Michelle Herbert and Paul Staunton v Jo Schmid

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995



DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Michelle Herbert and Paul Staunton to an application under section 92 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) by Jo Schmid for removal of trade mark number 1878383 (25) – SALTIES – in the name of Michelle Herbert and Paul Staunton

Delegate:

Nicholas Smith

Representation:

Opponent: Self-represented

Applicant: Self-represented

Decision:

2023 ATMO 19

Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) - section 96 opposition to s 92(4)(a) application for removal – intent to use inherent in filing of Trade Mark application – opponent asserts its intention at the filing date to use the Trade Mark – evidence of actual use of the Trade Mark for the Registered Goods – Trade Mark to remain on Register in its current form

Background

  1. This decision is pursuant to an application made on 23 September 2021 under s 92(4)(a)[1] of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) by Jo Schmid (‘Applicant’) to remove the trade mark detailed below from the Register of Trade Marks.  The application is made in respect of all the goods for which the trade mark is registered, that is, the application is for complete removal of the trade mark.

    [1] The application was initially made under ss 92(4)(a) and (b) of the Act however the application was subsequently amended to remove reference to s 92(4)(b).

Registration No.

1878383

Lodgement date

11 October 2017

Goods

Class 25: Apparel (clothing, footwear, headgear)

 (‘Registered Goods’)

Owner

Michelle Herbert and Paul Staunton

Trade Mark

SALTIES

(‘Trade Mark’)

2.  Unless otherwise indicated, any references to sections or regulations in this decision are references to sections or regulations of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Act’) or the Trade Marks Regulations 1995 (Cth) (‘Regulations’), respectively.

3.  Michelle Herbert and Paul Staunton (collectively ‘Opponent’) have opposed the application to remove the Trade Mark, filing a Notice of Intention to Oppose removal on 17 December 2021 and a Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’) on the same day.  The Applicant filed a Notice of Intention to Defend on 21 March 2022.

  1. The Opponent subsequently filed evidence in support of its opposition to removal (‘EIS’).  The Applicant filed evidence in answer (‘EIA’) and the Opponent filed evidence in reply (‘EIR’).  This material will be discussed in more detail below.

    5.  Once the time allowed for filing evidence had ended the parties were given an opportunity to request a hearing in this matter or a decision without hearing.  The Opponent requested that the matter proceed to a decision without hearing and paid the appropriate fee.  As a result the matter has been allocated to a delegate of the Registrar for a decision based on the written record.

    6.  I am a delegate of the Registrar and the matter has been allocated to me to decide, which I have done, on the basis of the…

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Details
Case
[2023] ATMO 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Michelle Herbert and Paul Staunton (the Applicants) sought the removal of a registered trade mark from the register under section 92(4)(a) of the *Trade Marks Act 1995* (Cth) on the grounds that they alleged the registered owner (the Opponent) did not intend to use the trade mark in good faith. The dispute concerned the Opponent's intention to use its registered trade mark for apparel. The matter was heard by Nicholas Smith, Hearing Officer and Delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Opponent had demonstrated an intention to use the registered trade mark in good faith at the relevant date, as required by section 92(4)(a) of the Act. The Applicants contended that the Opponent's evidence of use was limited and that the apparel displayed a different logo, not the registered trade mark.

The Hearing Officer considered the onus of proof, noting that under section 100 of the Act, the onus rests on the Opponent. However, drawing on established case law, the Hearing Officer found that in applications for removal under section 92(4)(a), where the allegation concerns the applicant's state of mind regarding their intention to use a mark in good faith, the onus is not high. The Hearing Officer was satisfied that at the relevant date, the Opponent intended to authorise the use of the trade mark for the registered goods, thereby establishing its opposition to the removal application.

The Hearing Officer decided that the Opponent had successfully established its opposition to the removal of the trade mark. Consequently, costs were awarded against the Applicants in favour of the Opponent.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Annexures to Herbert/Staunton 1 contain examples of the design of apparel bearing the Salties Nation Logo, photos of the finalised apparel (t-shirts) bearing the Salties Nation Logo, Facebook and Instagram pages bearing the Trade Mark and handwritten invoices dated 2018 to Salties Au Pty Ltd for the sale of t-shirts that are claimed to bear the Trade Mark (but may in fact bear the Salties Nation Logo).Applicant’s Evidence The material in the Schmid declaration is difficult to summarise as much of it relates to issues that are not relevant to consideration of an application under s 92(4)(a). In particular the declaration canvasses the following issues in detail which I have not summarised as they are not relevant to my decision:· Whether or not the Opponent was using the Trade Mark at the date on which the application for removal was filed; and· The interaction between the Opponent and the Applicant including the decision of the Opponent not to provide consent for the Applicant’s trade mark application. The relevant claims/statements in the Schmid declaration can be summarised as follows:· The evidence of the Opponent’s use of the Trade Mark is limited as their evidence of sales is hand written and not certified and they have not filed detailed financial statements;· The Opponent has not set out a detailed business website, address or contact details which indicates that they were operating an active business;· The Opponent’s t-shirts were not designed using the Trade Mark – rather they displayed the Salties Nation Logo; and· Some of the Opponent’s evidence of use of the Trade Mark postdates the date on which the application for removal was filed. The Annexures to the Schmid declaration contain posts from the Opponent’s social media pages which the Applicant submits suggest that the Opponent is not actively offering any apparel for sale as well as further photos from the Opponent’s social media pages which indicate that the Opponent’s t-shirts in fact display the Salties Nation Logo and not the Trade Mark.Discussion Though the onus is, in terms of s 100, on the Opponent in this matter, that onus is not particularly arduous. In Aston v Harlee Manufacturing Co[3] Fullagar J observed:[…] the making of the application itself is, I think, to be regarded as prima facie evidence of intention to use. I cannot think that the Registrar is called upon to institute an inquiry as to the intention of any applicant, and I think that, on … a motion to expunge, the burden must rest on … the person aggrieved, of proving the absence of intention. Again, I do not think that “intention” in this connexion ought to be regarded as meaning an intention to use immediately or within any limited time.[3] [1960] HCA 47; (1960) 103 CLR 391; [1960] ALR 605; 34 ALJR 242, [21]. While this observation was made in proceedings under the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), where the onus was on ‘the person aggrieved’ (that is, an applicant for removal), the principle has been held to be sound under the Act. In Structureco Inc v Starite Distributors Pty Ltd[4] the Registrar’s delegate Mr Forno said:Although the opponent to removal does bear the initial onus, in accordance with the legislation, I think that, in the case of applications for removal under s.92(4)(a), where the primary allegation regards the state of mind of an applicant for registration about whether it intends to use a mark in good faith, then that onus is not high. I believe that it is so low that it can be overcome if the opponent or its agent states that it was the case that the applicant for registration had an intention to use the mark in good faith. The onus should then shift to the removal applicant to support its case - perhaps by the production of some evidence which might support a circumstantial case of a lack of good faith, or by some other means.[4] [2000] ATMO 31.

Decision

Reasons for decision

I am satisfied that at the relevant date the Opponent intended to authorise the use the Trade Mark for the Registered Goods. The Opponent has established its opposition in relation to s 92(4)(a). Decision I decide that the Opponent has established its opposition to removal in respect of the Registered Goods. Costs25. The Opponent has been successful in relation to its opposition to the application for removal of the Trade Mark and has requested its costs. I direct that costs in relation to trade mark registration number 1878383 be awarded against the Applicant in accordance with Schedule 8 of the Regulations.Nicholas SmithHearing OfficerDelegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks14 February 2023

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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