MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Gilmour

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Gilmour [2012] FCA 568

Citation: MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd v Gilmour [2012] FCA 568
Parties: MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177 v MALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR and MAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607; MALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR and MAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607; MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177 and ALBERTO CESARIO VINCIGUERRA
File number: WAD 256 of 2010
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 31 May 2012
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – variation to freezing order
Cases cited: Bird v McComb (No 3) [2011] FCA 697
Date of hearing: 25 May 2012
Date of last submissions: 31 May 2012
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Plaintiff: Mr D Solomon
Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Solomon Brothers
Counsel for the Defendants: Mr K Dundo
Solicitor for the Defendants: Q Legal

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 256 of 2010

BETWEEN:

MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177
Plaintiff

MALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR
First Cross-Claimant

MAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607
Second Cross-Claimant

AND:

MALCOLM STEWART GILMOUR
First Defendant

MAGIL NOMINEES PTY LTD ACN 009 059 607
Second Defendant

MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177
First Cross-Respondent

ALBERTO CESARIO VINCIGUERRA
Second Cross-Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 MAY 2012

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The orders made by the Honourable Justice Barker on 16 April 2012 be varied to permit the defendants to pay from their liquid assets affected by those orders the following:

(a)the sum of $27,000 to meet legal services provided by the solicitors for the defendants to the defendants up to and including 2 May 2012;

(b)the sum of $35,000 to meet ongoing legal services in the conduct of this proceeding up to and including the trial;

(c)the sum of $15,000 to be paid to an expert witness to be engaged on behalf of the defendants to provide a expert report in relation to the allegations raised against the defendants in the statement of claim in the proceeding;

(d)a weekly allowance of $1,000 for usual living expenses for the first defendant;

(e)monthly mortgage payments as follows:

(i)$1,584 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(ii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;

(ii)$4,381.39 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(iii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;

including any additional amounts arising from variations in the interest rate charged on the mortgages in respect of the properties by the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited.

2.The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of this application to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 256 of 2010

BETWEEN:

MG CORROSION CONSULTANTS PTY LTD ACN 084 715 177
Plaintiff

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 568
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd sought a variation of a freezing order against Gilmour and Magil Nominees, to allow them to pay certain expenses from their liquid assets. The court was required to decide whether the application for variation should be granted, considering the circumstances and the principles governing the variation of interlocutory injunctions. The court reasoned that while the expenses raised in the variation application should have been considered earlier, they did not undermine the basis of the original freezing order. The court found that justice demanded allowing the variation in this instance, and thus granted the application. The orders made by the Honourable Justice Barker on 16 April 2012 were varied to permit the defendants to pay from their liquid assets affected by those orders certain expenses, including legal fees, ongoing legal services, an expert witness, living expenses, and mortgage payments. The defendants were also ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The orders made by the Honourable Justice Barker on 16 April 2012 be varied to permit the defendants to pay from their liquid assets affected by those orders the following:

(a) the sum of $27,000 to meet legal services provided by the solicitors for the defendants to the defendants up to and including 2 May 2012;

(b) the sum of $35,000 to meet ongoing legal services in the conduct of this proceeding up to and including the trial;

(c) the sum of $15,000 to be paid to an expert witness to be engaged on behalf of the defendants to provide a expert report in relation to the allegations raised against the defendants in the statement of claim in the proceeding;

(d) a weekly allowance of $1,000 for usual living expenses for the first defendant;

(e) monthly mortgage payments as follows:

(i) $1,584 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(ii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;

(ii) $4,381.39 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(iii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;

including any additional amounts arising from variations in the interest rate charged on the mortgages in respect of the properties by the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited.

2. The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of this application to be taxed, if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the conclusion of the hearing of the interlocutory application on 25 May 2012, at the request of counsel for Mr Gilmour and Magil Nominees, I gave those parties the opportunity to file and serve by 1 pm on Tuesday 29 May 2012 a further affidavit as to means and the opportunity for the parties thereafter to file further written submissions by 4pm, the following day.EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF VARIATION By an affidavit filed 3 May 2012, Mr Gilmour on behalf of both defendants stated in support of the variation application words to the effect:·His solicitors had informed him that he needed to pay them the sum of $26,976.28 to meet legal services provided up to and including 2 May 2012.·He had been advised by his solicitors that for the purpose of the hearing in the proceeding he would need to engage an expert witness to replace the late Mr Ruthven and complete preparation of non-expert witness statements.·That the estimated cost of a new expert witness, considering all the materials and preparing an expert report would be $35,000.·That the estimated costs of additional solicitors costs and disbursements including liaising with expert witnesses would be $50,000 (on the hearing of the variation application counsel for the defendants also being the solicitor for those parties indicated that the $50,000 estimate included work up to and including the trial in the proceeding).·He had received from George Lopez, the administrator of the plaintiff (now liquidator) a letter dated 17 April 2012 that in order to undertake and complete the tasks identified in that letter, the costs of investigation would be not less than $10,000. By further affidavit Mr Gilmour on behalf of the defendants filed 21 May 2012, Mr Gilmour further stated words to the effect:·The properties listed in paras 1(a)(ii) and 1(a)(iii) of the orders that are made on 16 April 2012 are mortgaged to Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ).·He had received from ANZ a letter dated 16 May 2012. That letter indicated that the current position of his lending with the ANZ was as follows:Account number 3684-55118 Loan expiry 11/1/13 Arrears $4,381.39Repayment interest only Next due 11/6/12 Account number 3711/72944 Loan expiry 5/7/13 Arrears $1,584.00Repayment interest only Next due 5/6/12·The bank stated that it holds registered mortgages over the properties known as Lot 4115 Jose Road, Bakers Hill and 4629 Great Eastern Highway, Bakers Hill which are held in support of both loans.·That in addition to being able to make repayments on the mortgages on the properties owned by him, he required a further amount of at least $1,000 per week to enable him to meet his usual living expenses, including food, electricity, water and gas, rates and taxes, fuel, clothing, personal hygiene items and entertainment expenses.·On 7 May 2012, Mr George Lopez was appointed the liquidator of the plaintiff but will still require $10,000 to conduct his investigation in relation to the “allegations contained in the Statement of Claim”.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In these circumstances orders to that effect should be made, along with an order that the defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application. In my view, the matters raised in the main are ones that could have been raised at the time the freezing order was made or that are not issues for which the plaintiff should have to bear the costs of responding. The plaintiff also reasonably acknowledged the appropriateness of some variations after the needs affidavit of Mr Gilmour was filed.CONCLUSION AND ORDERS I would make the following order:1.The orders made by the Honourable Justice Barker on 16 April 2012 be varied to permit the defendants to pay from their liquid assets affected by those orders the following:(a)the sum of $27,000 to meet legal services provided by the solicitors for the defendants to the defendants up to and including 2 May 2012;(b)the sum of $35,000 to meet ongoing legal services in the conduct of this proceeding up to and including the trial;(c)the sum of $15,000 to be paid to an expert witness to be engaged on behalf of the defendants to provide a expert report in relation to the allegations raised against the defendants in the statement of claim in the proceeding;(d)a weekly allowance of $1,000 for usual living expenses for the first defendant;(e)monthly mortgage payments as follows:(i)$1,584 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(ii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;(ii)$4,381.39 in respect of the property listed in para 1(a)(iii) of the orders made 16 April 2012;including any additional amounts arising from variations in the interest rate charged on the mortgages in respect of the properties by the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited.2.The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of this application to be taxed, if not agreed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Otherwise the plaintiff relies on its written and oral submissions and submits the affidavit of means provides no further support for the application to vary.CONSIDERATION The plaintiff, save in respect of the question of the mortgage payments and a weekly allowance, strongly opposes any variation to the freezing order, for the primary reasons outlined above. The plaintiff refers to a number of authorities to suggest that interlocutory injunctions, including freezing orders, should ordinarily only be varied or discharged in exceptional circumstances and should only be varied where there has been a material change of circumstance since the original application was heard or the discovery of new material which could not reasonably have been put before the Court at the hearing of the original application. On that basis the plaintiff says there should be no variation because the question of indebtedness to the solicitors by the defendants should have been raised at the freezing order hearing, as should have been the question of provision for continuing legal services in relation to this proceeding. Similarly, the question of an expert and the expenses associated with the expert should have been then raised. As to the amount of $10,000 to be paid to the former administrator, now liquidator, Mr Lopez, the plaintiff says that this is not an expense relevant to these proceedings and so there is no justification for any funds affected by the freezing order to be applied towards it. So far as the Court’s power to vary a freezing order is concerned, there can be little doubt about it. Similarly, it is also clear that having made a freezing order a court should not be quick to reverse it save for good reason and the dictates of justice. In making the order, I made it plain at [99] that the order was interlocutory in nature and made until judgment and it remained open to the defendants to apply to the Court to discharge or modify the orders should appropriate circumstances arise. That is a conventional statement of the circumstances in which discharge or variation might occur. There are numerous authorities, indeed too many to list, that make this point. It is sufficient for present purposes to refer to what her Honour, Collier J, said to similar effect at [28] of Bird v McComb (No 3) [2011] FCA 697 and the authorities there noted. Ultimately, the grant or discharge or variation of an interlocutory injunction, including a freezing order will be dictated by what justice demands in the particular circumstances of the case. When the freezing order was made in this case, the defendants did not make any submissions, even though they could have and did make submissions about other matters, concerning the amount of living expenses or the need to service mortgages in respect of certain properties owned by Mr Gilmour. Nor did they raise the question of their ongoing legal fees and the need to pay for an expert witness in this proceeding. Nonetheless, in my view, they are items that, in all the circumstances, fall into the category of what I might call refinements to the terms of the freezing order and do not strike at the basis of the grant of the freezing order or otherwise seek to undermine the basis upon which the freezing order was granted. This is not a case, therefore, where it can truly be said that the terms of the variation in substance constitute an appeal against the order earlier made. These sorts of expenses should have been thought about earlier but obviously were not given proper attention on behalf of the defendants at the time the freezing order application was argued and the freezing order granted.