McNicol v Queensland Police Service

Link copied
Case Copied 26 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

McNicol v Queensland Police Service [2016] QCA 102

PARTIES:

McNICOL, Dean Stuart
(applicant)
v
QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE
(respondent)

FILE NO:

CA No 45 of 2015
DC No 58 of 2014

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Criminal)

ORIGINATING COURT:


District Court at Brisbane – [2015] QDC 39

DELIVERED ON:

22 April 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

4 April 2016

JUDGES:

Morrison and Philippides JJA and Mullins J
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the order made

ORDER:

Application for leave to appeal is refused.

CATCHWORDS:

CRIMINAL LAW – APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – DISMISSAL OF APPEAL WHERE NO MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – where the applicant was convicted in 2014 of unlawfully stalking a female gym instructor – where the conviction came after a nine day trial in the Magistrates Court – where the learned magistrate did not accept the applicant’s version of events and accepted the evidence of the prosecution – where the applicant was sentenced to eight months imprisonment, fully suspended for an operational period of two years with pre-sentence custody taken into account and a restraining order made – where the applicant appealed to the District Court of Queensland– where the appeal was dismissed due to the applicant’s inability to establish any legal, factual or discretionary error on behalf of the learned magistrate – where the applicant seeks leave to appeal from that decision pursuant to s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) – whether an appeal is necessary to correct a substantial injustice – whether there is a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected

Criminal Code (Qld), s 359A, s 359B, s 359C, s 359F
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 118(3)
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21M, s 21N
Justices Act 1886 (Qld), s 222

Berry v Commissioner of Police [2015] 1 Qd R 388; [2014] QCA 238, cited
Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd v McNicol [2012] QSC 296, considered
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40, cited
Pickering v McArthur[2005] QCA 294, cited
R v Davies [2004] QDC 279, distinguished
White v Commissioner of Police [2014] QCA 121, cited

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
V A Loury for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
Director of Public Prosecutions (Queensland) for the respondent

  1. MORRISON JA:  On 10 February 2014 Mr McNicol was convicted of unlawfully stalking a young, female gym instructor between 1 January 2012 and 18 January 2013.

  2. The conviction came after a nine day trial in the Magistrates Court.  Mr McNicol represented himself during the trial, and gave evidence in his defence.  In his evidence some of the conduct particularised in the stalking charge was admitted by Mr McNicol, though he contended it did not constitute stalking.  Other conduct…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read McNicol v Queensland Police Service and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] QCA 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of McNicol v Queensland Police Service, the applicant, who was convicted in 2014 of unlawfully stalking a female gym instructor, appealed to the District Court of Queensland. The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant now seeks leave to appeal from that decision pursuant to section 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967. The applicant contends that there was no evidence to support the verdict, that the learned magistrate erred in rejecting media articles and the Supreme Court judgment, and that there was an error as to whether the complainant suffered fear, apprehension and emotional distress. The court was required to determine whether the appeal was necessary to correct a substantial injustice and whether there was a reasonable argument that there is an error to be corrected.

The court found that there was no error demonstrated in the way the learned primary judge dealt with these issues. The magistrate had preferred the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to that of the applicant, and the learned primary judge had summarised aspects of that evidence by reference to the findings of the magistrate and the prosecution submissions on appeal. There were no demonstrated errors in how the trial proceeded, or in how the evidence was interpreted or accepted. The court found that the learned primary judge was correct in his analysis and his conclusion that the conviction was supported by the evidence. The rejection of media articles and the Supreme Court judgment was also found to be correct. The court found that there was no merit in the applicant's argument that there was an error as to whether the complainant suffered fear, apprehension and emotional distress.

The court concluded that there was no merit in the points raised by the applicant. The application for leave to appeal was refused. The court found that no error of law had been demonstrated, and that the learned primary judge's conclusion was correct. The court found that there was an abundance of evidence to sustain the findings by the magistrate and by the learned primary judge. The applicant's application for leave to appeal was therefore refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for leave to appeal is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

In 2014, the applicant was convicted of unlawfully stalking a female gym instructor. The conviction resulted from a nine-day trial in the Magistrates Court. The learned magistrate did not accept the applicant's version of events and relied on the evidence provided by the prosecution. The applicant was sentenced to eight months imprisonment, which was fully suspended for an operational period of two years, with pre-sentence custody taken into account, and a restraining order was made. The applicant appealed to the District Court of Queensland, which dismissed the appeal due to the inability to establish any legal, factual, or discretionary error on the part of the learned magistrate. The applicant then sought leave to appeal from that decision under s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).

The case initially arose in the Magistrates Court, where the applicant was convicted of stalking and sentenced. Following the conviction, the applicant appealed to the District Court of Queensland, which dismissed the appeal. The applicant subsequently sought leave to appeal the dismissal of the appeal from the District Court to a higher court under s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

No reason has been shown to doubt the conclusions reached by the learned primary judge.Ground 13: no evidence to support the verdict This ground contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict. In reality it is a submission that the verdict was not open on the evidence. A “no evidence” ground of appeal is characterised as a matter of law,[55] and the error asserted in this ground should be understood in that way.[55]Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 390. As developed orally, the contention was that there was no proof of detriment to the complainant. It is evident that the learned primary judge reviewed all the trial evidence.[56] Further, his Honour paid particular attention to the specific grounds advanced by Mr McNicol, including this particular ground.[57][56]The prosecution evidence was summarised at Reasons [8], and that of Mr McNicol at Reasons [9]; and then his Honour said he had read the transcript: Reasons [11] and [102].[57]Reasons [101]-[103]. The learned primary judge pointed out that in support of this ground Mr McNicol referred to the other grounds advanced. The same was the case before this Court, with emphasis being placed on the contention that the learned primary judge erred in finding that detriment had been shown. For the reasons already given in paragraphs [45]-[54] above that contention cannot be sustained. In my view it cannot be demonstrated that the learned primary judge erred on this ground. Factors supporting that conclusion are:(a)the magistrate preferred the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to that of Mr McNicol; in fact he made adverse findings against Mr McNicol;(b)the learned primary judge summarised aspects of that evidence by reference to the findings of the magistrate and the prosecution submissions on appeal;(c)a number of credible witnesses gave corroborated evidence that the during the charged period, Mr McNicol had approached the complainant, both at Fitness First and later at the shopping centre, and had sent numerous emails to others; further, the essential content of those emails was likely to have been conveyed to the complainant and was likely to cause fear or apprehension; (d)despite Mr McNicol’s assertions that he had a legitimate reason for sending the email messages and attempting to contact the complainant, given the nature of his conduct it was not reasonable, and in fact was not engaged in for a legitimate purpose; and(e)there were no demonstrated errors in how the trial proceeded, or in how the evidence was interpreted or accepted. In my respectful view, the learned primary judge was correct in his analysis and his conclusion that the conviction was supported by the evidence. Having reviewed the evidence myself, I would come to the same conclusion. No error has been demonstrated on this ground.Conclusion For the reasons given above there is no merit in the points raised by Mr McNicol. There being no error of law demonstrated, I would refuse the application for leave to appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

No error has been demonstrated in the way the learned primary judge dealt with these issues. Having reviewed the evidence I am in agreement with the finding by the learned primary judge. There was an abundance of evidence to sustain the findings by the magistrate and by the learned primary judge on this point.Grounds 6 and 7: rejection of media articles and the Supreme Court judgment There is no merit in this point. Mr McNicol complains that the learned magistrate ruled that media articles were inadmissible as being hearsay. That was plainly correct. The articles could not be tendered as truth of their contents absent the authors being called as witnesses, and they were not. Further, on the appeal to the District Court the contention related only to one such article, and, as the learned primary judge found, it was tendered and became exhibit 19.[30][30]Reasons [54]-[55]. Mr McNicol also sought to tender a judgment of McMurdo J in Fitness First Australia Pty Ltd v McNicol.[31] The learned magistrate refused on the basis that any findings by McMurdo J were merely the opinion of that judge about the evidence before that court, in different proceedings on a civil dispute, where the onus of proof was on a civil standard.[31][2012] QSC 296. As the learned primary judge held, that conclusion was plainly correct.[32] The proceedings before McMurdo J concerned an application by Fitness First for injunctive relief for breach of a settlement agreement reached between Mr McNicol and Fitness First over the cancellation of Mr McNicol’s membership of that gym. The evidence in that proceeding, and the findings by McMurdo J, could not be admissible to prove or disprove facts in the criminal proceedings against Mr McNicol. All of the issues in the proceedings before the Magistrates Court were the subject of evidence in those proceedings.[32]Reasons [65]-[68], [74]. Further, to the extent that one witness, Ms Whale, had apparently given evidence in the Supreme Court proceedings different from that which she gave in Mr McNicol’s trial, Mr McNicol took advantage of that by cross-examining her in the inconsistency.[33][33]Reasons [70]-[72].Ground 8: error as to whether the complainant suffered fear, apprehension and emotional distress As developed orally this point focussed on what Mr McNicol said was the lack of any independent or credible evidence of the detriment sustained by the complainant. By this he was referring to the lack of evidence that the complainant sought medical assistance of some sort, and that the complainant’s mother did not refer to taking specific steps to remedy the distress felt by the complainant. The learned primary judge reviewed the evidence at the trial, in light of the relevant statutory provisions, s 359A, s 359B and s 359C of the Criminal Code 1899.[34] No error has been demonstrated in his Honour’s approach or analysis of the issues in this point.[34]Reasons [77]-[91]. The learned primary judge found, on a review of the evidence, that the learned magistrate’s findings were justified.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In considering the application for leave to appeal, the court examined the decision of the District Court of Queensland to dismiss the applicant's appeal. The District Court had found that the applicant failed to establish any legal, factual, or discretionary error on the part of the learned magistrate. The court reviewed the grounds of appeal raised by the applicant, including the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict, the admissibility of media articles and a Supreme Court judgment, and the evidence of fear, apprehension, and emotional distress suffered by the complainant. The court found that the learned primary judge had thoroughly reviewed the evidence, properly applied the relevant legal principles, and correctly interpreted the evidence presented. The court confirmed that the magistrate's findings were supported by credible and corroborated evidence, and there were no demonstrated errors in the trial proceedings or in the interpretation of the evidence. The court concluded that the learned primary judge was correct in dismissing the appeal and that no error of law was demonstrated. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was refused. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in the absence of demonstrated errors of law, fact, or discretion, an appeal will not be allowed to correct a perceived injustice. The court adhered to established legal principles in assessing the sufficiency of evidence and the admissibility of certain materials, and it followed prior authority in its analysis of the evidence presented. The court did not depart from any prior authority and maintained the consistency of the legal framework applied in such cases.