MIDDLECOAT and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2011] WASAT 152
•26 SEPTEMBER 2011
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL
ACT: FIREARMS ACT 1973 (WA)
CITATION: MIDDLECOAT and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2011] WASAT 152
MEMBER: MR P McNAB (SENIOR MEMBER)
HEARD: DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS
DELIVERED : 26 SEPTEMBER 2011
FILE NO/S: CC 1449 of 2010
BETWEEN: WALTER CHARLES MIDDLECOAT
Applicant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Respondent
Catchwords:
Firearms licensing - Gun control - Licence revoked following firearms convictions - Spent convictions imposed on appeal - Whether applicant a 'fit and proper' person - Firearms convictions specifically noticed by legislation - Breach of undertaking by applicant - Whether proceedings futile because of the effluxion of time - Extent to which restraining order material and spent convictions can be taken into account on the review - Material found to be logically probative of character - Applicant not at present a 'fit and proper person' - Words and phrases: 'fit and proper person'
Legislation:
Firearms Act 1973 (WA), s 9A(4), s 9A(5), s 11, s 11(3), s 11(5), s 18(8), s 20(1), s 113(a)(iii)
Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA)
Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA), s 26(1), cl 1, Sch 3
Weapons Act 1999 (WA)
Result:
Application for review refused
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Mr P Marsh
Respondent: Senior Constable S Bagley
Solicitors:
Applicant: Paul Marsh
Respondent: Commissioner of Police
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321
Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 67
Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 114 ALD 477
Middlecoat v Bluett [2010] WASC 300
Penketh v Commissioner of Police [2010] WASC 254
Tavelli v Johnson, (Unreported, WASC Library No 960693, 25 November 1996)
Tonkin and Commissioner of Police [2011] WASAT 24
Whittaker and Commissioner of Police [2008] WASAT 299
Wignall and Commissioner of Police [2006] WASAT 206
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Summary of Tribunal's decision
Mr Middlecoat sought a review of the revocation of his firearms licence. A licence holder is under State law required to be a 'fit and proper' person. The parties agreed that the review would also consider an application by Mr Middlecoat for a renewal of his licence.
The revocation came about after he was convicted of a number of firearms offences. He received a fine for those offences. On appeal, the Supreme Court substituted a spent conviction for the sentence.
The firearms offences arose out of a visit to Mr Middlecoat's residence by the police when they were called to attend there by his wife. Later, Mr Middlecoat admitted breaching an undertaking that he had given in relation to an application for a restraining order in proceedings brought by his wife.
The Commissioner of Police alleged that Mr Middlecoat was, because of these convictions and a breach of his undertaking, not a fit and proper person to hold a firearms licence.
The Tribunal refused the Commissioner's application to dismiss the proceedings because of futility because there was a window for renewal that extended for 12 months after the expiry of the revoked licence. Mr Middlecoat was still in that window.
The Tribunal also ruled on the extent to which material surrounding the wife's proceedings, the convictions themselves and the spent convictions could be used in these proceedings.
In the result, the Tribunal regarded the circumstances of the convictions and the convictions themselves as relatively serious. The Tribunal said that the convictions 'demonstrate[d] a very lax, casual and extremely careless attitude as regards a licensee's proper responsibilities as a firearms owner'.
The Tribunal concluded that at the present time it could not be said that Mr Middlecoat was a 'fit and proper' person to hold a firearms licence.
The applications for review were dismissed.
Introduction
On 31 August 2010, the Commissioner of Police (Commissioner or respondent), purported to revoke Mr Middlecoat's firearms licence. The licence was issued under the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (Firearms Act). Thirteen firearms were regulated under this single licence (No 1512083) (licence).
In the letter notifying Mr Middlecoat (applicant) of the revocation, reference is made to, amongst other matters, certain convictions recorded against the applicant in respect of firearms and weapons offences.
It appears that the revocation notice dated 31 August 2010, was served upon the applicant on 18 September 2010. His licence subsequently expired, in any case, on 20 September 2010 and but for the revocation (if valid), the applicant might have had flowing to him certain rights of renewal for the period of 12 months after the expiry date.
On 8 October 2010, the applicant sought a review in this Tribunal of the decision to revoke his licence.
The applicant's convictions
It is common ground that on 11 May 2010, the applicant pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of six firearms and one weapons offence and was fined a 'global' sum of $2,000 covering all charges. In summary, the seven offences for which the applicant was convicted under both the Firearms Act and the Weapons Act 1999 (WA) were as follows:
(a)a failure to observe a requirement in relation to storage responsibilities;
(b)a failure to ensure the safekeeping of certain ammunition;
(c)four counts of possessing unlicensed firearms; and
(d)one count of possessing a prohibited weapon (an electric 'stun gun' or Taserlike weapon).
The convictions must be read in the light of the prosecution's allegations, the substance of which Mr Middlecoat must be taken to have conceded, concerning the factual matrix or circumstances of the attendance of police upon him, not least as regards the not insignificant number of unlicensed and unsecured (and in one case the 'stun gun' prohibited) firearms, weapons and ammunition found at his house.
Those circumstances tell us that the police became aware of Mr Middlecoat's unlicensed firearms and the other matters, in respect of which he was eventually convicted, when his wife called the police following the entry by her into a room previously only accessible by the applicant. Mrs Middlecoat eventually commenced proceedings under the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). In this review the Commissioner has sought to rely upon some of the material arising out of those domestic proceedings.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court upheld an appeal on one aspect of the Magistrate's sentence: see, Middlecoat v Bluett [2010] WASC 300. On appeal McKechnie J observed, at [1] (emphasis added):
The appellant, who is aged 60 and in steady employment with Komatsu, in dual roles, partly as a planner and partly as an occupational health and safety representative, is a man who committed a number of firearms offences out of carelessness and a degree of casualness, that caused him to be charged with seven offences. He pleaded guilty to each of those offences, and the sole real issue before the magistrate, and on appeal, is whether he should have been relieved of the consequences of those convictions by a spent conviction order.
In the result, a spent conviction order was imposed by McKechnie J in respect of each conviction.
I accept Mr Marsh's submission that at the time of the revocation of the applicant's licence the convictions must be regarded as being spent convictions.
Unlike these criminal proceedings, which have resulted in relatively low penalties being imposed upon Mr Middlecoat (proceedings which, generally speaking, are directed to showing both society's disapproval of his conduct, and, in part, as punishment of him) the regulatory and administrative regime under the Firearms Act has nothing to do with punishment, but everything to do with an investigation into the relevant character of a person who has been given or seeks, under law, a significant privilege granted by the State in respect of the possession and use of firearms.
As will become apparent, that investigation of character is entitled to have regard to not only the fact of the convictions themselves, but to any material fact sustaining those convictions so far as it may relate to the assessment of character.
Proceedings for restraining orders
The applicant's counsel has helpfully summarised the fate of the, in a sense related, proceedings (already mentioned) under the Restraining Orders Act 1997(WA). This summary is as follows:
The brief history of this [matter] is that on [15] April 2010, an Interim Restraining Order [VRO] was issued against the [a]pplicant [Mr Middlecoat] and served on him on [16] April 2010.
The protected person was Margaret Middlecoat.
The [a]pplicant entered into an undertaking on [16] June 2010 and the Interim Restraining Order was revoked.
The [a]pplicant subsequently breached that undertaking and a second [a]pplication for a Restraining Order was made by Margaret Middlecoat.
An Interim VRO issued on [31] August 2010.
That [a]pplication proceeded to trial and was heard in the Perth Magistrates Court on [13] December 2010.
The [a]pplication was dismissed and the Interim VRO revoked.
At this point it is convenient to record that the Tribunal is of the view that the breach of an undertaking given under or in connection with the framework provided for by the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) is material to the question of the applicant's fitness to hold a licence under the Firearms Act, as it indicates something relevant about his character. I will return to this matter below.
Along the way, a number of preliminary matters arose. It is convenient to now turn to each of them and to say how they were each dealt with.
First preliminary issue: futility of the review
On 27 April 2011, the Tribunal refused an application made by the Commissioner in effect to dismiss the review for futility: cf Tonkin and Commissioner of Police [2011] WASAT 24.
Here, the Tribunal ruled that if the review were successful then at any point until 20 September 2011, the applicant had a right to seek a renewal of his licence arising out of the 12 months period for renewal provided for in s 9A(4) of the Firearms Act.
In any event, after the ruling, the Commissioner consented to the review being extended to cover a refusal to renew the licence, as it raised in substance the same issues as the initial review.
Second preliminary issue: does the exception in relation to the Firearms Act provided for under the Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA) apply in respect of revocation and renewals under the Firearms Act?
For the reasons that follow, on 20 June 2011, the Tribunal rejected an argument to the effect that the exception in relation to the Firearms Act provided for under the Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA) (SC Act) did not extend to both revocation and renewals under the Firearms Act.
The argument was centred on s 26(1) of the SC Act which deals with character assessments under State laws (including the Firearms Act). The provision is in the following terms:
Assessment of character under written law
(1)Where a written law of this State permits or allows a person to consider, take into account, or determine the good character, fitness, propriety or other like attribute of a person for the purposes of that written law, the person shall not in doing so have regard to a spent conviction or the charge to which the conviction relates.
However, under the SC Act, an exception to this prohibition is provided for under para 9 of cl 1 of Sch 3 of the SC Act in respect of, '[a] person applying for the issue of a licence under the Firearms Act 1973'.
In summary, Mr Marsh, for the applicant, argued that neither a revocation nor a renewal comfortably fitted within the actual words used in the statutory exception whether read with or without the language of the Firearms Act. Mr Marsh properly concedes that his client's spent convictions could be relevant if he were applying, in effect, for the first time for a firearms licence. He submitted, essentially, that applying for the 'issue of a licence' (as appears in the exception) means just that. He drew attention to the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation, which is that reference must be first had to the actual words used by the drafter. These words, he submits, do not extend to either renewal or revocation.
However, in my view, these words in the exception must be read in the light of what is provided for in the Firearms Act. First, there is in s 9A(5) of the Firearms Act reference made to 'renew[al] on application' leading to a deemed 'continuation of the licence'. Then there is s 20(1), which in its operation links decisions on renewal expressly to the exercise of the Commissioner's discretion as if he or she were considering an application for a firearms licence.
Finally, as Senior Constable Bagley pointed out, these provisions are consistent with s 18(8) of the Firearms Act which expressly refers to the Commissioner refusing an application, 'whether original or by way of renewal'.
These textual indications are sufficient to indicate the context in which the exception must operate. This context satisfactorily demonstrates, in my view, that a person who applies for the renewal of a licence is both in fact and law a person 'applying for the issue of a licence'.
Moreover, the underlying purpose of the exception in the SC Act would be severely eroded if it were read as only applying to the first or original application for a firearms licence. The evident purpose of the exception is to permit character assessment by reference to what would otherwise be spent convictions in respect of the important regulatory field of firearms control, the importance of which to our society has often been remarked upon.
The Firearms Act and the SC Act, when read relevantly together, in my view, cannot have been intended to nor should they be read in a way which would allow relevant material that would be available on an original application for a licence to be ignored on a subsequent renewal.
On the issue of revocation, I agree with Mr Marsh that this is slightly more problematic as an application for a licence and the revocation of a licence are, generally speaking, in the ordinary course of administration conceptually quite different matters. However, as I have already pointed out, s 20 of the Firearms Act dealing with revocation operates, in relevant part, as if 'the person were then applying for [the licence]'.
I do not therefore see in the context of the Firearms Act and its evident regulatory purpose to which I have referred, that the expression 'a person applying for the issue of a licence' found in the exception under the Firearms Act is not wide enough to capture the case where the decision maker is required to consider the revocation as if the person were applying for that licence.
Accordingly, the Tribunal rejects the applicant's contentions on the proper application of the exception to the SC Act.
Third preliminary issue: how much contextual material can regard be had to arising out of the criminal and quasicriminal proceedings involving the applicant?
For the reasons that follow, on 20 June 2011, the Tribunal also rejected an argument to the effect that the contextual, underlying or surrounding material resulting in the spent convictions could not be taken into account by the Tribunal. A similar issue was raised with respect to the material produced in relation to the restraining orders.
At the time of the Tribunal's ruling, the Commissioner had not identified with precision, apart from the spent convictions themselves, which parts of any transcript or other documents in these other cases the Tribunal would be taken to on the question of character.
Notwithstanding that, the following general propositions are, I think, established in administrative law concerning the reception of such material. First, the convictions and sentences, especially here as they relate to the Firearms Act itself, are directly relevant to the applicant's fitness to hold a licence. Secondly, the convictions and sentences cannot be impugned in review proceedings nor can the Tribunal make any additional findings of criminal conduct, nor for that matter make findings inconsistent with the material findings of any court.
However, the Tribunal may take into account the circumstances of the offences in evidence led by either party. Such material must be logically probative of the actual issues to be decided in the review. Finally, where there is other material which is logically probative and suggests criminal or similar serious misconduct which has not been put before a court, then satisfaction that such conduct has occurred in the absence of prosecution and conviction 'will not be allowed on slight material': Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 114 ALD 477 (Brown) at 489. When such material is admitted then it is a question for the Tribunal to determine how much weight should be given to it. Equally, these propositions apply, with the necessary changes, to 'quasi criminal' proceedings such as apprehended violence orders.
Both Brown, and that case at first instance, (Brown v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 112 ALD 67), discuss, amongst other things, the uses that may be made of 'criminal material' in the formation of judgments about character. I rely generally upon those cases.
There is, of course, nothing particularly new in the application of these principles: see, for example, Whittaker and Commissioner of Police [2008] WASAT 299 where such understandings were the unstated premise permitting much of the adverse background material admitted against Mr Whittaker.
Firearms Act: 'fit and proper'
So far as is relevant, s 11 of the Firearms Act provides as follows: (emphasis added)
Exercise of Commissioner's discretion
(1)The Commissioner [and, on review, this Tribunal] cannot grant an approval or permit or issue a licence under this Act to a person if the Commissioner is of the opinion that
(a)[not relevant];
(b)it is not desirable in the interests of public safety; or
(c)the person is not a fit and proper person to hold the approval, permit, or licence.
(2)Where the Commissioner is satisfied that a person has a history of, or a tendency towards, violent behaviour, the Commissioner may take it into account in deciding whether that person is a fit and proper person to hold an approval, permit, or licence.
(3)The Commissioner has a sufficient ground for forming an opinion that a person is not a fit and proper person to hold an approval, permit or licence under this Act if the Commissioner (emphasis added):
(a)is satisfied that at any time within the period of 5 years before the person applies for the approval, permit or licence
(i)the person was convicted of an offence involving assault with a weapon;
(ii) the person was convicted of an offence involving violence;
(iii) the person was convicted of any offence against this Act; or
(iv)a violence restraining order was made against the person, whether in this State or in any other place;
(b)is satisfied that the person fails to meet standards of mental or physical fitness that the Commissioner considers to be necessary for the person to hold the approval, permit or licence; or
(c)[not relevant].
(4)In subsection (3)
violence restraining order means a judicial order imposing on the person against whom the order is made restraints on the person's lawful activities and behaviour to prevent the person
(a)committing an offence against the person under Part V of The Criminal Code, other than Chapters XXXIV and XXXV; or
(b)behaving in a manner that could reasonably be expected to cause fear that the person will commit such an offence,
or a similar order made under the laws of any place other than this State.
(4a)[not relevant].
(5)The Commissioner may form an opinion that a person is a fit and proper person to hold an approval, permit or licence under this Act in a case in which the Commissioner has a sufficient ground under subsection (3) for forming the contrary opinion.
(6)Subsection (3) does not limit the Commissioner's ability, when forming an opinion as to whether a person is a fit and proper person to hold an approval, permit or licence under this Act, to take into account -
(a)a conviction or order made outside the period of 5 years referred to in paragraph (a) of that subsection; or
(b)anything else that could have been taken into account if that subsection had not been enacted.
...
The two interim restraining orders made against the applicant would appear to be 'violence restraining order[s]' within the meaning of s 11(3) of the Firearms Act. Thus, like the applicant's Firearms Act convictions, they potentially warrant the special attention that the Act itself reserves for such matters (see s 11(3) and s 11(5) of the Firearms Act).
Even if they are not 'violence restraining order[s]' the fact that such orders were made against the applicant by or with the authority of the State would be, in this case, logically probative of the issue of the applicant's likely character, taking into account, however, the fact that after a trial the second interim order was revoked.
What is 'fit and proper' in this context has been discussed many times. See, for example, the passages from Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, Tavelli v Johnson, (Unreported, WASC Library No 960693, 25 November 1996) and Wignall and Commissioner of Police [2006] WASAT 206, cited in Whittaker and Commissioner of Police [2008] WASAT 299.
Recently, in Penketh v Commissioner of Police [2010] WASC 254 (Penketh), Symonds J said at: (emphasis added)
[45] I accept the submission of counsel for the appellant [Mr Penketh] that [Tavelli v Johnson, Unreported, WASC, Library No 960693, 25 November 1996] must be considered bearing in mind that that case was decided in a different statutory context from the Firearms Act. I also note that under the legislation [Wheeler J in Tavelli] was considering a licence as an inquiry agent might be granted to a person who was 'of good character and in all other respects a fit and proper person to be the holder of a licence' (Inquiry Agents Licensing Act, s 4, emphasis added). I would accept that the vocational licensing and other legislative context in Tavelli made the matter of the person's integrity in the sense of general reliability or trustworthiness of particular significance to that determination: see Tavelli at(7). I would further accept that other legislative contexts involving qualifications for a vocational licence may make integrity in that sense of equivalent significance: see the authorities relied upon by the respondent Ex parte Tziniolis; Re Medical Practitioners Act [1967] 1 NSWR 357; (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 448, 461 (Walsh JA; Wallace P agreeing); and Kotowicz v Law Society of New South Wales (Unreported, NSWCA, 7 August 1987), 20 [5] (Kirby P dissenting). And I would also accept that the Firearms Act might be seen not to make integrity in that sense of equivalent significance.
[46] At the same time, in my view the legislative context of the Firearms Act and the authorities support the conclusion that, in determining whether or not a person who has prior convictions, is a fit and proper person, there is a matter which has some similarity to integrity in the sense described and which has comparable significance. That matter is the person’s appreciation of the need for responsible conduct in relation to firearms and ammunition.
[47] I consider that the following from [Re Jones; Ex parte Commissioner of Police [1999] WASCA 246 (Parker J; White & Steytler JJ agreeing), at [19]], as to the Firearms Act supports that view:
It is clear from the long title and the provisions of the [Firearms Act] that its objects include the control and regulation in the public interest, including safety, of firearms and ammunition and the limitation, by a restrictive licensing scheme of those who may possess, use, deal in or manufacture firearms and ammunition. The system of control and regulation is administered by the Commissioner of Police and includes power to prohibit the possession, use or dealing in types of firearms. Substantial penalties, including imprisonment in some cases, are provided for breaches of the Act.
[48] The 'control and regulation' referred to in my view underscores the importance of responsible conduct in relation to firearms and ammunition of those holding licences under the restrictive scheme in the Firearms Act.
[49] I find further support for the view I hold in the authorities that emphasise, in the context of disqualification from holding a firearms licence (a context to which I will return), that a firearms licence is a 'privilege, not a right': Schamotta v The Queen [2002] WASCA 262 [15] (Murray J, Wheeler J & Burchett AUJ); see also Binns v Gardiner [2004] WASCA 275 [40] (Templeman J; Jenkins & Simmonds JJ agreeing). A holder of a licence has a responsibility not to abuse the privilege which that holder enjoys. (Emphasis added).
[50] I find still further support for the view that I hold in what was said of the holder of a commercial television licence in Bond [per Mason CJ at 349], who had 'a responsibility to exercise the power conferred by the licence with a due regard to a proper standard of conduct and a responsibility not to abuse the privilege which it enjoys', that that holder 'must have an appreciation of those responsibilities and must discharge them. Conversely, a licensee which lacks a proper appreciation of those responsibilities or does not discharge them is not, or may be adjudged not to be, a fit and proper person'.
[51] I should add that there is some support for this view in the reasons of the SAT in Wignall and Commissioner of Police [2006] WASAT 206 (Barker J, President, Members Mansveld & Lord). …
[52] It follows in my view that, notwithstanding the difference in legislative context to which I have referred, Member Carey [in the State Administrative Tribunal] was correct in Penketh [in the Tribunal, at [34]] to take from Tavelli for his purposes the following:
As that decision makes clear, the "fit and proper person" formula allows the widest scope for the exercise of the discretion of the decision-maker. It is to be exercised in the light of the applicable statutory framework, with the fitness and propriety of the person to hold the particular licence in question being the relevant question. Prior convictions might be regarded as more or less significant depending on a variety of matters, including their age, whether they relate to the licence under consideration and whether they reflect particularly on the character of the putative licensee. In relation to the latter, insight and remorse, actions taken to militate against the future repetition of the offences, and other indicators that the licensee has reformed his or her character can be factors which go in favour of the grant of the licence.
The respondent's case
Senior Constable Bagley submitted that the convictions for the firearms offences alone attracted the operation of s 11(3)(a)(iii) and warranted a finding that Mr Middlecoat was not a fit and proper person to hold a licence. Further, he drew attention to what the Magistrate Langdon had said when sentencing the applicant, remarks which are found in Middlecoat v Bluett [2010] WASC 300, at [5].
The Magistrate had noted that there were 'aggravating features [in] that the offending went on for two years', and that Mr Middlecoat was 'very complacent, [and] had a very lax attitude towards [the] storage and possession of these firearms and ammunition'. In fact, the period of unlawful possession in respect of some of the firearms seems considerably more that two years.
The Commissioner's case also relied upon the breach by Mr Middlecoat's of the restraining order undertakings, the Commissioner submitting that this event suggested that Mr Middlecoat 'cannot be relied upon to comply with legally binding orders' and that he had, having regard also to his convictions, a demonstrated propensity 'to disregard the laws of this [S]tate'.
The respondent also drew attention to various matters disclosed in those restraining order proceedings, including the alleged intimidatory conduct of the applicant and the Magistrate's observation that the applicant's evidence was 'in part … unsatisfactory and unbelievable'.
However, given the approach taken by the Tribunal (see below) it in unnecessary to consider these additional matters.
The applicant's case
Mr Marsh supplied the full record of the proceedings before Magistrate Langdon, including the original character references, and some new updated character references (including one from a former police officer). His client had also filed a witness statement in these proceedings which, amongst other things, attempted to explain how the firearms came into his possession; contains an acknowledgement of the seriousness of the convictions; and a denial that certain other conduct was intimidatory. Mr Middlecoat said that the prosecution of him was a 'traumatic and humiliating experience'. Mr Marsh noted that the Magistrate had 'specifically found that the [a]pplicant was not likely to commit offences of this kind again'.
In summary, Mr Marsh submitted that in all the circumstances, which he details at para [95] and at the conclusion of his written submissions, Mr Middlecoat is of sufficiently good character to be regarded now as 'fit and proper' to now hold a firearms licence.
Discussion of the case
The transcript of proceedings before Magistrate Langdon shows the applicant pleaded guilty to facts alleged by the prosecutor concerning the existence of 'unsecured gun cabinets'; a 'large quantity of ammunition'; a '.44 calibre new model army revolver' and a Taserlike weapon. (It appears, however, that the Taser was purchased at a time when it would not have been unlawful to purchase such a weapon.) There was also another 'semiautomatic pistol … lying on the floor' with a holster and a belt. The prosecutor also alleged that Mr Middlecoat 'gave no explanation as to why he still had those items'. An explanation of sorts was given in these proceedings, but that was not put to the Magistrate.
I accept that apart from these regrettable and serious lapses of judgment (including the breach of his undertaking) the applicant could be generally regarded as a person of good character, and I further accept that it seems that he would be unlikely to be ever prosecuted again under the Firearms Act.
However, in my view, the facts surrounding these seven convictions, as do the convictions themselves, demonstrate a very lax, casual and extremely careless attitude as regards a licensee's proper responsibilities as a firearms owner. In the regulatory context of firearms control and management, these matters must be regarded as very serious and prima facie disentitling of the privilege of a firearms licence until the passage of time or other events show that Mr Middlecoat has fully regained an 'appreciation of the need for responsible conduct in relation to firearms and ammunition': Penketh at [46].
There is, with respect to Mr Marsh's extensive submissions on behalf of his client, nothing in the applicant's case to date that meets that standard.
Moreover, the legislature has specifically provided that at least in respect of six of the convictions they may, in and of themselves, adversely affect the character assessment required under the Firearms Act. Even without the added doubt thrown on Mr Middlecoat's character by his admitted breach of an undertaking, (even allowing for the fluid domestic context that that incident occurred in), I do not think that Mr Middlecoat can be said to be, at present, a fit and proper person to hold a licence under the Firearms Act.
Orders
For the reasons set out above, the Tribunal orders that:
1. The application for a review is dismissed.
2. The decisions under review are affirmed.
I certify that this and the preceding [62] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MR P McNAB, SENIOR MEMBER
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