Michelmore v Brown [No 5] - [2025] WASC 152

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   MICHELMORE -v- BROWN [No 5] [2025] WASC 152
CORAM:   SOLOMON J
HEARD:   22 APRIL 2025
DELIVERED          :   22 APRIL 2025
PUBLISHED           :   2 MAY 2025
FILE NO/S:   CIV 2457 of 2023
BETWEEN:   LAURA JANE MICHELMORE
Plaintiff
AND
ADAM SYDNEY BROWN
First Defendant
JERALD GLEASON MARTIN
First Second Defendant
EMMA HAZEL MARTIN
Second Second Defendant
EMERSION PTY LTD as trustee for THE MARTIN TRUST
Third Defendant

Catchwords:

Contempt - Contravening court order - Authority of the court - Pseudo-law - Legal systems

Legislation:

Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA)
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)

Result:

Applications granted
Findings of contempt made

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff	:	Mr J O'Hara
First Defendant	:	In Person
First Second Defendant	:	In Person
Second Second Defendant	:	In Person
Third Defendant	:	In Person

Solicitors:

Plaintiff	:	In Person
First Defendant	:	In Person
First Second Defendant	:	In Person
Second Second Defendant	:	In Person
Third Defendant	:	In Person

Cases referred to in decision:

Mammoth Investments v Donaldson [2024] WASCA 71
Michelmore v Brown & Ors [No 3] [2025] WASC 9
Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Allen [2012] WASC 258
R v Dunbabin; Ex Parte Williams [1935] 53 CLR 443
R v Eades 6 WAR 532

SOLOMON J:

(This judgment was delivered extemporaneously on 22 April 2025 and has been edited from the transcript.)

The applications

These reasons concern two applications of the plaintiff, Ms Michelmore, alleging that the second defendants, Mr Jerald Gleason Martin and Ms Emma Hazel Martin be committed for contempt of the orders of this court made by Tottle J on 15 January 2025.
The applications were brought by two separate chamber summonses, dated respectively 11 March 2025 and 1 April 2025.
The plaintiff is represented today by counsel. The second defendants appeared in person, and I recorded responses of not guilty to the allegations made by the plaintiff in the two chamber summonses, which were read to each of them separately. In addition, the first defendant attended, and made submissions, and then elected not to remain for the balance of the hearing.
The terms of the chamber summons of 11 March 2025 are as follows:
1.The Second Defendants be committed for contempt of this Honourable Court, by their conduct between around 18 February 2025 and 26 February 2025 in publishing to persons associated with the 'Sovereign Peoples Assembly of Western Australia' statements contained in a document titled 'Statement of Claim' (created on 16 February 2025 and printed on 18 February 2025) which statements conveyed imputations set out in [119(a)] of the reasons for judgment published in this matter on 15 January 2025 contrary to order 3 of the orders of the Honourable Justice Tottle made on 15 January 2025.
2.The Second Defendants pay the costs of this application on an indemnity basis, to be assessed if not agreed.
The terms of the chamber summons of 1 April 2025 are as follows:
1.The Second Defendants be committed for contempt of this Honourable Court, by their conduct during a meeting (described as a 'Common Law Court Hearing') on 30 March 2025 in publishing to 12 persons associated with the 'Sovereign Peoples Assembly of Western Australia' statements conveying the imputations set out in [119(a)] of the reasons for judgment published in this matter on 15 January 2025 contrary to order 3 of the orders of the Honourable Justice Tottle made on 15 January 2025.
2.The Second Defendants pay the costs of this application on an indemnity basis, to be assessed if not agreed.
It is appropriate that I make something clear at the outset: this application is of a limited compass. It is concerned with the singular question of whether there has been disobedience of the orders of Tottle J of 15 January 2025, and in particular order 3. I shall refer to the orders of this court made by Tottle J on 15 January 2025 as the Orders.
My consideration of this application begins necessarily on the basis that an order has been made, and that unless and until an order of this court has been set aside, it is valid, in force, and must be obeyed. This application is not the occasion to look behind the order, and consider or determine its validity, much less whether it somehow constitutes a breach of the law, or, as was submitted in closing submissions by the second defendant Mr Martin, crimes against humanity. It is important that it be understood that this application is directed to the question of whether the orders were disobeyed.

The reasons and orders of Tottle J

Before turning to the terms of order 3 of the Orders, it is necessary to refer to the reasons for the decision of Tottle J, to which those orders relate. Tottle J's reasons are published in the decision that bears the citation, Michelmore v Brown & Ors [No 3] [2025] WASC 9 (Michelmore). The first paragraph of his Honour's reasons provides a succinct summary of the background context. That paragraph is as follows:
The plaintiff is a legal practitioner who sues for damages for defamation. The defendants are former clients of the plaintiff. The action arises from the publication of two e-mails containing statements impugning the plaintiff's integrity and professional competence. One e‑mail was published by the first defendant, and one e-mail was published by all the defendants. The statements were grossly defamatory of the plaintiff. They had no foundation in fact. They were wholly indefensible and should never have been made.
As his Honour's reasons explain, the actions against Mr and Ms Martin concerned an email sent by them on 31 July 2023. The precise terms of that email are set out in appendix 2 of Tottle J's reasons. The email was sent by Mr Martin, and concluded: 'Regards, Jerry Martin and Emma Martin.'
His Honour found that the email was sent by Mr Martin on behalf of both himself and Ms Martin. As the introductory paragraph set out above demonstrates, Tottle J found the email to be grossly defamatory of the plaintiff. The relevant conclusions of Tottle J are set out in [119] of his Honour's reasons as follows:
I find the 31 July 2023 email conveyed the following imputations:
(a)There were reasonable grounds for investigating whether in the course of providing legal services the plaintiff had committed the following crimes:
i.compounding or concealing an offence or offences within the meaning of s 136, Criminal Code WA;
ii.corrupting a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of s 130, Criminal Code WA;
iii.deceiving a witness or witnesses in proceedings before the Supreme Court of Western Australia within the meaning of s 130, Criminal Code WA;
iv.conspiring with unnamed persons to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of s 135, Criminal Code WA;
v.attempting to pervert the course of justice within the meaning of s 143, Criminal Code WA; and
vi.fraud within the meaning of s 409, Criminal Code WA.
(b)There were reasonable grounds for investigating whether the plaintiff was not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner.
Tottle J concluded that the imputations were clearly defamatory. Tottle J rejected the defences that were advanced on behalf of the second defendants. Tottle J also granted injunctive relief. In that context, his Honour made the following remarks:[1]
The plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction restraining the publication of defamatory imputations by the defendants. The conduct of the defendants towards the plaintiff is reminiscent of a vendetta against her. In my judgment there is a real possibility that unless restrained the defendants will make statements that repeat the defamatory imputations conveyed by the two emails. The plaintiff is entitled to the injunctive relief sought by her.
[1] Michelmore [143].
It was in respect of those reasons and conclusions that Tottle J made the Orders. Order 3 of the Orders was in the following terms:
The defendants, by their servants, agents, or howsoever otherwise, be prohibited from publishing statements of, and concerning the plaintiff, conveying any one or more of the imputations set out in paragraphs 104 and 119 of the reasons for judgment, published in this matter on 15 January 2025, or any imputations of a like nature.
The plaintiff filed submissions dated 11 March 2025 in support of the application the subject of the first chamber summons, that is, the chamber summons dated 11 March 2025. The submissions clarify that the plaintiff's allegation is that the second defendants conveyed the imputation set out in [119(a)] of Tottle J's reasons for judgment.
The plaintiff did not file written submissions in respect of the second chamber summons, that is the chamber summons of 1 April 2025. However, in oral submissions, counsel for the plaintiff clarified that the second application was also directed to the imputations contained in [119(a)] of Tottle J's reasons. I thus understood that the written submissions were to be directed towards my consideration of the application in each of the chamber summonses.

Legal principles

I turn now to the legal principles.
The court has an inherent power to deal with cases of contempt, which constitute interference with the course of justice, and strike at the very heart of the administration of justice.[2] State Supreme Courts have a well- established jurisdiction to exercise a summary power of punishing contempts of court, for the purpose of preventing interference with the course of justice.[3] The underlying rationale for the exercise of the contempt power is to uphold and protect the effective administration of justice.[4]
[2] R v Eades 6 WAR 532.
[3] R v Dunbabin; Ex Parte Williams [1935] 53 CLR 443.
[4] Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd v Allen [2012] WASC 258 (Perpetual), Beech J [24] and see cases cited there.
In addition, Order 55 rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 provides:
Committal for Contempt of Court
...the power of a court to punish the contempt of court may be exercised by an order of committal, made by a judge or judge of appeal sitting alone.
Order 55 rule 4 makes plain that applications for committal for contempt include disobedience to orders of the court made by a judge. In addition, s 97 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) provides that Division 2 of Part 5 applies if a judgment requires, or has the effect of requiring, a person to not do an act, to cease doing an act, or to do an act, other than to pay money, or give possession of any real property or personal property to another person. Section 98 provides that if a natural person disobeys the judgment to which Division 2 applies, the person is guilty of a contempt of court.
Those sources of the court's power to punish for contempt illustrate, as Quinlan CJ recently observed:[5]
While previously the exclusive province of the common law, contempt by disobedience of a court order is now a form of contempt provided for by statute.
[5] Mammoth Investments v Donaldson [2024] WASCA 71 (Mammoth) [13].
Quinlan CJ went on to provide the following summary of the relevant principles (citations omitted):
The elements required to establish contempt by disobedience to a court order have been set out in many previous decisions of this Court. They may relevantly be summarised as follows:
(a)an order was made by the court;
(b)the terms of the order were clear, unambiguous and capable of being complied with;
(c)the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the terms of the order, or at least its substance; and
(d)the alleged contemnor 'disobeyed' the order.
The notion of 'disobedience' is important. The conduct alleged to be a contempt must be 'deliberate' or 'voluntary', although it is not necessary to prove that the alleged contemnor knew that their conduct was in breach of the order. It is sufficient that the alleged contemnor is aware of facts that make their conduct a breach of the order.
Historically there has been considerable discussion regarding whether an application for contempt is a criminal or civil procedure. The distinction is not critical in applications such as this. As Beech J observed in Perpetual Trustees of Victoria v Allen (citations omitted):[6]
An allegation of contempt is criminal in nature. All elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
[6] Perpetual [18].
Quinlan CJ summarised the position in that regard as follows:[7]
Unless the alleged disobedience involves deliberate defiance or is contumacious, disobedience of a court order involves a civil (rather than a criminal) contempt. Nevertheless, the criminal standard of proof applies to both civil and criminal contempt. That is, the onus of establishing the conduct which amounts to a contempt of court lies on the person alleging the contempt, and the facts demonstrating that the contempt has been committed must be established on admissible evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
[7] Mammoth [17].
Proof of contempt must be by admissible evidence. A contempt application is not an interlocutory application, so hearsay evidence is not admissible under order 37 of the Supreme Court Rules1971 (WA).[8]
[8] Perpetual [29].

The evidence and findings

I turn now to the evidence. As noted, the plaintiff bears the onus of proving the contempt by admissible evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The plaintiff filed the following affidavits in support of the applications, which I received into evidence over the objections of the second defendants. They were the affidavits of the plaintiff dated 11 March 2025, (Exhibit A), 14 April 2025, (Exhibit B), and 17 April 2025 (Exhibit C). In addition, affidavits were filed on behalf of the plaintiff by a process server, Graeme Coates, dated 16 April 2025. There were two affidavits which became respectively Exhibits D and E.
The second defendants each filed affidavits, which were each dated 17 April 2025, which became Exhibits F and G, and which I received into evidence without any objection taken by the plaintiff.
Further documents were filed or lodged by the second defendants. I received these into evidence, notwithstanding that they were not accompanied by or annexed to an affidavit, again without objection from the plaintiff. These documents were a document titled 'Sheriffs Office of Terra Australis Notice to Act' dated 11 April 2025, which became Exhibit H. By email on 22 April 2025 an updated version of that document was provided which became Exhibit I. A document entitled 'Reference: Emma and Jerry Martin and Synopsis of Events' dated 22 April 2025 became Exhibit J. A document provided on 31 March 2025 titled 'Court Verdict' became Exhibit K. A document provided on 28 March 2025, addressed to the 'American Citizen Services Unit, US Embassy in Australia, and Relevant US Oversight Agencies' became Exhibit L.
The plaintiff made an application for cross-examination of the second defendants. After hearing from both the plaintiff's counsel and the second defendants, I denied that application.
The evidence shows, and I find the following to have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
By email on Friday, 17 January 2025, the plaintiff provided to the second defendants, and indeed to all defendants, a copy of Tottle J's decision and the orders. Following that, on 21 January 2025 an email was sent by Jerald Martin to the plaintiff and others, including the court, with the subject heading, 'Letter from Sheriffs Office of Terra Australis'. The email attached a document with a letterhead and logo.
The letterhead is titled 'Sheriffs Office of Terra Australis Guardians of the Lore/Law', and includes a logo with the words 'Common Law' at the top and 'Sheriff' at the bottom, and in the middle a picture of some scales, presumably to represent the scales of justice:
That letterhead and logo was a common feature of the documents provided by the second defendants in response to Tottle J's reasons and the Orders.
Returning to the document attached to the email of 21 January 2025, paragraph 6 of the document stated:
Please be advised this matter is scheduled for a common law hearing 30 March 2025.
Paragraph 8 of the document stated:
The Supreme Court of Western Australia, a Court of inferior jurisdiction due to the nature of its privately owned status, is not permitted to make a judgment on this matter.
Paragraph 15 of that document referred specifically to order 3 of the Orders, which the second defendants characterised as a 'gag order'.
I pause there to note that the second defendants in their oral submissions emphasised that there were dates well prior to 21 January 2025 on which they advised that they were taking the matter to what they characterised as a common law court. The second defendants emphasised that on 18 December 2024 they 'called a mistrial due to failures of due process.'
The second defendants emphasised and reiterated that they had advised of their view that the process and the proceedings before Tottle J had 'miscarried' and constituted a form of 'mistrial' by 18 December 2024, and they reiterated that on 13 January 2025 prior to the commencement of the trial before Tottle J. The second defendants emphasised that by 18 December 2024, they had already advised that they were taking the matter to what they described as a common law court on 30 March 2025.
Returning to the document attached to the email of 21 January 2025, I also observe that the document asserted at paragraph 15 that the Orders were null and void, and concluded with the advice that a common law court had been convened for 30 March 2025.
The assertion of 'null and void' was a fairly constant theme in the documents filed or lodged by, or on behalf of, or in support of, the second defendants.
On 6 February 2025, a further email was sent to the plaintiff and to the court. That email was from Jerald Martin, and the subject matter was 'Please see attached PDF'. The attachment bore a letterhead with a logo. The letterhead stated that it was from 'The Office of :jerald-gleason: martin, Executor and Beneficiary of this Express Trust - Vessel: Jerald Gleason Martin IV - ' with a passport number and a logo with the words 'Executor and Beneficiary :jerald-gleason: martin IV':
The letter purported to be addressed to the Supreme Court of Western Australia or perhaps to Tottle J. The letter began under the date of 5 February 2025 with the heading in capitals: 'NOTICE OF OBJECTION UNDER COMMON LAW'. It then set out the words:
WE, the Living Souls, Executors and Beneficiaries of our Estate, bring forth this formal Notice of Objection under the authority of Common Law in response to the unlawful orders and demands contained in the letter dated 4 February 2025 from L.J. Michelmore.
The letter went on to assert, in effect, that the Supreme Court was a court of inferior jurisdiction. Paragraph 4 of that document asserted that:
4.1… this court has acted outside of lawful jurisdiction.
4.2 Therefore We have transferred the matter to a Common Law Court where it will be heard before a jury of our peers.
Under the heading 'FINAL NOTICE' the letter said:
Let it be known that the Common Law Court shall be the final authority on this matter.
The document went on to state:
All orders issued under statutory courts that have failed to provide a fair hearing are void ab initio and hold no lawful standing.
On 26 February 2025, Ms Michelmore received an email with the subject 'Court Documents Attached'. The email attached what appears to be a number of documents. The body of the email stated:
Please find attached court documents, statement of claim, and summons to appear.

The documents attached to the email from what is described as a 'court officer' included reference to a website, wacommonlaw.au. On 10 March 2025, Ms Michelmore accessed that website and printed off documents from it. Those documents included the following. First, there is a document with a logo and the words 'Sovereign Peoples Assembly of Western Australia' and the words 'Welcome to' in the middle of the logo, and then a title, 'Sovereign Peoples Assembly of Western Australia':
There is then a photo of some people gathered together and under the title 'Our Assembly'. The page then reads:
The Assembly/community is a gathering of people in a local area to self-govern. It is from the people that the sheriffs and courts draw their authority.
There is then a photo of a group of people that appear to be in a uniform, and under the photo is the heading 'Our Sheriffs'. Under that there is commentary:
Common Law Sheriffs work for the Community. They protect the unalienable rights of every man and woman.
There is then a section with a picture of people seated at tables and what appears to be something akin to an audience behind them, and under the photo is the heading 'Our Court'. It then states:
The Common Law Court is convened by the People. It is free to everyone. There are no presiding judges or lawyers.
There is then a page headed 'Court' with the further heading, 'Why Use The Common Law Court Process?' That section begins with the words:
We the people have the unalienable right to establish among ourselves a Common Law Court that defends against any tyranny or violence perpetuated against us and protects the inherent liberties and sovereignty of all men and women. The Common Law Court arises from the conscious consent and participation of the people and is the direct responsibility of all people.
And then the statement:
For the people, by the people.
The document then sets out 11 steps for a 'Common Law Court' hearing:
There is then a page from the website entitled 'How to Submit a Statement of Claim'. That reads:
If you have decided that you would like to commence a common law court hearing, you will need to submit a Peoples Notice of Statement and Claim of Right.
It states that the submitted form is emailed to the court coordinator.
Returning to the documents attached to the email of 26 February 2025, that email also attached the document entitled:
The document then sets out what appears to be a 'summons' from the second defendants to the plaintiff advising her that she was required by service of the summons to appear before Sovereign Peoples Assembly Common Law Court via Zoom on Sunday, 30 March at 9:15 am to answer the statement of claim by the second defendants. The purported writ of peoples' summons was signed by two people, each purporting to be or describing themselves as a court officer.
The email of 26 February 2025 also included what appears to be a further document said to have been created on 16 February 2025 and printed on 18 February 2025, and I so find. That document is headed 'Peoples Notice of Statement and Claim of Right'.
I observe that the title of the document indicates that it is precisely the document that the website to which I have already referred advises that a claimant must submit in order to commence a common law court hearing.
The 'Statement and Claim of Right' contained claims that the plaintiff had committed various criminal offences, and contained purported particulars of those alleged offences. They appear to be allegations that the plaintiff committed criminal offences in relation to legal proceedings in the Supreme Court, that is the proceedings before Tottle J, and possibly in the Magistrates Court as well. The document purported to make claims for financial compensation well in excess of $10 million.
I find beyond reasonable doubt that those documents were prepared and that they were then sent to the plaintiff, as set out in her affidavit.
The plaintiff swore a further affidavit on 14 April 2025. That affidavit attaches a further email dated 31 March 2025 (sent at 4:29 pm) from what is described as the 'Court Officer, SPAWA Common Law Court'. The email attaches a document as follows:

The substantive body of the document advises, among other things, at paragraph 1.4, that:
A jury of 12 competent, capable and upstanding men and women of Perth in Western Australia* have carefully considered extensive evidence presented by The Claimants.
And at paragraph 2.3:
All Claims were considered individually by the Jury.
A second email sent on the same date at 4:43 pm attached a document headed 'Notice to Act', purportedly addressed to, among others, the Supreme Court of Western Australia. Among many other things, the notice asserted that the Supreme Court, (at least when spelt in capital letters), represented a 'privately owned language of a privately owned structure of CORPORATIONS.' The document went on to assert that:
These matters render the SUPREME COURT of WESTERN AUSTRALIA, fit to be permanently dismantled and closed …
I further find that the following matters have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
I find that the second defendants submitted to the people administering the 'Sovereign Peoples Assembly' or the 'Court of Common Law', however it is variously described, the document titled 'Peoples Notice of Statement and Claim of Right', otherwise described as a Statement of Claim on the website to which I have referred.
I find beyond reasonable doubt that the second defendants submitted that to the people who administered that process. I find beyond reasonable doubt, by submitting that document to those people, each of the defendants published statements of and concerning the plaintiff, that the plaintiff had committed criminal offences under s 130, s 131, s 135, s 136, s 143 and s 409 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) (Criminal Code).
I further find beyond reasonable doubt that an assembly of 12 people considered the claims so submitted by the second defendants, and each of the second defendants thereby published to each of those 12 people statements of and concerning the plaintiff that the plaintiff had committed the criminal offences to which I have already referred under the Criminal Code.
I further find beyond reasonable doubt that each of the second defendants have consistently and repeatedly asserted that they are not bound by the Orders, and that they consider that the authority of this court is subordinate to another authority which they have characterised as the Sovereign Peoples Assembly or the Common Law Court.
The affidavit evidence filed on behalf of the plaintiff and, indeed, also by the second defendants themselves, established beyond reasonable doubt that each of the defendants were advised of the Orders. This included evidence that the Orders and Tottle J's reasons were provided to each of Mr and Ms Martin.
The affidavit evidence also included correspondence from Mr and Ms Martin which established beyond reasonable doubt that they were aware of Tottle J's reasons and the Orders.

Defence

I turn to the affidavits and materials filed by on behalf of or in support of the defendants. They are replete with the following features. They reflect grievances regarding the legal representation provided to them by the plaintiff and grievances regarding the legal processes in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, the Magistrates Court and the Legal Practice Board. Those grievances were referred to by the second defendants before me at the hearing, at least in summary form.
Those materials and submissions reflect deep grievances on the part of the second defendants that they have been treated unjustly. They also reflect a deeply held conviction that there is some form of parallel legal process to which this court, the Supreme Court of Western Australia, is subordinate, which renders the Orders ineffective or null and void, and, in any event, not binding on them.
The affidavits filed by each of the defendants contains the following statements at paragraphs 9 and 10. First at paragraph 9 under the heading 'Common Law Court hearing on 30 March 2025':
On 30 March 2025 we lawfully participated in a Common Law Court hearing before a full jury conducted under the Sovereign Peoples Assembly of Western Australia. This was scheduled following our declared mistrial and public filing into the Supreme Court. At no time did we intend to breach any Supreme Court order. We exercised our right to be heard before a competent court after this court had denied our defence and gagged us while refusing to provide a transcript and is paid for. That record was previously provided in other matters free of charge.
Paragraph 10 of the affidavits of each of the second defendants under the heading 'Emails and Documents Attached by the Plaintiff' stated:
The plaintiff's affidavit relies on two emails dated 31 March 2025 sent from common law officers. We had no role in authorising these communications. They do not reflect our personal speech and were not published by us. Any materials referenced by the plaintiff stemmed from an independently convened jury process after we had formally and lawfully removed ourselves from proceedings due to a failure of lawful due process. Therefore, reliance on those materials to justify contempt or violence restraining orders is procedurally improper.
The affidavits and materials filed by or in support of the second defendants further established beyond reasonable doubt that the second defendants were aware of Tottle J's reasons and the Orders. They further established beyond reasonable doubt that the second defendants participated in what they characterised as a common law court hearing on 30 March 2025 relating to their grievances, and they further confirmed beyond reasonable doubt that the second defendants regard this court's authority as subordinate to the authority of the Sovereign Peoples Assembly or the Common Law Court.
I find all of those matters that I have referred to beyond reasonable doubt. By reason of those findings that I have made, I have found that each of the defendants have published statements of and concerning the plaintiff containing the imputations set out in [119(a)] of the reasons for judgment of Tottle J published 15 January 2025 as alleged in each of the applications.
Accordingly, each of the defendants have contravened the Orders.
I made some comments at the beginning of my reasons about the singular issue to which the application is directed. I need to say a little more about the importance of obedience to court orders, whatever one's personal beliefs (to which every person is entitled).
The upholding and protection of the effective administration of justice ultimately depends upon respect for and obedience to orders of a court duly constituted by the Parliament. The rule of law in civil society cannot be maintained if individual members of the community regard this court's orders as subordinate to some other form of governance that is unauthorised by the democratic process manifested in legislation duly resolved by the Parliament.
It matters not whether a conviction or belief to the contrary is genuinely held, persuasive, rational, or otherwise. In this instance, I do not doubt that the convictions expressed by the defendants are genuinely held and that their views reflect beliefs held by others, perhaps many others. I also do not doubt that they feel genuinely aggrieved and that they feel they have been unjustly dealt with.
That said, the strength of the second defendants' convictions and the growing ubiquity of their beliefs render their disregard for the authority of the court's orders all the more problematic and, indeed, dangerous to the welfare and cohesion of our society.
It follows that materials filed by and in support of the second defendants regarding the status of this court, the grievances they genuinely hold regarding the legal system, and the existence of a parallel pseudo-legal system provide no defence to the charges of contempt. The second defendants are entitled to have grievances about the legal system. We are indeed privileged to live in a society that permits dissent and grievances to be aired, including in relation to the legal system and court decisions. Indeed, the system of appeals in particular is designed to accommodate those grievances.
However, for the reasons I have given, the avenues of grievance do not include disobedience to, or contravention of, orders of the court. Were it otherwise, anarchy would ultimately prevail; or in the grave but sage description of one historic text, were it not for the fear of such authority, each person would swallow their neighbour alive.[9] History, including very recent history, reminds us that such colourful depictions ought not to be dismissed as the mere hyperbole of the ancients.
[9] Mishnah, Tractate Avot Chapter 3 No. 2 (translated by Dr Joshua Kulp) and see also generally Hobbes T, Leviathan (1651).
The second defendants have said they did not intend to breach any Supreme Court order. However, that statement is made in the context of the assertion that this court's orders are subordinate to a parallel pseudo-common law court hearing. The defendants have repeatedly asserted that this court's orders are null and void, and indeed that this court ought to be dismantled. They have repeatedly said that the proceedings before Tottle J were a mistrial. Understood in their context, the defendants' denial of their intent is illusory and of no assistance to their defence for these applications.
The second defendants in their affidavits also point to the fact that the relevant emails were sent from the 'common law officers', the second defendants had no role in authorising those communications, and that the materials relied upon by the plaintiff stem from an independently convened 'jury process'. That aspect of the defence to these applications misunderstands the content of the charges of contempt. The allegations of contempt are not constituted by the communications from the common law officers. Rather, they are constituted by communications from the second defendants themselves to the people administering the parallel pseudo-legal process and to the twelve people constituting the purported jury.

Conclusions

I turn, then, to each of the elements of the allegation of contempt. I find that an order was made by the court in the form of order 3 of the Orders. I find that the terms of order 3 were clear, unambiguous and capable of being complied with.
I find that that the second defendants had knowledge of and were aware of the terms of order 3 of the Orders.
In the circumstances I find beyond reasonable doubt that the relevant conduct of each of the second defendants is deliberate and voluntary, and that each of the second defendants therefore disobeyed order 3 of the Orders.
For those reasons I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that each of the second defendants, Mr and Ms Martin, committed the contempts alleged.
Those are my reasons for holding the second defendants in contempt. I am going to timetable a separate hearing for the punishment or the penalty.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
LZ
Associate to the Honourable Justice Solomon
2 MAY 2025