Federal Court of Australia
Melbourne City Council v Telstra Corporation Limited [2020] FCAFC 200
Appeal from: Telstra Corporation Limited v Melbourne City Council [2020] FCA 305 File number: VID 232 of 2020
VID 234 of 2020Judgment of: GLEESON, CHARLESWORTH, O'BRYAN JJ Date of judgment: 20 November 2020 Catchwords: COMMUNICATIONS LAW – whether New Payphone Cabinets are “low-impact facilities” within the meaning of clause 6 of Sch 3 to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) exempt from planning laws – where Telstra sought planning approval to display commercial advertising on New Payphone Cabinets – where New Payphone Cabinets to be installed only after planning approval to display commercial advertising obtained – whether primary judge erred in concluding that the New Payphone Cabinets are “low-impact facilities” – appeal allowed with costs Legislation: Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) ss 3, 7, 15, 484, Sch 3
Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 (Cth) s 6
Telecommunications (Low-impact Facilities) Determination 1997 (Cth)
Telecommunications (Low-impact Facilities) Determination 2018 (Cth) s 3.1
Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) s 31
Planning and Environment Act 1987 (Vic) ss 6, 77, 149A
Cases cited: Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission [1992] HCA 10; 175 CLR 564
DBB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 178; 260 FCR 447
Gill v Donald Humberstone & Co Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 929; [1963] 3 All ER 180
Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd v City of Mitcham [2006] HCA 12; 80 ALJR 711
NBN Co Limited v Pipe Networks Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 475; 295 FLR 256
Nominal Defendant v GLG Australia Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 11; 228 CLR 529
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Economic Regulator, Competition and Access Number of paragraphs: 173 Date of hearing: 3 August 2020 Counsel for the Appellants: T Sullivan QC, MJ Batty and K Wood Solicitor for the Appellants: City Legal, Melbourne City Council and City Legal, Brisbane City Council Counsel for the Respondents: SR Morris QC and R Chaile Solicitors for the First Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons Solicitors for the Third Respondent: Maddocks ORDERS
VID 234 of 2020 BETWEEN: MELBOURNE CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
AND: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED (ABN 33 051 775 556)
First Respondent
SYDNEY CITY COUNCIL
Second Respondent
BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Third Respondent
order made by:
GLEESON, CHARLESWORTH, O'BRYAN JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
20 November 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The declaration made by the primary judge on 10 March 2020 be set aside.
3.The originating application in proceeding VID500/2019 be dismissed.
4.The order for costs made on 17 March 2020 be set aside.
5.The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant below and in this appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
ORDERS
VID 232 of 2020 BETWEEN: BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
AND: TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED (ABN 33 051 775 556)
First Respondent
MELBOURNE CITY COUNCIL
Second Respondent
SYDNEY CITY COUNCIL
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- Case
- [2020] FCAFC 200
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the primary judge erred in concluding that the new payphone cabinets were "low-impact facilities." The judges reasoned that the primary use of these cabinets was to display commercial advertising, which is not a permitted use under the criteria for low-impact facilities. The court emphasised that the assessment of whether a facility is low-impact involves a prospective enquiry into the intended uses of the facility. The design and intended use of the cabinets pointed to commercial advertising as a primary function, which disqualified them from being considered low-impact facilities. Consequently, the appeals were allowed, the primary judge's declaration and order for costs were set aside, Telstra's originating application was dismissed, and Telstra was ordered to pay the costs of the appellants and the appeals.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The declaration made by the primary judge on 10 March 2020 be set aside.
3. The originating application in proceeding VID500/2019 be dismissed.
4. The order for costs made on 17 March 2020 be set aside.
5. The first respondent pay the costs of the appellant below and in this appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Paragraph (e) does no more than to state a legal conclusion that would follow should the remaining grounds be upheld.CONSIDERATION Four observations may be made from the outset. First, Item 1 of the table in Pt 6 is to be understood as describing the features of a facility that is to be installed at a future time. The provisions conferring immunity from the operation of certain State laws could not have meaningful operation if the uses to which the facility is to be put were unable to be identified in advance of its installation. The prospective analysis ensures that there will be certainty as to the rights and obligations of the carrier at the time of the installation of the facility vis a vis others who may have a legal interest in opposing the installation. It follows that the assessment of a facility against the criteria necessarily involves a prospective enquiry as to the uses to which the facility is to be put once it is installed. As part of that prospective assessment, criterion (b) directs attention to its design. In most cases, it will not be difficult to demonstrate that a carrier has the subjective intention to operate a facility to achieve the purposes for which it is designed. The subjective intent of the carrier may be relevant to the limited extent that it is manifested in the design intent under criterion (b). Second, a facility that may be installed without first obtaining approval under State planning laws may then be used in the manner described in Item 1 without first obtaining approval under State law for that use. Third, the words added by amendment to criterion (d) of Item 2 are relevant to the proper interpretation of Item 1, as the difference in text informs the question of what constitutes a “content service”. On one interpretation, text of the amendment tends to suggest that the display of commercial advertising is something that may occur incidentally in the course of providing a content service, but it is not to be regarded as the supply of a content service in and of itself. Fourth, the question of whether the display of commercial advertising constitutes the supply of a “content service” necessarily impacts upon the interpretation and application of the criteria as a whole. If the display of commercial advertising is the supply of a content service (as opposed to something that may occur in the course of supplying a content service), then criterion (d) must be understood as prohibiting a use (commercial advertising for goods and services other than standard telephone services) that would otherwise be permitted under criterion (a), (b) and (c). On the other hand, if the display of commercial advertising is not a content service, then criterion (d) may be understood as permitting installation of a facility for a use (namely the display of commercial advertising for standard telephone services) that might otherwise fall foul of criteria (a), (b) or (c). Having made those observations, it is necessary to emphasise the confines of the arguments advanced on the appeal.