FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Gilmour [2012] FCA 568
Citation: MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Gilmour [2012] FCA 568 Parties: MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177 v MALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR and MAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607; MALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR and MAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607; MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177 and ALBERTO CESARIO VINCIGUERRA File number: WAD 256 of 2010 Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 31 May 2012 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – variation to freezing order Cases cited: Bird v McComb (No 3) [2011] FCA 697 Date of hearing: 25 May 2012 Date of last submissions: 31 May 2012 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr D Solomon Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Solomon Brothers Counsel for the Defendants: Mr K Dundo Solicitor for the Defendants: Q Legal
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 256 of 2010
BETWEEN: MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177
PlaintiffMALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR
First Cross-ClaimantMAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607
Second Cross-ClaimantAND: MALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR
First DefendantMAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607
Second DefendantMG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177
First Cross-RespondentALBERTO CESARIO VINCIGUERRA
Second Cross-Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 MAY 2012
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The orders made by the Honourable Justice Barker on 16 April 2012 be varied to permit the defendants to pay from their liquid assets affected by those orders the following:
(a)the sum of $27,000 to meet legal services provided by the solicitors for the defendants to the defendants up to and including 2 May 2012;
(b)the sum of $35,000 to meet ongoing legal services in the conduct of this proceeding up to and including the trial;
(c)the sum of $15,000 to be paid to an expert witness to be engaged on behalf of the defendants to provide a expert report in relation to the allegations raised against the defendants in the statement of claim in the proceeding;
(d)a weekly allowance of $1,000 for usual living expenses for the first defendant;
(e)monthly mortgage payments as follows:
(i)$1,584 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(ii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;
(ii)$4,381.39 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(iii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;
including any additional amounts arising from variations in the interest rate charged on the mortgages in respect of the properties by the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited.
2.The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of this application to be taxed, if not agreed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 256 of 2010
BETWEEN: MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177
Plaintiff
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 568
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The orders made by the Honourable Justice Barker on 16 April 2012 be varied to permit the defendants to pay from their liquid assets affected by those orders the following:
(a) the sum of $27,000 to meet legal services provided by the solicitors for the defendants to the defendants up to and including 2 May 2012;
(b) the sum of $35,000 to meet ongoing legal services in the conduct of this proceeding up to and including the trial;
(c) the sum of $15,000 to be paid to an expert witness to be engaged on behalf of the defendants to provide a expert report in relation to the allegations raised against the defendants in the statement of claim in the proceeding;
(d) a weekly allowance of $1,000 for usual living expenses for the first defendant;
(e) monthly mortgage payments as follows:
(i) $1,584 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(ii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;
(ii) $4,381.39 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(iii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;
including any additional amounts arising from variations in the interest rate charged on the mortgages in respect of the properties by the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited.
2. The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of this application to be taxed, if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Otherwise the plaintiff relies on its written and oral submissions and submits the affidavit of means provides no further support for the application to vary.CONSIDERATION The plaintiff, save in respect of the question of the mortgage payments and a weekly allowance, strongly opposes any variation to the freezing order, for the primary reasons outlined above. The plaintiff refers to a number of authorities to suggest that interlocutory injunctions, including freezing orders, should ordinarily only be varied or discharged in exceptional circumstances and should only be varied where there has been a material change of circumstance since the original application was heard or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the Court at the hearing of the original application. On that basis the plaintiff says there should be no variation because the question of indebtedness to the solicitors by the defendants should have been raised at the freezing order hearing, as should have been the question of provision for continuing legal services in relation to this proceeding. Similarly, the question of an expert and the expenses associated with the expert should have been then raised. As to the amount of $10,000 to be paid to the former administrator, now liquidator, Mr Lopez, the plaintiff says that this is not an expense relevant to these proceedings and so there is no justification for any funds affected by the freezing order to be applied towards it. So far as the Court’s power to vary a freezing order is concerned, there can be little doubt about it. Similarly, it is also clear that having made a freezing order a court should not be quick to reverse it save for good reason and the dictates of justice. In making the order, I made it plain at [99] that the order was interlocutory in nature and made until judgment and it remained open to the defendants to apply to the Court to discharge or modify the orders should appropriate circumstances arise. That is a conventional statement of the circumstances in which discharge or variation might occur. There are numerous authorities, indeed too many to list, that make this point. It is sufficient for present purposes to refer to what her Honour, Collier J, said to similar effect at [28] of Bird v McComb (No 3) [2011] FCA 697 and the authorities there noted. Ultimately, the grant or discharge or variation of an interlocutory injunction, including a freezing order will be dictated by what justice demands in the particular circumstances of the case. When the freezing order was made in this case, the defendants did not make any submissions, even though they could have and did make submissions about other matters, concerning the amount of living expenses or the need to service mortgages in respect of certain properties owned by Mr Gilmour. Nor did they raise the question of their ongoing legal fees and the need to pay for an expert witness in this proceeding. Nonetheless, in my view, they are items that, in all the circumstances, fall into the category of what I might call refinements to the terms of the freezing order and do not strike at the basis of the grant of the freezing order or otherwise seek to undermine the basis upon which the freezing order was granted. This is not a case, therefore, where it can truly be said that the terms of the variation in substance constitute an appeal against the order earlier made. These sorts of expenses should have been thought about earlier but obviously were not given proper attention on behalf of the defendants at the time the freezing order application was argued and the freezing order granted.