Mechman and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) - [2019] AATA 4474

Mechman and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 4474 (5 November 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2019/4830; 2019/4831; 2019/4832; 2019/4833; 2019/4834
Re:Shaymaa Mechman; Abdullah Shuhaib; Farhan Shuhaib; Abeer Shuhaib; Hameedah Shuhaib
APPLICANTS

AndMinister for Home Affairs
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
Date:5 November 2019
Place:Sydney

The application of Mrs Shaymaa Mechman for an extension of time is refused.
The extension of time applications of Hameedah Shuhaib, Abeer Shuhaib, Farhan Shuhaib and Abdullah Shuhaib are also refused.
...........................[sgd]...............................
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
Catchwords
CITIZENSHIP – Extension of time application – whether there is an acceptable explanation for the delay –– whether applicant rested on rights – merits of substantial application – permanent or enduring physical or mental incapacity – prejudice – extension of time applications refused
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 29
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 21
CASES
Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441
David and High Court of Australia [2009] AATA 448
Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 179
Han and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 3325
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344
Hillman and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2017] AATA 1411
Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516
Jamal v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2018] FCA 513
Minister for Home Affairs v G [2019] FCAFC 79
O’Gorman and Comcare (Compensation) [2017] AATA 2192
Parker v R [2002] FCAFC 133
Phillips v Australian Girls’ Choir Pty Ltd [2001] FMCA 109
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Smith and Commissioner of Patents [2012] AATA 60
Wijewardhanage and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 746
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Citizenship Policy, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 1 June 2016
Convention on the Rights of the Child (opened for signature 20 November 1989) 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
5 November 2019

This is an application by Mrs Shaymaa Mechman (the Applicant), to which are linked individual applications on behalf of four minor dependent children,[1] for an extension of time (EOT) to lodge an appeal against a decision by a Delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs (the Respondent) to deny her claim for citizenship by conferral under subsection 21(3)(d) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) (the Act).
[1] Hameedah Shuhaib (born in 2004); Abeer Shuhaib (born in 2005); Farhan Shuhaib (born in 2007) and Abdullah Shuhaib (born in 2009). These four children were born outside Australia. The Applicant also has two further children, Mustafa Shuhaib (born in 2014) and Adam Shuhaib (born in 2019), who were born in Australia.
As such, it is not necessary to go into an in-depth consideration of the provisions of the Act or the detailed grounds for refusal of that application. Were an EOT to be granted, those matters would be determined at the full merits-based hearing of the application.
What is of primary concern to the Tribunal is whether or not an application for an EOT should be granted.
TIMETABLE
On 16 May 2018, the Applicant lodged an application for grant of citizenship by conferral for herself and four minor dependent children. That application, and the applications of the four children, were rejected by a Delegate of the Minister on 19 September 2018 and notifications of these decisions were sent via registered post to the current postal address of the Applicant on 20 September 2018.
Those notifications to the Applicant included information to the effect that she had 28 days in which to lodge an appeal against the adverse decisions to this Tribunal. That period expired on 22 October 2018.
The Applicant lodged appeals for herself and the four children against the adverse decisions which were received by the Tribunal on 10 September 2019, being 323 days out of time.[2] At the same time, applications for an EOT were lodged (dated 9 September 2019).
[2] The Application for Review of Decision (Individual) form for the Applicant is dated 15 August 2019.
Subsection 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) provides:
The Tribunal may, upon application in writing by a person, extend the time for the making by that person of an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision (including a decision made before the commencement of this section) if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.
The matter came before the Tribunal for hearing on 17 October 2019. At that hearing the Tribunal drew attention to the fact that it had not been provided with a copy of a medical report from Dr Nermen Ismail, dated 23 October 2017, upon which the Minister was placing some reliance in arguing against the grant of an EOT. It gave the Minister until 18 October 2019 to provide that report and, at the same time, noting that the Applicant had an appointment with Legal Aid later that day, granted her some time to make further written submissions, with the Minister also being granted time to reply to those. The Tribunal granted a subsequent request by Legal Aid on behalf of the Applicant for a minor delay in lodging further representations and all further information was in the hands of the Tribunal by Monday 28 October 2019.
PRINCIPLES COVERING EXTENSION OF TIME APPLICATIONS
It is generally accepted that the “checklist” outlined by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment[3] (Hunter Valley Developments) should be taken as the guide by this Tribunal in determining EOT matters.
[3] (1984) 3 FCR 344, affirmed by the Full Court in Parker v R [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6].
That list provides as follows:
·an applicant must show an “acceptable explanation of the delay” and that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time;
·a distinction is to be made between an applicant who has “rested on his rights” and allowed the decision-maker to believe that the matter was finally concluded, and one who has continued to make the decision-maker aware that he or she contests the finality of the decision;
·any prejudice to the respondent caused by the delay;
·whether any others or the general public would suffer any prejudice as a result of the extension, or established practices be upset;
·the merits of the substantial application; and
·“considerations of fairness as between the applicants and other persons” in a similar position.
There is, however, very powerful authority which stresses the importance of statutory time limits being observed.
McHugh J in the High Court case of Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor[4] gave four reasons why such limitations are an important part of the legal process. His Honour noted that:
First, as time goes by, relevant evidence is likely to be lost. Second, it is oppressive, even “cruel”, to a defendant to allow an action to be brought long after the circumstances which gave rise to it have passed. Third, people should be able to arrange their affairs and utilise their resources on the basis that claims can no longer be made against them.
The final rationale for limitation periods is that the public interest requires that disputes be settled as quickly as possible.
[4] (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 552–553. Footnotes and citations omitted.
His Honour also noted that:
An applicant for an extension of time who satisfies those conditions [i.e. the conditions laid down in the relevant Act] is entitled to ask the court to exercise its discretion in his or her favour. But the applicant still bears the onus of showing that the justice of the case requires the exercise of the discretion in his or her favour.[5]
The discretion to extend should therefore be seen as requiring the applicant to show that his or her case is a justifiable exception to the rule that the welfare of the State is best served by the limitation period in question. Accordingly, when an applicant seeks an extension of time to commence an action after a limitation period has expired, he or she has the positive burden of demonstrating that the justice of the case requires that extension.[6]
[5] Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 at 551.
[6] Ibid at 553–554.
Similarly, in Hunter Valley Developments, Wilcox J observed:
Although the section [Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 s 11] does not, in terms, place any onus of proof upon an applicant for extension an application has to be made. Special circumstances need not be shown but the court will not grant the application unless positively satisfied that it is proper so to do. The “prescribed period” … is not to be ignored. (Ralkon Agricultural Co. Pty Ltd v. Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 43 A.L.R. 535 at 550). Indeed, it is the prima facie rule that proceedings commenced outside that period will not be entertained (Lucic v. Nolan (1982) 45 A.L.R. 411 at 416). It is a pre-condition to the exercise of discretion in his favour that the applicant for extension show an “acceptable explanation of the delay” and that it is “fair and equitable in the circumstances” to extend time (Duff at 485; Chapman v. Reilly unreported (Federal Court of Australia, Neaves J., 9 December 1983) at 7).[7]
[7] Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348.
Further refinement of this checklist was suggested in both Phillips v Australian Girls’ Choir Pty Ltd[8] and in Hillman and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation),[9] where the essential principles were held to be:
·Delay;
·Prejudice;
·Merits; and
·Fairness.
[8] [2001] FMCA 109.
[9] [2017] AATA 1411.
CONSIDERATIONS
In effect, the primary matters for consideration in applications such as the present are twofold: was there a reasonable explanation for the delay in lodging the application for review and, if the matter were to proceed to a full merits-based hearing, would it have reasonable prospects of being successful.[10]
[10] Smith and Commissioner of Patents [2012] AATA 60 at [29]–[31].
Equally, this Tribunal has noted that the checklist items in Hunter Valley Developments “are not to be applied mechanically” and that “an ‘acceptable explanation for the delay’ is not an essential precondition to the exercise of the discretion, although it is to be expected that such an explanation will normally be given”.[11]
[11] O’Gorman and Comcare (Compensation) [2017] AATA 2192 at [13], citing Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441.
Reasons for delay
The Applicant states her reasons for delay in lodgement in the following terms:
I sent the appeal in the post but the documents were lost in the mail. I attended Legal aid on 05/09/19 to request advice. The delay since then is because I was awaiting assistance.[12]
[12] Applicant’s Application for Extension of Time for Making an Application for Review of Decision dated 9 September 2019 at page 2.
In her affirmed evidence to the Tribunal the Applicant says that when she received the notification from the Department of Home Affairs she sought help from the Liverpool Migrant Resource Centre (MRC) and from a friend at the children’s school to help her understand it as she is functionally illiterate in English. She told the Tribunal that the MRC helped her to download a review application form and told her that she needed to present certain medical reports in the review process. The Applicant said further that she received help from her friend at the school and from a “nurse” who, she suggested, worked in the practice of Ms Sana Zaarour (a psychologist) to complete the form and that the latter helped her to prepare and address the material for posting to the Tribunal. She said that she posted the various documents herself and while she could not recall precisely when this occurred, it was likely to have been in “October or early November 2018”.
This explanation was somewhat contradicted in the form of a Statutory Declaration by the Applicant, prepared after she had been granted additional time by the Tribunal to consult Legal Aid. In this statement she says that the form was completed by a person named “Asma” who was “someone I knew in the Iraqi community”.[13] She goes on to claim that her attempts to contact Asma have been unsuccessful because “their mobile number is not (sic) longer connected”.
[13] Applicant’s Statutory Declaration filed at the Tribunal on 24 October 2019.
That Statement went further and explained that the Applicant, after posting her original review application, accepted that the delay in hearing any response from the Tribunal was something which she did not find unusual. She stated that, as a person of Iraqi cultural background, she expected that government authorities would take their own time to respond to representations and that it would be disrespectful of her to contact the Tribunal, and that she had been advised that she “should not annoy them” by pressing the matter any further. It was only after about one year had passed without a response from the Tribunal that she thought it appropriate to make contact, at which stage she was advised that her original review request had not been received.
There are two immediate issues which arise from this Statement. The first is that there is no evidence produced to show that an application for review was completed and despatched by the Applicant and, in the event that one was, the date upon which it was sent. Materially, was it sent within the 28 day prescribed period or thereafter? If it is accepted that the original refusal notice was in the Applicant’s hands by 24 September 2018 and that she had until 22 October 2018 to apply for a review, her claim to have posted material to the Tribunal sometime in “October” may well have been within the prescribed period. On the other hand, it may have not. However, it would not have been within the prescribed period if posted in “early November” as claimed by the Applicant.
The second issue is that even accepting that there was some delay in activity after Legal Aid had been consulted, this consultation did not take place until almost a full year after the adverse decision was notified.[14] The Tribunal is asked to accept as the explanation the cultural values or understandings of the Applicant, namely that it was disrespectful to press matters with government authorities; that it risked causing them annoyance and that they would deal with matters according to their own convenience.
[14] See para 18 above.
Whether this constitutes a reasonable explanation from a person unfamiliar with the workings of Australian bureaucracy or, rather, whether it amounts to a case of an applicant having “rested on [her] rights”,[15] is somewhat of an open question. However, on balance, the Tribunal is not inclined to accept the explanation that, given the Applicant expresses a desire for Australian citizenship, she would let this matter lie for almost a year without taking steps to at least seek information and assistance from her contacts in the Iraqi community. Although the Applicant would not see it in these terms, the Tribunal agrees with the Respondent’s suggestion that she effectively rested on her rights.
[15] To use a term from the Hunter Valley Developments checklist.
Merits of the application
As noted above, in EOT applications it is not appropriate for the Tribunal to seek to canvass in any detail the substantive merits of the original application itself. However, it needs to be aware of the essentials of the case in question and have some appreciation of the issues likely to be canvassed at any full merits-based hearing.
In Jackamarra v Krakouer,[16] the High Court stated:
The understanding of counsel for the appellant as to how the Court would examine "the merits" was consistent with the practice of the courts in a number of common law jurisdictions dealing with applications to extend the time for appealing. In R v Secretary for the Home Department; Ex parte Mehta, for example, Lord Denning MR said:
"We often like to know the outline of the case. If it appears to be a case which is strong on the merits and which ought to be heard, in fairness to the parties, we may think it is proper that the case should be allowed to proceed, and we extend the time accordingly. If it appears to be a flimsy case and weak on the merits, we may not extend the time. We never go into much detail on the merits, but we do like to know something about the case before deciding whether or not to extend the time."
[16] (1998) 195 CLR 516 at 519 per Brennan CJ and McHugh J [also Kirby J at 540]. Footnotes omitted.
In Jamal v Secretary, Department of Social Services,[17] the Federal Court stated:
The last relevant principle set out in Hunter Valley Developments was that the merits of the substantive appeal should to be taken into account. Her Honour followed the view expressed by Mortimer J in MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585 at [62], upheld by the Full Court in MZABP v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110; 152 ALD 478, to the effect that it will seldom be in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time where an appeal would have little prospect of success, given the additional resource demands that it would impose upon the parties and the Court, and the inevitable impact it would have on other users of the Court.
[17] [2018] FCA 513 at [6] per Bromwich J.
One of the requirements for the grant of citizenship is that an applicant must sit and pass the so-called citizenship test.[18] However, subsection 21(3)(d) of the Act allows for applications for citizenship by conferral to be made, without sitting for or passing the citizenship test, as follows:
(3) A person is eligible to become an Australian citizen if the Minister is satisfied that the person:
…..
(d) has a permanent or enduring physical or mental incapacity, at the time the person made the application, that means the person:
(i) is not capable of understanding the nature of the application at that time; or
(ii) is not capable of demonstrating a basic knowledge of the English language at that time; or
(iii) is not capable of demonstrating an adequate knowledge of Australia and of the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship at that time;
[18] Section 21(2)(d), (e) and (f) of the Act.
Applicants seeking to avail themselves of the beneficial provisions of this section must provide to the decision-maker sufficient information and evidence to establish the level of enduring physical or mental incapacity to attract these provisions.
The Citizenship Policy[19] issued by the Minister prescribes that evidence related to such levels of incapacity must be provided by psychiatrists or medical practitioners who hold certain specialist qualifications or accreditations.
[19] This Policy is promulgated by the Minister with effect from 1 June 2016 and, although not having the status of being binding on the Tribunal (Minister for Home Affairs v G [2019] FCAFC 79 at [18]), the Tribunal is still obliged to have due regard to it and to follow it in the absence of cogent reasons not to do so (Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at 645).
Decision-makers are required to take into account the provisions of the Policy in their decision-making unless there are compelling grounds for not so doing.[20]
[20] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634; Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1979] AATA 179.

In support of her application the Applicant provided a number of reports attesting to her state of “mental incapacity” occasioned by her experiences in Iraq and her suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). There were three such reports, one of which is from a person (Ms Sana Zaarour, a psychologist) who the Minister asserts does not meet the evidentiary qualifications spelled out in the Policy and so cannot be taken into account.
In respect of this matter the Minister is correct.
There are two reports from Dr Nermen Ismail (a qualified consultant psychiatrist), one of which was provided to the Delegate in their decision-making process and the other of which was submitted after that decision had been made. The first of these is dated 23 October 2017 and was considered by the Delegate. In their determination, the Delegate stated:
The medical report you provided is dated 23/10/2017. Departmental records indicate that you first arrived in Australia on 20/08/2013 and remained here continuously since then. This information suggests that you were in Australia for approximately 4 years prior to seeking medical treatment and advice for your claimed incapacity. Therefore this suggests that your claimed incapacity is not one that is permanent or enduring.
Citizenship policy states, it is anticipated that a person who claims to have a permanent or enduring physical or mental incapacity must be seeing a specialist on a regular basis. Based on the information above I am satisfied that the medical report you provided to support your application was based on a single consultation specifically for the purpose of obtaining evidence for your Australian citizenship application. I have therefore decided to give this report little weight in my assessment.[21]
[21] Delegate’s Decision Record regarding the Applicant attached to a letter to the Applicant dated 19 September 2018 at page 9.
The report herein referred to was the one not before the Tribunal at the date of the hearing and was, as a result of the Tribunal’s direction, provided to it subsequently.
Dr Ismail’s report of 23 October 2017 confirms that he first saw the Applicant on 25 September 2017 and that “her presentation was consistent with the diagnosis of Chronic PTSD”. The report states that the Applicant told Dr Ismail that she had suffered significant trauma in Iraq, especially after her home was raided by terrorists associated with ISIS. Apart from herself being a victim, she reported that at least three of her brothers had been kidnapped, killed or executed during the civil unrest in that country. She had lost her house and possessions, and been forced to flee. The report goes on to state that the Applicant continues to worry about family members left in Iraq; she has developed a “tendency to isolate herself and suffered vegetative symptoms with constant nightmares with a significant impairment of sense of pleasure”. Although she entertains “passive thoughts of death” she is not at risk as her religious beliefs and commitment to her family would preclude her from any acts of self-harm. There is a reference to a “Mental State Examination” having been carried out which described her mood as “unhappy with flat effect” but displaying “no evidence of psychotic symptoms”.
In relation to the Applicant’s expressed concerns about the need to sit the citizenship test, Dr Ismail states:
I believe this should be evaluated in light of the current instability in her mental (sic), reduced concentration and attention spans secondary to her constant traumatic preoccupations and her severe physical pains.
The Delegate is correct to the extent that the Applicant did not consult Dr Ismail until some four years after her arrival in Australia; his report appears to be based upon only one consultation which at least, in part, focussed upon the Applicant’s preparedness to undertake the citizenship test. In addition, there does not appear to have been any other formal psychiatric or psychological tests or evaluations undertake by Dr Ismail.[22]
[22] Delegate’s Decision Record regarding the Applicant attached to a letter to the Applicant dated 19 September 2018 at page 9.
The second letter from Dr Ismail is dated 22 July 2019, that is, some 10 months after the original adverse decision of the Delegate. It appears that Dr Ismail had seen the Applicant on 4 July 2019 and that prior to that her last appointment had been “nearly a year ago”. In the most recent report,[23] Dr Ismail attests that the Applicant:
·Had “presented for first assessment on 25/9/17 and her presentation was consistent with the diagnosis of Chronic PTSD”
·Continues to express bitter themes of grief and loss
·Mourns the loss of close members of her family in the conflicts in Iraq and worries about family members remaining there
·Was dysphoric “however with appropriate congruent affect”
·“There was no evidence of delusional thoughts”
·“She denied the current experience of passive thoughts of death and denied current active thoughts or plans of self-harm or suicide”
·Had been and was on a variety of antidepressant medications “with poor response”
[23] Report of Dr Nermen Ismail dated 22 July 2019.
Dr Ismail wrote:
I recommend her to continue to see her psychologist to address her negative cognitions and learn better coping styles however she declines at this stage.
The Doctor opines that given the Applicant’s “clinical picture” and “her poor English skills” that she should be considered for exemption from the provisions of the citizenship test.
It is to be noted that the Applicant has clearly not been seeing Dr Ismail on anything that could be described as a routine or ongoing basis.
There is limited evidence in Dr Ismail’s reports which establishes how he reached his diagnosis of PTSD, although he appears to be relying on the self-reported history of the Applicant. More to the point, there is no clear indication that this psychological condition is “permanent or enduring” as required by subsection 21(3)(d) of the Act. The delay of four years between the Applicant’s arrival in Australia and her first consultation with a psychiatrist tends to confirm the Delegate’s assessment that this consultation was, at least in part, related as much to the Applicant’s citizenship application as to her concerns about the management of her mental health condition.
The Minister contends that, in any case, none of this appears to address the fundamental questions of why the Applicant could not gain an understanding of the meaning of citizenship or demonstrate adequate knowledge of its responsibilities, or why (especially with six young children in her family) she is not capable of learning sufficient English to be able to sit the citizenship test with the language and other assistance provisions which are available in such circumstances.
The Minister also mounts an attack upon the validity of some of the more fundamental diagnostic conclusions offered in the various medical reports.
Prima facie, the Minister’s position is a strong one and the Tribunal notes that it is within the competence of the Applicant to obtain further corroborative evidence related to the specific issues identified in subsection 21(3)(d) in a further citizenship application. It was also open to her to do so in relation to this immediate application.
The Tribunal does not regard it as necessary to canvass any other of the Hunter Valley Development checklist items which do not appear to have material bearing on this application although it recognises some prejudice to the Respondent when matters are not brought to a degree of finality within a reasonable period of time.[24]
[24] David and High Court of Australia [2009] AATA 448 at [10].
The applications by the minor dependent children
Each of the minor dependent children have lodged an application for review and EOT, and these must be considered separately. They need to be considered under the Department’s Policy guidelines related to children applying for citizenship under the age of 16 years.
The Policy states:
Children under 16 applying individually in their own right would usually not be approved under s24 unless they are permanent residents at the time of application and decision and under policy also are:
• under 16 when applying and living with a responsible parent who is an Australian citizen and who consents to the application or
• usually resident in Australia with a permanent resident responsible parent who consents to the application, and that responsible parent would meet the residence requirement but has decided not to apply for Australian citizenship because they would lose the citizenship of another country or
• under 16 when applying, living with a responsible parent who is not an Australian citizen and consents to the application, and the child would otherwise suffer significant hardship or disadvantage … or
• an unaccompanied humanitarian minor who falls under the Minister’s guardianship and a delegated guardian has consented to the application … or
• an unaccompanied humanitarian minor who does not fall under the Minister’s guardianship and their responsible carer has consented to the application …[25]
[25] Citizenship Policy, Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 1 June 2016 at page 76.
It does not appear that the children in question meet any of these guidelines. Their mother is obviously not an Australian citizen and her evidence to the Tribunal was to the effect that her husband, who holds a permanent residency visa, was also not a citizen. This was clearly the position taken by the Delegate in their review of these applications.[26]
[26] Delegate’s Decision Records regarding the four minor dependent children attached to letters to the Applicant dated 19 September 2018 at page 6.
The Delegate also considered that, in terms of the Policy, given that the applicant children were “living with a responsible parent who is not an Australian citizen” they would nevertheless suffer no “significant hardship or disadvantage” should their applications be refused.[27]
[27] See paras 53–56 below.
Such applications also require consideration of Australia’s obligations under Article 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which require that “the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” in the process of making any decisions about their legal rights or status.
In the assessments of the applications of each of the children, the Delegate took into account the fact that they were permanent residents, and that a decision to refuse their applications would not affect their immigration status nor result in any prospect of the family members being separated.[28]
[28] Delegate’s Decision Records regarding the four minor dependent children attached to letters to the Applicant dated 19 September 2018 at page 6.
The Delegate thus came to the conclusion that refusing the applications for each of the children would not be against the children’s best interests.
It is not for the Tribunal, at this level of proceedings, to make a definitive determination of the merits of the applications of the four children. However, the Tribunal accepts that such a decision was properly made with reliance upon the provisions of the Citizenship Policy.
The Tribunal also notes that in the case of Wijewardhanage[29] the Tribunal was concerned about the maintenance of the “integrated citizenship status” of a family unit and in Han[30] it relied upon this as a primary reason for finding that a grant of citizenship to a minor was not in the best interests of the child.
[29] Wijewardhanage and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 746 at [37]–[40].
[30] Han and Minister for Home Affairs (Citizenship) [2019] AATA 3325.
The applications for an EOT by each of the children must, of course, meet the same criteria as discussed in relation to that of their mother, namely, that there are good reasons for the delay and that the matters are ones where there is a prospect of ultimate success at a full merits-based hearing.
In relation to the former, there is no evidence advanced by the children as to the lateness of their applications, and indeed, it would be unrealistic to expect there to be. In this respect, their applications are dependent upon that of their mother and, to the extent that her application fails, then so to must theirs on this point.
The Tribunal is also of the view that at a full merits-based hearing it would be unlikely that the children (considered as individual applicants) would be successful in challenging the decision of the Delegate.
CONCLUSIONS
Mrs Mechman
The reasons stated by the Applicant for the delay in lodgement of her application for a review of the Delegate’s decision are in part contradictory and in any event without corroborative evidence that the application was posted within the prescribed period or, indeed, posted at all.
The analysis of the medical reports submitted by the Applicant do not suggest that she would have a reasonable prospect of success were all the matters exposed at a full merits-based hearing as they do not support a diagnosis of her condition being “permanent or enduring” as required by the Act.
The four children
There are no separate reasons stated for the delay in the lodgement of the applications for review by the four minor dependent children which are linked with that of their mother. To that extent they must be taken to be encompassed within her statement of reasons and, to the extent that the Tribunal has found that her reasons are without substance, the same must apply in their cases.
For the reasons given above, the Tribunal does not believe that any of the children would be successful in a full merits-based hearing in challenging the decision of the Delegate to refuse their citizenship applications.
DECISION
For the reasons stated, the application of Mrs Shaymaa Mechman for an extension of time is refused.
For the reasons stated, the extension of time applications of Hameedah Shuhaib, Abeer Shuhaib, Farhan Shuhaib and Abdullah Shuhaib are also refused.

I certify that the preceding 64 (sixty-four) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member

............................[sgd]..................................
Associate
Dated: 5 November 2019

Date(s) of hearing: 17 October 2019

Date final submissions received: 28 October 2019

Applicant: By telephone

Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms L Hargrave, Clayton Utz

Date(s) of hearing:	17 October 2019
Date final submissions received:	28 October 2019
Applicant:	By telephone
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Ms L Hargrave, Clayton Utz