Miller v Cimic Group Limited (formerly ‘Leighton Holdings Limited')

Link copied
Case Copied 12 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Miller v CIMIC Group Limited (formerly ‘Leighton Holdings Limited’)

[2015] FCA 587

Citation: Miller v CIMIC Group Limited (formerly ‘Leighton Holdings Limited’) [2015] FCA 587
Parties: ANDREW MILLER v CIMIC GROUP LIMITED (FORMERLY ‘LEIGHTON HOLDINGS LIMITED’) ACN 004 482 982 and THIESS PTY LTD ACN 010 221 486
File number: QUD 304 of 2015
Judge: REEVES J
Date of judgment: 28 May 2015
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 – consideration of whether no reasonable prospects of success – consideration of whether an abuse of process – where proceedings already transferred to Federal Circuit Court – where similar complaint sought to be litigated in more than one court – where collateral attack on as yet unmade decision of court
Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth)
Cases cited: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (2013) 220 FCR 256; [2013] FCA 641
Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275
Stergiou v McGrail (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Burchett, Ryan and Gummow JJ, 22 April 1994)
Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378
Williams v Hunt [1905] 1 KB 512
Date of hearing: 28 May 2015
Place: Brisbane
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 21
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr A Miller appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr J Murdoch QC
Solicitor for the Respondents: Mr R Cullen of Franklin Athanasellis Cullen

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 304 of 2015

BETWEEN:

ANDREW MILLER
Applicant

AND:

CIMIC GROUP LIMITED (FORMERLY ‘LEIGHTON HOLDINGS LIMITED’) ACN 004 482 982
First Respondent

THIESS PTY LTD ACN 010 221 486
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 MAY 2015

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Judgment be entered for the first respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2.Judgment be entered for the second respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

3.The applicant pay the first and second respondents’ costs of the proceeding.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 304 of 2015

BETWEEN:

ANDREW MILLER
Applicant

AND:

CIMIC GROUP LIMITED (FORMERLY ‘LEIGHTON HOLDINGS LIMITED’) ACN 004 482 982
First Respondent

THIESS PTY LTD ACN 010 221 486
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

REEVES J

DATE:

28 MAY 2015

PLACE:

BRISBANE

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. At the first directions hearing of this proceeding, the respondents, CIMIC Group Limited (CIMIC Group) and Thiess Pty Ltd (Thiess), applied to have this proceeding determined summarily, relying on s…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Miller v Cimic Group Limited (formerly ‘Leighton Holdings Li... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2015] FCA 587
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Miller v Cimic Group Limited (formerly ‘Leighton Holdings Limited’) involved the plaintiff, Mr Miller, bringing claims against the respondents, Cimic Group Limited and Thiess, in the Federal Court of Australia. Mr Miller sought relief under the Corporations Act 2001 and claimed damages for the alleged breach of a code of business conduct. The respondents applied for summary judgment, arguing that Mr Miller had no standing to commence the proceedings and that the proceedings were an abuse of process.

The court had to decide whether Mr Miller's claims had any reasonable prospects of success and whether the proceedings constituted an abuse of process. The court considered the claims against Cimic Group Limited, finding that Mr Miller had no contractual or other relevant relationship with the company, and therefore, his claims were foredoomed to fail. Furthermore, the court held that Mr Miller did not have standing to bring claims under the Corporations Act, as these were civil penalty provisions limited to specific applicants. The court also determined that the claims against Thiess were an abuse of process, as they related to the same factual dispute being litigated in the Federal Circuit Court.

Based on these findings, the court granted summary judgment in favour of both respondents, concluding that Mr Miller's claims had no reasonable prospects of success and that the proceedings were an abuse of the court's process. The court also ordered Mr Miller to pay the respondents' costs of the proceeding.

The orders made by the court included entering judgment for the respondents against Mr Miller under section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, and the second respondent under rule 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011. Additionally, the court ordered Mr Miller to pay the costs of the proceeding to both respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Judgment be entered for the first respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

2. Judgment be entered for the second respondent against the applicant under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and r 26.01(1)(d) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

3. The applicant pay the first and second respondents’ costs of the proceeding.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The respondents relied upon two broad grounds in their application for the summary determination of this proceeding. First, insofar as the proceeding seeks relief under s 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act), the respondents claim that Mr Miller had no standing to commence the proceeding. Secondly, insofar as the proceeding relates to Mr Miller’s former employment with Thiess, the second respondent, they submitted that the proceeding is an abuse of process. In my view, both of these grounds have been made out and I propose to make orders accordingly.THE BACKGROUND TO THIS PROCEEDING To explain why I have come to that conclusion, it is necessary first to recount some of the background to this proceeding. Until September 2013, Mr Miller was employed by Thiess. During that month, Thiess terminated his employment on one month’s notice. Mr Miller was dissatisfied with the manner in which that termination occurred. He therefore commenced proceedings in the Fair Work Commission and, when they were not resolved to his satisfaction, he commenced a proceeding in this Court. On 7 February 2014, Logan J made a number of orders in that proceeding. They included an order that a mediation be conducted and, should that not result in the resolution of the dispute, the proceeding was to be transferred to the Federal Circuit Court. The mediation that Logan J ordered did not result in the resolution of the proceeding and it was duly transferred to the Federal Circuit Court. In that Court, the matter proceeded through the interlocutory stages and has now been set down for trial before Jarrett J during the second week of July 2015. Until recently, Mr Miller was represented in that proceeding. Soon after his lawyers withdrew, he made an application to Jarrett J to, among other things, amend his statement of claim to add some additional claims. That application was heard on 20 April 2015. Because he had not put the proposed amendments in writing, Jarrett J refused to allow Mr Miller to make them. However, he suggested a process which Mr Miller subsequently followed, at least in part. That was: to put the proposed amendments in writing; to submit them to the respondents; and, once their attitude had been determined, to return to his Honour and he would then decide whether to allow the amendments. Mr Miller followed this process to the second stage but, once the respondents indicated that they were opposed to the proposed amendments because they did not disclose a cause of action, he did not seek to return before Jarrett J. About a week after the above amendment application, Mr Miller commenced this proceeding. In his statement of claim, he essentially made two broad areas of claims for relief. First, he claimed damages for breach of, what he referred to as, the “Leighton Holdings Code of Business Conduct”. He claimed that Code was imported into the terms of his contract of employment with Thiess. Some brief explanation of this claim is required. Leighton Holdings Limited is the predecessor to CIMIC Group. CIMIC Group, and Leighton Holdings before it, are, or were, the parent company of Thiess. Nonetheless, neither of these entities has had any contractual relationship with Mr Miller and none is pleaded in his statement of claim in this proceeding.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Furthermore, Mr Miller’s declared desire to make a pre-emptive strike on the as-yet-unmade decision of the Federal Circuit Court by commencing this proceeding is plainly abusive of the processes of both Courts. Finally, I consider Mr Miller has coincidentally breached s 32AA of the Federal Court Act by commencing this proceeding in this Court when he was concurrently pursuing proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court in relation to associated matters. On my reading of Mr Miller’s statement of claim on each of these sets of proceedings, they clearly relate to associated matters, namely the alleged breach of Mr Miller’s employment contract with Thiess.CONCLUSION For these reasons, I am satisfied that Mr Miller has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting this proceeding against the first respondent and it is, therefore, entitled to summary judgment against Mr Miller under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act. I am also satisfied that Mr Miller has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting this proceeding against the second respondent, insofar as it relates to his claim under the Corporations Act. And I am separately satisfied this proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court. On these bases, the second respondent is, therefore, entitled to summary judgment against Mr Miller under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court Act and r 26.01(1)(b) of the Rules.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Staying or dismissing a proceeding for an abuse of process is also an exceptional power which ought to be used sparingly: see Sea Culture International Pty Ltd v Scoles (1991) 32 FCR 275 at 275–279. Whether an abuse of process has arisen obviously depends on all the circumstances of the case at hand and depends on, among other things, the purpose of the particular applicant in commencing the proceeding. Pertinent to this proceeding, it has been held to be an abuse of process to commence proceedings that are “foredoomed to fail”: see Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393. An abuse of process can also arise where the same, or a similar, complaint is sought to be litigated in more than one court: see Williams v Hunt [1905] 1 KB 512. And it has also been held to be an abuse of process to make a collateral attack upon an unappealed decision of a court, or upon a decision which, having been appealed, has been affirmed: see Stergiou v McGrail (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, Burchett, Ryan and Gummow JJ, 22 April 1994).CONSIDERATION With these principles in mind, I will deal with the claims Mr Miller has made against the two respondents separately. First, with respect to CIMIC Group, I consider Mr Miller’s claims have no reasonable prospects of success and are an abuse of process because they are foredoomed to fail. That is so for the following reasons. First, Mr Miller has not identified any contractual, or other relevant, relationship between CIMIC Group and himself that could found the claims he has made relating to the Leighton Holdings Code of Business Conduct. If that Code was incorporated into any contract, based upon the facts alleged in Mr Miller’s statement of claim in this proceeding, it could only be imported into his contract of employment with Thiess. Secondly, while he does not appear to have specifically sought relief against CIMIC Group in relation to ss 180 or 181 of the Corporations Act, even if that was his intention, it is clear from the provisions of that Act, and particularly s 1317J, that he has no standing to make that claim. That arises from the fact, as outlined by Mr Murdoch, that a contravention of those sections is a civil penalty provision and s 1317J of that Act limits the applicants for relief for such penalty provisions to ASIC, the corporation, and a responsible entity of a registered scheme. Turning to the claims against Thiess, for the same reasons as I have given above, I do not consider Mr Miller’s claims based on the abovementioned provisions of the Corporations Act have any reasonable prospects of success and I consider they are foredoomed to fail. As to Mr Miller’s other claims against Thiess, I consider they are an abuse of the processes of this Court. They plainly relate to the same factual dispute as is currently being litigated by him in the Federal Circuit Court. Indeed, Mr Miller conceded as much before me. Mr Miller’s dissatisfaction with the way his claims are being dealt with in that Court do not provide any basis for commencing this proceeding in this Court. To the contrary, to use that as a reason for commencing this proceeding, particularly when the proceeding was originally remitted by this Court to the Federal Circuit Court, is, in my view, as clear an abuse of the process of this Court as one could encounter.