FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Miller v CIMIC Group Limited (formerly ‘Leighton Holdings Limited’)
[2015] FCA 587
Citation: Miller v CIMIC Group Limited (formerly ‘Leighton Holdings Limited’) [2015] FCA 587 Parties: ANDREW MILLER v CIMIC GROUP LIMITED (FORMERLY ‘LEIGHTON HOLDINGS LIMITED’) ACN 004 482 982 and THIESS PTY LTD ACN 010 221 486 File number: QUD 304 of 2015 Judge: REEVES J Date of judgment: 28 May 2015 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – consideration of whether no reasonable prospects of success – consideration of whether an abuse of process – where proceedings already transferred to Federal Circuit Court – where similar complaint sought to be litigated in more than one court – where collateral attack on as yet unmade decision of court Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)Cases cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256; [2013] FCA 641
Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275
Stergiou v McGrail (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Burchett, Ryan and Gummow JJ, 22 April 1994)
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378
Williams v Hunt [1905] 1 KB 512Date of hearing: 28 May 2015 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 21 Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr A Miller appeared in person Counsel for the Respondents: Mr J Murdoch QC Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr R Cullen of Franklin Athanasellis Cullen
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 304 of 2015
BETWEEN: ANDREW MILLER
ApplicantAND: CIMIC GROUP LIMITED (FORMERLY ‘LEIGHTON HOLDINGS LIMITED’) ACN 004 482 982
First RespondentTHIESS PTY LTD ACN 010 221 486
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
REEVES J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MAY 2015
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Judgment be entered for the first respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
2.Judgment be entered for the second respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
3.The applicant pay the first and second respondents’ costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 304 of 2015
BETWEEN: ANDREW MILLER
ApplicantAND: CIMIC GROUP LIMITED (FORMERLY ‘LEIGHTON HOLDINGS LIMITED’) ACN 004 482 982
First RespondentTHIESS PTY LTD ACN 010 221 486
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
REEVES J
DATE:
28 MAY 2015
PLACE:
BRISBANE
EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
At the first directions hearing of this proceeding, the respondents, CIMIC Group Limited (CIMIC Group) and Thiess Pty Ltd (Thiess), applied to have this proceeding determined summarily, relying on s…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 587
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether Mr Miller's claims had any reasonable prospects of success and whether the proceedings constituted an abuse of process. The court considered the claims against Cimic Group Limited, finding that Mr Miller had no contractual or other relevant relationship with the company, and therefore, his claims were foredoomed to fail. Furthermore, the court held that Mr Miller did not have standing to bring claims under the Corporations Act, as these were civil penalty provisions limited to specific applicants. The court also determined that the claims against Thiess were an abuse of process, as they related to the same factual dispute being litigated in the Federal Circuit Court.
Based on these findings, the court granted summary judgment in favour of both respondents, concluding that Mr Miller's claims had no reasonable prospects of success and that the proceedings were an abuse of the court's process. The court also ordered Mr Miller to pay the respondents' costs of the proceeding.
The orders made by the court included entering judgment for the respondents against Mr Miller under section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, and the second respondent under rule 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011. Additionally, the court ordered Mr Miller to pay the costs of the proceeding to both respondents.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Judgment be entered for the first respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
2. Judgment be entered for the second respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).
3. The applicant pay the first and second respondents’ costs of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Staying or dismissing a proceeding for an abuse of process is also an exceptional power which ought to be used sparingly: see Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275 at 275–279. Whether an abuse of process has arisen obviously depends on all the circumstances of the case at hand and depends on, among other things, the purpose of the particular applicant in commencing the proceeding. Pertinent to this proceeding, it has been held to be an abuse of process to commence proceedings that are “foredoomed to fail”: see Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393. An abuse of process can also arise where the same, or a similar, complaint is sought to be litigated in more than one court: see Williams v Hunt [1905] 1 KB 512. And it has also been held to be an abuse of process to make a collateral attack upon an unappealed decision of a court, or upon a decision which, having been appealed, has been affirmed: see Stergiou v McGrail (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Burchett, Ryan and Gummow JJ, 22 April 1994).CONSIDERATION With these principles in mind, I will deal with the claims Mr Miller has made against the two respondents separately. First, with respect to CIMIC Group, I consider Mr Miller’s claims have no reasonable prospects of success and are an abuse of process because they are foredoomed to fail. That is so for the following reasons. First, Mr Miller has not identified any contractual, or other relevant, relationship between CIMIC Group and himself that could found the claims he has made relating to the Leighton Holdings Code of Business Conduct. If that Code was incorporated into any contract, based upon the facts alleged in Mr Miller’s statement of claim in this proceeding, it could only be imported into his contract of employment with Thiess. Secondly, while he does not appear to have specifically sought relief against CIMIC Group in relation to ss 180 or 181 of the Corporations Act, even if that was his intention, it is clear from the provisions of that Act, and particularly s 1317J, that he has no standing to make that claim. That arises from the fact, as outlined by Mr Murdoch, that a contravention of those sections is a civil penalty provision and s 1317J of that Act limits the applicants for relief for such penalty provisions to ASIC, the corporation, and a responsible entity of a registered scheme. Turning to the claims against Thiess, for the same reasons as I have given above, I do not consider Mr Miller’s claims based on the abovementioned provisions of the Corporations Act have any reasonable prospects of success and I consider they are foredoomed to fail. As to Mr Miller’s other claims against Thiess, I consider they are an abuse of the processes of this Court. They plainly relate to the same factual dispute as is currently being litigated by him in the Federal Circuit Court. Indeed, Mr Miller conceded as much before me. Mr Miller’s dissatisfaction with the way his claims are being dealt with in that Court do not provide any basis for commencing this proceeding in this Court. To the contrary, to use that as a reason for commencing this proceeding, particularly when the proceeding was originally remitted by this Court to the Federal Circuit Court, is, in my view, as clear an abuse of the process of this Court as one could encounter.