Michelmore v Brown [No 7] - [2025] WASC 247

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION:   MICHELMORE -v- BROWN [No 7] [2025] WASC 247
CORAM:   SOLOMON J
DELIVERED          :   18 JUNE 2025
PUBLISHED           :   20 JUNE 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 2457 of 2023
BETWEEN:   LAURA JANE MICHELMORE
Plaintiff
AND
ADAM SYDNEY BROWN
First Defendant
JERALD MARTIN
EMMA HAZEL MARTIN
Second Defendants
EMERSION PTY LTD as trustee for THE MARTIN TRUST
Third Defendant

Catchwords:

Contempt of Court - Penalty - Whether imprisonment appropriate penalty - Where contemnors refuse to recognise jurisdiction of Supreme Court - Deterrence - Maintaining the integrity of the court’s process and authority - Term of imprisonment necessary

Legislation:

Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 55 r 3, r 7
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 6

Result:

Second defendants sentenced to 30 days immediate imprisonment

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	Mr J O'Hara
First Defendant	:	In person
Second Defendants	:	In person
Third Defendant	:	Not represented

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	L J Michelmore
First Defendant	:	In person
Second Defendants	:	In person
Third Defendant	:	Not represented

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Hunt v Clarke (1889) 58 L.J. (Q.B.) 490
John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351
Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2023] FCAFC 174
Michelmore v Brown [No 3] [2025] WASC 9
Yap v Matic [No 7] [2023] WASC 55

SOLOMON J:

(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 18 June 2025 and has been edited from the transcript).

Background

On 22 April 2025, I found each of the second defendants, Mr Jerald Martin and Ms Emma Hazel Martin, guilty of two charges of contempt of court. The circumstances constituting the contempts are set out in my reasons delivered orally on 22 April 2025 and published on 2 May 2025 in the decision of Michelmore v Brown [No 5] [2025] WASC 152.
In essence, the contempts by Mr and Ms Martin were each constituted by their disobedience of the orders of Tottle J dated 15 January 2025 by:
(1)Publishing statements to a group called the Sovereign Peoples Assembly of Western Australia, contained in a document titled Statement of Claim (created on 16 February 2025 and printed on 18 February 2025). These published statements convey the imputation set out in [119(a)] of the reasons for judgment of Tottle J published on 15 January 2025; and
(2)Publishing to 12 persons associated with the Sovereign Peoples Assembly on 30 March 2025, statements which convey the imputation set out in [119(a)] of the reasons for judgment of Tottle J published on 15 January 2025.[1]
[1] Michelmore v Brown [No 3] [2025] WASC 9.
I did not sentence Mr and Ms Martin on 22 April 2025. I listed the matter for sentencing on today's date, 18 June 2025. I urged Mr and Ms Martin to obtain legal advice for their own benefit and explained to them that the consequences could be very serious, including a term of imprisonment.
Through the Western Australian Bar Association, the court also arranged for Mr and Ms Martin to obtain the benefit of pro bono legal advice from a barrister at the independent bar.

Submissions on penalty

I advised the plaintiff that she could file submissions in respect of penalty. I also advised the defendants that they could file submissions or any other material they wish to put before me in relation to penalty. The plaintiff filed submissions in relation to penalty on 6 May 2025. Mr and Ms Martin filed a number of documents. I will not read them all out. One of them I will annex to the published reasons. I will make brief reference to them in the reasons below.
Mr and Ms Martin filed a document dated 10 June 2025, which bears document number 2025-846-016, received by the court on 10 June 2025 at 11.48 am.[2] The document includes the following statements:
The court is a corporate entity, it is not a living being.[3]
[3] Document #2025-846-016, 10 June 2025 [5] (Document 016).
It also includes the statement:
As it is inferior jurisdiction, it cannot instruct the Living Being.[4]
[4] Document 016 [5].
The document also includes the following references to a barrister, whom I understand was the barrister that was provided to the Martins through the facilitation of the Western Australian Bar Association:
The services of Barrister Young will not be engaged, as that would change the jurisdiction of the standing of the Executor and Beneficiary, the Living Being, to incompetent and would turn us into the ALL CAPITALS name of the corporation, which would then allegedly grant jurisdiction to the Court to make a ruling pursuant to the Null and Void Orders JUDGE TOTTLE wrote in his mis-trial of December 19 and 20 2024.[5]
[5] Document 016 [6].
The document goes on to say:
We note the advice offered by Barrister Young was to:
1.say the court was the authority,
2.apologise,
3.and pay the money.[6]
[6] Document 016 [7].
The document then goes on to say:
By competent standards in Law, the Court is not the Authority. The People are.[7]
[7] Document 016 [7].
It goes on to say:
7.There are not further moneys owed to Laura Michelmore in any way whatsoever.
8.Laura Michelmore is accountable to the outcomes of the Superior Jurisdiction Court.[8]
[8] Document 016 [7].
The document goes on to say:
We acknowledge in pursuit of its existence; the Supreme Court of inferior jurisdiction continues to pursue its alleged claim that it is operating in law.[9]
[9] Document 016 [8].
The document also states:
The Judicial Officers of Judge Tottle and Judge Solomon currently move against the wellbeing of the People. [10]
[10] Document 016 [9].
It also includes the statement:
We will not continue to engage in the beliefs that the Court has any valid standing.[11]
[11] Document 016 [12].
It goes on to say:
All Orders are Null and Void due to failure of Lawful Due Process, that is; the defence was not permitted to be filed in readiness for the trial, rendering the Court and Judge Tottle to be incompetent, and Judge Solomon to be incompetent as he also pursues Null and Void Orders.[12]
[12] Document 016 [13].
A further document was received at 9.22 pm on 13 June 2025. It bears the document number 2025-44-015. The document appears to relate to orders made by Tottle J in relation to moneys held by Suncorp Bank in an account of the defendants. It is not relevant directly to the contempt hearing other than it repeats the assertion that the orders of Tottle J are null and void.[13]
[13] Document #2025-44-015, 10 June 2025 (Document 015).
A further document was filed by the defendants on 13 June 2025 at 9.08 pm. It is a document of some 12 pages. The document repeats the assertions that have been consistently made by the defendants in these proceedings. It includes the statement of [33] that:
Police are given Notice that any warrant issued by the pursuit of the hearing on 17 June 2025, is rendered invalid.[14]
[14] Document #2025-44-017, 13 June 2025 (Document 017).
And at [34] it states:
Any officer attempting to pursue such an invalid instrument will be held 100% personally liable and accountable for their actions to perpetuate failure of Lawful Due Process. And positioned for dismissal from Public Service.
The document continues at [67]:
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE TOTTLE AND
1.THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE SOLOMON
2.are hereby on notice that their services are strictly forbidden
3.in the SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
4.until further notice.
Paragraph 69 of the document states:
If either JUDGE is found to be presiding over any matters, repercussions will be forthcoming.
A further document was filed of 111 pages on 17 June 2025 at 9.55 am, that is, shortly before the hearing that was scheduled to take place on 17 June 2025. That document, it must be said, contains a plethora of very disturbing material.[15]
[15] Document #2025-66-001, 17 June 2025 [5] (Document 001).
I shall make this clear. The relevance of those additional documents, that is, the documents filed on Friday night, 13 June 2025 and the document filed on 17 June 2025 are relevant to the extent that they repeat and reinforce the position consistently adopted by Mr and Ms Martin that they do not accept the authority of this court. I will not be taking those documents into account in terms of the penalty I impose other than to that extent. However, I should point out that some of the content of at least the document bearing the number 017 that was filed on Friday night, 17 June 2025, may itself amount to a contempt of the court because it may be construed as a threat to judicial officers and police officers. That is not a matter that I am dealing with today, but it may be a matter that arises in the near future. I reiterate that I do not take those matters into account in my determination of penalty. As I have said, I will annex the first of the reasons referred to above to the published reasons.

Legal principles

I turn to the general principles in relation to penalty, but before I turn to these general principles in relation to sentencing, it is important that I make a number of general remarks. In that regard, I shall repeat some remarks I made on a previous occasion in relation to a different matter, but in respect of a finding of contempt of someone who expressed views not dissimilar to those expressed by Mr and Ms Martin.[16]
[16] See Yap v Matic [No 7] [2023] WASC 55 and the cases cited therein.
Contempt of court is a matter that lies both within the court's inherent jurisdiction and is provided for by the statutory regime relating to the court's powers. It is a tool that the court may employ to protect the due administration of justice. A finding of contempt may be dealt with summarily and may, if appropriate, result in the imprisonment of a contemnor without trial.
The ability of the court to charge a party with contempt, to determine the matter of guilt, and to impose a penalty of its own volition is an immense power that must be exercised sparingly. It is therefore important to distinguish between that conduct of which the court disapproves and that which attracts the court's condemnation and punishment. In the High Court decision of John Fairfax Sons Pty Ltd v McRae, their Honours quoted from Cotton LJ in Hunt v Clarke as follows:
A penalty will not be imposed in its exercise unless the thing done is of such a nature as to require the arbitrary and summary interference of the court in order to enable justice to be duly and properly administered without any interruption or interference.[17]
[17] John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd v McRae (1955) 93 CLR 351, 370; Hunt v Clarke (1889) 58 L.J. (Q.B.) 490.
Conduct which the court considers unusual, irritating, rude or even belligerent does not necessarily invoke the summary powers of the court. A party may express beliefs about the legitimacy of a court order or the quality of a judgment or may resist particular principles of law. It is not enough that the court is insulted or that the beliefs expressed do not align with those of the judicial officer. The threshold requirement is that the court must find that the conduct interferes with the administration of justice, or in some way demonstrates a contumelious disrespect for the authority of the court. In matters such as this, it is particularly important to emphasise that the court does not impose punitive measures in relation to people's beliefs.
Mr and Ms Martin are quite entitled to their beliefs, even if they are regarded by some as irrational, irritating or even offensive, or regarded by others as foolish or delusional. In a tolerant and humane society, people must be entitled to hold such beliefs without fear of sanction or punishment from the state. History is littered with the tragic consequences of intolerance and injustice perpetrated by state authorities for beliefs that do not meet with the approval of the governing or ruling elite.
However, at the same time, the court must be concerned with and must remain vigilant to protect the administration of justice from conduct, including on occasion, the expression of views that corrode public confidence in and respect for the courts and the justice system. A just and tolerant society must zealously guard the instruments and institutions that preserve justice and tolerance.
Order 55 r 7(1) of the Rules of theSupreme Court 1971 (WA) provides that:
The court may punish contempt of court by committal of the contemnor to prison, or by imposing a fine, or by both committal and a fine.
The penalty applicable to contempt is not governed by the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act). It is nevertheless appropriate to have regard to the principles of sentencing set out in s 6 of the Sentencing Act. Those principles include the principle that the sentence must be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence and imposed after taking into account the circumstances in which the offence is committed, any aggravating factors and any mitigating factors. Another principle imposed by that section, which I take into account, is that a sentence of imprisonment should not be imposed unless the seriousness of the offence is such that only imprisonment can be justified or required for the protection of the community, and that means the protection of the community in a broad sense.
Sentencing for a contempt of court constituted by a breach of the court's orders serves two distinct purposes, one coercive and the other punitive. A sentence for contempt may provide a coercive means by which court orders can be enforced and future compliance with the order secured. This may occur so the benefit of a party to the proceeding can be ensured. However - and this is particularly important on this occasion - a sentence for contempt may also punish wilful disobedience of a court's order so as to vindicate judicial authority and maintain the integrity of the court's process in the name of public interest.
The purpose of imposing punishment reflects the need for both individual and general deterrence and retribution for the party's failure to comply with the order. Retribution is called for because it is essential to the proper working of the court system that court orders are obeyed. If they are defied or ignored, the whole system of dispute resolution by litigation breaks down. While there are other means of dispute resolution available, in the final analysis, a citizen has the right to approach a court to determine a dispute and the court has a duty to do so. Those rights must be preserved and, indeed, guarded.
The Full Court of the Federal Court in Kazal v Thunder Studios helpfully endorsed a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be relevant in any given case, these include; the seriousness of the contempt, the contemnor's culpability, the reason or motive for the contempt, whether the contemnor received or tried to receive a benefit from the contempt, whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition by the contemnor, the character and antecedents of the contemnor, the contemnor's personal circumstances, personal and general deterrence, and finally, the need for denunciation of contemptuous conduct.[18]
[18] Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California) [2023] FCAFC 174.

Concluding remarks

In oral submissions before me this afternoon, the defendants were given the opportunity to make further submissions in relation to penalty. The defendants reiterated matters that were not relevant to the penalty, but rather sought to reagitate matters in relation to both the primary defamation proceedings, which as I explained on the last occasion, are not matters with which I am concerned, and in relation to the contempt hearing, which has already been determined.
As I explained on the last occasion, and reiterate today, court orders must be obeyed. Coming to court when flouting court orders to argue that you don't agree with the court orders does not advance a contemnor's case at all, particularly in relation to penalty. The matters raised by Mr and Ms Martin in their oral submissions today therefore did not assist me in arriving at an appropriate sentence for the contempt.
In relation to their personal circumstances, they explained that they had suffered enormous financial distress and personal distress in terms of both their business, their income, their financial circumstances and their relationships. That is extremely regrettable. It is all the more regrettable because it was entirely avoidable. Even at the point of this contempt hearing, it was avoidable had Mr and Ms Martin accepted the advice of the independent barrister that was given to them, to apologise to the court and to accept the court's authority. Rather than do so, they have continued to insist that the court is inferior and that they do not consider themselves bound by the court's orders, which they continue to characterise as null and void.
The contempt in this matter was unequivocally deliberate, defiant and flagrant. Mr and Ms Martin have explicitly chosen to reject the advice they received and continue to express the view that the authority of this court is subordinate to some other authority. It is plain that they do not regard themselves as bound by the orders of Tottle J. It is plain that there is no remorse or contrition. To the extent that in oral submissions today there was an expression of remorse, it was remorse for what has unfolded and what has happened to them. No expression of remorse was forthcoming in relation to the rejection of the court's authority.
There has been no acceptance of the court's authority in respect of their ongoing conduct. On the contrary, the court can have no confidence at all that Mr and Ms Martin will not breach the court orders again whenever it suits them. In the circumstances, the contempts are plainly serious.
Mr and Ms Martin are wholly responsible for their conduct. There is a defiant and explicit rejection of the court's authority, and indeed, what appears to be an ideological commitment to disregard the authority of the court. The level of culpability and the lack of remorse or contrition could not be more manifest. I accept that Mr and Mrs Martin have not, in any conventional sense, benefited from their contempts. Indeed, by any objective measure, they have only been prejudiced by what they have done. In one sense, that weighs in their favour. However, in a broader sense, it serves to highlight the intensity of their commitment to their position. They appear determined to defy the court's authority notwithstanding the consequences.
All of those factors indicate that, in this matter, individual and general deterrence is of great importance. It is indeed of grave importance that a message be sent not just to Mr and Ms Martin, but to the general community that views of this nature will not be tolerated.
Mr and Ms Martin have told me more than once they are not dangerous people. The ideas they express, however, can be extremely dangerous. Dangerous ideas breed dangerous people, whether those people consider themselves to be peaceful, dangerous or otherwise.
The court has no alternative but to mark its disapproval of this conduct in the most serious way. In all the circumstances, I see no alternative, regrettably, but to impose a term of immediate imprisonment. I therefore sentence each of Jerald Martin and Emma Hazel Martin to a term of 30 days immediate imprisonment.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
GP
Associate to the Hon Justice Solomon
20 JUNE 2025