MDXJ v Secretary, Services Australia (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MDXJ v Secretary, Services Australia (No 3) [2022] FCA 765

File number: SAD 131 of 2020
Judgment of: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 5 July 2022
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) under s 44 of Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) — where Tribunal (Tier 2) made decision setting aside decision of Tribunal (Tier 1) and substituting decision affirming decision of Authorised Review Officer that for purposes of A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) (FA Act), applicant have 0% care of child, Child A, from 15 September 2016 — where findings made by Tribunal included finding that for purposes of s 35C(1)(a) of FA Act, no care arrangement applied in relation to Child A at relevant date — where applicant raises 46 grounds of appeal in Amended Notice of appeal, alleging denial(s) of procedural fairness by Tribunal and various errors of law by Tribunal — whether denial of procedural fairness established — whether error of law established — appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43, 44

A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth)

A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) ss 3, 23, 35, 35A, 35B, 35C, 35D (repealed), 35F, 35P, 35Q, 35R

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 4, 63C, 64B, 70NAE

Cases cited:

Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577

MDXJ v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] FCA 2163; (2019) 168 ALD 454

MDXJ v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2020] FCA 1767

Ongal & Materns (No 2) [2017] FamCA 144

Ongal & Materns [2017] FamCAFC 207

Sande v Registrar, Supreme Court of Queensland (1996) 64 FCR 123

Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31; (2008) 235 CLR 286

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152

Division: General Division
Registry: South Australia
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 147
Date of hearing: 1 March 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr S Cummings
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

SAD 131 of 2020
BETWEEN:

MDXJ

Applicant

AND:

SECRETARY, SERVICES AUSTRALIA

First Respondent

SVPX

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

BESANKO J

DATE OF ORDER:

5 JULY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the first respondent be amended to Secretary, Services Australia.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BESANKO J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal). The appeal under this section is limited to an appeal on a question of law.

  2. The applicant…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 765
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In MDXJ v Secretary, Services Australia (No 3), the applicant challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had set aside a previous decision and affirmed the decision of an Authorised Review Officer (ARO). The ARO had determined that for the purposes of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) (the FA Act), the applicant had 0% care of Child A from 15 September 2016. The applicant argued that the AAT had denied procedural fairness and committed errors of law. The AAT had found that no care arrangement applied in relation to Child A as at 15 September 2016, which led to the conclusion that s 35C(1)(a) of the FA Act did not apply. The applicant contended that s 35D of the FA Act provided an alternative pathway but the AAT rejected this, stating that it would require disturbing its earlier findings.

The court was required to determine whether the AAT had indeed denied procedural fairness and made errors of law in its decision. The court examined the arguments presented by the applicant regarding s 35D of the FA Act and found that the AAT had correctly applied the law. The AAT had made clear findings that no care arrangement applied in relation to Child A as at 15 September 2016, and entertaining the applicant's argument would require the AAT to disturb these findings. The court also found that the AAT's interpretation of s 35C(1)(a) and s 35D(1)(a) was consistent with the legislative intent, and that the applicant's reliance on s 35D was misplaced because the conditions necessary for its application were not met.

The court concluded that no error of law had been identified in the AAT's decision and dismissed the appeal. The appeal was dismissed with the name of the first respondent amended to Secretary, Services Australia, and the appeal itself dismissed as per the orders entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the first respondent be amended to Secretary, Services Australia.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Although the appeal is against the decision in TD2, the reasoning in TD1 is also relevant. That is because in TD2, the Tribunal addressed the following issues: (1) whether the Tribunal member should disqualify himself; and (2) whether there was any substantive matter that remained which justified a further hearing in the reviews or whether the Tribunal should make final orders. The Tribunal member refused to disqualify himself and he decided that no further hearing was necessary. The decision was to set aside the decision under review and to substitute a decision affirming the Authorised Review Officer’s (the ARO) decision made on 4 July 2017. The ARO’s decision was to the effect that for the purposes of the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999 (Cth) (the FA Act), the applicant have 0% care of Child A from 15 September 2016 and SVPX have 100% care. BACKGROUND The applicant and SVPX are the parents of two children. One child is relevant for the purposes of this appeal and that child is Child A. Prior to 15 September 2016, the applicant and SVPX shared the care of Child A. Since 15 September 2016, Child A has been in the sole care of SVPX. The appeal concerns the construction and application of certain provisions of the FA Act and the entitlement of the applicant under that legislation to a family tax benefit (FTB) based on the extent of care for Child A. Prior to 15 September 2016, the allocation of the percentage of care under the FA Act of Child A between the parents was SVPX, 60% and the applicant, 40%. The FA Act makes provision for an interim care period where an event occurs in relation to the relevant child without the adult’s consent that prevents the child being in the adult’s care and the adult takes reasonable steps to have the child again in the adult’s care. The FA Act also gives the Secretary of the Department various discretions to decline to apply an interim care period or to extend an interim care period or to abridge it. Section 23 of the FA Act addresses the effect of a child designated as an “FTB child” ceasing to be in a person’s care without the consent of that person. It provides, relevantly:(1) This section applies if:(a)an individual is an FTB child of another individual (the adult) under subsection 22(2) or (3); and(aa)the circumstances surrounding legal responsibility for the care of the individual are those mentioned in paragraph 22(5)(a) or (b); and(b)an event occurs in relation to the child without the adult’s consent that prevents the child being in the adult’s care; and(c)the adult takes reasonable steps to have the child again in the adult’s care.When the child remains an FTB child of the adult(2)Subject to subsection (4A), the child is an FTB child of the adult for that part of the qualifying period (see subsection (5)) for which:(a)the child would have been an FTB child of the adult under subsection 22(2) or (3) if the child had not ceased to be in the adult’s care; and(b)the circumstances surrounding legal responsibility for the care of the child are those mentioned in paragraph 22(5)(a) or (b).(3)The reference, in paragraphs (1)(a) and (2)(a), to an FTB child of an individual or adult under subsection 22(2) or (3) includes a reference to:(a)a child who is an FTB child under subsection 22(2) or (3) in its application by virtue of subsection 22(7); and(b)a child who is an FTB child under subsection 22(2) or (3), but who is taken not to be an FTB child under section 25.Note:As a result of subsection (2) of this section, a child who is taken not to be an FTB child under section 25, but who is a regular care child, will remain a regular care child for the part of the qualifying period referred to in subsection (2) of this section.(4)Except as provided in subsection (2), the child cannot (in spite of section 22) be an FTB child of any individual during the qualifying period.When subsection (2) does not apply(4A)If the Secretary is satisfied that special circumstances exist in relation to the child, the Secretary may determine that subsection (2) does not apply in relation to the child and the adult.Definition of parent and qualifying period(5) In this section:parent includes a relationship parent.qualifying period means the period beginning when the child ceases to be in the adult’s care and ending at the earliest of the following times:(a)if the child again comes into the adult’s care at a later time—that later time;(b)either:(i)after 14 weeks pass since the child ceased to be in the adult’s care; or(ii)if the Secretary specifies, under subsection (5A), a day that is earlier than the last day in that 14‑week period—the end of that earlier day;(c) if:(i)the adult is a parent of the child; and(ii)no family law order, registered parenting plan or parenting plan is in force in relation to the child; and(iii)the child comes into the care of the other parent at a later time;that later time.Shorter qualifying period(5A)If the Secretary is satisfied that special circumstances exist in relation to the child, the Secretary may specify a day for the purposes of subparagraph (b)(ii) of the definition of qualifying period in subsection (5). …

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal addressed the arguments the applicant wished to raise about s 35D of the FA Act in TD2 (at [28]–[29]). The Tribunal said that its concern in relation to those arguments was that it had made clear findings as to the relevant time when it was to decide whether a “care arrangement” applied in relation to Child A (TD1 at [37], i.e., 15 September 2016) and clear findings that a care arrangement did not apply at that time. The Tribunal said that looking at the text of the now repealed s 35D of the FA Act, entertaining any argument from the applicant as to the applicability of that provision would require the Tribunal to disturb each of those findings because a criterion for satisfying s 35D was that “a care arrangement applies in relation to the child”. The Tribunal said that given its findings in TD1 that the Family Court orders did not apply in relation to Child A as at 15 September 2016 and that the Tribunal was not satisfied that a written agreement between the parents of Child A relating to his care existed on 15 September 2016 (TD1 at [55] and [66]), the applicant’s argument that s 35D of the FA Act provided an alternative pathway to the discretion in s 35L would be rejected. The first respondent’s submission that there is no meaningful difference between s 35C(1)(a) and s 35D(1)(a) is correct. The reference to a “current care arrangement” in s 35D(1)(a) is necessary to distinguish it from the concept introduced later in s 35D of a “new care arrangement”. Section 35D(1)(a) could not be met by the applicant because the family law orders were no longer a care arrangement that applied in relation to the child and the informal agreement was never a care arrangement that applied in relation to the child. This ground of appeal fails.CONCLUSION No error of law has been identified and the appeal must be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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