Middis v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Middis v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] QDC 125

PARTIES:

THOMAS GREGORY MIDDIS

(Appellant)

v
COMMONWEALTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

(Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

D2/23

DIVISION:

Appellate

PROCEEDING:

Appeal pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld)

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Hervey Bay

DELIVERED ON:

9 August 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

5 September 2023

JUDGE:

LONG SC, DCJ

ORDER:

The sentencing order of the Magistrate, on 7 February 2023, is confirmed.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE OF MAGISTRATE – where the appellant was sentenced to sixty hours of unpaid community service with the consequence that a conviction was recorded – whether the mandatory recording of a conviction rendered the sentence manifestly excessive – whether the sentencing discretion was vitiated by the Magistrate’s reliance on the prosecutor’s submission as to penalty – whether the Magistrate failed to take into account delay – whether the Magistrate allowed the principle of general deterrence to overwhelm the exercise of sentencing discretion – whether the Magistrate misapplied the test set out in section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

LEGISLATION:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 16A, 17A, 19B, 20AB

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 135.1
Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 223

Motor Dealers and Chattel Auctioneers Act 2014 (Qld) s 21, Schedule 3

CASES:

Aikman v Bourne (1992) 63 A Crim R 467
Barbaro v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 58
Cobiac v Liddy (1969) 119 CLR 257
Commissioner of Taxation v Baffsky [2001] NSWCCA 332
Elzein v R [2021] NSWCCA 246
Matthews v The Queen [2014] VSCA 291
R v Hyatt [2011] QCA 55
R v L; ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 2 Qd R 63
R v Newton [2010] QCA 101
R v Phillips & Woolgrove [2008] QCA 284

Teelow v Commissioner of Police [2009] 2 Qd R 489

Weininger v R (2003) 212 CLR 629

COUNSEL:

B McKenzie on behalf of the Appellant
L Ygoa-McKeown on behalf of the Respondent 

SOLICITORS:

KLM Solicitors on behalf of the Appellant
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of the Respondent

Introduction

  1. Pursuant to s 222(2)(c) of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld), the appellant appeals against the sentence imposed upon him on 7 February 2023. The effect of that sentence was that the appellant was ordered to perform sixty hours of unpaid community service to be completed within twelve months of the order. It is not in contention that the result of such an order, made pursuant to s 20AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), entailed the consequence that convictions were recorded against the appellant.

  2. It is convenient to first note the following circumstances:

    (a)on 7 February 2023, the appellant was convicted on his own guilty pleas of three offences of dishonestly causing a risk of loss to Services Australia pursuant to s 135.1(5) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). Those offences related to the false assertions made by the appellant, in the context of reporting as to his…

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Details
Case
[2024] QDC 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Middis v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, the appellant contested the sentence imposed by a Magistrate, which mandated sixty hours of unpaid community service and resulted in a recorded conviction. The appellant argued that the mandatory recording of a conviction made the sentence manifestly excessive. Further, it was contended that the Magistrate's sentencing discretion was flawed due to reliance on the prosecutor's submissions on penalty, failure to consider the delay in prosecution, and the principle of general deterrence overwhelming the sentencing discretion. The appellant also sought to introduce new evidence to support their grounds of appeal.

The court examined whether the Magistrate's sentencing discretion was properly exercised. The primary contention was that the Magistrate allowed the principle of general deterrence to dominate the sentencing process, influenced by the prosecutor's submission that the offence could be likened to social security fraud. The court assessed the Magistrate's decision in the context of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and the application of section 19B. The prosecution's submission suggested that the offence warranted a serious sentence to promote deterrence, balanced against individual circumstances. The Magistrate considered the seriousness of the offence and the need for general deterrence, ultimately deciding on a sentence under section 20AB rather than dismissing the complaint under section 19B(1).

The court found that the Magistrate's reasons adequately addressed the sentencing issues and correctly applied section 19B(1) of the Crimes Act. There was no discernible error in the Magistrate's consideration of the prosecution's submissions or the delay in prosecution. The court concluded that none of the grounds of appeal established an appealable error, and the appeal should be dismissed, affirming the Magistrate's sentencing order.

The court confirmed the sentencing order of the Magistrate, dated 7 February 2023, and dismissed the appeal. The ruling upheld the Magistrate's decision and sentence, finding no basis for interference with the exercise of sentencing discretion.

Orders

Orders of the court

The sentencing order of the Magistrate, on 7 February 2023, is confirmed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It has not been established that there has been any significant error by the Magistrate in not having regard to the principles of R v L; ex parte Attorney-General of Queensland or in otherwise dealing with the consequences of any delay in the prosecution of the appellant.Ground 4 and application for leave to adduce new evidence It will also be convenient to deal with the application for leave to adduce new evidence here, as it particularly relates to the consideration of Ground 4. In respect of this ground the initial focus is upon a contention of error in the Magistrate’s acceptance of the prosecution submission that the offending here “could be likened to social security fraud”.[52] An initial difficulty is that this is not the expressed focus of the ground, which is expressed to be in terms of the Magistrate allowing “the principle of general deterrence to overwhelm the exercise of sentencing discretion”. In any event, it is discernible that there is a sense of misconception of both the prosecution submissions and more importantly the approach adopted by the Magistrate.[52]Appellant’s written submissions, filed 21/4/23, at [28(a)]. Relevantly the prosecution submission was first made in the following terms:“… given the nature of the conduct being the provision of false information or the failure to provide information as required to a government agency for the proper calculation or (sic) liabilities or entitlements, some analogy can be drawn with a social security type of offending, insofar as sentencing principles to be applied. On that basis, it is submitted that offending of this kind should be viewed seriously, because it is easy to commit and the system relies largely on the extent of honesty of its participants to function effectively. As such, sentences that promote both personal and general deterrence are called for. Balanced, of course, against the circumstances of each individual case.”[53]Later and in reference to the Magistrate’s attention being drawn to the decision in Aikman v Bourne,[54] a single judge decision upon an appeal to the Supreme Court of Tasmania, against the decision of a Magistrate to sentence in respect of offending pursuant to s 1347(b) and (d) of the Social Security Act1991 (Cth), by dismissing those charges pursuant to s 19B(1) of the Crimes Act, the prosecutor drew attention to the ultimate conclusion in that decision as to the lack of reflection of the seriousness of the type of case.[55] The prosecutor may be noted to then agree with the Magistrate’s enquiry that:“So that’s the effect of this … is that one really has to look at the principle of general deterrence in assessing the punishment that’s just in all of the circumstances”.[56][53]T1-3.38-46.[54](1992) 63 A Crim R 467.[55]T1-7.38.[56]T1-7.38-1-8.5. It may be noted that in Aikman v Bourne,[57] specific reference is made, in dealing with the notion that “offences involving social services fraud are serious”, and that such offences:“Called for a deterrent penalty and the expediency of adopting a course involving the dismissal of the complaint having regard to the factors mentioned in s 19B still had to be judged in the light of their seriousness”.[57](1992) 63 A Crim R 467, 471.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In these circumstances in which the contention as to the application of s 19B(1) arose for the Magistrate’s determination, there is no discernible error in respect of the adequacy of her reasons in conclusion as to the overall issue of proceeding pursuant to s 19B(1), as opposed to an accepted alternative of an order to perform community service under s 20AB.Conclusion Therefore, in these circumstances where none of the grounds of appeal nor any of the associated points have been vindicated, in terms of establishing any appealable error in respect of the Magistrate’s exercise of sentencing discretion or any other basis upon which there should be interference with the Magistrate’s exercise of sentencing discretion, this appeal should be dismissed, with an order that the sentencing order of the Magistrate, on 7 February 2023, is confirmed.