Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp Dohme Corp

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp Dohme Corp [2019] FCA 1084

File number: NSD 610 of 2018
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 12 July 2019
Catchwords:

ESTOPPEL – issue estoppel – proper law of “co-existence” agreement – whether first respondent precluded from denying that agreement governed by German law – whether first respondent bound by issue estoppel arising out of proceedings between applicant and the first respondent in United Kingdom (“UK proceedings”) in which it was found that the agreement was governed by German law – whether test applied in UK proceedings was different from test to be applied under Australian law – whether issue estoppel would arise were different tests applied

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – abuse of process – whether the second and third respondents who are wholly owned subsidiaries of the first respondent and who were not party to the agreement or the UK proceedings are entitled to contend in this proceeding that the agreement is governed by New Jersey law – whether second and third respondents precluded from denying that agreement is governed by German law – whether an abuse of process for second and third respondents to deny agreement is governed by German law

Legislation:

Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 29, r 2

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 30.01

Cases cited:

Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Company Limited (1996) 188 CLR 418

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corp (No 3) (2016) 337 ALR 647

Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464

Bonython v Commonwealth (1950) 81 CLR 486

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd [No 2] [1967] 1 AC 853

Coast Lines Ltd vHudig & Veder NV [1971] 2 Lloyd’s Law Reports 390

Coast Lines Ltd. v Hudig Chartering (C.A.) [1972] 2 QB 34

Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport v Spirits International BV [2010] FCA 1293

Haines v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1995) NSWLR 404

Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363

Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp [2014] EWHC 3867 (Ch)

Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp & Dohme [2016] EWHC 49 (Pat)

Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp & Dohme [2017] EWCA Civ 1834

Mount Albert BC v Australasian Temperance & General Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd [1938] AC 224

O’Shane v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd (2013) 85 NSWLR 698

Ramsay v Pigram (1968) 118 CLR 271

Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1999) 217 ALR 495

Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd (2001) 53 NSWLR 198

Rogers v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251

Spirits International BV v Federal Treasury Enterprise (FKP) Sojuzplodoimport (2011) 91 IPR 438

State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Stenhouse Ltd [1997] Aust Torts Rep ¶81-423

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507

UBS AG v Tyne (2018) 360 ALR 184

Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly Contour Aerospace Ltd) [2014] AC 160

Wanganui-Rangitikei Electric Power Board v Australian Mutual Provident Society (1934) 50 CLR 581

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1084
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Merck KGaA v Merck Sharp Dohme Corp, the primary dispute centered on the governing law of certain agreements between the parties. The matter was brought before the court to determine whether the first respondent, Merck Sharp Dohme Corp, was estopped or precluded by abuse of process from denying that the agreements were governed by German law. The dispute arose from prior proceedings in the United Kingdom, where it was determined that the agreements were indeed governed by German law. The court was tasked with determining whether the findings of the UK courts could bind the first respondent in Australian proceedings and whether the second and third respondents, wholly owned subsidiaries of the first respondent, could contend that the agreements were governed by New Jersey law.

The central legal issues included whether the first respondent was bound by issue estoppel due to the UK court decisions and whether the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel would be different under Australian law. Additionally, the court had to decide whether it would be an abuse of process for the second and third respondents to deny that the agreements were governed by German law. The court had to consider whether the test applied in the UK proceedings differed from that applied under Australian law and whether the issue estoppel would still arise if different tests were applied.

The court found that the first respondent was indeed bound by issue estoppel due to the UK court decisions. The court held that the UK Governing Law Decision, the UK Appeal Judgment, and the UK Trial Judgment were determinative of the issue of the governing law of the agreements. The court noted that the UK judge had applied the English common law rules in determining the governing law, which was consistent with Australian law. The court concluded that there was no significant difference in the tests applied under Australian and UK law, and thus, the first respondent was estopped from denying that the agreements were governed by German law. The court also found that it would be an abuse of process for the second and third respondents to deny that the agreements were governed by German law.

The court made several orders, including that the first respondent was bound by issue estoppel regarding the governing law of the agreements. The interlocutory application was dismissed, and the costs of the proceeding were reserved. The case was listed for a case management hearing to be fixed by arrangement with the Associate to Nicholas J.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The following question (“the separate question”) be determined separately and before all other questions in this proceeding:

Is the First Respondent precluded from denying that the 1970 Agreement and the 1975 Protocol (as defined in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim) are governed by the law of the Federal Republic of Germany by reason of:

(a) estoppel; and/or

(b) abuse of process of this Court,

based on the judgments of the English Court in the UK Governing Law Decision, the UK Appeal Judgment and the UK Trial Judgment (as defined in paragraph [12] of the Court’s reasons for decision dated 12 July 2019)?

2. The separate question be answered as follows:

The First Respondent is bound by the doctrine of issue estoppel from denying that the 1970 Agreement and the 1975 Protocol (as defined in paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim) are governed by the law of the Federal Republic of Germany by reason of the judgments of the English Court in the UK Governing Law Decision, the UK Appeal Judgment and the UK Trial Judgment (as defined in paragraph [12] of the Court’s reasons for decision dated 12 July 2019).

3. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 5 October 2019 be otherwise dismissed.

4. Costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application and the determination of the separate question be reserved.

5. The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing on a date to be fixed by arrangement with the Associate to Nicholas J.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

The 1975 Protocol dealt with what were referred to as some minor problems relating to the interpretation of the 1970 Agreement. It is not necessary to refer to the provisions of the 1975 Protocol in any detail. It was common ground in the UK litigation that the 1975 Protocol was governed by the same law that governed the 1970 Agreement and that the 1970 Agreement was governed by the same law as the 1955 Agreement. The UK Governing Law Decision It is clear that the Judge who made the UK Governing Law Decision (Nugee J) was focused almost entirely on the governing law of the 1955 Agreement. This reflected the way in which the parties’ conducted the case, which led Nugee J to ask what was the system of law with which the 1955 Agreement had it closest and most real connection. Nugee J found that the 1955 Agreement was governed by German law rather than the law of New Jersey and that, since it was not disputed that the 1970 Agreement and the 1975 Protocol were governed by the same law as the 1955 Agreement, they were also governed by German law. One aspect of the 1955 Agreement upon which MSD placed much reliance during the course of the UK proceedings was found in cl 12, which provided:It is understood that Merck & Co. will submit this agreement to the United States Department of Justice for review and with the concurrence of the Department will seek an appropriate Court order that Merck & Co. is authorized to execute and carry out this agreement. This agreement shall not become effective until such a Court order has been entered. Clause 12 is to be understood against the background of an earlier agreement dated 17 November 1932 (“the Treaty Agreement”) which Nugee J said formalised existing arrangements between E. Merck and Merck & Co that “in effect divided up the world between them”. The existence of the Treaty Agreement gave rise to proceedings in the US District Court for the District of New Jersey commenced by the United States Department of Justice against Merck & Co and another corporation in October 1943 which culminated in a consent decree made by Judge Foreman on 6 October 1945 (“the 1945 Decree”) that required Merck & Co to file with the Department of Justice notice of any intention to make any further agreement with E. Merck relating to or affecting the business of either defendant and allowing the parties to apply to the court for, amongst other things, amendment or modification of the terms of the decree. I mention this because the Treaty Agreement and the 1945 Decree are referred to in passages in the UK Appeal Judgment which I refer to later in these reasons. An order authorising execution of the 1955 Agreement was made on 24 October 1955 (“the 1955 Order”) by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Clause 12, and the need to obtain such an order, were said by MSD in the UK proceedings to weigh heavily in favour of finding that the 1955 Agreement was governed by New Jersey law. Nugee J’s discussion of the relevant legal principles appears in the following six paragraphs of his Honour’s judgment which relevantly state:7.There is a dispute between the parties on the pleadings whether the 1970 Agreement and 1975 Letter are governed by German law or the law of New Jersey, and that is the subject of the preliminary issue which is in these terms:“There be a trial of a preliminary issue to determine the governing law of the Agreement and Letter as defined in the Particulars of Claim.”8.Although the Agreement and Letter here referred to are the 1970 Agreement and 1975 Letter, it is accepted by both Mr Carr QC, who appears for the Claimant, and Mr Hobbs QC, who appears for the Defendants, that the governing law of the 1970 Agreement and 1975 Letter must be the same as the 1955 Agreement. Thus although it is no longer in force, the argument before me has concentrated entirely on the governing law of the 1955 Agreement.9.[T]he question as to the governing law of the 1955 Agreement is to be determined under the English common law rules. There is an extended treatment of these in the 1987 (11th) edition of Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws (“Dicey”). Rule 180 in Dicey reads as follows:“The term “proper law of a contract” means the system of law by which the parties intended the contract to be governed, or, where their intention is neither expressed nor to be inferred from the circumstances, the system of law with which the transaction has its closest and most real connection.”Subject to one point, there is no doubt that this is the appropriate test to apply. (The one point on which there is some doubt is whether at the third stage the test should refer to the system of law or the country with which the transaction has its closest and most real connection: see Dicey at 1193f.) The commentary to the Rule in Dicey at 1162f recognises that although there are in theory three stages in the analysis (express intention, inferred intention, closest and most real connection), in practice courts frequently move straight from the first to the third stage because the tests of inferred intention and close connection merge into each other. In the present case there is no expressed intention and the argument has largely revolved around the third stage.10.Various other points, which were not disputed before me, emerge from the commentary in Dicey:(1) Renvoi has no place in the law of contract: Dicey at 1164.(2)The issue falls to be determined at the time the contract was made. There must be a governing law at the outset of the contract, and the governing law cannot fall to be decided, retrospectively, by reference to events which are uncertain when the contract is concluded: Dicey at 1167.(3)English law adopts a flexible method of determining the proper law: there are no rigid or narrow rules and a wide variety of circumstances are taken into account: Dicey at 1164.(4)Although some of the older authorities purported to search for the “presumed intention” of the parties where they had not expressly or impliedly chosen the proper law (ie at the third stage), and for that purpose there was a tendency to resort to rebuttable presumptions, the use of presumptions was rejected by the Court of Appeal in Coast Lines Ltd v Hudig & Veder Chartering NV [1972] 2 QB 34 and it was recognised that it is not in truth a question of intention at all (see Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, 2012) at §30-012 n 65). The judge, putting himself in the place of the ‘reasonable man’ determines the proper law for the parties, not by seeking to ascertain their (non-existent) intention, but by “how a just and reasonable person would have regarded the problem”, what intention “ordinary, reasonable and sensible businessmen would have been likely to have had if their minds had been directed to the question.”: Dicey at 1191f.……74.… Mr Hobbs’s more general point [was] that the requirement to obtain Department of Justice approval and an appropriate order from the District Court points to the central significance of the law of New Jersey to the 1955 Agreement. But I do not accept that this has the paramount importance that Mr Hobbs sought to ascribe to it. The agreed principle, in the words of Dicey, is that the governing law is to be found in the “system of law with which the transaction has its closest and most real connection” but “the transaction” here does not refer to the process of negotiating and agreeing a contract and getting to the stage of a binding and effective agreement. It refers rather to what is to be done under the agreement: see the Coast Lines case [1972] 2 QB 34 at 46F-H per Megaw LJ where he said that the transaction meant “the transaction contemplated by the contract”, and that “what was to be done under the contract – its substance” was more important than matters of form; and at 50H per Stephenson LJ where he agreed.…95.I have found that the requirement to obtain a Court order from the District Court in New Jersey is a connection with the law of New Jersey, but that the transaction as a whole has a connection with German law. It is now necessary to identify which is the closer and more real connection. This is to some extent an artificial task as the two are incommensurable, but my conclusion is that the connection with German law is the closer and more real connection. I do so in essence because what I understand to be of significance in this context is the substance of the transaction – what the transaction does – rather than matters which however important to get right are essentially subsidiary and ancillary to the transaction. I regard the requirement to obtain the approval of the District Court as more relevant to the ability of Merck & Co to enter into the 1955 Agreement than to the substance of it.The UK Trial Judgment

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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