Miles v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

MILES v. OFFICIAL RECEIVER IN BANKRUPTCY

(1963) 109 CLR 501

26 July 1963

Life Insurance

Life Insurance—Policy moneys—Mortgage of land—Assignment of life policy as further security—For death of assured—Administration of deceased's estate in bankruptcy—Policy moneys not available to general creditors—Extent of statutory protection—Marshalling—Life Insurance Act 1945-1959 (Cth), s. 92—Bankruptcy Act 1924-1960 (Cth), s. 91 (b).

Decision


July 26.
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment.
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Bankruptcy which, upon an application for directions made by the trustee of the bankrupt estate of C. E. Miles deceased, ordered that a fund of 9,137 pounds 14s. 11d. held by him should go to the deceased's unsecured creditors rather than to the appellant, who was his widow and the executrix of his will. (at p506)

2. The fund of 9,137 pounds 14s. 11d. was actually constituted by deducting from 16,500 pounds - the gross proceeds of a piece of land forming part of the bankrupt's estate, which the trustee, with the consent of the appellant, sold - the following payments:

(a) To the first mortgagee 2,007 pounds 19 8 (b) To the second mortgagee 4,640 pounds 3 7 (c) Selling expenses 714 pounds 1 10 7,362 pounds 5 1 (at p506)


3. The contest between the appellant and the trustee - who in the proceedings before the Court of Bankruptcy and this Court took the part of the creditors - arose in this way. On 28th June 1957 Miles, who was the registered proprietor of land at Moorabbin, mortgaged it to The Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd. (which we shall call "the Society") in consideration of a loan of 11,000 pounds. On the same day the deceased gave the Society further security for the loan by assigning to it a policy issued by it to the deceased on 12th June 1957 whereby he was insured for 10,000 pounds payable upon attaining the age of sixty years or his death at an earlier date. This assignment was registered on 7th July 1957. On 11th August 1958 the deceased gave a second mortgage over the land to Marjorie Wilson Thomson. The deceased died on 7th October 1960 before reaching the age of sixty years and thereupon the policy moneys became payable. These have been treated as amounting to 9,981 pounds. It is common ground that, at the date of the death of the deceased, the principal moneys secured by the mortgage were due and payable because interest and premiums were arrears. After his death the Society applied the policy moneys as follows:-

Proceeds of Policy 9,981 pounds 18 0 Principal on Mortgage pounds 10,400 0 0 Interest to date of death 168 9 4 Life Premiums due to 1.10.1960 1,190 0 0 Interest on Charges 16 13 4 Balance 1,793 4 8 pounds11,775 2 8 pounds 11,775 2 8
Thereafter on 29th June 1961 an order was made upon…
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Details
Case
[1963] HCA 24
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Miles v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy* concerned an appeal to the High Court of Australia regarding the validity of a deed of assignment of a debt. The appellant, Miles, sought to recover a debt owed to him by a company, but his claim was challenged by the Official Receiver in Bankruptcy, who asserted that the debt had been validly assigned to a third party prior to Miles's bankruptcy. The central dispute revolved around whether the assignment, which was not registered under the *Companies Act 1961* (Vic) or notified to the debtor, was effective to transfer legal title to the debt.

The High Court was required to determine whether the deed of assignment, in the absence of registration or notification to the debtor, operated to pass the legal chose in action to the assignee. Specifically, the court had to consider the requirements for the effective assignment of a legal chose in action at common law and under relevant statutory provisions, and whether the assignment in question met those requirements. The question of whether the assignment was complete and binding as between the assignor and assignee, and whether it was effective against third parties such as the Official Receiver, was also central to the determination.

The court held that the deed of assignment, while intended to transfer the legal chose in action, was ineffective to do so because it did not comply with the requirements for the assignment of a legal chose in action at common law. The judges reasoned that for a legal chose in action to be effectively assigned at common law, there must be a clear intention to assign, and the assignment must be complete. In this instance, the assignment was found to be incomplete and therefore ineffective to pass legal title. The court distinguished between an assignment that is complete as between the assignor and assignee and one that is effective against third parties, noting that the latter often requires further steps such as notice to the debtor. The principles of equitable assignment were also considered, but the court found that the assignment did not meet the criteria for an equitable assignment either.

The appeal was dismissed, with the High Court affirming the decision of the lower court that the assignment of the debt was not valid. Consequently, the debt remained the property of the bankrupt estate.

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