my democratic and individual rights…" (T1, p5)

PREVIOUS APPLICATIONS

This is not the first application made under the Act by the Applicant. Indeed, it is the fourth, each one of the prior three applications to the Tribunal being consequential upon material being determined by the Respondent to be exempt. The Applicant informed the Tribunal at the present hearing that the purpose sought to be achieved by him is to elicit material held by the Respondent relating to his late father, his former wife and himself in aid of his writing a book reflecting the position taken by ASIO during relevant periods and the characteristics, activities and associations of such persons as seen by ASIO. He said that he has no interest in sources of information or identification of individuals who provided the same.
The reasons for decision given in the three previous applications set forth the relevant statutory provisions, meanings or interpretation to be ascribed to it and its application. Unless otherwise stated in these reasons, this Tribunal adopts the same and has applied it in the course of its reasoning.
THE HEARING
At the hearing of the application, the Applicant appeared on his own behalf; the Respondent was represented by Mr Ben Dube from the office of the Australian Government Solicitor.
The documents lodged with the Tribunal pursuant to section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 were admitted into evidence and marked T1-T23. The following written material was tendered on behalf of the Respondent as exhibits:
Exhibit No Description
1 2 3 4 Open Affidavit of David Thomas Holbrook dated 6 April 2000 Closed Affidavit of David Thomas Holbrook dated 15 May 2000 Bundle of Documents titled 'Folios in Dispute' Short Minutes of Order sought by the Respondent

Mr David Holbrook, an intelligence officer with ASIO, was the deponent to both an open affidavit and an affidavit in respect of which a confidentiality order under section 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 was made. Mr Holdbrook gave oral evidence and was cross-examined by the Applicant.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION AND PRINCIPLES
The provisions of the Act the more relevant to this application are sections 33(1)(a), (d), (e)(ii) and (g). Such sections provide:
"Exempt records
33 (1)For the purposes of this Act, a Commonwealth record is an exempt record if it contains information or matter of any of the following kinds:
(a)information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth;
…
(d)information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of confidence;
(e)information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would, or could reasonably be expected to:
(i) …
(ii)disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the existence or identity of a confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law; or
…
(g)information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person (including a deceased person);
…"

Thus the issue in this application is whether the documents the subject of our inquiry contain information of the kind described in the statute. If they do then they are exempt from public access.
In order to obtain the required confidentiality it is necessary to determine whether the disclosure of a particular document or a part of a document could reasonably be expected to have the result of revealing the identity of an individual and/or a source or cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth. A finding of "could reasonably be expected" is, as the Respondent submitted, one that calls for an expectation that is not irrational, absurd or ridiculous, fanciful, imaginary or contrived (Attorney-General's Department v Cockcroft (1986) 64 ALR 97 at 106; Arnold v Queensland (1987) 73 ALR 607 at 616-628; Re McKnight and Australian Archives (1992) 28 ALD 95 at 111). A source is to be seen as confidential or not confidential and there is no question of balancing one interest against another, public or private (Department of Health v Jephcott (1985) 62 ALR 421 at 425; Re Milliss and Australian Archives (No 3) (AAT 13502, 2 December 1998). If a source is confidential it is entitled to the benefit and protection afforded to it by the Act.
Section 33(1)(e)(ii) refers to disclosure under the Act of information or matter which would, or could reasonably be expected to disclose or enable a person to ascertain the existence or identity of a confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law. To attract the operation of the provision it is the source that must be confidential, this regardless of whether or not the information provided by the source is or was confidential. The status of the information does not affect the confidentiality issue as to the source.
As has been said in other applications under the same legislation (Re Milliss and Australian Archives (No 1) (AAT 11192, 23 August 1992) at 7-8; Re Milliss and Australian Archives(No 2) (1998) 47 ALD 427 at 428; Re Millis (No 3) (supra) at 7), in seeking to obtain access to material, a searcher may seek or be enabled to – with the smallest particle of intelligence, even though such particle may be innocuous standing alone, when used in conjunction with other pieces of intelligence – build up a picture, the like of which the searcher was seeking to construct.
Thus information on its face or in conjunction with other material might, depending on the evidence, enable a person to ascertain by process of inference, induction or deduction, the identity of a source in question (Re McKnight (supra) at 112; Re Milliss (No 3) (supra) at 5). It is possible that the information that would or could be called in aid to ground an inference as to the identity of a source, would or could be available to a seeker. It is trite to say that disclosure under the Act is a general disclosure and any interested researcher could, if so motivated, use material to identify a source. It is a question as to whether the disclosure of the material could reasonably be expected to have the designated effect that is of disclosing or enabling a person to ascertain the identity or existence of a confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law, that is the Australian Security Intelligence Act 1979 ("the 1979 Act") and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1956 ("the 1956 Act").
The Tribunal agrees with the submission made on behalf of the Respondent, that at all relevant times it has been the essence of ASIO's functions in administering the latter mentioned Acts to gather intelligence that is relevant to security (see section 17 of the 1979 Act). Incidental to that function is the task of preserving the confidentiality of confidential sources who provide the intelligence.
Security is defined in section 5 of the 1979 Act. It embraces the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system or acts of foreign interference, whether directed from or committed within Australia or not. The definition was similar, be it narrower, in the 1956 Act.
Evidence was before the Tribunal to the effect that the relevant material contained information dating from 1967 and 1968 relating to the business interests of the Applicant, his late father and his former wife in the Communist Party of Australia, the Communist Party of Australia - Marxist Leninist and other ASIO assessed infiltrated organisations such as the New Theatre League.
It was believed by ASIO at the time that the activities of the Communist Party of Australia were subversive to the security of the Commonwealth and its people. It is unnecessary for the Tribunal to inquire into or make a finding as to whether the activities of the party were in fact subversive (see Re Milliss (No 1) (supra) at p 6; Re Milliss (No 2) (supra) at 428).
As above stated, the Act exempts from access, information or matter, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth. ASIO is directly concerned with the security of the Commonwealth (Re Robinson and Department of Foreign Affairs (1986) 11 ALN 48 at 50). Its functions entail the protection of the security of the Commonwealth through obtaining, correlating and evaluating intelligence relevant to security and it is entrusted with the responsibility of advising ministers and authorities of the Commonwealth in respect of matters relating to security (the 1979 Act, section 17; the 1956 Act, section 5).
The latter is an area that is particularly dependent for its effectiveness upon an adequate flow of information, any interference with which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth (Re Slater and Cox (1988) 15 ALD 20 at 29). Much of the information obtained by ASIO will be sensitive and come from confidential sources, as is the case, on the evidence, in relation to the documentary material in this application.
THE NATURE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

There are four categories of confidential sources involved in this matter: human sources, domestic liaison, institutional sources and foreign liaison.
Human sources are individuals who assist ASIO by providing information. They are referred to in ASIO documents by name, description, symbols or code words, depending on the level of protection required for each individual (Exhibit 1). Mr Holbrook gave evidence that ASIO's ability to gather intelligence from human sources is reliant upon the assurances of confidentiality ASIO can offer and the legal obligation that the identity of each individual will remain confidential. He indicated that, from personal experience, human sources remain concerned about the confidentiality of their identity many years after they cease providing information to ASIO, often because of the possible effects upon their family; indeed they expect this confidentiality to be maintained even after their death.
Information may also be obtained by ASIO through liaison with domestic security and intelligence organisations, police and government agencies and departments (Exhibit 1). In his open affidavit, Mr Holbrook states:
"…
Whilst some of these relationships are a publicly acknowledged part of governmental cooperation, there are particular sensitivities surrounding other relationships, including the scope of these relationships and the subject of information exchange [sic] which the agencies themselves seek to protect…
…" (Exhibit 1)

Mr Holbrook also indicated that the agency involved in the provision of material through domestic liaison in this particular matter objects to its release primarily because the material was provided in confidence and disclosure of the relationship with ASIO may jeopardise the agency's effectiveness and ability to operate.

The folios in issue in this matter contain information provided by institutional sources to whom ASIO has also given assurances of confidentiality. These sources indicated in June 1999 that they did not wish their association with ASIO to be made public through the release of identifying material and that if this association was made public, their ongoing cooperation with ASIO would be reviewed (Exhibit 1).
Overseas security and intelligence agencies have also provided information that is contained in the folios in issue in this matter. Mr Holbrook explains:
"…
…These liaison relationships provide valuable and at times unique insights into matters of direct security relevance to Australia. They are all established on the basis of the confidentiality of the subject areas of information exchange. The content of that exchange and – in some cases – the existence of the relationship itself. Whilst the general principal [sic] of international liaison is acknowledged publicly, the specific countries and services, and the specific subjects of mutual interest are generally not, unless both ASIO and the specific foreign agency agree to acknowledge the relationship publicly.
…" (Exhibit 1)

Mr Holbrook gave evidence that foreign security agencies remain concerned to maintain the relationship of trust with ASIO and an ongoing assurance of confidentiality of their relationship and the content of the information exchanged.
THE DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL

It was contended by the Applicant that the documents in question were "my documents" by reason of the fact that they mentioned him, his late father or his former wife, and by reason of this he should be entitled to access to, if not possession of them. This is not so. The documents are the property of the Commonwealth by reason of their coming into existence in the course of an instrumentality of state carrying out its statutory duties. The mere reference to a person in a document does not make it his or hers.
The right of access in the present instance is one conferred by statute in the absence of which it would be for the owner to decide, putting aside any court order, the person or persons to whom the contents of a document should be revealed.
FOLIOS AT ISSUE
There were, as has already been mentioned, 58 folios (nine of which are duplicates) remaining at issue when the application was heard by the Tribunal. It was claimed by the Respondent that all of the designated material on such folios was exempt within the meaning of section 33 of the Act.
The Tribunal has, in the light of the evidence and the statutory provisions and the principles earlier enumerated, examined each of the folios and makes findings in relation to them as follows:
ROGER MILLISS, volume 2
Folio No Description of exempt material Tribunal decision
137 146 147 152 164 165 166 167 168 175 176 Page 2 ASIO Report no. 3893/67 of 27 June 1967: Page 1 ASIO Report no. 3893/67 of 27 June 1967: Page 4 ASIO Report no. 369/67 of 22 August 1967: Page 1 ASIO Report no. 369/67 of 22 August 1967: ASIO Report no. 5287/67 of 13 October 1967: ASIO Report no. 3273/68 of 18 June 1968: ASIO Report no. 3282/68 of June 1968: ASIO Report no. 3268/68 of 18 June 1968: ASIO Report no. 3274/68 of 18 June 1968: ASIO Report no. 3288/68 of 20 June 1968: Page 2 of ASIO Memo no 2847 of 14 August 1968: Page 1 of ASIO Memo no. 2847 of 14 August 1968: Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii). Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential sources that could identify those sources. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Portion deleted from the body of the minute shows liaison with an agency of another country. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii)

ROGER MILLISS, volume 3
Folio No Description of exempt material Tribunal decision

7 13 16 33 34 35 58 59 60 66 72 86 87 91 92 Page 3 ASIO Report no. 37/68 of 7 February 1968: Page 1 ASIO Report no. 37/68 of 7 February 1968: ASIO Report no. 2352/68 of 23 February 1968: ASIO Report no. 2507/68 of 5 March 1968: Page 3 of Report attached to ASIO Memo no. 01516 of 29 April 1968: Page 1 of ASIO Memo no. 01516 of 29 April 1968: ASIO Report no. 2942/68 of 8 May 1968: Page 2 of ASIO Memo no. 02726 of 12 July 1968: Page 1 of ASIO Memo no. 02726 of 12 July 1968: ASIO Report no. 3775/68 of 9 August 1968: ASIO Memo of 11 September 1968: Confidential source ASIO memo no 03998 of 18 September 1968: Page 3 of ASIO Report no. 574/68 of 23 October 1968: Page 1 of ASIO Report no. 574/68 of 23 October 1968: Page 2 of ASIO Report no. 635/68 of 7 November 1968: Page 1 of ASIO Report no. 635/68 of 7 November 1968: Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consist of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii)

SUSE MARIA WOLF, volume 1
Folio No Description of exempt material Tribunal decision

95 97 102 103 104 119 122 123 124 130 133 134 Page 2 of ASIO Report no. 3893/67 of 27 June 1967: Page 1 of ASIO Report no. 3893/67 of 27 June 1967: ASIO Report no. 2159/67 of 25 September 1967: ASIO Report no. 3282/68 of 18 June 1968: ASIO Report no. 3271/68 of 18 June 1968: ASIO Report no. 3270/68 of 18 June 1968: Page 2 of personal particulars relating to Suse Maria Milliss (nee Wolf): ASIO Report no. 3775/68 of 9 August 1968: Page 2 of ASIO Memo no. 2847 of 14 August 1968: Page 1 of ASIO Memo no. 2847 of 14 August 1968: ASIO Memo of 9 September 1968: Copy of ASIO Memo of 16 September 1968: ASIO Memo no. 03998 of 18 September 1968: Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source and information that shows liaison with an agency of another country. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Portion deleted from the body of the minute shows liaison with an agency of another country. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt as to last two items at end of first indented para under number two. Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt as to last two items at end of first para. Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii)

BRUCE JOSEPH MILLISS, volume 3
Folio No Description of exempt material Tribunal decision

105 106 107 108 114 116 117 118 119 120 126 127 ASIO Memo no. 01606 of 7 April 1967: Page 2 of Report no. 976/67 of 25 May 1967: Page 1 of Report no. 976/67 of 26 May 1967: Page 2 of Report no. 1379/67 of 30 June 1967: Page 1 of Report no. 1379/67 of 30 June 1967: Page 2 of ASIO Memo of 18 October 1967: Consists of information that shows liaison with an agency of another country. Extract from a Memo of 20 November 1967: ASIO Memo of 30 November 1967: Extract of Memo of 5 December 1967 Page 3 of Report no. 2708/67 of 12 December 1967: Page 1 of Report no. 2708/67 of 12 December 1967: Page 2 of Report no/ 1596/68 of 9 September 1968: Page 1 of Report no. 1596/68 of 9 September 1968: Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information that shows liaison with an agency of another country. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by, and identifying information about an ASIO confidential source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of identifying information about an ASIO confidential source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by, and identifying information about, an ASIO confidential source. Exempt see(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by an ASIO confidential source that could identify the source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii)

BRUCE JOSEPH MILLISS, supplementary
Folio no Description of exempt material Tribunal decision

8 9 10 Memo dated 20 November 1967: Extract from a Memo of 20 November 1967: Memo dated 5 December 1967: Extract from a Memo of 5 December 1967: Confidential source Consists of information provided by, and identifying information about, an ASIO confidential source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by, and identifying information about, and ASIO confidential source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by, and identifying information about, an ASIO confidential source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii) Confidential source Consists of information provided by, and identifying information about, and ASIO confidential source. Exempt s33(1)(a), (e)(ii)

The Tribunal is satisfied as to the above mentioned documents held to be exempt that the disclosure of them would, as Mr Holbrook contends (Exhibit 1, para 35), have the effect of:
·breaching the assurances of confidentiality given to its sources of information;
·destroying or tending to destroy the basis of confidentiality on which ASIO sources in the past and in the present operate. Human sources, institutional sources, foreign and domestic liaison sources, would see assurances of confidentiality as of no value, as meaningless or likely to jeopardise relationships which are vital in enabling ASIO to perform its legislative functions;
·damaging the security of the Commonwealth.
As in Re Throssle and Australian Archives (1987) 14 ALD 292 at 294 so in this matter. The evidence given in confidential written material and confidential hearing, in open written material and in the course of cross examination as to the circumstances as to which the information was obtained, the nature of the activities in which the agent or agents concerned were engaged and the effect that disclosure might have both on the willingness of other agents to continue with their activities and the recruitment of agents in the future, provides a legitimate basis for a claim that the records above decided as being exempt under section 33(1)(a) contain information or matter, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth.
For the reasons earlier set forth, the decision under review is varied by granting access to documents described with reference to their numbers shown in volume 1, folio 130 and 133 of this decision.
In all other respects the decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the 41 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of:
R N J Purvis, Deputy President
M J Sassella, Senior Member
B J Gibbs, Senior Member
Signed:         .....................................................................................
  Associate
Date/s of Hearing  23 and 24 May 2000
Date of Decision  11 July 2000
Representative for the Applicant   self represented
Solicitor for the Respondent         Mr Ben Dube